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PREFACE
This study is the first attempt to describe sys­
tematically and analyze critically the foreign policies 
of Jordan during the period 1947-1967* It is not intended 
as a diplomatic history but rather as a political analysis 
of Jordan's foreign policy. It is concerned with the as­
pirations of the Hashemite ruling dynasty and the policies 
pursued to achieve them.
This work is an application of the triangular ap­
proach. The main features of this approach is the study 
of foreign policy through the analysis of the interaction 
between the internal and the external settings which de­
termines the content and direction of the policy decisions 
of the state. The internal setting emphasizes the personal­
ity role of the decision maker, the political culture and 
authority relationships,and the political socialization 
and recruitment. The external setting involves the geo­
political environment, the nature of the situation, and 
state capabilities to take action in the form of an ini­
tiative or in response to external stimuli.
The foreign policy of Jordan has been treated in 
three main areas. The first was the Arab-Israeli con-
viii
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flict in which Jordan played a crucial role. Due to its 
economic and military limitations, Jordan could not sustain 
prolonged hostilities. Its economic progress and political 
stability could be secured only if peace prevailed in the 
region. This situation has been the most significant 
factor that forced the Kings of Jordan to attempt the con­
clusion of a peace treaty with Israel. The second was 
inter-Arab relations. Despite its economic limitations 
and political unviability, Jordan’s role proved to be de­
cisive as well as pivotal. Jordan's probelm with the Arab 
states has been one of leadership struggle, and to a lesser 
degree, its connections with the West. While the Hashem- 
ites claimed Aurab leadership, they failed to appreciate 
the gap between the objectives and the means to achieve 
them. The monarchy has constituted the major obstacle to 
cooperation and unity between the Hashemites and the prog­
ressive regimes. Third, failing to convince the Arab 
people of their leadership to Arab unity and Arabism, the 
rulers of Jordan resorted to parochial nationalism and 
associated themselves too closely with the Western Powers 
irrespective of the Arab popular opinion. Such associa­
tion was based on the Anglo-Jordanian treaties, which, un­
til 1956 encompassed all spheres of governmental activi­
ties through controlling the military, the economic and 
the political actions of Jordan. It was also based on the 
assumption that the Western Powers would protect the in-
dependence and the monarchy, and preserve the territorial 
integrity of Jordan, particularly against the progressive 
Arab regimes. In return, as a Western-oriented conserva­
tive monarchy, Jordan would serve as the foothold for the 
West in the Arab World, King Husayn's efforts to accede 
to the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine are cases 
in point. Further, the study concludes that Jordan's des­
tiny must be tied with a large Arab unity rather than a 
parochial nationalism backed by its association with non- 
Arab powers.
Ideally, the study of foreign policy should be 
based on the primary materials of the state papers still 
confined in the secret archives. This work, however, draws 
on Arabic and Western sources, both primary and secondary: 
general books on the region; memoirs of kings and politi­
cal leaders in Jordan, the United States, Israel and Britain; 
official releases of these governments; Arabic and foreign 
periodical literature and newspapers; and United Nations 
documents.
The transliteration system applied to the Arabic 
names used in this dissertation is phonetic. For the pur­
pose of originality, the names are rendered in English as 
they are pronounced in classical Arabic, I have applied 
this system to those names familiar to the Western reader. 
Thus, for instance, Husayn is substituted for Hussein,
Yaman for Yemen, and Hijaz for Hejaz,
THE FOREIGN POLICY OP JORDAN: 1947-1967 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Jordan is the product of peculiar circumstances.
Its creation was a political accident dictated by expe­
diency and the exigencies of World War I. Its existence 
has been that of an " incubator nation," its political 
development and survival have been unique among the states 
of western Asia.
This study will analyze Jordan's foreign policy 
1947-1967. It is by no means exhaustive, for it is de­
rived mainly from already accessible materials. Ideally, 
the study of foreign policy should be based on the pri­
mary materials of the state's papers still confined to 
the confidential archives.
The study, however, will be based on the memoirs 
of the prominent political leaders in Jordan, Israel,
Great Britain and the United States; from releases and 
documents of these states; public announcements; legis­
lative deliberations; treaties and agreements; and speeches 
of key figures in the countries under discussion. While
1
2much i3 derived from books on the region, a substantial 
source has been Arabic pul lications in the form of books, 
periodicals, and particularly the official collections of 
speeches by the rulers of Jordan.
This dissertation will analyze Jordan's foreign 
policy in three main areas. jPirst, Jordan's role in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict where its role has been paramount 
in view of the common long frontier and the uniq.ue geo­
graphy of that border. Second, Jordan's role in inter- 
Arab relations and its position in the Arab league. Third,, 
Jordan's, relations with the Great Powers, particularly 
Great Britain and the United States. In addition, the 
study will focus on the application of four key factors 
in decision-makinga the personality factor; the political 
culture; the political recruitment; situations, the ex­
ternal setting and the tactical capabilities.
The study of foreign policy and international 
relations seek to understand the behavior of nations Eind 
individuals acting for these states in their capacities 
as decision-makers. Accordingly, there are specific 
aspects of foreign policy to which the study of the indi­
vidual attitude has relevance. As national ideologies have 
bearing on matters of war and peace, so war and peace also 
depend on personality attitudes.
Herbert Eelman (ed.)," Social Psychological Ap­
proach to the Study of International Relations," Inter­
national Behavior. (New York; Holt, 1966), p. 566.
3Personality characteristics can influence the way 
a decision-maker responds to situations. His attitude may 
he affected by many factors including his cultural envi­
ronment, the kind of political system in which he operates, 
his role in the institutional framework, and his formative 
background. The latter may be considered as the cause for 
his certainty or insecurity about his future role, his dom­
inance , values and philosophy, need for achievement and 
power seeking. His education and intelligence as well as 
religious values and ideology also significantly influence 
the method by which a decision-maker approaches foreign 
policy. One author stated that the person who ultimately 
determine policy should possess certain leadership quali­
ties, Among these are; one, astute sense of socio- po­
litical climate ; two, deductive capacities and talent for 
synthesis and ; three, courage, " It is the scarcity of 
such talent that leads to so many political miscalculations,"
since significant political decisions may produce a chair •»- 
2
reaction. In studying the conduct of Jordan's foreign pol­
icy, the personality factor of the rulers can be seen as 
the dominant influencing factor in their approach to the 
development of Jordan's foreign relations.
The second factor is political culture. Accord­
ing to Almond political socialization is the process of
2
Kurt London, The Making of foreign Policy. (New 
York: Lippincott, 1965), p. 2Ô6,
4induction into the political culture creating loyalty of 
the individual to that political system.^ It is also the 
process by which political cultures are maintained and 
changed.4 Political culture, on the other hand, refers to 
the propensities or the psychological dimensions oi the 
system. It consists of peoples* beliefs, attitudes, val­
ues, skills and the special propensities of subcultui'es 
within the system.^ Professor Sidney Verba has defined 
the concept of political culture as follows:
The political culture of a society con­
sists of the system of empirical beliefs, expres­
sive symbols, and values which defines the sit- 
uationsin which political acticntakes place. It 
provides the subjective orientation to politics.6
The importance of studying political culture lies 
in the fact that it constitutes a subsystem of the inter­
national system. Secondly, since political culture ref­
lects the attitudes and orientation of the individual 
member of the society toward politics, such orientation 
constitutes the latent political tendencies and the pro­
pensities for political behavior. These propensities are
^Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds.), The Pol­
itics of the Developing Areas. ( Princeton, New Jersey; 
Princeton University lS*ess, i960), pp. 27, 30.
^Gabriel Almond and G. B. Powell, Jr., Compara» 
tive Politics: A Developmental Approach. ( Boston: little, 
Èrown and Ôompany, lifeb;, p. 64.
I^bid..p. 23.
^Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in 
Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds). Political Culture ^ d  
Political Development, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
tlniversity Press, 15ê6) p. 513.
5of great importance in explaining and predicting a state's 
political action, in understanding the psychological as- 
spects of political development and political change in
7
that nation. In the case of Jordan, political culture ap­
pears to have .influenced the personal conduct of King Ab­
dullah's foreign policy. This was facilitated by the lack 
of political involvement by the Transjordan population, and 
in view of the fact that the authoritarian culture of the 
Middle East has been largely molded by Islam, which liter­
ally means submission; that the ruler is the agent of God
8who must be obeyed. However, this situation changed sig­
nificantly with the introduction of the Palestine Arabs 
who were politically more involved, and whose loyalty to 
the Jordanian regime was less reliable.
The third factor is political recruitment. Each 
political system is constantly involved in recruiting to 
fill the roles of the political system. It is defined as 
the process of selection and induction of members of the 
society into specialized roles of the system by training 
them in appropriate skills and providing them with "poli­
tical cognitive maps" and values for the operation of that
Q
system. hecruitment may be accomplished by the universal-
7
Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 51.
Q
Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Devel­
opment. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 197Ü), p. 187.
^Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 31.
6isitic method whereby a role ia filled by election, examin-
!
ation, ability or performance. On the other hand, filling 
a role through friends, family ties and direct appointment 
is illustrative of the particularistic criteria. " Below 
the highest level, the problem of political recruitment 
in patriarchal, societies reduces itself largely to one of 
obtaining the ruler’s favor.
During King Abdullah's reign recruitment was mainly 
achieved through the particularistic method. The wealthy 
landlords constituted the elite who remained loyal to the 
Palace since their interests coincided with those of the 
ruler. Furthermore, the king appointed most key decision 
makers, the Palace Group, from the conservative loyal mi­
nority. However, unification with Arab Palestine signifi­
cantly altered this situation, as West Bankers were elected 
to the Parliament and held cabinet positions. However, 
since unification only one Palestinian became Prime Minis­
ter. The apparent reason was that only a conservative 
Transjordanian could be loyal to the Palace. In any case,
the inclusion of the Palestinians in the bureaucracy has
diminished the use of the particularistic pattern of re­
cruitment, while the presence of the West Bankers in the
army, especially the officer corps, has also diluted the
army’s loyalty to the Palace. However, the bedouin ele-
^°Ibid.. p. 438.
7ment continued to be the most reliable guardian of the 
throne. The psychological reason for the Bedouins' un­
swerving loyalty can be found in the difference in out­
look between them and the Palestinians who the Bedouins 
consider to be a threat to their favored position in the 
army.^^
The study of political recinaitment is important 
because it reveals the relationship between recruitment 
and personality, since the decision-makers and those as­
piring for power assume their political roles through this 
process. Thus by examining recruitment patterns of any 
nation, one can discover the attitudes, moods, morale, 
resoluteness, and the capacity for policy-making of the 
political elites of that system. Furthermore, by observing 
the actions of these policy-makers in both the internal 
and external fields, one can predict the viability and 
the projected objectives of that system.
Foreign policy is defined as the courses of action 
and the decisions relating to them that a state under­
takes in its relations with other states in order to at­
tain its national objectives and advance national interests. 
It is also a reaction to external stimuli and situations
^Robert BeVine, "Socialization, Social Structure, 
and International Images," International Behavior, ed. 
Herbert Kelman, ( New York: Holt, 1^66 ), p. ^6.^
812requiring response, A state acts when the following 
components can be ascertained: actors, goals, means and 
situation. Since the decision-makers act on behalf of 
the state, the key to explaining why a state reacts in a 
particular pattern lies in the way its decision-makers 
define the situation. Comprehension and appreciation of 
the situation requires the consideration of three distinct 
factors: one, the political environment in which the state 
operates; two, the specific reactions of other states to 
its policies and; three, the state's capabilities to 
undertake action in light of the first two factors,
These three factors may be termed as the setting,^^ 
Comprising the internal and external aspects of the poli­
tical environment, it involves the set of categories of 
potentially relevant factors and conditions which may 
affect the choices and actions of the state. Internal 
setting may include the skills of the population, the 
productivity of the industrial and the agricultural sec­
tors, which can limit the achievement of the state's 0b-
^^Charles Lerch, Jr,, and Abdul A, Said, Concepts 
of International Politics, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1953), PP» 30-31,
^^Ibid.. p, 32; and Charles Lerohe, Foreign Policy 
of the American People, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 196V], p, 14,
^^Richard Snyder, H,W, Bruck, and Burton Sapin, 
Foreign Policy Decision Making, (New York: The Free Press 
of Glencoe, 1963), p, 67,
9jectives. External setting, however, refers to such fac­
tors heyond the control of the state, such as actions of 
decision-makers in other states. The external setting 
is a viable factor because it depends upon what foreign 
decision-makers decide as important at various times.
As to external response, an action by a state may be re­
sisted nominally or extensively. In case of the latter, 
a state must be ready to devote a substantial portion of 
its capability to counter such resistance.
Another limitation on states' actions is cost 
risk calculations. Due to unforeseen contingencies, these 
tend to sharply delimit the scope of choice by the deci- 
sion-maicer. A further limitation is the consensus aspect. 
Execution of policy is affected by the nature of public 
opinion concerning steps taken or proposed. Since any 
foreign policy decision requires sacrifices on the part of 
the population, lack of public support reduces the credi­
bility of the move. Therefore its effectiveness in influ­
encing other nations.is diminished.
In the case of Jordan, achievement of its politi­
cal objectives appear to have been precluded to a large 
extent. This is due to the fact that Jordan's internal 
and external settings were incapable of sustaining the 
desire for achieving such objectives. It also appears
^^Lerche and Said, op. cit.. pp. 37038.
^^Kelman, op. cit.. p. 571.
10
that the rulers of Jordan may have been conducting their 
foreign policy in vacuum, for while they aspired to higher 
goals, they lacked the instruments. The discrepancy be­
tween the objectives and capabilities rendered the count­
ry's foreign policy feeble, thereby curtailing achieving 
of aspirations to bare minimum.
Having been overshadowed by foreign powers and 
placed in the background, virtually nothing has been writ­
ten specifically on Jordan's foreign relations. Aside 
from journalistic accounts and sporadic articles in schol­
arly literature, Jordan's foreign policy has not been ex­
plored, Thus while this study does not challenge the ex­
isting viewpoint, it elaborates and expands the current 
writings on the subject. For this reason, this disser­
tation aims at exploring a practically new subject.
OHiiPTER II 
JORDAN AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION
Historical Background
The Sykes-Picot and Anglo-Prench Agreements of May 
16, I9I6, and September 15, 1919, placed Transjordan with­
in the British sphere of influence which included Palestine 
and Iraq., The San Remo Agreement of April 25, 1920, de­
tached Jordan from Syria and included it under the Palestine 
Mandate.^ Transjordan provided a political strategic 
advantage for Britain and served as a land link between 
British oil interests in Iraq, and the Red Sea. Strategi­
cally, however, the region was crucial for the protection 
of the Suez Canal and the land route to the Persian Gulf.
It was contemplated also to be used for the resettling of
^On November 22, 1918, General Allenby issued the 
following declaration regarding the administration of the 
occupied enemy territories:
1. The southern region (Palestine) will be under 
direct British administration.
2. The eastern region (Inner Syria and Transjordan) 
will be under the administration of Amir Faysal.
3. The western region (Lebanon and the entire 
Syrian coastline) will be under direct French 
admini strati on.
During Faysal's administration in Damascus, Trans­
jordan was under Syrian administration. Munib Al-Madi and 
Suleiman Musa, Tariekh Al-Urdun Fi Al-Qam Al-Ishrin,
(Amman: n. p., 1959), p. 83.
11
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the Palestine Arabs once a Jewish National Home in Pales-
2
tine became an accomplished fact.
The area of Transjordan has never been in the past 
a separate independent entity. Under the Ottomans it was 
the southern province of Syria, However, since ancient 
times, it has been an inseparable part of Palestine. The 
Zionists have not forgotten this. They always have con­
sidered it in their expansionist plans, not as an Arab 
land, but purely as a Palestine land. Today, the Herut 
Party, the strongest in Israel, includes Transjordan on 
their map of Greater Israel and does not recognize its 
separation from Palestine, The majority of the Zionists 
blame Churchill for harming them and serving the Arabs 
in 1921, when he separated Palestine from East Jordan,^
The year 1921 ushered in a new system of adminis­
tration in East Jordan by Amir Abdullah's take-over of 
the area under direct British Mandate, His administra­
tion succeeded in ending anarchy and tribal war-fare. At 
the Jerusalem Conference, Churchill formally proposed that
2
Alec S, Kirkbride, A Crackle of Thorns: Expe­
rience in the Middle East, (london: Murray, 195b), p. l9.
^Ahmad Baha'uddin, Iktirah Dawlat Filistin. 
(Beirut; Al-Sharikah Al-Haditah lAl-fiba^aii, 1568), p, 89, 
The British delegate to the Permanent Mandate 
Commission declared that "Transjordan is not a part of 
Palestine, but it is a part of the area administered by 
the British Go-vemment as mandatory under the authority 
of the Palestine Mandate," The League of Nations, 11th 
Session, 1927, p. 111, See Al-Difa*. October 16, 1959,
13
Abdullah, as agent of Britain, should form a government 
in the area east of the Jordan with British financial and 
military aid, and that he should help in the restoration 
of law and order and should check nomadic intrusions into 
Syria.^ In return, Abdullah promised not to attack the 
French in Syria and to renounce all claims to Iraq where
5
his brother Paysal had been installed as king.
Amir Abdullah arrived in Transjordan with the 
intention of occupying Syria and restoring Hashemite rule 
in Damascus. Accordingly, he addressed a note to the 
"sons of the Syrian Homeland" urging them to join him as 
Vice-King of Syria in restoring Paysal’s tlirone. ^  Vdiile 
pledging friendship to Britain, he also was anxious to 
gauge British reaction to his plan. However, the British 
Government was committed to the recognition of the French
4p.G. Peak, the British Military Agent in Trans­
jordan communicated with his government that Abdullah should 
not be allowed to use Transjordan as a base of operations 
against the French. F.G. Peak, "Transjordan," Journal of 
the Royal Central Asian Society. Vol. XI, (1924^, p. 3^0; 
Also his book, A History of Jordan and its Tribes.(Miami; 
University of Miami, l95b;pp. l05, 3^3.
^Although without a throne, Amir Faysal held that 
the Iraqi throne was to be Abdullah's. Only when Abdullah 
renounced it did Faysal accept the kingship of Iraq. Ben­
jamin Shwadran, Jordan; A State of Tension. (New York:
Council for Middle JSastem Affairs Press, ±959), p. 132.
^Musa, op. cit.. p. 133. The British Government was 
opposed to Abdullah * s plan and asked Faysal and Husayn I 
to use their influence to stop him. Rohan Butler and E.L. 
Woodward (eds.). Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919- 
1939. (London: His Majesty's Stationary Cÿfice, p. 412.
14
sphere of influence in Syria, while maintaining a vague 
obligation to the Hashemites. Due to British objection 
and for financial reasons, Abdullah accepted the British 
offer to head an administration in Transjordan, as a face-
7
saving device for giving up his highly ambitious plans.
The offer provided a basis for his future schemes. 
While the British offer satisfied his ambitions temporar­
ily, Abdullah hoped that with the support of a great power 
like Britain, he could legitimately achieve his goals. 
Thus, while Transjordan was accepted by Abdullah as a nu­
cleus for his future kingdom, the creation of Transjordan
was intended by Britain to place Abdullah in an "unwanted
.e i
9
Q
territory." Nonethel ss, Abdullah was promised indepen­
dence at a later date.
Abdullah accepted the British offer without ar­
guing. This led the British Resident to observe, " . . .  
Whether his (Abdullah's) bellicose intention toward Syria 
had ever existed was a moot point." Kirkbride, op. cit.. 
p. 27. See Abdullah Bin Husayn, Al-Amali Al-Siyasiyya, 
(Amman: n. p., 1939). -------------- ----
O
John Bagot Slubb, The Story of the Arab Legion. 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 194b), p. $8; also Klirktride, 
op. cit., p. 19.
^The Abdullah-British agreement included a provi­
sion that Great Britain should use its good offices with 
France to secure the restoration of the Ajpab government in 
Syria, "with Amir Abdullah as its head." Baha'uddin Tuqan,
A Short History of Jord^. (London: Luzac, 1945), pp. 42- 
45; also Bhillip Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Devel­
opment. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 31Ô.
Abdullah claimed that Churchill promised him Syria 
as a price for surrendering the throne of Iraq to Faysal.
"In six months he (Churchill) would be able to congratu­
late us on the return of Syria to our hands." Phillip 
Graves (ed.). Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan.
15
The establishment of "Transjordan" under Hashemite 
administration severed this particular area from the juris­
diction of the proposed Jewish National Home in Palestine 
and formally demarcated the Western frontier of Transjordan. 
These two measures gave Abdullah effective protection 
against Zionist colonization.^^ At the same time, Britain 
appeased Abdullah in partial fulfillment of its promises 
to his father for joining the side of the Allies in 1915.^^
Abdullah Defends Arab Palestine
During the first decade of his rule, Abdullah kept 
himself scrupulously aloof from involvement in the Pales­
tine problem. His greatest ambition was to create a geo­
graphic Syria under his leadership, to include Syria, 
Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. This plan was his 
major obsession until his death in 1951. Since Syria and
(London; Jonathan Cape, 1950), p. 45.
However, according to Jarvis and Abu Al-Sha'ar, 
Britain never committed itself for such a project. In fact 
the British government was doing its utmost to obstruct 
the realization of this plan so that it would not antago­
nize the French, and perhaps, not to create obstacles which 
might obstruct the realization of establishing a Jewish 
National Home. C. S. Jarvis, Arab Command. (London: Hutch­
inson, 1943), p. 80; and Arne en Abu Al-Sha'ar, Mutha^arat 
Al-Malik Abdullah Bin Al-Husayn, (Sao Paolo: n.p,, l9$3)V
p” i79-‘8^':—  ------------------------
^^No Jews lived within the boundaries of Trans­
jordan. Jewish National Home was made "inapplicable to 
Transjordan." Great Britain Parliament, Papers by Command, 
(London: H. M, Stationery Office, December, 1922), 178$.
^^Royal Institute of International Affairs, Docu- 
ments on International Affairs, (London: Oxford Univers!ty
Ff^s ,-T9‘28')”,"Tp ."TIT-l'g.---
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Lebanon were under French mandate, he envisioned a partial
fulfillment of this dream by uniting only Palestine with
Transjordan, this time with the help of Britian which was
in control of Palestine. But in Palestine, there were two
forces - Arab nationalism and Zionism - and both were in
12opposition to such a plan. Nevertheless, in 1934 he laid
claim first to the religious and then to the political
leadership of the Arabs in Palestine. In his letter to the
British High Commissioner dated July 25, 1934, he said;
As the ruler of an Arab country neighboring Pales­
tine, and as a Moslem descendent of the Prophet, 
who is near to its Holy Places especially the Aqsa 
Mosque, and as a leader who bears a large responsi­
bility for the Great Arab Revolt, and as overseer 
of the conditions at which my people the Arabs of 
Palestine have arrived . . .  I saw it imperative 
to write to your Excellency about the Arabs in Pal­
estine for the time had come . . .  I communicate 
to you the fears of my people in Palestine as 
frankly as possible. . . .  My loyalty to my Arab 
people and my British friends equally. 13
By so doing, Abdullah made Transjordan the base and the 
nucleus for an expanding kingdom,
Abdullah adopted the Palestine case.^^ Persis­
tently, he expressed his frank opinion to the High Commis­
sioners regarding the Balfour Declaration and Jewish
12Palestine Arabs were divided: one group led by 
the Huseinis who opposed Abdullah, Zionism, and the Bri­
tish; the other led by the Nashashibi family were pro- 
Abdullah and more conciliatory.
^^Abu Al-Sha'ar, op. cit., 4th ed., pp. 258-261.
^^Husa, op. cit.. p. 453.
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immigration.^^ On October 18, 1933, he wrote to the High
Commissioner in Transjordan;
The Arabs in Palestine believe that the Zionists 
intend to exploit the catastrophe of the German 
Jews, who embarked on fulfilling their known desire 
to make Palestine a Jewish country. They have re­
vealed their intentions in a manner that exhausted 
Arab patience. . . .  If the Arabs, Moslem and 
Christian, began to feel the danger of extinction 
and decline due to those intruders, I do not blame 
them, especially when they realize that a great 
nation like Germany despite organization and civi­
lization had feared for its existence from those 
Jews who persisted to feel like strangers despite 
their connection with the indigenous people there 
for long periods of time. V/hat can we say of the 
Arabs in Palestine who have been surprised by the 
Jewish immigration? . . . How can they protect 
themselves from this great catastrophe when other 
nations are releasing to them Jews with European 
education in science and industry, and with mechan­
ical and military knowledge such as the German 
Jews. . . . Compelled by impartial cooperation and 
in fulfillment of my duty to the common interest,
I must be frank. . . . Nationalism is a moving 
force for this turbulence. This is the same spirit 
that drives the Palestine Arab to demonstrations 
and rebellion. Added to that is fear of extinc­
tion whose manifestations have been shown in a dis­
turbing manner throughout the country and threat­
ening the neighboring Arab countries. . . .  16
15"His Majesty's Government views with favor the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jew­
ish race and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood 
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil 
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed in 
any other country by such Jews who are fully contented 
with their existing nationality." Leonard Stein, The Bal- 
four Declaration, (New York: Simon and Schuster, l961). 
p, 521.
^^Abu Al-Sha'ar, op. cit.. pp. 255-257.
Jewish immigration increased from 4,755 in 1931 to 
30,327 in 1933 and reached a peak of 61,854 in 1935. The 
Jewish Agency for Palestine, Statistical Handbook of Jewish 
Palestine, 1947, p. 103.
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The Balfour Déclaration was a betrayal of all pro­
mises made to the Arabs and that betrayal was to condition 
subsequent events. Arab hostility was not slow to show 
itself in Palestine and in the most violent fashion, a 
clear indication of the Arabs' hostility to the Zionist 
project of making Palestine Jewish. The British became 
aware of the enormous difficulties that Jewish immigration 
and colonization would cause. But the British had gone too 
far in their support for Zionist ambitions to retreat, 
especially since the Zionist lobby v/as extremely powerful. 
But to the British Government, the Balfour Declaration 
was intended to facilitate the creation of a "National 
Home" and not a "Jewish State." In a statement on British 
policy in Palestine, Churchill stressed that the Jewish
National Home did not mean "the imposition of a Jewish
17nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine." Accord­
ingly, there was no intention to bring about the "disap­
pearance or the subordination of Arabic population, Ian-
1 ft
guage, or culture in Palestine."
Transjordan and Britain on Palestine 
As the disturb'-ances in Palestine grew more menacing,
17J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle 
Bast, (New York: Van Nostrand, 1 ^ 5 o ) , p. 15.
^^Great Britain, Parli^entary Papers, (Correspon­
dence of the Colonial Office With the Palestine Arab Dele­
gation and the Zionist Organization), Cmd. 17Û0« 192&.
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the Hi üh CoiiLmirjeioner met with Abdullah in Amman and re­
quested his iiiediation in the Palestine issue, ,/hile Abdul­
lah agreed to undertake the task, he, in return, asked the 
British government to intercede with Prance for the unifi­
cation of Transjordan and Syria under his leadership. The 
alternative to the unity with Syria was his demand to join 
Palestine to Transjordan. A treaty similar to that between 
Iraq and Britain would be entered into by the unified 
state.
Under criticism and pressure from the Arab nation­
alists, Abdullah decided to maintain a policy of noninter­
vention, declaring that the conflict in Palestine was the 
concern of the Arabs in Palestine only.
As the pace of strife in Palestine was accelerated, 
the leading tribal chiefs in Jordan met on June 26, 1936, 
and decided to enter Palestine to aid the Arabs, and warned 
Abdullah that:
. . .VVe must cross the Jordan to win Palestine. .
. . We will warn the Amir that the Arabs of Pales­
tine must be given freedom and liberated from 
Jewish dominance within ten days or we will go to 
free them. . . . Freedom for Transjordan is useless 
without freedom in Palestine. 20
While Abdullah was able to convince the chiefs to
delay their action hoping that the British government
would do justice to the Palestine Arabs, he expressed his
Oriente Moderno, April, 1936, pp. 180-81.
on
New York Times, June 27, 1936.
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fears as he declared;
. . .  I do not know how much longer I will be able 
to hold them. Thousands of Transjordan Bedouins 
edge near the Palestine borders. . . .  I have held 
them for two months. . . . But if the problem is 
not quickly settled, I fear grave troubles in Pal­
estine. . . . We cannot interfere. . . . But the 
Arabs will hold tight to their rights until Great 
Britain realizes the justice of the Arab claims. 21
Abdullah's influence over the Transjordan volun­
teers had prevented them from entering Palestine, and the
22British government expressed its gratefulness.
As the Arab heads of state, Abdullah, Ibn Saud, 
and Ghazi, King of Iraq, assured the Palestine Arabs of 
their support, they urged them to avoid violence. The Bri­
tish government, in an effort to allay Arab fears, declared 
that Jewish immigration would not be unlimited.
. . . There can be no question of the total stop­
page of Jewish immigration into Palestine. The 
guiding principle as regards the admission of immi­
grants is the policy of absorptive capacity? His 
Majesty's government contemplates no departure 
from that policy. 23
Britain was then confronted with two fronts; the 
Arabs who resolved to revent the creation of a Jewish 
commonwealth, and the Jevb who were determined to establish 
their national home through immigration and land purchases. 
The British, not really knowing what they were trying to
2^Ibid.. June 14, 1936.
22Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, (5th series), 
(Commons), Vol. CCDKIII, Col. 1320.
^^The Palestine Report. 1936, p. 21.
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(Jo, found tVio:;irielvoa fighLing the Jews on one side find the 
Arabs on the o t h e r . b u r d e n e d  by the I'ajfour declaration, 
Britain was committed to the Jewish cause and political 
cooperation between the Arabs and the Jews. The ultimate 
result would have inflicted serious injuries upon the Arab 
community for the "crux of the problem was the bearing of
25Jewish national progress upon the Arab national prospect."
On January 10, 1937, Abdullah sent a memorandum 
to the Royal Commission which was sent to investigate the 
Palestine situation explaining the Arab rights and aspira­
tions, and the falsified Jewish claims. He said:
The Jews argue that the Balfour Declaration 
gave them a national home in Palestine. This could 
have been possible, logically and legally, if Pal­
estine were desert without people. But Palestine 
was inhabited by its original people when this de­
claration was issued. What right has a nation to 
dispose of another's homeland and award it to others 
while its people are still living?
Balfour did not have a limit to his declara­
tion, but left it open as if he wanted it to contin­
ue forever, or until no one Palestine Arab survives 
- until, the Jews say, when they accomplish the 
eviction of the Arabs from their homeland and the 
erection of a Jewish kingdom on its ruins. Thanks 
to Balfour who was generous with somebody else's 
money or property without his knowledge or opinion 
on the subject. 26
^^King Husayn of Jordan, Uneasy Lies the Head.
(New York: Geis, 1962), p. 119.
^^Arnold Toynbee, "The British JVlandate for Pales­
tine," Survey of International Affairs. 1930, p. 227.
^Siusa, op. cit.. p. 457.
The Balfour declaration was included in the Versaille 
Treaty of 1919, the provisions of which were approved by 
Faysal, Abdullah's brother, on condition that the Arabs ob­
tain their independence as demanded by Faysal in his memor-
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Although Abdullah appeared to reject the Balfour 
Déclaration, he nevertheless accepted it, Abdullah had 
trust in Britain that ultimately, it would redeem her pro­
mises to the Arab nation. That was the core of Abdullah’s 
political belief. But, at the same time, he understood 
that Britain also had to redeem the promise she had given 
to the Jewish people in the Balfour Declaration. Accord­
ingly, he warned the Arabs not to ask Britain to break her
andum to the British Foreign Office dated the 4th of Jan­
uary, 1919. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 3rd ed., 
(New York; Capricorn Books, 1965), p. 439.
The Versaille Treaty was not ratified nor acknow­
ledged by King Husayn I (father of Paysal and Abdullah), 
in view of the great injustices done to the Arabs by the 
Allies, particularly their refusal to create the promised 
Arab kingdom. Had this promise been fulfilled, Zionism 
would not have entrenched itself within an Arab kingdom, 
and the Middle East would have been a peaceful region to­
day. Stewart Erskine, King Faisal of Iraq. (London: Hutch­
inson, 1933), p. 99.
In an interview with Turkish Prime Minister Ismat 
Inonu, he was asked if the Arab circles accused Turkey of 
supporting Israel. He replied:
"We were not those who allied with the Jews 
in the previous war. We were not those who agreed 
to the Balfour Declaration. . . .  It was the Arabs 
that did this, the Arabs themselves. . . . They 
are namely El-Said, and the like . . . Faysal . . . 
because those were the allies of England, allies 
with the Jews, allies with the enemies. They sac­
rificed us for their personal ambitions."
Nasir Eddin Al-Nashashibi, Matha Jara Fi Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 
(Beirut: Al-Maktab Al-Tigari, I96I), pp. 103-1Ô4; also see 
Appendix 4 in Prank Gervasi, The Case for Israel, (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1967), p. 191.
The Balfour Declaration implied unlimited Jewish 
immigration. The Zionists attempted to purchase or lease 
land for Jewish settlers. Although Transjordan was outside 
the area for the Jewish National Home, in 1933, Abdullah, 
himself leased to the Jews 65,000 dunums in the Ghor Al- 
Kabid for 99 years for 20,000 Palestine pounds. Carl 
Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, (New York: 
Capricorn Books, I960), p. 492,
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promises to the Jews - for he might have feared that one
27broken promise would justify another.
■<Vhen the British Royal Commission arrived in Pales­
tine in the summer of 1937 to investigate solutions to the 
problem such as partitioning, Abdullah sent them a memor­
andum showing the danger of such division and decided to 
assume the role of mediator. He submitted a twelve point 
proposal, the key points of which was uniting Transjordan
with Palestine under an Arab monarchy with adequate safe-
28guards for the Jewish minority.
'^^ The London Times. April 6, 1921,
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The proposal included the following recommenda-
'1, A united Arab kingdom of Palestine and Trans­
jordan to be established under an Arab monarchy 
that is able to execute its responsibility and 
to implement its obligations,
2, The kingdom will award special regime to the 
Jews in the Jewish areas which will be designa­
ted by a committee of British, Arabs, and Jews,
3. The Jews will enjoy complete privileges similar 
to those enjoyed by privileged administrations.
4. The Jews will be represented in the Arab state 
parliament according to their number; they will 
be represented in the ministry,
5. Jewish immigration - at a reasonable scale - 
will be restricted to the areas of special admin­
istration,
6, The Jews will not have the right to purchase 
land or receive immigrants outside the Jewish 
area,
7, These provisions are for 10 years only, 8 for 
experiment, the remaining two to give a final 
decision; then independence will be announced 
and the mandate terminated.
8, If the Arabs detect the good intentions of the 
Jews, Jewish immigration to the Arab parts will 
be allowed under Arab discretion.
9. The British mandate will continue during the ten
tiens;
24
Abdullah believed that by uniting Palestine with 
Transjordan as a first step in the Syrian unification plan, 
he could put an end to the problems which had plagued 
Palestine. By creating a larger Arab government with an 
army to defend it and with an efficient administration to 
run it, he believed that peace could reign once illegal 
immigration was checked. With these proposals, Abdullah 
challenged the commission to propose a more efficient solu­
tion than his.^^
Having investigated the conditions in Palestine, 
the Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Peel 
came to the conclusion that partitioning was the best solu­
tion. It reported;
. . . Manifestly, the problem cannot be solved by 
giving either the Arabs or the Jews all they want.
. . . While neither race can justly rule all Pal­
estine, we see no reason why if it were practicable, 
each race should not rule part of it. . . . Parti­
tion seems to offer at least a chance of ultimate 
peace. 30
The Peel report recommended the termination of the
years symbolically, merely for observation and 
control in the united state.
10. No objection will be made to the stay of the 
British army for these ten years.
11. At the end of the eighth year and the beginning 
of the ninth, the government of the united state 
and its parliament must make a final decision 
and implement the choice. . . . "  Musa, op. cit..
p. 459.
PQ^
Husayn, op. cit., p. 120.
^^Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, (Palestine 
Royal Commission Report. ï^ eel), Cmd. 5479, 1937, p. 375.
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mandate and the partitioning of Palestine into two indepen­
dent states: a Jewish state, and an Arab state consisting 
of Transjordan united with the Arab part of Palestine.
This idea pleased Abdullah. The scheme, however, 
did not materialize. After the British government changed 
its mind regarding the partition plan, it invited the Arab 
governments of Transjordan, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi 
Arabia to the London Conference to discuss the Palestine
•50
problem.^ After the convening of the conference, late in 
January, 1939, the British government issued the famous 
White Paper which recommended the creation of an indepen­
dent Palestine state after ten years,
Pre-World War II British policy methods had antag­
onized most of the Arab world. Britain now tried to improve
% b i d . . p. 381.
A third sector was to include the Holy cities of 
Jerusalem and Bethlehem with the immediate surrounding 
areas and a narrow corridor to the sea. This sector was 
to remain under British mandate.
^^Qn November 9, 1938, Britain issued a statement 
recognizing the ties that bound Arab Palestine to the other 
Arab countries. Toynbee, Op. cit.. 1938, p. 443.
^^Musa, op. cit.. p. 462.
The Conference which ended on March 17, 1939, showed 
that the major obstacle to any compromise lay in the judi­
cial basis of the problem. The Arabs demanded the abroga­
tion of the Balfour Declaration and replacement of the man­
date by a treaty similar to that concluded with Iraq in 
1930. In order to secure Arab acceptance of a compromise, 
the McDonald White Paper was issued on May 17. It was con­
sidered a positive step in the interest of the Arabs since 
it stated that the Arabs in Palestine should not be made 
subjects of a Jewish state against their will. Great Bri­
tain, Parliamentary Papers. Cmd. 6019, 1939.
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its reputation by actually taking the initiative for a 
Pan-Arab policy which would remove the grievances which 
had been hampering Anglo-Arab relations. One observer 
commented; "It is possible that the future history of the 
British Empire may in the end depend on its Arab policy 
now than any other single factor.
Britain's major consideration for such a shift in 
policy were several. First, Britain would strengthen the 
Anglo-Arab alliance if she gave support to Arab national­
istic aspirations. Second, unification of the Arab states 
under British influence, considered a tactical measure to 
drive the French from the Levant, could realize Britain's 
policy of creating a Hashemite dominated state, thereby 
fulfilling its long awaited promises. Third, Britain may 
have wanted to convey to the United States and the Zionists 
the fact that she no longer would allow herself to be the 
Jewish catspaw in Palestine, Britain hoped that an Arab 
political body would be more effective in dealing with the 
Palestine problem than the Palestine Arabs themselves, and 
that a Pan-Arab front would be more effective in counter­
balancing the Zionist ambitions than was the case at the 
London Conference,
G, Frere, "Arab Chessboard," Spectator. June
7, 1946, p, 577.
s.
Middle Eastern Affairs. Vol. VI, (March, 1955), p. 68,
35j, 8, Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League,"
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Amir Abdullah's initiative and communications 
to the British Government regarding the future of Pales­
tine brought him severe criticism from Arab political lead­
ers who suspected his personal ambitions in Palestine. In 
a letter to Abdul- Hameed Said, head of the Young Mens*
Muslim Association in Egypt, Abdullah defended his position.
. . .  I was fortunate to have established 
a government in Transjordan and excluded it from 
the provisions of the Balfour Declarations, • • •
The Declaration was implemented quietly. The num­
ber of Jews has increased and their influence aug­
mented. . . .  In 1921, their number did not exceed 
one hundred thousand; today, it increased to four 
hundred fifty thousand. Now they own the most 
fertile land, as they have established themselves 
everywhere. . . .  Zionism is based on three pillars; 
the Balfour Declaration; the European nations which 
decided to rid themselves of the Jews, and which 
recommended Palestine for their National Home and; 
the Arab extremists who do not accept any solution 
- except on their terms-. In the meantime, Pales­
tine is breathing its last breath. I was informed 
that the Jews have requested the extension of the 
Mandate so that they would be able to purchase more 
land and bring in new immigrants. . • • Palestine, 
in its catastrophe, is unlike any other country. . . , 
Palestine duffers the danger of dominance by one 
nation over another. The remedy for Palestine 
lies in the hastening to halt this danger and lim­
iting the invasion. . . .  I find it my religious 
duty and nationalistic obligation to prevent the 
disadder by uni ting Palestine with Transjordan, 
thereby increasing the Arab population by one half 
million- to maintain majority-. In addition, the 
Palestine Arabs will be in control of the admin» 
istration of the state, the Parliament, and the 
army which will defend it. . . . controls its shores, 
and closing its doors to secret immigration. . . .  36
The outbreak of World War II also dimmed Abdullah's
plana in Palestine. But with the proposed French plan to
^^Musa, op. cit.. p. 460.
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make Syria a monarchy, the Great Syria Plan was revived, 
especially when Ahdur Rahman Shahhandar, an ardent Syrian 
ally to Abdullah, visited Amman in 1939 and was reported 
to be supporting Abdullah for the Syrian throne.
As World War II broke out, Abdullah commenced his 
call for the unification of geographic Syria, the aim of 
which was to combine the Arab forces to check the Zionist 
invasion. "Syrian unity must precede any other Arab uni­
fication. It is imperative to have Palestine in this 
unity. . . .
The report of the Anglo-American Investigating Com­
mission of March 13, 1946, was disappointing to Arab aspir­
ations. Abdullah communicated to the British government 
that:
The report placed the case in the worst sit­
uation ever. The report which permitted one hun­
dred thousand immigrants to enter Palestine, also 
indicates a policy of turning Palestine into a Jew­
ish country. . . .  If there is value or wei^t to 
the Muslim East from Burma to Tangiers, it is then, 
the duty of Attlee and Bevin to correct the situa­
tion. 39
In his reply to Abdullah, King George VI said that
^^G. E. Kirk, The Middle East in the War. 1939- 
1946, (London: Oxford Üniversity Press, 195&), p/ 84.
^®Musa, op. cit.. p. 462.
On March 3, 1544, Abdullah cabled F, D. Roosevelt 
drawing his attention to the pro-Jewish attitude of Con­
gress whose stand "brings pain which is felt by every 
Easterner. Itirther, the deliberations of Congress contra­
dict the principles of national freedom and eliminating 
tyranny which the United States is fighting for." Ibid.
^%bid.. p. 463.
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his government awaits the opinions of the Arab governments 
before finalizing the decisions taken by the Commission. 
Similarly, President Truzfian, in his reply to Abdullah's 
cable said that there would not be any basic changes in 
the Palestine situation without consulting Arab and Jewish 
leaders, and that the United States would not take any de­
cision regarding the Commission’s report without consulting 
the government of Jordan.However, despite these assur­
ances, both western powers preceded with their pro-Zionist 
policies. 4"^
Jordan's negotiations for independence were received 
with indignation by Zionist circles. Although the Jewish 
Agency had reconciled itself to the separation of Trans­
jordan from Palestine, many radical Zionists still insisted 
that Jordan was included within the provisions of the Jew­
ish National Home. Realizing the Zionist danger, Abdullah 
called upon all the Arabs to cooperate more closely and to 
be ready to defend the Arab homeland with their lives if 
n e c e s s a r y . I n  his coronation speech on IVIay 25, 1946, 
Abdullah affirmed his defense of Arab Palestine: "Y/e pro­
mise God a holy war in defense of Palestine to keep it an 
Arab country.
40lbid.
41lbid.
4^New York Times, Jpnuary 28, 1946. 
^%usa, cp. Gi t . , p. 464.
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The Arab League and Palestine
At the Bludan Conference, 8-12 June, 1946, the Arab 
countries, including Jordan, decided on direct Arab inter­
vention in support of the rights of Arab Palestine. The 
Zionist reply to the Bludan decision was the dynamiting of 
ten bridges connecting Palestine with its Arab neighbors 
and the attacking of police and customs posts inside Jor­
dan.
After the end of the War, the British government 
was still indecisive regarding its policies in Palestine. 
While the Arabs persisted in their intransigence, the Zi­
onists acted positively and vigorously. While the Pales*
tine Arabs were backed by the Arab League, the Zionists
45too had found a new and powerful support in America.This 
widened the scope of the problem and caused it to become 
an international rather than a localized dispute.
In an effort to bridge the gap between the Jews 
and the Arabs, the British Government held conferences in 
London with the representatives of the Arab Governments,
In the first conference, which lasted from September 10 to 
October 2, 1946, Britain proposed the Morrison Plan which 
was rejected by the Arabs. The second conference took 
place on January 28, 1947, when Britain proposed a new plan,
^^Musa, op. pit,, p. 464.
^^Aqil Hyder Hasan Abidi, Jordan; A Political Study; 
1948- 1957, (New York; Asia Publishing House, l9bb), p. %4.
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the Bevin Plan, which was also rejected hy the Arabs,
Commenting on Britain’s handling of the Palestine 
question, an Arab politician wrote;
Britain came to realize that, in her hand­
ling of Palesting, she had launched an irresist­
ible force of Jewish aspirations against the im­
movable obstacle of Arab nationalism, and that no 
practical solution lay in her hands. Like a sig­
nalman who had mistakenly set two trains rushing 
at each other on the same set of lines, she could 
only bury her face in her hands sind refer the mat­
ter to Providence, 47
At this time, the British Government declared that she
would take the case to the Unitad Nations.
Conclusion
The establishment of the Transjordan Amirate came 
as a face-saving solution to both Amir Abdullah and Great 
Britain. Having forfeited the throne of Iraq, Amir Abdullah 
purported destination was Syria to restore King Paysal's
^^The Morrison Plan was based mainly on the rec- 
commendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry.
The Plan envisaged converting the Mandate into a trustee­
ship and dividing Palestine into Jewish and Arab provinces. 
The Plan would ultimately lead to either a unitary state 
or to partition.
According to the Bevin Plan, Palestine would be 
divided into sectors with considerable self government.
Both nationalities would be represented in the High Com­
missioner's Advisory Council. The Mandate would be ter­
minated in five years, and Jewish immigration would be al­
lowed at the rate of four thousand per month for a period 
of two years. After that trial period, a new arrangement 
would be made; Palestinians would progressively be taken 
in the central government, and at the end of four years, 
a constituent assembly would be convoked to establish an 
independent state. Ibid.
4^Emi1 Bustani, March Arabesque, (London: Ebenzer 
and Sons, Ltd., Trinty Press, l$6l), p. 70.
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throne from the French. The British felt that it was time 
to come to an understanding with him, for they suspected 
if Ahdullah should attack Syria the French would crush him 
and occupy the territory east of the Jordan. This the Bri­
tish had to prevent, With British persuasion, Abdullah 
abandoned his plan and remained in Transjordan. His de­
cision was dictated by economic, military and political 
considerations. He realized that a campaign against the 
French would require vast funds which he did not possess 
nor have access to. The force which he could assemble was 
no match for the French army in the Levant. A third factor 
was that since Britain would have prevented him from ad­
vancing through its Transjordan territory, the Amir knew 
that he could not cope with this situation either. A 
forth, although the British considered Transjordan to be 
of little value, installing Amdullah as its Amir to pacify 
it would benefit Britain in two ways: first, the British 
domain would be increased by precluding French occupation 
of the territory and; second, Britain would impress upon 
the Arab and the world their sincerity with regard to her 
promises and international obligations, namely to create 
an independent Arab kingdom.
By consenting to adminsiter Transjordan, Abdullah 
may have achieved a tactical victory. He considered the 
territory a hsord-won fief, and made it the nucleus for an 
expanded kingdom since he never abandoned his ambitious
33
plans to unite the Syrian provinces.
The external setting, namely opposition, of Syria, 
Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Prance and to some extent, 
Britain to his plans, precluded for all practical purposes 
the realization of this scheme. However, Abdullah’s loyal­
ty To Britain was rewarded when the Arab sector of Pales­
tine came under his administration, in 1948, thereby part­
ially fulfilling his personal dream.
CHAPTER III 
JORDAN AND THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 
Background
The United Nations' partition plan for Palestine 
was approved by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, 
by thirty-three to thirteen, with ten abstentions. This 
was followed by a British declaration to terminate the man­
date on the 15th of August, 1948, which was revised to 
May 15.
The Arab governments, including Jordan, met at Alai 
in Lebanon on October 7, 1947, and decided to "support Pal­
estine Arabs in order to enable them to defend themselves 
and their e x i s t e n c e . T h e  Arab League convened a confer­
ence in Cairo on December 8, 1947, in which they declared 
that partitioning was illegal and promised their support in 
weapons and funds to the Jaysh Al-Inqath (Army of Libera­
tion) under the command of the Iraqi General, Ismail Safwat. 
Furthermore, despite the advice of the military experts, 
the League decided that in the event of partition the Arab 
armies would enter Palestine to restore it to its inhabit-
4viusa, op. cit.. p. 466.
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ants who possessed the inviolable right to self-determin- 
2
ation.
Of all the Arab states, Transjordan alone had a 
long standing interest in Palestine, since it was considered 
a part of the Great Syria Plan. Thus, when King Parouk 
announced in the League Political Committee that the Arab 
armies would enter Palestine to liberate it and hand it 
over to its people, Abdullah in order to assuage the fears 
of the Arabs declared to the Arab News Agency on April 14, 
1948;
. . . This is not a time of greed for any Arab 
government. . . . After liberating this land, 
^alestin^. . . its people will have the last 
word /to determine their destiny/ without compul­
sion. No doubt Jordan and Palestine are one. Any 
assistEince from any Arab state given Palestine, I 
shall consider an assistance to Jordan. 3
However, despite his claim to quiet Arab public 
opinion, Abdullah's approach to the partition resolution 
preceded the determination of the League to intervene mili­
tarily in Palestine. Jordan's discussions with Britain 
through Prime Ministers Tawfiq Abul-Huda and Bmest Bevin 
during the revision of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty in February, 
1948, indicated that Jordan planned to administer the parts 
of Palestine adjacent to Transjordan after the British
2
Had a plebiscite been conducted, the partition 
would have been defeated, since two thirds of the papula­
tions were Arabs. Further, some local Jews led by Magnes 
and Poper objected to the plan. From a speech by King 
Husayn at the Press Club, Washington, D. C., November 7, 
1967.
^Arab News Agency, April 14, 1948.
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evacuation. Since the Palestine Arabs, unlike the Jews, 
did not possess organized administrative machinery, the 
greatest majority of the Palestinians urged Abdullah to 
send his army to protect them after the British withdrawal.^ 
It was reported that Bevin had agreed to the plan and that 
both Syria and Egypt would, in the same manner, administer 
the adjacent parts of Arab Palestine according to the par­
tition plan. However, Bevin warned Huda that Jordan should 
not go beyond the partition lines to occupy any area of the
5
Jewi sh part.
The Jordan-British discussions were based on the
fact that partition was forthcoming and thus all parties
had to accept it without any choice. Furthermore, Jordan's
acceptance of the proposed partition should be considered
in the light of the inability of the Arab governments to
take effective action in Palestine, as was evident later 
6on.
Musa, op. cit.. p. 469.
^Jobn Bagot Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs, (New 
York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957), p. 63; also 
Nashashibi, op. cit., p. 77.
In his memoirs, Glubb said it was decided that the 
Legion, in case it entered Palestine, was not to fight but 
was only to occupy the Arab part according to the Partition 
Plan of 1947.
"I personally was against the idea of the Legion's 
entry in Palestine. I told Abdullah and Huda of 
this, but Huda told me, 'I..assure you, Glubb, we 
will not fight. I know what the League wants. It 
does not want war at all."' Nashashibi, op. cit.,
p. 146.
ronically, the idea of partition which Jordan had
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Jordan and the Partition Plan 
King Abdullah's interest in the Partition Plan 
was determined by three considerations: his ambition for 
territorial expansion; the indecisiveness and evasiveness 
of the British Government regarding a Palestine settlement; 
and finally, inter-Arab rivalries toward Abdullah's poli-
7
tical aspirations.
The Government of Jordan had suggested to the
Arab league that its army alone be given the task of
containing the Zionists, provided that the Arab states 
finance the increase in troops and the purchase of arms, 
Jordan's argument in this connection was based on the fact
that it was not a United Nations member. But the Arab
states refused this suggestion for several reasons: first,
Jordan's political and military life was tied exclusively 
with that of Britain. The Jordan army was commanded and 
officered by British personnel. Thus the danger of leak­
age of operational plans was present. Second, coggizant of 
Abdullah's ambitions, they feared, once he was in full 
control of Arab Palestine, he would annex it to Jordan, 
Third, they suspected that he under pressure from Britain 
might reach a settlement with the Zionists. Fourth, his
welcomed in 1947 is today the official demand which the 
Arab states desire to attain,
^Jon and David KLmche, Both Sides of the Hill; 
Britain and the Palestine War, llondon: Seeker and War- 
Bûrg,"T9ÏÏO), -p-p-, 55-6a:-----
38
control would perpetuate Bid tish presence in the Arab 
world. However, in their meeting of April 25, 1948, the 
foreign ministers finally decided that the Arab armies
Û
would enter Palestine. Accordingly, the Jordan army was 
given a subsidy of one and one half million pounds for 
the proposed combined military operation.^
Having been well informed about the Zionist strength, 
the Jordan government counseled the Arab states to arrive 
at a peaceful solution. Jordan did not wish to devote 
its scarce resources to a military e f f o r t . P r o m  the 
day partition was voted in the United Nations, Abdullah 
accepted it, though not o p e n l y . H e  had hoped that his 
earlier proposals to the Royal Commission would material­
ize this time.
Jordan's Efforts to Avoid War
icing Abdullah wished to make his intentions clear 
to the Zionists, while maintaining his position vis a vis
Q
The decision was based on two main reasons: one, 
to prevent loss of Arab land to the Zionists and; two, 
to prevent the "Zionist terrorists" from expelling Arab 
farmers and townsmen from their properties. King Husayn's. 
Speech at the Press Club, Washington, November 7, 1967.
Q
^Musa, op. cit.. p. 470.
^^On May 15, 1948, the combined Arab force was 
21,500. In the final phase of the war, the Arab force 
numbered 40,000 facing 60,000 Israelis. Musa, op. cit.e 
p. 472; Max Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs. (New lorl: 
Pantheon Books, 1966), p. 39.
Abidi. op. cit.. p. 25.
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the Arab leaders. Against odds, he steered tactfully. He
took the initiative of inviting Zionist representatives
to his Palace for peace talks based on the partition plan,
12He would explore every means to secure peace, Y/hile he 
was eager for a peaceful settlement, he sensed that the 
Zionists were uncompromising. On April 21, he told the 
Arab News Agency:
The present conflict aims at displacing a 
nation by another, . , , I still had remnants of 
hope to find peace and cooperation before the in­
cidents at Deir Yassin, etc, I told the Arab League 
delegation last fall: if the Jews want peace, we 
also want peace; but if we are compelled to defend 
Palestine, that we shall do. The matter of peace 
is in the hands of the Jews, if they can get rid 
of their haughtiness and accept a compromise with 
the Arabs, . . .  As to Jerusalem, it is the res­
ponsibility of the United Nations to advise the 
Zionists not to come close to it because that would 
mean fitting and Jerusalem is Jerusalem. , , ,
The national and religious feelings compel us to 
preserve its holiness regardless of cost. lÆy 
desire for compromise compels me to mention this. 
Further, the Arabs are compassionate if the Jews 
try for an understanding,13
Realizing the futility of Arab cooperation and 
that the conflict would be a collision between two.;Ja<nre- 
inents- a colonizing Zionism and a xenophobic Arab national-
12In February, 1948, at Lake Success, King Abdul­
lah made a bold international venture. It was reported 
that Jordan's representative at the United Nations, Omar 
Al-Dajani, had offered a scheme in Abdullah's name whereby 
a partition plan be effectuated in return for American 
recognition of Transjordan. Shwadran, op. cit,. p. 249,
Abdullah At-Tall, Karithat Pilistin: Muthakkarat 
Abdullah At-Tall, (Cairo, n.p,, 1959), pp. b2-bj.
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ism each seeking to destroy the other- Abdullah decided 
to pave the way for peace to avert bloodshed in the Holy 
Land.^^ Accordingly, on May 5, 1948, he directed a mes­
sage to the people of Palestine:
We are trying for peace settlement which 
would give the Jews the right of citizenship in 
Palestine. . . .  If they inclined to peace, then 
peace is our goal. We will give them local govern­
ment in the areas in which they constitute a ma­
jority within the Arab State.15
On the following day, he warned the Jews saying:"the jour­
ney is long and the Arabs are numerous. You have espous­
ed tyranny and no victory accrues to t y r a n t s . H i s  mes­
sage portrayed him as peace-maker and the Zionists as war­
mongers.
^^Uri Avnery, Israel Without Zionism: A Plea For 
Peace in the Middle East, iNew York: MacMillan, 1968), p.
I9T:
^^Musa, op. cit., p. 472,
T.E. Lawrence testified to Abdullah’s peaceful in­
clinations. He found him "too balanced, too cool, too hu- ' 
mourous to be an armed prophet," in Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 
(GardenOity, N.Y.: Loubleday, 1951), p.
^%usa, op. cit., p. 472,
In reference to the atrocities committed by the 
Zionists such as the Deir Yassin massacre, Abdullah told 
Al-Ahram on April 17, 1948:
"I received a telegram from the Jewish Agency 
in which they expressed indignation at the crime 
committed by the terrorists. The Agency said that 
the new State would respect international law and 
principles in the fighting. I interprète this as 
tantamount to a declaration of war on Transjordan 
and the Arab states. I do not recognize the exist­
ence of a Jewish state, and give no weight to this 
telegram," At-Tall, op, cit,, p. 62; Also Terrence 
Pritties, Israel: Miracle in the Desert, Revised 
Edition, (Baltimore: Penguins Books. IgbOJ, p. 177.
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Jordan and the 1948 War
’if/hen the Jordan army originally planned to enter
Palestine at the termination of th Mandate,” no war with
17the Jews had been visualized." Its mission was to oc­
cupy the Arab part according to the United Nations Parti­
tion Plan, and to restore order which had broken following 
the withdrawal of the British,^®
According to General Glubb, the military action 
undertaken by the Jordanian army was designed to prevent 
the well organized Israeli forces from overrunning the 
entire country, and from inflioting more massacres on the 
peaceful Arab population and driving them into exile^^ Thus 
the issue became a matter "not of securing something for
20the Jews but of trying to salvage something for the Arabs."
^^Glubb, Soldier With the Arabs, pp. 82, 96.
Prime Minister Abul-Huda told the Israeli rep­
resentatives to the secret talks," We never initiated 
battles. . . .  There has haver beezuiany inclination to 
war at all. . . . "  At-Tall, op. pit.. p. 531.
Furthermore, while the Egyptian, Parliament appro­
priated fcry five million pounds for the war, Abul-Huda 
expressed his in#gnation at dragging Jordan into the 
conflict. He said,". . . .  Those who insist on making 
war had better pay for it." Immediately the Arab League 
paid to Jordan twenty five thousand pounds. Glubb, Sol­
dier With the Arabs.pp. 82-85.
18
Shwadran, op. cit.. p. 258.
iq
See the "situation" which made imperative the 
intervention of the Jordanian army as illustrated by Glubb. 
Glubb, Soldier With the Arabs.p. 97.
20
John Marlowe, The Seat of Pilate. (London: The 
Cresset Press, 1959), p. 249.
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General Glubb realized that:
If the Israeli forces had moved forwards 
on May 15th and the Arab Legion had not crossed 
into Palestine, the Jews in a very short time would 
have conquered all Palestine up to Jordan.21
High on the list of priorities of King Abdullah
was to prevent the fall of Jerusalem in the hands of the
enemy," The absence of an Arab military force in Jerusalem
when the Mandate ended offered the Jews the irresistible
temptation to seize the whole defenseless city and incor-
22porate it into the new Israel. Furthermore, the main 
road connecting Jerusalem with Tel-Aviv, also had to be 
brought under Jordan's control, particularly the strategi­
cally crucial latrvm heights to prevent the introduction 
of new Israeli forces into Jerusalem. In other parts of 
eastern and central Palestine, the Jordan army merely held 
its positions along the partition line, since there had - 
been no plan occupy any part of the Israeli sector.
^^Glubb, Soldier With the Arabs, p. 107.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.. p. 110,
The Jordan army was subjected to greater military 
pressure than expected due to the larger Israeli forces 
and their resolve to occupy the entire city. Abdullah's 
despevAte efforts to save the City seemed to have weakened 
the Israeli determination. One observer remarked:
" . . .  The Israelis apparently decided that 
they could not afford the heavy casualties which 
their attacks on Jerusalem were causing to their 
army and diverted their offensive to other parts 
of the front." Kirkbride, op. cit. p. 163.
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The Truce
The military objectives of the Jordan army were 
concerned with containing the advance of the Israeli forces 
and with isolating Jerusalem from the coastal plain where 
the majority of the Jewish population was concentrated.
Due to Jordan's victories inside Jerusalem and around it, 
the situation of the beseigned Jews in Jerusalem worsened 
due to the lack of water and supplies.Failing to save 
the city militarily, the Israeli Government with the help 
of its supporters throughout the world, pressed the United 
Nations for a truce. On May 23, the Security Council is­
sued an order for a cease fire which the Israelis accepted 
immediately because the city would fall to the Arabs if 
fighting continued. However, Jordan refused the truce 
declaring that it would not stop the fighting unless the
25Israelis changed their plan of establishing a Zionist state.
The Security Council continued its discussions of 
the Palestine issue. On May 29, it approved a British 
resolution for stopping any military aid to either side.
To complicate matters for Jordan- which at the time had the 
upper hand in the City- the British Government informed 
Jordan on May 30, that it had decided to withdraw all
^^Musa. op. Pit.. p. 498.
A telegîâm from Tel Aviv to the Mayor of beseiged 
Jewish Jerusalem said;" Patience. Help will come, but it 
will be political." See At-Tall, op. cit., pp. 198-200.
^%usa, op. Pit.. p. 498.
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British officers in the Legion, This would have had sig­
nificant repercussions because these officers were in full
command and incharge of the operations on which Jordan's
26military and political positions depended. Furthermore, 
the British Government threatened to stop sending arms and 
ammunitions, and end its subsidy unless Jordan complied
27
with the four-week truce ordered by the Security Council,
The British action was ostensibly influenced by their
respect for the International Organization, world public
28opinion and in response to the American pressure,
^^Glubb, Soldier With the Arabs, pp, 133-134,
^^Musa, OP, cit., p. 502; Also U.N, Security Council 
Official Record, Document S/801, 1948,
pQ
The United States exterted great pressure on 
Britain to stop her military and monetary aid to Jordan, 
Senator Brewster found support in the Senate for his 
suggestion that American financial aid to Britain, under 
the European Recovery Program, should be reconsidered 
"to determine to what extent the United States is assist­
ing those, who, both at lake Success and in the Middle 
East, are apparently so militantly opposing the United 
States."
On May 22, Warren Austin, the American Ambassador 
to the U.N,,accused Jordan of 'contumacy' and urged the 
Security Council to 'keep Abdullah where he belongs,*
In response to these pressures, Britain, through 
its representative at the U,N,, Sir Alexander Cadoga*, 
announced that immediate steps were being taken to ensure 
th#t those officers seconded to the Arab Legion from the 
British army should not serve in Palestine; that the obli­
gation to pay the next installment of the subsidy to Jordan, 
which fell due on July 12, would be reviewed in the light 
of the United Nations decision; and that the British Govern­
ment would suspend its deliveries of arms to Egypt, Iraq, 
and Transjordan in completion of existing contracts, if 
the Security Council should decide on a general embargo 
effectively preventing the supply of arms to Arabs and 
Jews alike, U.S. Congressional Record, 94, (1948), pp, 
6279-81; Also U,N, StiOR, 30lst Meeting, No. 72, 3rd Year,
PP» 42, 44; Also Glubb, Soldier With the Arabs, p, 133,
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While King Abdullah felt the absolute necessity 
to comply, the other Arab states refused the truce. How­
ever, when Jordan threatened to unilaterally accept the
truce and to withdraw from the League - which would have
29meant also the withdrawal of Iraq - they acquiesced.
Thus, in order to save the Arabô' so-called unity, the poli­
tical committee of the League decided on accepting the 
truce. This decision proved to be a major disaster to the 
Arabs because it ended the seige of Jewish Jerusalem, there 
by allowing tens of thousands of Jews to leave the city and 
join the Zionist fighting forces in other fronts. Most 
importantly, however, it enabled the Zionists to procure 
sorely needed armaments. This, undoubtedly, was a tacti­
cal victory for the Zionists and the beginning of the de­
cline of the. Arab military position, as Gabbay observed;
The Israelis could do an|ty very little to 
stop the Arab military advance during the first 
days of the battle. This was due to the scarcity 
of modern arms such as heavy weapons, tanks, anti­
aircraft guns. Only one or two weeks had elapsed 
after the truce than weapons and ammunitions, as 
well as airplanes began to fly to Israel to be 
readied within hours. . . . Israel was also flood­
ed with volunteers from all over the world. . . . 
And when fighting was renewed on July 9, 1948,
^%ahmoud Hafez, Istiragiat Al-GEharb Pi A1 V/atan 
Al-Arabi, (Cairo: Al-Mutba'ah Al-^anniyyiah' Àl-Ëaditha57 
T^T)7 p. 153.
Jordan's dire need was explained by Glubb as he 
told Abdullah in 1948:
"V/e have very little ammunition, and the de­
pots are empty. I cannot fight for more than FIVL 
hours. The army is tired and we must accept the 
truce." Nashashibi, op. cit.. p. 151.
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the Iaraeli army was not the unarmed or untrained 
army. 30
In order to maximize his advantages, Prime Minister
Ben Gurion, broke the truce and the cease fire on various
occasions.Significantly, "fait accompli" was the code
32name for such violations.
In an interview regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and the truce arrangement which Israel had pressed for to
escape the Arab military pressures, Ben Gurion said:
The fate of Israel would be determined in 
Palestine either in battle or in peace negotia­
tions between the Arabs and Israel and not in the 
United Nations conference rooms. . . . Even if 
the truce would have been carefully observed by 
the Arab countries, we would not have accepted 
it for an indefinite period. . . and Israel would 
force the Arab armies out of Palestine in the 
United Nations failed to accomplish this itself.33
By this time, Israel had become convinced that
Egypt was its principal enemy, not only due to its strength
but also because it took a harder policy toward Israel,
as compared to Abdullah. In October, the clamour for
^^Rony E. Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab- 
Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem, tParis: ÏA’braire
Mnard," m 9T ; T n w .   ------------
^^Vick Vance and Pierre Bauer, Hussein of Jordan:
My"War" With Israel.(New York: William Morrow, 1969;, p. 109.
32Rodlnson, op. cit.. p. 39.
Cniy an Anglo-American ultimatum prevented Ben- 
Gurion from pressing into Sinai beyond the Egyptian frontier. 
Ibid.
^^New York Times. July 30, 1948; KLmche, op. cit.. 
p. 272; Also Gabbay. op. cit.. p. 155.
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resumption of hostilities in order to deal one more "blow 
against hgypt and seize the Negeh had i n c r e a s e d . A  plan 
to attack the Egyptian front was contemplated for the fol­
lowing reasons: first, the confidence that the Egyptian 
forces would he defeated, especially when Abdullah would 
not come to their aid; and second, Ben Gurion's interest 
in conquering the Old City of Jerusalem which was high on
his priority list. If his army gained control of the Ne-
•35
geb, it could readily attack Jerusalem from the rear.^
This plan was made by the military minded Ben Gurion de- 
spiiè the warnings of his foreign Minister Moshe Sharette 
who declared that such aggression could seriously harm 
Israel's international standing. Thus, military prepara­
tions for the invasion of the Negeb were u n d e r w a y , O n  
October 14, 1948, Israel surprised the world by breaking
■37
the truce and attacking the Egyptians in the Negeb area.^ 
This decision to attack was due to several factors: 
the U.S.S.R, had indicated that she would not seriously 
consider applying sanctions against Israel; the American 
presidential elections were at a climax, thus, the least 
reaction to an attack would be voiced; but mainly, distrust,
^% e w  York Times. October 15-16, 1948,
35pred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Bi.lemma, (Syra­
cuse: Syracuse University Press, i960j, p. 86.
^^Kimohe, op. cit,. p. 274.
Shwadran, op. cit.. p. 267.
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disunity, and lack of cooperation between the Arab armies 
enabled Ben Gurion to concentrate a large striking force 
against Egypt in the Negeb without having to worry about a 
Jordan attack from the rear. As a result, the Egyptians 
lost a large part of the territory which was under their 
control, while the Zionists made substantial gains. On 
October 17, they announced that Israel "stands by its claim 
to the whole Negeb." Only strong opposition from his cab­
inet prevented Ben Gurion from marching and occupying the 
Old City of Jerusalem and the area eastward to the Jordan 
River.
The Security Council ordered a cease-fire to take 
place on October 19, But Israel, certain of victory, ig­
nored it and continued attacking until October 2 2 , When 
the Security Council Resolution of November 4, 1948, was 
passed ordering both sides to go back to the lines prior 
to the attack, Israel refused again, and the U.N. did no­
thing about it.40
Abdullah "not even bothering to reply" to the 
Egyptian call for help made possible an Israeli victory, 
since the Israeli government was assured of non-interfer-
^^New York Times, October 17, 1948.
^%.N., S.C.O.R., Document S/1058. October 26, 1948; 
At-Tall, op. cit., p. 4Ü9.
4^377th meeting of the Security Council, November 4,
1948.
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ence of the Hashemite armies,
Furthermore, Abdullah refused to permit the Iraqi 
army to assist the Egyptians by denying passage of Iraqi 
troops and supplies across Jordan-held territory. This 
created bitter reaction by the Egyptians who felt abandoned 
by their Arab allies and considered entering separate nego­
tiations with Israel to extricate themselves from their 
dangerous military p o s i t i o n . E g y p t  did so in January, 
1949, influenced by three factors: the critical military
situation which would have resulted in loss of more terri­
tory and men; secondly, the fact that fighting alone would 
not yield victory, since Egypt had been abandoned by its 
allies; and thirdly, the American and British pressure made 
it imperative to sign the Armistice Agreement with the 
Zionists, It was followed by other agreements with Jordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon. Only Iraq refused to sign since it had 
no boundsoies with Israel.
Oonolusi on
Jordan's intervention in Palestine in 1948, was not
^^Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War, 1948,
(New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 198; At-l*all. op. cit.. 
p. 543»
In one of the secret meetings on Janua^ 7 and 30, 
1949, the King congratulated Sasoon (a major Zionist figure 
in the secret negotiations) and expressed his regret that 
the Israelis were unable to occupy Gaza and added, "The 
southerners / ^ e Egyptian^ were badly beaten, and the 
northerners 7%ie Syrians and Lebanese/ were helpless." At- 
Tall, op. ciT.. pp. 432, 464.
p. 198.
^^Khouri, op. cit.. p. 94; and 0'Ballance, op. cit..
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calculated to wage a war, but to implement the United Na­
tions Partition Resolution by occupying and administering 
the Arab sector. In view of its lack in military capability 
to wage an offensive, Jordan's position was a defensive one. 
The army of Jordan depended for its supplies on the good­
will of Britain; its commanders were British officers, who 
in effect were implementing Britain's Palestine policy.
More importantly, however, King Abdullah was conducting 
secret talks .with the Zionists. This diplomatic venture 
determined to a large degree Jordan's military operations 
as well as Abdullah's political aspirations in Palestine.
In any case, avoiding military conflict was, with­
out doubt, in Jordan's interest for tactical, political 
and economic reasons. One, Abdullah did not see the logic 
of devoting Jordan's scarce resources to a military effort 
which would not benefit him more than negotiations would. 
Two, his information about the enemy's military and politi­
cal strength dictated that negotiations, rather than fight­
ing would be more advantageous^ since hostilities might 
result in loss of Arab land. Pour, hostilities would not 
secure more land for Jordan, since world public opinion 
would not allow depriving the Zionists from the minimum 
area designated by the Partition Plan. Pive, King Abdul­
lah realized that Jordan's political interests had to be 
preserved. To him, a peaceful solution was most desired. 
Accordingly, he insisted on a Jordanian solution rather
51
than an Arab one.
Although Abdullah was determined to avoid military 
conflict, he, nonetheless, under popular pressures, joined 
the Arab League states in their so-called Palestine cam­
paign . His decision to participate- at least on the sur­
face- was occasioned by external forces, some beyond his 
control. As founding member of the league, the King could 
not afford to be the Maverick of the Arabs. As self-appoint­
ed heir of Atoab leadership, his refusal would inevitably 
make him a traitor to Arab nationalism. As well, Abdullah 
might have wished to impress upon his critics that he enjoy­
ed independence in foreign and military policies as any 
other Arab ruler. Since the avowed objective of the Arab 
expeditionary force was to protect Arab Palestine, and since 
he intended to do so in any case, his participation did not 
alter his plans. Moreover, Abdullah's personal rivalries, 
especially with King Parouk, made him eager to take part 
as commander in chief of the Arab forces, in an attempt to 
prevent Egypt from sharing Arab Palestine with him.
This appears to have precipitated the ever-present Jordan- 
Egyptian cold war, considered by many students of Arab 
affairs to be a major cause for Arab disunity.
CHAPTER IV 
JORDAN AND THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM
According to the partition plein, Jerusalem was to 
be internationalized.^ But on the 14th of Ivlay, the Zion­
ist forces commenced the occupation of key strategic build­
ings in the city, including those directly overlooking the
2
old section like the Notre Dame building. The Arab de­
fenders were merely volunteers with no organization. They 
feared that the organized Zionist forces could overwhelm 
them and occupy the Old City. Despite frequent requests
^The General Assembly Resolution, I8l (II), Novem­
ber 12, 1947, provided that Jerusalem would be a corpus 
separatum under a special international regime and adminis- 
tered by the United Nations. Article 4 designated the boun­
daries of the territory of the city:
"1, The territory of the city shall include the 
municipality of Jerusalem as delimited on 29 November, 1947, 
together with the surrounding villages and towns, the most 
eastern of which is Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; 
the most western Ein Karim (including also the built up 
area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat." U.N. 
Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assem­
bly, Vol. I, Doc. A/364, 1947, pTTT:
2
David Ben Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, 
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 530.
Replying to a question, Bevin said, "They first 
started it. . . .1  certainly say that they did not start 
the battle, the attack was made on the Holy Places of the 
Arabs." Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 451, Col. 
2145.
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for help from Ahdullah, he would not intervene.
Abdullah's plan in Palestine was governed by cer­
tain objectives, mainly the annexation of Arab Palestine 
and reaching a final peace settlement with the Zionists.
As to Jerusalem, it was exempted from the Legion's 
military operations because:
1. The Arab League had agreed to exempt Jerusalem 
from the military plans of the Arab armies;
2. due to the existence of a truce in Jerusalem 
supervised by foreign counsels of the U.S., 
France, and Belgium; and
3. on account of the political situation of Jeru­
salem and the possibility of internationalizing 
it. 3
Ahmad Hilmi, leader of Arab Jerusalem, cabled the 
government of Jordan saying, "Unless you rescue us immedi­
ately, Jerusalem will fall finally into the hands of the 
Jews.Accordingly, Abdullah met with his Prime Minister, 
Tawfiq Abul-Huda, regarding the situation in Jerusalem, but 
Abul-Huda emphasized that military intervention would be
5
considered a violation of the agreement with Bevin. Con­
sequently, it would lead to international complications, 
in view of the U.N. resolution to internationalize the 
city.^ Aggravated by the Zionist violations, being highly
^At-Tall, op. cit.. p. 78; also Musa, op. cit., 
p. 484; Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 98. ïor a de­
tailed account on the battle of Jerusalem see pp. 105-118 
in Ibid.
^Hazza'a Al-Majali, Muthakkarati, (n.p., I960),
p. 67.
■^Shwadran, op. cit., p. 246.
Slajali, op. cit., p. 68.
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emotional about the religious importance of the city and 
the need to defend the civilian Arabs and concerned about 
the city's future, Abdullah decided to intervene. He or­
dered a cabinet meeting immediately to form a regency coun­
cil since he decided to personally take command of the
7
operational forces regardless of the consequences.
At this juncture, Abdullah communicated with Glubb;
The importance of Jerusalem to the Arabs, 
Muslims and Christians, is known. Any catastrophe 
that might befall its people by the Jews - such as 
being murdered or evicted - is a matter of grave
importance for which we are responsible. The sit­
uation is not desparate yet. I order you to pre­
serve what is in hand: the Old City, the Jericho 
road. . . .  I ask the implementation of this order 
with dispatch. 8
On May 19, the Jordan army intervened and the Old 
City was secured for Abdullah,
The control of the Arab part of Palestine including 
the Old City by Jordan brought Abdullah a step closer to 
the realization of his Great Syria Plan. The armistice 
gave Israel and Jordan a ^  facto division of the city, and
^Ibid.
Musa, op. cit., p. 489; Glubb, A Soldier with the 
Arabs, p. 118.
According to At-Tall, Glubb did not agree to send­
ing troops to defend Jerusalem. But Abdullah issued an 
order for the movement of the 8the Hegiment over-ruling 
Glubb. The task of this regiment was to defend the walls 
of the Old City and to occupy the Jewish quarter in the Old 
City which the Zionist force decided to defend. Ibid.
According to At-Tall, King Abdullah, on May 18, 
1948, sent an ultimatum to the Belgian Consul, who at the 
time served as chief of Truce Commission: "I shall bombard 
the Jewish section of New Jerusalem to the ground if the 
Jews refuse to surrender.” At-Tall, op. cit.. p. 455.
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non-intemationalization was orystalized.^
V/hen the General Assembly voted for international­
ization on December 9, 1949, the Arab states except Jordan 
voted for it.^^ However, when Bernadette suggested that 
all of Jerusalem become part of Abdullah's domain, they 
agreed because it was more preferable to have Jerusalem 
under Arab control rather than international or Zionist 
c o n t r o l . B y  previously voting for internationalization, 
they intended to prevent both Zionists and Jordan from 
controlling the city. Disappointed at this policy, Abdul­
lah emphasized his interest in the city as he commented;
. . . The demand for the internationalization of 
Jerusalem was one of the most unbalanced /%ra^ 
national aims. It was one that disregarded the 
Arab rights and interests by handing the Holy Places 
over to international control and wrenching Jerusa­
lem from the possession of the Arabs, It was my 
duty to stand resolutely and firmly in defense of 
the Arab character of the Holy City and resist in­
ternationalization in all its aspects. 12
^Prank Sakran, Whose Jerusalem?, (Washington: Amer­
ican Council on the Middle East, 1968), p. 1,
^^U.N,, G,A,G,R,, 75th meeting, 4th year, p. 607.
After the failure of the Crusades and 400 years 
of Turkish rule, the Christians agreed to Muslim sover­
eignty over the Holy City. Thus, the idea of Muslim rule 
under Jordan remained familiar and not wholly repugnant. 
There was no Christian protest against the Bernadette pro­
posal that Jerusalem be under Jordanian rule. On the other 
hand, Jewish rule seemed contrary to the natural order, es­
pecially when some Arabs are Christians, and Israel has no 
connection with Christianity, Further, there might have 
been fear that Israel might extend its authority to the 
Old City. Walter Bytan. The First Ten Years; A Diplomatic 
History of Israel, (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1956), 
pp. 77-78.
^^Sha'ar, op. cit.. p. 339.
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Abdullah realized that internationalization could 
never become a reality as long as each side opposed it and 
occupied a part of the city. The Zionists did not favor 
territorial internationalization, since they wanted to ex­
pand their domain and make the city their c a p i t a l . T o  
them, if the city was internationalized, 680,000 refugees 
would have to be returned to the international sector.
To Abdullah, Jerusalem constituted the heart of 
annexed Palestine. Recognizing the strategic, political, 
religious, and economic importance of the Old City, Jordan 
informed the General Assembly that:
No form of internationalization . . .  would 
serve any purpose, as the Holy Places under Jordan's
protection , . . were safe and secure without the
necessity for a special regime. 14
Jordan, however, gave the assurance to guarantee full free-
15dom of worship and ready access to Holy Places.
From the Arab side, other influences dictated Abdul-
^^Fytan, op. cit., p. 72.
The Zionists accepted internationalization as the
price for obtaining an independent state under the parti­
tion plan. Government of Israel, Jenisalem and the U.N., 
(V/ashington: Office of Information, July, 1955), p. 1.
^^Khouri, op. cit.. p. 107.
Abdullah did not close the door to a possible 
change in his position. In an interview, he stated that 
he would consider withdrawal from the Old City if Israel 
gave up the Arab area allotted to the Arab state by the 
Partition Plan. London Times. November 21, 194$.
While Jews were not given access to their Holy 
Places in the Old City or in the Jordanian sector, due to 
security measures, "There is no recorded instance of any 
Christian being refused access to any of the Holy Places 
of this faith in Jordan." Eytan, op. cit., p. 72.
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lah's decision, First, his response to the decisions taken 
hy the Jericho conference of December 1, 1948, which re­
flected his territorial ambitions. On December 1, 1948, 
after the Zionist aggression culminated in the occupation 
of a large sector of Arab territory, the Palestine Arabs 
in the Jordanian sector held a conference in Jericho and 
took the following resolutions:
1. . . . Resumption of fighting to liberate Pales­
tine;
2. the call for Jordan-Palestine unity . . .;
3. the call for a comprehensive national unity in
which uniting Palestine to Transjordan must 
take place first; ng
4. to proclaim Abdullah king of all Palestine.
Abdullah's attempts to annex Arab Palestine were opposed 
by the Mufti, president of the All-Palestine Gaza Govern­
ment. In a telegram to the president of the United Nations
Trusteeship Council dated March 4, 1950, he stated:
Transjordan does not represent the views of
the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of Jerusalem
area. Their views can only be ascertained by free
plebiscite covering both residents and refugees. 17
Second, opposition to the All-Palestine Govecament 
of Gaza, which was created by the Arab League under Egypt's 
sponsorship. The Gaza Government was viewed by Abdullah 
as an attempt to block Jordan's annexation and as a
^^Musa, op. cit., p. 536; New York Times, December 
14, 1948; Edmund Wright, "Abdullah's Jordan: 1947-51," 
Middle East Journal. ?, (Autumn, 1951), p. 456.
^'^United Nations, Trusteeship Council Official Re- 
cords. Annex Vol. I, 4th Year, 6th Session, T/4-87, March 4» 
195Û, p. 116.
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réaffirmât!on of opposition to the Zionist, state as well
1 8
as to partition. In order to silence the Gaza Govern­
ment and to assuage Arab fears with regard to Abdullah's 
ambitions, the Jordanian parliament approved, on April 24, 
1950, the unity of both banks of the Jordan in defiance of
iq
the League's resolution to the contrary. ^
To authenticate his control over the Old City, 
and in opposition to internationalization, Abdullah ap­
pointed a custodian for the Holy Places with rank of cabinet
member on January 2, 1950. He also appointed a Mufti re**
20
placing of Haj Arne en Al-Husayni, his main opponent. On 
July 27, 1953, the cabonet proposed transferring certain 
government ministries to the Old City and holding parlia-
18Ben Gurion, op. cit., p. 530.
^^The League's reaction to the annexation was 
negative. The political committee decided on May 16, 1950, 
that annexation violated the Organization's resolution of 
April 12, which prohibited annexing any part of Palestine 
unilaterally by any Arab state. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 
Lebanon voted for the expulsion of Jordan from the League. 
However, the negative vote of Iraq and Yaman, together with 
Iraq's mediation, resulted in a compromise. ^Accordingly, 
Jordan declared that annexation was without prejudice to 
the final settlement of the Palestine question.
The unity was recognized by Britain subject to the 
reservation that "pending final determination of the status 
of the Jerusalem area, they are unable to recognize Jordeui' s 
sovereignty over any part of it." Whiteman's Digest of 
International Law, Vol. II, pp. 1163-68. Quoted in lËllhau 
Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places. (London: n.p. 
October, 1958), p. 47.
20Raghib Al-Nashashibi and Shiekh Husam Eddin Jar- 
allah respectively. Al-Nashashibi was a prominent ant&- 
Husayni and pro-Abdullah.
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mentary sessions there. This proposal was not implemented
21in view of the dangerously exposed position of the City.
However, on August 21, 1959, Arab Jerusalem was designa-
22ted as the second capital.
Israel and Jerusalem 
Although the Armistice Agreement of 1949 recog­
nized the de facto occupation of Jerusalem by Israel and 
Jordan, without reference to internationalization, the 
United Nations Trusteeship Council proceeded to make plans 
to administer the City, and called upon both parties to 
cooperate in establishing international administration. 
However, in defiance of the International Organization,
Ben Gurion countered by ordering the transfer of his 
government ministries to Jerusalem, Characterizing the 
international proposal as "wicked c o u n c i l , h e  declared
that "the Jews will sacrifice themselves for Jerusalem
2*5no less than the English for London," Determined to
^^Daily Star, (Beirut), January 5, 1954.
^^New York Times, August 21, 1959.
The United States declred that it would recognize 
such a step. United States Department of State, Digest of 
International Law, Vol. i, (Washington D.C., 1 9 6 p. b94.
The United State disapproved of the move and 
maintained its embassy in Tel-Aviv, United States Depart­
ment of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-55, (1957).
Sakran, op. cit.. p. 1.
^^Khouri, op. cit.. p, 107.
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perpetuate their control over the City, the speakers at
the dedication of the new parliament building made it
known to the world that Israel intended Jerusalem to
26
reamin their capital forever.
In view of these violations, the president of the
Trusteeship Council, in a letter to the Israeli foreign
minister, inquired about the legality of transfering the
ministries to Jerusalem, and counselled Israel "to abstain
from any action liable to hinder the implementation of the
27
General Assembly Resolution of 9 December, 1949." CheuL- 
lenging the authority of the Trusteeship Council, the Is­
raeli representative to the United Nations replied:
. . . only a minority of the Council (five 
out of twelve) associated themselves with the 
resolution. In the view of the government of 
Israel, the powers of the Trusteeship Council 
as fully defined in the Charter of the United 
Nations do not include a capacity to call for 
the revocation of administrative acts by the 
governments of Member States in Territories for 
which whose administration and security they are 
responsible. In this connexion, the Government 
of Israel has noted the doubts expressed in the 
debates of the Trusteeship Council on 20 Decem­
ber, 1949, 'whether the Council was entitled to 
make a direct appeal to the Government of Israel' 
or in particular 'whether the Council has autho­
rity under the General Assembly resolution to 
pass a condemnatory resolution addressed to any 
particular government. '
My Government believes that it had full and 
complete authority for deciding upon the measures 
announced in the Kenesset on 17 December, 1949*
^^Ibid.. p. 112.
27Trusteeship Council Official Records, Document 
T/431. Annex. Vol. I. 4th Year. 6th Session. 5 January.
61
These measures mark the continuation of a process 
begun long ago as part of an effort to restore 
Jerusalem to its traditional place in the life 
of the country. . . ,28
In a speech to the parliament on December 13,
1949, Ben Gurion rejected internationalization and stressed 
Israel's determination to restore Jerusalem as its capital. 
He said:
As you know the General Assembly. . • has 
. . .  by a large majority decided to place Jeru­
salem under international regime as a separate 
entity. This decision is utterly incapable of 
implementation- if only for the determined un­
alterable opposition of the inhabitants of Jeru­
salem themselves. It is to be hoped that the 
General Assembly will in the course of time cor­
rect this mistake which its majority has made and 
will make no attempt whatsoever to impose a regime 
on the Holy City against the will of its people 
, , , , But for the State of Israel there has 
always been and always will be one capital- Jeru­
salem, the eternal. So it was three thousand 
years ago- and so it will be we believe until the 
end of time,29
Ben Gurion's rejoinder to the Trusteeship Council's 
demand confirmed the belief that Israel intended to annex 
all of Jerusalem as soon as an opportunity presented itself. 
This opportunity came in June, 1967, when the Israeli 
forces occupied the Old City, Shortly after the cease­
fire, Israel's parliament enacted a statute annexing it.
In justifying this action, deputy Prime Minister, Yigal 
Allon, in a news dispatch on July 5, 1967, said: "The 
world must reconcile itself to the fact that the city has
Z^ ibid,
29^Ibid,; Also Eytan, op, cit.. p, 74.
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at last returned to the nation that founded it and turned 
it into a Holy C i t y . T w o  days after the City fell under 
Israeli military control, approval was given by the Israeli 
municipal council of Jerusalem to include the Old City in 
the Greater Jerusalem Master Plan.^^
The Response of the United Nations 
The General Assembly convened on June 17, 1967, 
at the request of the Soviet Union, and after extensive 
debate approved Resolution 2253 on July 4.^^Ten days later. 
Resolution 2254 (ES-V) was also approved. These two reso­
lutions reflected a wide spread sentiment within the World 
Organization that territorial- aggrandizement cannot be the 
product of conquest by force. Secretary General, U Thant, 
stated it as follows:
It is indispensable to an international 
community of states- if it is not to follow the 
law of the jungle- that the territorial integrity 
of every state be respected and the occupation 
of one state cannot be condoned.33
^^Sakran, op. cit.. p. 2.
Jerusalem Post. June 8, 1967.
■3P
In the main, the Resolution stated that the Gen­
eral Assembly "Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures 
already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any ac­
tion which would alter the status of Jerusalem." ÜNGA, 
Official Records, 5th Emergency Special Session. Supplemet 
it p. 4.
^^DN. General Assembly, Official Records. Intro­
duction to the Annual Report of the' Secretary General on 
ÿïie Work of the Organization, ^une l6, 19b7. Document 
37723T,-p. 5. -- ---------
63
The Resolution v/as adopted by a vote of ninety- 
nine to nothing with twenty abstentions including the 
United States. Its delegate stated that peace in the 
I/dddle hast would not be achieved by a resolution dealing 
with one aspect of the question and emphasized that the 
United States does not "recognize or accept" the measures 
taken by Israel which he regarded as "interim and provi­
sional.
The Resolutions invalidating Israel's annexation 
of East Jerusalem evolved from earlier proposals that Is­
rael withdraw from all occupied areas. The Yugoslav draft 
resolution of June 28, was supported by seventeen states 
in addition to the Arab countries. Although it received 
a majority, it failed to obtain the required two-thirds 
vote. These states made up a significant part of the Third 
V/orld.
On June 30, another draft resolution sponsored by 
twenty other members of the Third V/orld - virtually all of 
the Latin American states - called upon Israel to "withdraw 
all its forces from all territories occupied by it as a re­
sult of the recent c o n f l i c t . T h i s  proposal, too, failed
^^New York Times, July 15, 1967, p. 5.
35The Yugoslave resolution was co-sponsored by Indo­
nesia, Cambodia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghan­
istan. Cyprus, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo (Brazza­
ville;, Brundi, Mali, Guinea and Senegal.
^^Formally presented by Trinidad and Tobago, it was 
co-sponsored by Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
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for lack of two-thirds majority.
Thus, opposition to Israeli occupation became evi­
dent by the developing nations, for either religious rea­
sons or for the anti-colonial character of the occupation. 
Furthermore, other nations, as noted above, supported this 
stand.
Discarding conciliation by the Vatican, Britain 
and the United States, and in defiance of the world organ­
ization, Israel decided to present the world with a fait 
accompli. Foreign Minister Eban's speech at the General 
Assembly declared that Israel had no intention to comply 
with the resolutions just adopted, and announced that Jeru­
salem’s future would no longer be considered a negotiable 
i s s u e . I s r a e l ’s decision was influenced by emotional­
ism of its own people and by the political, strategic,
■30
economic, as well as by religious considerations.
The United States refused to recognize the validity 
of the Israeli action and took the position that these 
measures could not be considered as "prejudicing the final
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Cominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela.
'Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 48.
Israel did not vote for the resolution on the 
grounds that the issue of Jerusalem was "outside the 
legal competence of the General Assembly. " New York Times 
July 5, 1967.
^^New York Times. June 18, 1967; Khouri, op. cit.,
p. 113.
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■jq
and permanent status of J e r u s a l e m . T o  that end, on 
November 7, 1967, the United States submitted a draft 
resolution in which it declared its policy of "just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East," and the "withdrawal of 
armed forces from occupied territories."^^ The draft res­
olution, it was assumed, would apply to East Jerusalem.
A fourth resolution was submitted by India and 
co-sponsored by Mali and Nigeria. It was cast in a stronger 
language that the United States draft resolution. However, 
neither resolution was adopted. Instead, on November 22, 
the British draft resolution was unanimously adopted.
^^United Nations Document A/FV, 1554, July 14, 1967.
^^Although the United States had hitherto held to 
a policy of "territorial integrity of all states in the 
Middle East, omitting "all" from the phrase "all terri­
tories, reflected the partiality of the United States 
Government toward Israel on the issue of retaining some 
Arab land such as Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, perhaps 
other sectors. Significantly, the United States represent­
ative to the United Nations at the time was Arthur Gold­
berg.
'^^United Nations Security Council Official Reoo^. 
Supplement for July-August-September. 1967, document S/b?29.
^^The„resolution read as follows:
The Security Council . . . emphasizing the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory
by war. . .
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from terri­
tories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of bel­
ligerency and respect for and acknowledge­
ment of the sovereignty, territorial integnty 
and political independence of eve^ state in 
the area and their right to live in peace with­
in secure boundaries free from threats or acts 
of force;
2. Affirm further the necessity
(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through 
international waterways in the area;
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While Israel insisted on keeping the City under
its control, it promised to give free access to the Holy
P l a c e s . 43 However, it emphasized that it would not give
up the Old part regardless of the Assembly's resolution.44-
Just as King Abdulla had stressed to the United Nations
that an international regime would be impractical; that
peace and safe-by of the Holy Places be assured under
45Jordan's protection, so Israel did the same in 1967.
On May 2, I960, Israel decided to hold an independ-
(b) for achie-ving a just settlement of the refingee 
problem;
(c) Por guaranteeing the territorial inviolability 
and political independence of every state in 
the area.. ;
(d) Requests the Secretary-General to designate 
a Special representative to proceed to the 
Middle East to establish and maintain con­
tacts with the states concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve 
a peaceful and accepted settlement in accord­
ance with the provisions and principles of
the resolution. • • • United Nations Security 
Council, Document 8/8247.
43ibid, Document S/8032.
44h 0w York Times. July 12, 1967.
4^Khouri, op. cit.. p. 115.
Israel's representative at the U.N., in defence 
of his government's action, said:
" . . .  since June 7, the entire city of 
Jerusalem has experienced peace and unity. The 
Holy Places of all faiths have been opened to 
access to those who held them sacred. . . .  The 
term 'annexation* used by the supporters of the 
resolution is out of place. The measures adopted 
referred to the integration of Jerusalem in the 
administrative and municipal spheres, and furnish­
ing a legal basis for the protection of the Holy 
Places in Jerusalem." United Nations Security 
Council, Document S/8052. pp. 74-75.
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ence day military parade in violation of the agreement 
that the City should permanently be demilitarized.^^
Israel explained its action on the basis of three points; 
one, that Jerusalem had become a united city; two, the 
Armistice Agreement was no longer operative for it had 
been destroyed by the June war; and three, the Israelis 
"are free to move, and to parade as they see fit,"^"^ Thus 
the parade was planned and held in the face of warnings by 
the Security Council to desist from taking any action which 
might result in changing the status of the city.^^
Jordan's accusation that Israel was contemplating 
the final liq.uidation of the Arab character of Jerusalem 
was supported by the Arab population of the city. In a 
memorandum sent to the Israeli authorities, they deplored 
Israel's action, insisting the Old City still belonged to 
Jordan.49
The Position of the United States
Israel has persistently disregarded United Nations
4^Avnery, op. cit.. p. 20.
4'^yosef Tekoah, Barbed V/ire Shall Not Return to 
Jerusalem, (New York: Israel Information Service, n.d.), 
p. 4-2.
4®United Nations, Document 8/8549. April 18, 1968; 
New York Times. April 28, 1968,
The Israeli authorities refused to cooperate with 
the U.N. Mixed Armistice machinery by preventing them from 
investigating the military parade. U.N,, S.C.G.R.. Docu­
ment S/7893.
49u .N., S.C.Q.R.. Document S/8109, August 3, 1967; 
New York Times. July 22, 1967.
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resolutions and emphasized that the decisive factor, as 
far as she was concerned, was the attitude of the United 
S t a t e s . T h e  American policy position regarding the an­
nexation of Old Jerusalem could have been derived from the 
United States concern with the territorial integrity of 
Jordan. This explains Washington's refusal to recognize 
the validity of the Israeli annexation move. "It should 
he equally clear that boundaries cannot and should not re­
flect the weight of c o n q u e s t . A n d  "a just and lasting 
peace will require . . . withdrawal of Israel's armed 
forces from territories occupied in the Arab-Israeli war 
of 1967."^^ However, two weeks after President Johnson's 
moral stand in his speech on June 19, 1967, the United 
States refused to support the General Assembly resolution 
which called on Israel to refrain from annexing Hast Jeru­
salem. This resolution censured Israel on the grounds 
that her move to change the status of Jerusalem was invalid.
Two years later, however, it was reported that "on 
one major and crucial issue the Administration appears to 
accept Israel's position: Jerusalem should remain a unified 
city."5^ This apparent deviation in the U.S. policy may
^%.N., S.C.Q.R.. Document 8/8650, June 21, 1968.
51President Johnson's address to the B'nai B'rith, 
September 10, 1968.
52Secretary of State Rodgers before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, March 27, 1969.
^%ear Hast Report. May 14, 1969.
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have been by possible "trading” of Old Jerusalem by Jor­
dan for the right of access to the Mediterranean through 
Israeli territory.While Britain and France were urging 
Israel to postpone action on annexation until a peace set­
tlement was reached, the United States, while declaring 
non-acceptance of the move, refused to apply effective 
pressure on Israel "without obtaining something from the 
Arabs in r e t u r n . W i t h  this backing, unification of 
Jerusalem became an accomplished fact and outside the 
framework of any negotiated settlement.
The United Nations has, demonstratably, been un­
able to disuade Israel from annexing Arab Jerusalem. Some 
observers ascribe this failure to the absence of whole­
hearted support by the Johnson administration, whose decla­
rations proved incompatible with its voting at the United
56Nations, as lacking sincerity and consistency.
Conclusion
The United Nations Resolutions had recommended that 
the City of Jerusalem be placed under international admi­
nistration, but the World community and the Organization 
never seriously tried to enforce its will.
^^anchester Guardian, April 9, 1969.
^^New York Times. July 13, 1967.
^^Richard Efaff, Jerusalem; Keystone of an Arab- 
Israeli Settlement. (Washington: American Enterprise In­
stitute, 1965) , p. 44; Also Financial Times, November 21, 
1967.
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The occupation of the new part of the City by Is­
rael, and the subsequent transfer of Israeli Government’s 
ministries in defiance of the United Nations, complicated 
the task. However, Jordan’s position was not dissimilar.
King Abdullah’s decision not to surrender the Old City to 
international administration was based on political, mili­
tary and personal considerations. From the political view­
point, controlling the Old City endowed Jordan with inter­
national importance as guardian of the Holy Places. Further­
more, by occupying half of the City which the Zionists cal­
led their capital, Jordan was placed in a stronger bargain­
ing position in the event of territorial adjustments. By 
administering part of the City, considered the center of 
Palestine- spiritually, economically and politically,- 
Jordan’s presence was tantamount to legalizing Arab rights 
against the claims of the Jews. Placing the Holy Places 
under Jordan's control, provide Abdullah with a sense of 
achievement, which he hoped would encourage the revival of 
the Great Syria Plan. Economically, the Old City became 
the source of a significant part of foreign exchange, sorely 
needed by Jordan. Militarily, the Jordananny had suffered 
large casualties in the defense of the Old City. Thus, 
presei-ving it became a symbol of the King’s determination.
Most importantly, however, Abdullah was under no 
pressure from the Middle Eastern Christian community to 
intemationalize the City. While they viewed Jewish control
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as repugnant since Israel had no connection with Christian­
ity, the idea of a Muslim rule under Jordan was acceptable 
in the light of recent history. For centuries since the 
Crusades, the City and the Holy Places had been under Muslim 
administrati on•
CHAPTER V
JORDAN- ZIONIST SECRET NEGOTIATIONS
King Abdullah did not intend to enter Palestine 
temporarily to liberate it and turn it over to the Pal­
estine Arabs.^ Instead, he wished to achieve his long 
standing dream of ruling a Great Syria, of which Pales­
tine would be the first province to be annexed to Trans- 
2
Jordan. On account of his disgruntlement with the poli­
cies of other Arab governments, because the British would 
not openly support him, and due to the probability of 
reaching a reasonable settlement with the Zionists, a 
point of mutual agreement on partition was sought.^ Since
^Khouri, op. cit.. p. 70.
2This plan was approved by Foreign Secretary Bevin 
in the House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates, 451? (2 
June, 1948).
^Kenneth W. Bilby described the relationship bet­
ween Abdullah and the Zionist leaders. He wrote:
"I sketched in detail the king's views, 
emphasizing his di sgruntlement with Arab League 
policy and his anxiety to annex the remainder of 
Palestine. Ben Gurion listened attentively, oc­
casionally nodding his head.
*I believe in Abdullah's sincerity,' he 
said slowly. 'I think he really wants peace. Now 
if he just translate his words into action. We 
are willing to meet him halfway. Por the sake of
72
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Abdullah, apparently, preferred a political solution to 
a military one, as long as he could make territorial gains, 
he decided on unilateral negotiations with the Jews.^ But 
to negotiate openly was impolitic if not suicidal. Thus, 
surreptitious meetings had to be arranged with Zionist
5
agents.^
The secret talks had commenced before the termi­
nation of the Mandate. In his first meeting with Golda 
Meyerson (later Golda Meir, Prime Minister) in November, 
1947, Abdullah assured her, as agent of the Jewish Agency, 
that once partition was approved by the United Nations, 
he would merely annex the Arab part of Palestine and would 
not attack the proposed Zionist state. The same assurance
peace we will accept less, even though we might 
get more.
'Abdullah has alw^s gotten along well with 
some of our people. Shertock was friendly with 
him. I remember once they even played 'Hatikva' 
in a theatre at Amman when a group of us were vis­
iting there. We have been always willing to talk 
with Abdullah and we are now." Kenneth W. Bilby, 
New Star in the East, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,
T m r r r r w . ---------
tin 1948-49, Jordan was considered the most im­
portant power facing Israel. If Jordan made peace, it 
was believed that the other Arab states would follow. 
Abdullah did not want a second round with Israel, because 
the latter was internationally established and thus was 
there to stay. London Times. March 23, 1950.
^Jon and David Kimche, A Clash of Destinies, (New 
York: Praeger, I960), p. 110.
^At-Tall, op. cit.. p. 67.
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was expressed to another agent, Moshe Shertok (later foreign, 
minister Sharette), whom AhduJ-lah met on April 12, 1948.
In another meeting, Meyerson tried to persuade 
Abdullah not to collaborate with the other Arab govem-
7
ments in an attack on Israel. At this point, Abdullah 
advanced a new proposal. He suggested that war could be 
averted under two conditions; one, that the Jews should 
not declare a state and; two, that they should stop im­
migration for several years. He further proposed to take
Palestine over, merge it with Jordan and after an interval
of one year unity would be completed giving the Jews
Q
representation in the new parliament. Meyerson instantly 
rejected the proposal and said," there would be war and 
we will win it.
On May 12, 1948, Meyerson met with Abdullah at 
his Palace in Amman. She submitted the demands of the 
Jewish Agency as follows:
1. Abdullah should declare peace with the 
Jews, and not send his army into Palestine at all;
2. Abdullah should send a governor to the
Arab part of Palestine, according to the Partition
7
'Naphatali Lau-Lavie, Moshe Dayan: A Biography. 
(London: Vallentine, Mitchel, l9b8j, pV 8^.
Q
Marie Syrkin, V/ay of Valour, a Biography of Golda 
Meyerson, (New York: B. Putnam*s Sons, 1955)» p. 2I3, !ühls 
plan was submitted to the Royal Commission earlier. The 
Fertile Crescent Plan also provided for this solution.
^Ibid., p. 218.
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plan;
3. In return., the Jewish Agency would ap­
prove the annexation of the Arah part to the Ha­
shemite throne.10
Abdullah rejected the first condition, since he 
wished to appear cooperative with the Arab League which 
had decided to intervene. However, he declared that 
neither the Jordan nor the Iraqi army would fight, but 
stop at the partition line, and would be confined to 
the Arab sector.
As May 15, 194-8, drew nearer, Abdullsih's position
became hardened toward the Zionists. He feared that his
12promise not to attack could not be honored. Thus, in 
May, he sounded out the Jewish Agency to see if they could 
cede to him a sector of the area allotted to them. While 
giving the impression that he was confident in his armed 
superiointy, he felt that such territorial gain would 
strengthen his hand to deal effectively with the Arab
^°At-Tall, p. 67.
^^0‘Ballance, op. cit. pp. 78-79; Also At-Tall, 
op. G i t .. p. 67.
In a phone conversation on May 14» 1948, between 
Glubb and the British High Commissioner who was leaving 
Palestine, he told Glubb, "Keep your master on the hills," 
which meant that the Legion would occupy the hills surround­
ing Jerusalem, but not to attack it. At-Tall. op. cit., p. 
102.
12Y/hen Abdullah decided to join the League expedi­
tion, Golda Myerson sent him a message asking "whether 
this agreement (November, 1947) still held good. A mes­
senger from Abdullah brought Golda a soothing answer. 
Abdyllah asked her to remember three things; he was a 
Bedouin, a man of honor; he was a king; a promise made 
to a woman was never broken. " Syrkin, op. cit., p. 214.
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antagonists. The Jewish Agency flatly rejected the pro­
posal,
Abdullah's unilateral secret talks were undoubt­
edly directed at reaching peace and averting war,^^ These 
efforts, however, could not materialize due to the posi­
tions of the League and the Jewish Agency. But Abdullah 
was not discouraged. The next stage of the secret talks 
took place in Paris in late September, 1948, while the Arab 
armies were battling the Israeli forces. During these ne­
gotiations, Jordan learned that Israeli forces were plan­
ning an attack on the Egyptian army in the Negeb. Although 
Jordan was obligated to assist the Egyptian forces, Abdul­
lah instructed his agents in Paris "to be neutral and not
15to indulge in any war against the Jews."
However, the most crucial of the negotiations were 
conducted during the third and final stage which began on 
December 10, 1948. They took place at Abdullah's palace 
in Shunah, five miles east of the River Jordan. The Zion­
ist representatives were Ilyas Sasoon, Walter Eytan and 
Koshe Dayan. It began at the initiative of the Jews, who, 
on September 29, 1948, requested the Chief of the United 
Nations Truce Supervisory Organization to arrange a meeting
^^Ibid.. pp. 214-215.
^^"Except for Jordan, the Arab states did not ap­
ply their full military strength." Edward Latham, Crisis 
in the Saddle East. (New York: Wilson, 1952), p. 169.
At-Tall, op. cit.. p. 344.
77
with Colonel Abdullah At-Tall, the Jordan military gover­
nor of Jerusalem. At-Tall met Dayan in the demilitarized 
zone on December 10, 1948.^^
At-Tall carried a letter from a high Zionist au­
thority, Iliyas Sasoon, to be delivered to Abdullah: 
i/iy Great Lord:
Reverence and respect, I hope that Your Majesty is 
in good health which God bestows upon you forever. 
Sir!
I arrived in Jerusalem today returning from 
Paris for a very short time to get in contact with 
Your Majesty - if you so desire - in order to co­
operate in solving the complicated problems and to 
arrive at what we all yearn for, and that is estab­
lishing peace in all parts of this land v/hich is 
dear to you and to us. I beg Your Majesty, this 
being the case, to send to Jerusalem to meet and 
discuss with me one whom you trust, as I hope that 
this person would be accompanied by my friend. Dr. 
Shawkat Pasha and he should be faithful to the com­
mon problem.
I hope that this person will come as soon as 
possible, if possible tomorrow, Saturday, because 
my time is very limited and I am obliged to return 
to Paris as soon as possible. I hope the circum­
stances will help me to have the honor of meeting 
Your Majesty on a happy occasion, God willing.
I hope that the person who will come to meet 
me will be carrying much of your Majesty's observa­
tions regarding the many matters which will guide 
our discussion. May God extend your life. Amen.
Sincerely,
Ilyas Sasoon
Jerusalem, Friday, 10/12/948
Note: Before I left Paris, I met my friend, Amir 
Abdul Majid Hyder and we talked at length in many 
matters. 17
^^Ibid.. p. 437; also James G. McDonald, My Iviission 
in Israel. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 1È4; 
also Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 256.
17Author's verbatum translation from photostatic 
copy of the original, At-Tall, op. cit., p. 439.
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The King's reply was to be conveyed by his physi­
cian, Shawkat El-Sati, and At-Tall;
1, V/e are glad to have a conference with you,
2, You know that any unsuccessful separate discus­
sion will result in difficulties from the Arab 
side, particularly the political enemies, more 
than you can imagine.
3, The resolutions of the Jericho Congress must be 
highly respected,
4, The question of lydda and Ramie must remain as 
it was before withdrawal, because you cannot 
comprehend the difficulties that we faced fol­
lowing it,
5, The question of Jaffa is under consideration; 
the Old Jerusalem is Arab and the Jewish part 
is in the hands of its people,
6, Issues of Negeb and Galilee are under consider­
ation,
7, The problem of the refugees is under considera­
tion. 18
These points were approved by Prime Minister Tawfiq 
Abu El-Huda who declared that the government does not ob­
ject to these personal communications and agreed to abide 
by the King's agreements with the Jews since the govern­
ment itself could not negotiate publicly in order to avoid 
criticism from the Arab states,
However, these points were revised by At-Tall and 
Sati without the King's knowledge due to their vagueness 
and the fact that Arab Jerusalem was not mentioned to in­
clude the Arab parts of the New City. The following points
^^At-Tall, op, cit., p, 440,
^%bid,. p, 441. Abdullah told At-Tall, "I told 
you that I do not care about the Government, because I can 
change it with the stroke of a pen, I do not depend on the 
elastic government methods in solving problems, I must 
meet with Sasoon, He is an old conservative friend," Ibid. 
p. 457,
79
were handed to Sasoon instead:
1. Lydda and Ramie must be returned as a gesture 
of good will.
2. The Arab refugees must be repatriated to their 
homes before the sowing season.
3. Discussion of Bernadotte's proposal and the par­
tition plan in order to reach a mutually accept­
able solution.
4. The return of the Arab quarters in New Jerusa­
lem. 20
On the 13th of December, 1948, after consulting 
with Tel Aviv, Sasoon presented the following points to be 
conveyed to Abdullah:
1. We have no objection if his Majesty wishes to 
implement the Jericho resolutions. We believe 
that they should be effectuated as soon as pos­
sible, so that he can present to his opponents 
and friends a fait accompli. This policy has 
great importance for tke countries of Europe and 
in America. V/e have experienced it ourselves.
2. When he takes steps for implementation, he should 
look to the Jews neither for good nor for bad.
He should be content to state that this is a 
step to save that can be saved and to restore 
peace and happiness to the Arab people of Pales­
tine.
3. We hope that he will not finally decide about 
the fate of Jerusalem - Old or Nev/. We believe 
that its settlement should be postponed to dis­
cussions and agreements to be made directly be­
tween his Majesty and us, in the near future.
We believe that there is a solution acceptable 
to him as well as to us.
4. We advise Our Lord to announce an official long 
truce - a permanent truce - which will aid in 
the withdrawal of his troops from the fronts.
He can employ these troops in other directions, 
if he so desires. If the present circumstances 
are not suitable for such a declaration we can 
sign a secret agreement. In this regard, we 
can assure him that his position on all the 
fronts will not be attacked. We shall honor 
the agreement till the conclusion of discussions 
even if they extend over months.
20
‘^^Ibid.. p. 441.
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5. We advise Our Lord to act expeditiously in se­
curing withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the fron­
tiers and their replacement by Transjordanian 
forces for internal security only. If he does 
so, we assure him that we shall not attack these 
places till the end of the talks. But if the 
Iraqi forces remain in their positions, we are 
afraid that it will lead to friction one day.
6. We advise Our Lord to make efforts for with­
drawal of Egyptian forces from the south of Je­
rusalem and Hebron, so that he may save him­
self from the political troubles which may fol­
low from the presence of these forces, at any 
time.
7. We advise Our Lord to avoid, as far as possible, 
foreign mediation for the settlement of matters 
between us, as we do, and to negotiate directly. 
This, in our view, is more successful, both in
the military and political fields.
8. If Our Lord accedes to the aforementioned seven 
points, we assure him that we shall make propa­
ganda in support of the Jericho resolutions in
all parts of the world. 21
The Zionist counter-proposal was conveyed to Abdullah the
same night. The King's comments were as follows:
1. This is a good suggestion.
2. This is our old plan.
3. Old Jerusalem for the Arabs and the New for the 
Jews. This question be postponed for discus­
sion.
4. I approve of this secretly on condition that it 
be applied to the Iraqi front.
5. Bor discussion with His Excellency, the Regent 
of Iraq.
6. It is possible that after we have settled the 
problems between us and Egypt and the Arab 
League. I might prefer to accept the secret 
truce.
7. Bor secret negotiations with the Pasha and he 
will inform you of my opinion.
8. Yes. 22
These comments were passed on to Sasoon on December
^^bid.. p. 444.
^^Ibid., p. 445.
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14, 1948. These communications revealed Abdullah’s sincere 
interest in peace negotiations, though with utter disregard 
for the other Arab states. These negotiations would in ef­
fect neutralize the Jordan and Iraqi fronts which were most 
dangerous to the new state from a strategic point of view. 
Since both armies faced major centers of population and at 
certain points were only ten miles from the sea and could 
cut the new state into two sections, it was only logical 
that the Zionist leaders accept these proposals. By 
freezing the eastern and central fronts, the Zionist forces 
could be deployed in force along the southern front.
The result of these secret negotiations gave the 
Zionist forces a tactical superiority against the Egyptian 
forces, as in fact they did have in the following months.
In order to extract official promises, and in the 
interest of secrecy, the Zionists demanded that officially 
accredited representatives from both sides engage in these 
discussions.
On January 15, 1949, the Zionist representatives 
handed to At-Tall and Sati the document authorizing them 
to negotiate on behalf of their government. However, At- 
Tall never handed his letter of authorization to the other 
side. The exchange of the document was the first authentic 
and documentary evidence of Abdullah's recognition of the 
state of Israel - while the other Arab armies were still 
fighting. However, this step revealed his desire for
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establishment of peaceful relations between the two nations. 
The two documents bore the official seals of the respective 
governments such as those normally exchanged between states.
STATE OF ISRAEL 
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
MR. REUVEN SHILOAH and IIEUTENANT-GOLONEL 
MOSHE DAYAN are hereby given full power and author­
ity in the name of the GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL to ne­
gotiate and conclude v/ith the duly appointed repre­
sentatives of HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE HASHEMITE 
KINGDOM OF TRANSJORDAN an agreement for the cessa­
tion of hostilities and the establishment of peace­
ful relations between the STATE OF ISRAEL and the 
KINGDOM OF TRANSJORDAN, it being understood that 
any such agreement that may be signed is subject 
to ratification by the GOVERI^MENT OF ISRAEL.
DONE at HAKERYA, this fifth day of January, 
in the year one thousand nine hundred and forty 
nine.
Sd/- M. Shertok Sd/- D. Ben Gurion^^
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRIME MINISTER
SEAL
ABDULLAH BIN AL-HUSAIN
Amman; 2 Rabi' Al-Awwal 1368 
1 Januaiy 1949
Military Commander of Jerusalem 'Abdullah At-Tall
I hereby confer upon you the authority to 
negotiate with the Israeli side, on the basis of 
mutual understanding, to solve every difficulty 
likely to arise during the official negotiations. 
This authorization is personal, but shall be fol­
lowed by an official one which will include other 
persons. It will take the usual governmental rou­
tine in regard to such problems.
As the purpose is to find ways for real peace 
every point must be agreed upon by both parties.
I trust that you and the other side will agree, 
with good intention, on a humanitarian act.
Sd/- 'Abdullah 
On the occasion of a one-sided exchange of documents
Z^ibid.. p. 450.
^trbid.. p. 451.
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the Jordan representatives presented three major points on 
the basis of which the King would reach an understanding 
with the other side:
1. The return of the area of Lydda and Ramie.
2. Refugees must be permitted immediately to return 
to their cities and villages before the commence­
ment of any discussion.
3. The return of the Arab quarters of New Jerusa­
lem, especially as they were taken without war 
and before the evacuation of the British. 25
To these demands, the Zionist agents replied:
1. Israel may consider the proposal to allow some 
of the people from lydda and Ramie to return, 
but under no circumstances could the two cities 
be placed in the Arab part because Tel Aviv lies 
within the range of gunfire from them.
2. The problem of the refugees is very complicated. 
V/e shall discuss the plan with His Majesty for 
compensating and rehabilitating the refugees, 
particularly in Transjordan*.
3. In the mutual interest we shall allow His Majesty 
to use the port of Haifa in exchange for allowing 
us to resume the operations at the potassium and 
electricity projects in the Jordan Valley.
4. The problem of Jerusalem is very delicate and 
causes great disturbance to the government in 
Tel Aviv. We face great pressures from the Jew­
ish people who regard Jerusalem as a Jewish city,
more than the problems which face the govern­
ments of Our Lord. Therefore, we shall leave 
this matter for now, especially since the Arab 
quarters are now overcrowded with Jewish refu­
gees.
5. V/e are interested in the exchange of prisoners 
of war, 26
To Abdullah, these secret contacts seemed to have 
opened the door for a partial fulfillment of an expanded
Jordan. Thus, he was in a hurry to finalize a peace settle-
^^Ibid.. p. 452.
ZGlbid.
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ment and to present the Arab states with a fait accompli 
having attained full control of the Arab section of East 
Palestine. Dissatisfied with the progress of the negotia­
tions carried out by his emissaries, he decided to conduct 
the negotiations personally. Thus, on January 16, 1949, 
Sasoon and Dayan were transported to his winter palace at 
Shuneh for talks with the King. There he showed utter 
naivete as he divulged to the enemy representatives vital 
political, strategic, and military information. He said:
I am an Arab King who does not betray a trust 
nor fail to fulfill a promise. You know my inten­
tions and feeling towards you. %  opinion is that 
nobody should stand between us now after the distur­
bances are over and you are in control in the South. 
You know, Sasoon, that we did not fight you nor 
transgress into your allocated part. Now, I do not 
listen to the advice of my British allies who are 
your faithful friends. They have refused to help 
us and they have not sent us one single round since 
the disturbances broke out, although we were and 
are still short of ammunition. . . . You know, 
brother Sasoon, that our agreement is based on 
earlier arrangements. Now you are entitled to 
rightful demands as we are entitled to ours. Holy 
Jerusalem is in our custody and you have free pas­
sage to your Holy Places. We shall not dispute 
you over what is under your control. 27
To this statement Dayan replied:
Jerusalem is tied to Israel by spiritual ties. 
It has been the objective of the Jews of the World 
for thousands of years, while it does not have so 
strong ties with the Arabs. Israel is prepared to 
protect all the Holy Places, including those of the 
Muslims. Jerusalem was ours and shall remain with 
us. . . .28
2?Ibid.. p. 460.
^^bid.. p. 463.
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The Zionists were greatly interested and were 
urging the withdrawal of Iraqi forces which Abdullah pro­
mised to do in a few days in his scheduled meeting on the 
Iraqi-Jordan frontier with Abdul-Ilah, the Regent of Iraq. 
At the same time, Abdullah was highly interested in reach­
ing a negotiated settlement which would give him an outlet 
to the Mediterranean. He addressed Sasoon saying, "I wish
that you had occupied Gaza for us, it's our outlet to the
2Q
Sea. We need a port. Let it be Iiflajdal Asqalan."
Abdullah wanted a final peace settlement, not only 
a military one, if Israel showed good intentions. Due to 
the close relations between Iraq and Jordan, the Jordan 
delegation was to speak for Iraq too. "Jordan was one with 
Iraq, and the two countries would never be divided.
'While Abdullah could make concessions, his declared 
intention was no compromise about the future of Jerusalem, 
"The Old City would never be yielded to Israel.
The successes which the Zionists had realized 
during the last days of fighting made them less disposed 
toward Abdullah's proposals. He, nevertheless, pursued a 
formal peace and put forth four preconditions;
A corridor giving access to the Mediterran­
ean through Beersheba and Gaza; return to the Arab
29lbid., p. 465.
^^London Times. February 22, 1949; also At-Tall, 
op. cit., pp. 62-63.
^^London Times, op. cit.
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quarter in New Jerusalem; restoration of the Jeru­
salem- Bethlehem road to Jordan: free port privi­
leges at Haifa, In return, Abdullah promised the 
Israelis free port at Aqaba and access to the val­
uable potash works on the Jordan- controlled nor'kh 
shores of the Dead Sea,32
In 1949, Abdullah agreed to sign a peace treaty 
in return for a port on the Mediterranean, His project 
was opposed by his cabinet who demanded a corridor of 
several miles wide. But Ben Gurion wanted to allow only 
a few hundred feet on each side instead. However, despite 
the cabinet objections, Abdullah continued to seek peace 
agreements,
A few weeks later, Abdullah proposed a five-year 
non aggression pact with Israel on the basis of the status 
quo.^^ The proposal leaked out causing violent protests 
inside Jordan as well as other Arab countries, and render­
ing Abdullah isolated for having violated the League's 
Resolution by unilaterally and secretly negotiated with 
the enemy,
The secret talks enraged the Arab rulers and were
432,
McDonald, op, cit,, p, 193; Also At-Tall, op, cit,.
^^Rodinson, op, cit,, p, 55.
^^Abidi, op, cit,, p, 37.
IK
The Resolution stated:
", , , No State (Member) of the Arab League 
may negotiate or actually conclude a separate peace 
(treaty) or any (other) political, military, or
economic agreement with Israel, A (Member) State
which does take such course shall be considered to 
have withdrawn from the Arab League forthwith in
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opposed by Britain, In his diary, Dayan stated that King 
Abdullah had told him in 1951, that he was prepared to 
reach an agreement with Israel, but the British Ambassa­
dor, Alec Kirkbride, was opposed to it, for he felt that 
such move would harm friendly relations between Britain 
and Egypt, At the time, Britain realized that her asso­
ciation with Egypt was the best guarantee for her contin­
ued influence in the Middle East. Commenting on Britain's 
position, Dayan wrote in 1956;
It would be interesting to know if Britain's 
Prime Minister Eden still feels that it was worth 
preventing peace between Jordan and Israel only 
in order that Britain should not appear pro- Is­
raeli in the eyes of Egypt, the Egypt of King 
Earouk. 36
Despite Arab and British opposition, Jordan and 
Israel held more secret talks at Shunah. These talks led 
to the recommendation that a "peace treaty • • • based on 
the establishment of a confederation between the two conn- 
tries," be c o n c l u d e d . I t  was envisaged that such con-
in accordance with Article 18 of the Pact. . ." Muhammad 
Khalil, The ^ a b  States and the ^ a b  League: A Documen­
tary Record,C;ëeirut. tOiayyats, 1^62),^ol. II, pp. 165-66.
^^Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign. (New 
York: Harper, 1965), p. 21,
^^Dau- Davie, op. cit., p. 87.
Abdullah used to say that Israel sent him a message 
that she was ready to pay sixty million Jordan Dinars ( ap­
proximately two hundred million dollars) to Jordan or to 
the refugees if he accepted a separate peace. Nasi-Eddin 
Al-Nashashibi, Matha Jara Pi Al-Shurq Al-Awsat. (Beirut; 
Al-Maktab Al-Tigari, 1961), p. 76.
According to Dayan, the draft agreement to that 
end was signed. Dayan, op. cit.. p. 21.
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federation would allow the two countries to cooperate 
economically, particularly in the development of natural 
resources. Further, it would provide for free access to 
the Holy Places for the Jews in return for free port faci­
lities on the Mediterranean.
Walter Eytan, a frequent negotiator with Abdullah, 
commented on the proposed treaty. He wrote:
Conversations with him and some of his clo­
sest advisors were carried on intensively, espe­
cially between November, 1949 and March, 1950, A 
draft treaty was prepared and initialled, but the 
King,under rising pressure of Arab extremism which 
scared his ministers,was unable in the end to 
carry it through. The desultory talks went on, 
but after a while it became clear that nothing 
could come of them, despite the personal efforts 
of the King,38
Yearning for peace, Abdullah continued to receive Jewish
39emissaries at his Palace for peace talks,
It is paradoxical that Abdullah's secret talks 
influenced his conduct of the war. Contrariwise, on the 
Israeli side, war operations determined their pattern of 
negotiations. The occupation of Eastern Negeb and the
^^Eytan, op, cit.. p,42: Also The Economist,
July 21, 1950; Al-&asry, (Cairo), March 19, 1950; And 
George Kirk, The Middle East. 1945-50» (London: Oxford 
University Press, l954), p, 309,
In 1951, Abdullah sought the good office of a strong 
Arab personality. His choice was Lebanese Prime Minister 
Riyad Al-Sulh, Abdullah needed his help to realize his Great 
Syria Plan, Al.-Sulh agreed to help on condition that Abdul­
lah must absolutely abandon the idea of separate peace with 
Israel, Al-Sulh was assassinated in Amman while on a visit 
to Abdullah, only shortly before Abdulla's assassination 
on July 20, 1951, Nashashibi, op, cit,, p, 340,
Syrkin, op. cit., p. 220,
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port of Elat, hitherto designated as Jordanian territory 
linking Egypt with North Arabia, the occupation of the 
Northern Triangle and valuable agricultural land along 
the entire Truce line, were cases in point.
Conclusion
As early as November, 1947, King Abdullah had com­
menced secret negotiations with the Zionists. The personal 
talks were aimed at ensuring his control over the Arab sec­
tor of Palestine, and legalizing it in a peace treaty. Most 
importantly, the secrecy meant to prevent Arab competition 
in Palestine.
Abdullah's character and personal ambitions appeared 
to have been the driving force behind his attitudes, ac­
tions and behavior. Publicizing such negotiations would 
expose him as a traitor and confirm his schemes, being view­
ed by the Arabs as detrimental to their interests. Accord­
ingly, he viewed secrecy as the best method to achieve his 
objectives, furthermore, his dominant personality and pa- 
triarchial rule precluded opposition, which facilitated his 
control over the destiny of his subjects. Abdullah's de­
sire to rule alone. His autocratic mentality which he in-
40
At-Tall, on. cit.. p. 220.
Some students of inter-Arab relations be­
lieve that Abdullah's acquiescence in the loss of the Negeb 
and Elat may have been motivated by his desire to complete­
ly cut Egypt off from East and North Arabia, thereby elim­
inating the major opposition to his Great Syria Plan.
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herited from his tribal background and his political edu­
cation at the Ottoman Congress rendered democracy and par­
liamentary institutions mere facades. Consulting meant 
lessening his power, which to him was repugnant. He once 
remarked to a close confidante,
I do not care about the government, because
I can change it with a stroke of a pen. I do not
depend on the government's red tape methods in 
solving problems. 41
Kost importantly, however, was his feeling of security
against an army coup, for having been patronized by the
Palace the army's loyalty was unquestionable.
Although Abdullah knew that he was violating the
League's resolutions, fulfilment of his personal aspirations
were more fundamental than obeying the Organization which
he scorned. One major conclusion may be stressed: what was
good for Abdullah, had to be good for Jordan and the Arab
nation.
^^At-Tall, op. cit.. p. 457.
CHAPTER VI 
THE RHODES ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
After Egypt decided to begin armistice talks on 
January 12, 1949, under the direction of Ralph Bunch, the 
United Nations Mediator, Jordan also consented to enter 
such talks on February 8. Jordan's military position was 
drastically weakened due to the withdrawal of the Iraqi 
army, and because Iraq had decided not to negotiate her­
self, but authorized Jordan to substitute for her.^ How­
ever, King Abdullah's eagerness to arrive at a final 
peace crowning his secret talks with the Israelis, dic­
tated his entry in the Rhodes armistice negotiations.
However, while Jordan assumed that her consent to 
start peace talks would also end military operations on 
both sides, the Israelis, anxious to acquire more Arab 
territory in the East Negeb and to obtain an outlet to the 
Red Sea at the Gulf of Aqaba, sought to delay peace talks 
as long as possible. Only after her military objectives
^usa, op. cit.. p. 531.
See a fascinating discussion on the conspiracy to 
encircle the Iraqi army and force it to withdraw from Pal­
estine. According to At-Tall, when Iraq discovered the 
plot, it decided on immediate withdrawal, rendering Abdul­
lah's position precarious. See At-Tall op. cit.. pp. 522-6.
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were achieved, did Israel sign a cease-fire with Jordan 
on March 11.^
As the Egyptian front became pacified, Israeli 
forces were deployed along the Jordan-Iraqi front. Fear­
ing that Israel might use its military power to invade 
and occupy parts of Transjordan's territory, the king's 
interest was intensified in the direction of peace. In 
the meantime, Abdullah invoked his treaty with Britain.
The British answer was that they would defend all area 
under Abdullah's control- including the newly won West 
Bank. This reply caused a wave of protest in Israel and 
in the countries that supported it. Thus, under inter­
national pressure, Britain declared that it would defend 
the original areas east of the Biver only.^ Although 
a British force arrived in Aqaba and took battle positions, 
their duty was merely to prevent the Israeli forces from 
crossing into Transjordan.
2
Khouri, op. cit.. p. 96,
W^iusa, op. cit.. p. 530.
In explaining Jordan' s dilemma,Prime Minister Abul- 
Huda said,
"The arrival of the British forces at Aqaba was at 
our request in order to prevent the Jews from reaching the 
shore, thereby cutting us off from Egypt. . . . But the 
British did not interfere. V/hen we inquired from Sir Alec 
Kirkbride- Britain's ambassador to Amman- about the reasons 
. . .  he said that the British force came to defend Aqaba 
only. . . . The British Government apologizes for its fail­
ure to fulfil its obligations for two reasons: one, because 
the United States advised her not to clash with the Jews; 
and two, because the majority of the British Commonwealth 
nations did not agree to a confrontation with the Jews."
See At-Tall, op. cit.. p. 521,
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During the armistice talks, the Jordan delegation 
proposed that the cease-fire take effect on the Iraqi lines. 
The Israeli delegation refused and informed Bunch that they 
did not approve of replacing the Iraqi army by the Legion, 
and they would "consider this act as a violation . • • and 
reserved for themselves in that situation complete freedom 
of action,"^ They threatened to "obtain what they want by 
war if not by peace," and demanded that the truce line 
be moved several kilometers to Israel’s advantage. Ac­
cordingly, if their demands were met, they would;
, . . sign a permanent truce with Jordan; 
that this demand be the last request for they 
consider it vital to them in view of the military 
necessities,6
Confronted with a serious situation, Abdullah 
requested the aid of his ally, Britain. Bevin’s reply 
was discouraging. He advised the king to seek the medi­
ation of President Truman. On March 29, Truman answered 
advising submission to the Jewish demands, but promised
trbid.. p. 530.
I^bid.
^Ibid.
when the Israeli demand reached Jordan, the Prime 
Minister inquired from Glubb:
"One, if we refuse these demands and fighting 
was renewed, can we repel them on all fron.ts; two, 
if we cannot repel them and the Legion faced them 
alone, is there a possibility of their occupying 
more territory than they demand now?"
The army chief replied that "the Legion cannot hold 
its positions on all front lines; and it is possible that if 
fighting is renewed the Zionists would occupy larger area 
than what they demand now." Musa, op. cit., p. 531: Also 
Majali, op. cit., p. 92.
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to intervene to stop further Israeli expansion in the
7
Jordanian sector of Palestine.
Thus, when the British and the Americans were un­
willing to intervene, Abdullah, who was already alienated
g
by the other Arab states, accepted the Jewish demands.
The decision to cede a number of strategic mountain posi­
tions and good farm land along the truce line, was an 
alternative to renewal of hostilities and as an attempt 
to pacify the enemy, both in quest of future peace: "If
they inclined to peace, you should also do so and leave it 
to God.
The Rhodes Agreement was considered a first step 
to eliminate the threat of war and to facilitate the tran­
sition from hostilities to permanent peace in Palestine.
Its most immediate objectives were military matters such 
as the reduction of forces and exchange of prisoners.
"^Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, op. cit., p. 210; 
also Musa, op. cit., p. 531; At-^all, dp. cit., p. 527.
®Glubb, op. cit., p. 234.
The cession of the central belt deprived many vil­
lages of their farming land and were left without adequate 
means of support. Ibid.; Kirk, op. cit., p. 297.
For an excellent description of the plight of the 
border villages, see Ann Bearden, Jordan, (London: Robert 
Hale, 1958), p. 132.
This "deal" intensified bitterness among the Arab 
nationalists who accused Abdullah of betraying the Arab 
cause in return for personal gains. As a result the mon­
archy became upset with serious unrest among the refugees 
and the whole Palestinian population in the West Bank.
The internal condition may have precipitated the assassin­
ation.
F^rorn the Koran; Abu Sha'ar, 4th edition, op. cit.,
p. 242.
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The agreement defined the armistice "demarcation 
line" which, although it was not a political or territo­
rial boundary, it, nevertheless, has been the frontier.
To Jordan, the Rhodes agreement signified military 
as well as political defeat due to the following reasons: 
one, the armistice was made under duress on orders from 
the King. It did not represent the opinion of the desire 
of the population, especially the Palestinians; two, it 
was signed because there was no alternative since Jordan 
was militarily incapable of defending its territories; 
three, the outcome of the Armistice was catastrophic to the 
Arabs, even to Abdullah personally. Thus, since it bene­
fited only the enemy, Jordan could not expect advantages 
from any revisions, especially since Israel defaulted in 
giving Jordan the seaport of Asqalan.^^
Reacting to the oppressive character of the Agree­
ment, the Jordanian Parliament asked the Prime Minister 
to revoke the Agreement, but their demand was not met.
In any case, the Agreement continued to be the sole legal 
instrument of relationship between Jordan and Israel.
Ralph Bunch likened the Agreement to the "unequal treaties" 
in its oppressive results and commented, " The Jewish 
delegation asked for the shirt, but the Arab delegations
^^Eytan, op. cit., p. 29. Pull text in Khalil,
Vol. II, p, 599.
l^At-Tall, op. cit.. pp 453, 489.
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were very generous and handed both the shirt and the trou-
12sers,"
The Israeli-Jordan armistice agreement was con­
cluded after prolonged secret negotiations and extensive 
diplomatic activities carried out by Israel, Jordan, Great 
Britain, the U.S., and the U.N. Abdullah personally did 
the negotiating at his palace of Shuneh. In a sincere at­
tempt to reach a peace settlement and to end the military 
confrontation and with disregard to the outcome of the 
details of the agreement, Abdullah fixed his mind to sign 
the agreement. Accordingly;
The results achieved at Shuneh were incorpor­
ated in the armistice agreement signed there on 
April 3, 1949. The demarcation line was not drawn 
strictly in accordance with the position of the 
armies but further east. It involved the cession 
to Israel of considerable territory. The govern­
ing factor being in the main topographical. The 
Jordanians were anxious to keep as many villages 
as possible on their side of the line, but they 
cared less about village lands. As a result a good 
many farmers were cut off from their land and some 
from their wells. Here again however, this was re­
garded as a temporary expedient pending peace and 
the establishment of a definite frontier. It is 
not likely that either Israel or Jordan would have 
agreed to this particular demarcation line except 
as a provisional measure. 13
The delegation, which included Glubb, was person­
ally picked by Abdullah and were expected to merely sign 
rather than negotiate since negotiations were being carried 
on secretly in Jordan. The Jordan delegation was entirely
^^Majali, op. cit.. p. 91.
^^Bytan, op. cit.. p. 41.
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composed of men from the East Bank who were not aware of 
the land values, the water resources, or the conditions of 
the villages in Palestine.
One observer remarked ;
The quality of the Jordan delegates, however, was 
not equal to the mission on which they had been 
dispatched. The Egyptian delegation had been skill­
ful, tenacious, and well-briefed. That of Lebanon 
was fully adequate to its task which proved the 
easiest of all. The delegates of Syria were fierce­
ly argumentative regarding diplomacy as a form of 
aggression and were well able to stand up for the 
rights of their country.
Jordan's delegation, however, was not of this 
mettle. V/hen they arrived at Rhodes, they were 
seen to be an unimpressive set. They looked help­
less and lost, apparently not sure of their instruc­
tions; it had seemed possible indeed that no clear 
instructions had been given them. King Abdullah, 
their master, soon indicated that he did not trust 
them to negotiate on his behalf, and that he pro­
posed to take matters in hand himself. It was 
agreed that the talks at Rhodes should continue as 
a facade, but that the real negotiations should be 
conducted in secret with the King at his winter 
palace at Shuneh, Only the King's closest confi­
dantes were to know; the rest of the world was to 
go on watching the show at Rhodes. This had per­
haps been the King's intention from the outsat and
^^Majali, op. cit.. p. 90; also Eytan, op. cit.,
p. 40.
A delegation from Palestine pleaded to Abdullah the 
necessity of including Palestinians in the delegation.
While the King agreed, the Prime I/Iinister Huda refused be­
cause "these negotiations were of military character which 
could not affect the final settlement if a peaceful settle­
ment is possible." Majali, op. cit., p. 92; and Glubb,
A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 241.
The critics of Huda accused him of voluntarily sign­
ing the agreement without outside pressure, for he could 
have resigned to avoid this painful catastrophe since he 
used to resign for trivial reasons. The Zionists had re­
fused to sign any agreement unless it was signed by Huda 
personally. It seems that the ghost of the agreement con­
tinued to haunt him until he committed suicide in 1954. 
Majali, op. cit.. pp. 91-93.
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15determined his choice of delegates.
In a last attempt to placate the Israeli delegation, 
Prime Minister Ahul-Huda, addressing them in the presence 
of King Abdullah at the Shuneh Palace, stated;
I speak to you in the name of the government 
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in the presence 
of our Lord. I welcome your visit which we hope it 
will be in the interest of both countries.
If we recall the past, we see how Jordan was 
dragged into the war, the immediate causes of which 
were the Old City of Jerusalem and the attempts of 
your forces to occupy it. This resulted in actual 
battles between the Jordan army and your troops. 
Aside from that, we never initiated battles.
. . . Our original policy, which we followed, 
was that the Arab army (Jordan; was to stop its 
advance at the partition line which we never cros­
sed. . . .  There has never been any inclination to 
war at all. . . . You can appreciate our difficult 
position in implementing this policy and being 
swept in the current of Arab policy merely as ca­
mouflage. Today we are not tied with Arab policy, 
nor do we accept outside advice. Prom all our 
hearts we desire to reach peace and a settlement 
with you. If your intentions are as good as ours, 
our problems will be solved as dictated by our mu­
tual interests, and good neighborhood policy bet­
ween our two countries.
The present problem is the permanent truce, 
according to which you demand altering the bounda­
ries, and the difficulties which this will bring 
us. His Majesty's Government suggests the imple­
mentation of the Partition Plan , which gives you 
a state and which gives us the other part. Why 
don't we proceed accordingly so that our problems 
would not multiply-especially the refugee problem 
. . .  ? Submitting to your demands places the 
government and the King in a precarious position 
and impedes progress toward a final settlement 
with you.16
Eytan, op. cit.. p. 40; Also Glubb, A Soldier 
With the Arabs, p. 241,
ïhe delegation was forbidden to agree to anything 
without reference to Amman," Thus, in reality, every phrase 
has been approved or even dictated by Taufiq Basha," Ibid.
At-Tall, op, cit. p. 531.
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At the same meeting, the King adding to Ahu-Huda's
policy briefing, addressed Eytan saying:
We are better for you than others ^Arab 
countries 7, Our interests are interwined. We 
are neighbors, like it or not. Do not place my 
Government in an uncomfortable position. 17
Insisting on the absolute demand that the Triangle
be ceded to Israel, and encouraged by the apparent weak
bargaining position of Abdullah and his Government, Eytan,
replying to Abul-Huda's statement, said:
. . . The basis of strong friendship bet­
ween Israel and Jordan is a settlement of the 
Northern Triangle which will be satisfactory to 
Israel and which ensures her security, . . .  The 
Government of Tel-Aviv would like to calm public 
opinion regarding the situation in the Triangle 
over which the people want to go to war,
Israeli demands in the Triangle are not 
negotiable. No part of it can be given up since 
the military experts had recommended that these 
demands are the absolute minimum to insure the 
security of the new Jewish State in that region. 
Their recommendations are considered by the govern­
ment as more important than the Palestine problem- 
compensations and the like- because the security 
of Israel is the most important demand we present. 
When this demand is fulfilled, and agreement would 
be reached tonight, 18
To King Abdullah, whatever land in Palestine he 
could bring under his control was an improvement. Thus 
his accommodation to the Israelis aimed at ending hosti-
^^ Ibid.
iGlbid., p. 532.
After the agreement was initialled, the Jewish de­
legation surprised Abdullah by offering him a gift from Ben 
Gurion. It was a copy of the Old Testament with a map of 
ancient Israel which included Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, 
Iraq, and parts of Hijaz. In return, Abdullah gave a return 
gift. It was a dagger. He expressed," They meant something.
I gave the dagger , let them take the hint," At-Tall, p. 517,
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liti.es and establishing peaceful relations with his nei­
ghbor, Israel. He considered the armistice as the begin­
ning of his quest for an enlarged kingdom and a fulfilment 
of his ambitions, Walter Eytan of the Israeli Foreign Of­
fice commented;
Abdullah alone of the Arab rulers was sincere 
in regarding the armistice as a major step toward 
peace. After the agreement was signed, he sought 
more permanent arrangements with Israel, To that 
end, negotiations with him and his closest advi­
sors were carried on intensively, especially between 
November, 1949 and March, 1950. A draft treaty 
was prepared and initialled, but Abdullah, under 
the rising pressure of Arab extremism which scared 
his ministers, was unable to carry it through,
, . .It came to be suspected that the King was plan­
ning to make peace with Israel. This, in the eyes 
of Arab nationalists was treason. . . . His death 
served as a warning to others, and nowhere in the 
Arab camp has there been talk of peace with Israel 
since. 19
The war of 1948 which ended in the armistice of 
1949, insured the existence of the Zionist state, and en­
abled it to extend its boundaries well beyond those allotted
20by the Partition Plan, Furthermore, by resorting to war
19■^ i^ ytan, op. cit.. p. 43.
As to direct negotiations, no Arab state or person­
ality has ever been willing to undertake them without the 
intervention of the United Nations, An example is the pre­
sent Jarring mission,
Y/hen the Rhodes delegation returned by air to Amman, 
they were told to go quietly and separately to their homes. 
It was feared that if they entered the town together riots 
might start. Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, p, 243,
20Israel with the help of the Western powers par­
celled the Palestine problem: the refugees, freezing funds, 
division of the Jordan waters, shipping through the Suez 
Canal, the U.N. Conciliation Commission, and the interna­
tionalization of the city of Jerusalem, This policy aimed
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to achieve its objectives, a significant growth of the in­
fluence of the military mentality in the internal and ex­
ternal affairs of Israel was manifested. Thus, the politi­
cal and military goals went hand in hand.
Conclusion
The deteriorating military position of the Egyptian 
army led to the signing of an Armistice Agreement. Since 
hgypt, the largest Arab state had signed it, the others, 
except Iraq, followed suit.
Jordan's political and military situations had 
reached a point which demanded that peace replace hostili­
ties. On the military front, the Jordan army was left 
facing a determined enemy force fifteen times larger, and 
resolved to hold to every inch of territory it occupied.
In this light. General Glubb warned that the army, with 
its depleted supplies could not possibly challenge a super­
ior enemy force, and thàt any attempt to attack would in­
evitably result in loss of more jilrab land. Furthermore, 
resumption of hostilities, it was feared, would encourage 
the enemy to occupy the Old City, even the entire West Bank. 
To Abdullah, such a nightmare was tantamount to losing his
dream of enlarging his domain.
Aside from the military aspect, the King was also
at keeping the Arabs attention diverted to deal with secon­
dary issues rather than the central one, freeing Palestine. 
Fadhil Al-Jamali, Thikrayat Wa Ibar; Karithat Filistine. 
(Beirut: Bar Al-KitaV“À1-Jadid, 1965), p. 49.
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faced with external pressures. His appeals to the U.N., 
the United States and to his ally-hy-treaty, Britain, went 
unheeded. This signalled Jordan's inability to protect 
its interests and made imperative the signing of the Armis­
tice Agreement which was characterized as the "unequal 
treaties."
No doubt Abdullah's self confidence had become 
shaken, as he expected a final peace treaty on equal terms. 
Again, his authoritarian rule permitted him personally to 
select the negotiating delegation, while he personally 
reached the terms with the enemy emissaries to his Palace.
CHAPTER VII 
JORDAN AND THE 196? WAR
Immediate Factors Contributing to the 1967 Conflict
All factors that had induced Israel to go to war 
in 1956 were present in 1967. The conflict revolved 
around the blockade of the Suez Canal, the Straits, the 
search for new markets by Israel, the increase in frequency 
and daring of the Arab commandoes across the ceasefire line, 
the policy of the Zionists to dispose of the Palestine 
people and their national liberation resistance, the Jordan 
River question, the United Arab command and Jordan's sign­
ing of the military pact with Egypt and Syria on i/iay 30, 
1967.
The Question of Free Navigation 
Egypt justified its mobilization and the closing 
of the Straits as purely defensive measures, claiming that 
it had the legal right to prevent Israel from using the 
Gulf because; (1) the Arab states were still in a state of 
war with Israel, (2) Israel's occupation of the Port of 
Elat on the western shore of the Gulf was illegal since it 
was done after the signing of the Rhodes Agreement with
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^gypt ajnd in complete violation of Security Council resolu­
tions, (3) the tripartite aggression of 195Ô did not change 
the legal status of Egypt's rights since Israel's privi­
leges to use the Gulf were guaranteed only hy her Western 
supporters, particularly the United States, Britain, and 
France, (4) Fgypt was not denying any country innocent pas­
sage nor actually blockading the straits since normal ship­
ping was not being interfered with, however, the U.A.R, 
had the right to prohibit Israeli ships and strategic ma­
terial from passing through her territorial waters because 
in the state of war such passage could not be considered 
innocent, and (5) the Arab states consider the Gulf as pri­
marily an internal, not an international, body of water 
since its only entrance is one mile wide surrounded by Arab 
land.l
Israel's insistence on keeping the Straits open, 
even at the risk of war, was dictated by the belief that 
diplomacy will produce nothing practical. The best Israel 
could hope for was less than free and open passage through 
the Straits. Moreover, while opening the Straits through 
diplomatic efforts might provide a solution to the immedi­
ate problem, it would be temporary and unsatisfactory. To 
Israel, diplomacy or reliance on United Nations' interven­
tion would not satisfy its aspirations of absolute control 
of the Straits; thus, Israeli leaders expressed that they
^Khouri, op. cit., p. 251.
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had no confidence in the U.N. peace-keeping force as a
2
means of insuring the right of navigation in the Straits.
To that end, "Israel must chart her own course."'^ Foreign 
Minister Ahha Kb an expressed this policy in the Security 
Council when he threatened that, "Nothing less than com­
plete non-interference with free and innocent passage is 
acceptable.
Seemingly sure of Israel's capability to back its 
threat to force the opening of the Gulf, Eban in a press 
conference on May 30, 1967, stated that the Egyptian action 
caused a change in the security balance in the region.
He threatened that unless Egypt immediately rectified these
5
changes, Israel would take retaliatory measures.
To Israel, security was placed above every other 
consideration. She had insisted that the major powers im­
plement the 1957 commitment to create "a regime of interna­
tional security and l a w . T h i s  included open navigation 
in the Gulf of Aqaba. Eshkol had acted upon that assump­
tion, but President Johnson responded by indicating that
2
New York Times, December 15, 1968, p. 1.
^Ibid., November 11, 1968, p. 2.
T^bid., June 4, 1967.
^Charles Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War: How it Be­
gan," Foreign Affairs, (January, 1968), pp. 304-320.
^Terrence Prittie, EshkOl: The Man and the Nation, 
(New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1969), p. 3l9.
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the United States was not in a position to uphold interna­
tional law and warned Israel against taking unilateral ac­
tion, Since the Big Powers did not respond to Israel's 
expectations, the Zionist leaders Began to believe that 
international order had been abandoned by the Great Powers, 
to the detriment of Israel, It decided to chart its own 
course and take unilateral action:
The international order had been challenged 
and abdicated. The Israeli soldiers took over,
, , , They believed that they had to get very fast 
results before any great power could act. The in­
stinct that there is a great power system built up 
over the years faded away gradually. 7
To Israel, the closing of the Straits constituted 
a threat to its vital interests since ninety-nine percent 
of its oil imports were handled by the Port of Elat, How­
ever, the closure did not pose a threat to its survival 
since no Israeli ships crossed the Straits for over tv/o and
u
one half years before the conflict. According to King 
Husayn:
The latest attack is not an isolated example 
but a part of a deliberate Israeli expansionist 
policy, although they have some how made it appear 
that they are a tiny unarmed country surrounded by 
Arab willies. 9
7
London Times, January 2, 1969.
BHusayn's speech at the General Assembly Emergency 
Session, June 26, 1967, (Amman: Ministry of Information), 
p. 3.
Thr Port of Elat handled 0^% of Israel's oil imports 
though only 5.95^  of the rest of its trade. See Malcolm 
Kerr, The Middle East Conflict, (New York: Poreign Policy 
Association, 1969), p, 2B,
^Husayn's G,A, speech, June 26, 1967, p. 6,
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The Btrategic problem of Israel was not a military 
or an economic one, but political and psychological, Mo­
hammad Haykal of Al-Ahram explained:
The closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli 
navigation and the ban on import of strategic 
goods, even when carried by non-Israeli ships, 
means first and last that the Arab nation rep­
resented by the UAR has succeeded for the first 
time vis a vis Israel in changing by force a 
fait accompli imposed on it by fOrce* This is the 
essence' of the problem, regardless of the implica­
tions surrounding it and future contingencies , . .
. . .  To Israel this is the most dangerous 
aspect of the current situation. . . .  Therefore, 
it is not a matter of the Gulf of Aqaba, but some­
thing bigger. It is the whole philosophy of Is­
raeli security. It is the philosophy on which 
Israeli existence has pivoted since its birth and 
on which it will pivot in the future.
Hence I say that Israel must resort to arms.10
Egypt's action was primarily based on Soviet in­
telligence. By closing the Gulf and the Straits, "the 
Soviets wanted an Egyptian show of strength, but only one
II 1 1
that would be limited exercise in brinkmanship, not war."
Miles Copeland of the Central Intelligence Agency 
insisted that Nasser's move was merely a show of strength 
aimed at enhancing his prestige, while the Israeli action 
was calculated to win a decisive battle. He wrote :
Except that I would add that Nasser did not 
exactly stumble, and that Israel was not exactly 
unprepared. Nasser planned his operation in detail 
right up to the moment Vice President Zakaris Mo- 
hieddin, in Nasser's name , was to back down mag­
nanimously (over the Straits of Tiran issue) in
^^Kerr, op. cit., p. 25.
^^Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1969;, p. 275.
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response to appeals from the United Nations; the 
Israelis had no wish to let Nasser get away with 
such a prestige- building gesture. Despite their 
promise to President Johnson that they would hold 
off until Zakaria got to New York, the Israelis 
struck on the very morning Zakaria was supposed to 
depart. After all, they had been rehearsing their 
assault for years, and never again would they get 
such favorable circumstances in which to launch it.12
Since its conception, Israel has been a garrison 
state. Its army's ideology of expansion and security has 
been tied closely to its foreign policy. Thus the army 
played a major role of implementing and determining to a 
large extent the course of Israel's foreign relations^^
It was the military, rather than the politicians that made 
the strike unavoidable.
There had grown up a myth of Israeli invincibility 
which weighed heavily behind the Israeli policy of armed 
reprisals. Thus, in June, 1967, a retreat from attacking 
the United Arab Republic first, Jordan and Syria second, 
would have given the impression that Israel did not dare 
to tangle with the Arab armies. The mere possibility that 
Nasser personally would benefit from such retreat, streng­
thening his position of Arab leadership upset the Zionists 
who wished to minimize, even to eliminate his power. By 
maintaining military superiority over the combined Arab 
force, Israel could successfully preserve the safety of
12Copeland, The Game of Nations, (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1969), p. 27b.
^^Amos Perlrautter," The Israeli Army in Politics," 
World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 4, (July, 1968;, p. 625.
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its frontier. Since offense is the best defense, offense 
was employed to establish peace through strength. This 
theory became the policy of the Israeli army.^^ There­
fore, it became imperative that Israel must strike first.
By so doing, Israel had achieved an unchallengeable mili­
tary superiority over the entire region.
Israel's Search for New Markets
As to the internal economic conditions in Israel, 
the German reparation payments expired in 1965. Thus, a 
substitute source of funds had to be found. The rising un­
employment and frequent recessions in Israel's economy had
IBreached an alarming level in 1967. In order to halt the 
economic decline, the state embarked on a policy in the 
direction of armed conflict that would attain certain econo­
mic objectives, as increased commercial transactions in the 
immediate vicinity of Israel, it was argued, could alleviate
^^Ibid., p. 626.
^^Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "Israel's Arab Policy," The 
Arab V/orld, IIV, Special Issue, No. 10-11, p. 35.
TKe Zionist economists knew that Agriculture and 
services - the nation's principle source of employment - 
had been expanded to the maximum limits. Virtually all 
arable lands were being tilled and cultivated. Furthermore, 
by 1964 there was surplus housing units as immigration had 
been reversed.
The war solved the unemployment problem over night, 
but demobilization recreated it. However, by occupying 
large territories, new markets were created, new enter­
prises established, and new jobs for administering the 
populated occupied areas were found. New York Times, Au­
gust 13, 1967, IV, p. 5. See also "Israel's Economy Slows 
Dovm," New Outlook. June, 1966, pp. 9-18; and "Anatomy of 
a Crisis," New Outlook, March, 1966, pp. 21-25.
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sone of the pressing eoonorrdc problems.
One major result of the 1956 aggression was the 
opening of markets for Israeli trade in certain Asian and 
African countries. However, the volume of trade was lov/ 
and its proportion of Israeli export market remained neg­
ligible and continued to decline, despite improvement in
17relations between Israel and these states.
it this point, it became evident to Israel that 
there was no substitute for normalization of trade with the 
immediate Arab neighbors. To that end a policy was directed 
toward a long-range objective of reaching a form of settle­
ment with the Arabs, by either voluntary peace of by 
1R
force. The Zionist leadership differed on the method of
^^The United Jewish Appeal, the Israeli bonds, and 
the Israel Emergency fund have been the major source of 
funds.
On Alay 15 and 25, 1967, following Eshkol’s threat­
ening declarations, top American Jewish leaders journeyed 
to Israel and were taken on a tour of the front. There it 
was decided that war is the "only solution" and the launch­
ing of the Israel Emergency Fund drive to finance the war 
v/as to start on May 22. Jerusalem Post, July 3, 1967, 
quoted in Lughod, op. cit.. p. 351
17Odeyo Ayagu, "Africa's Dilemma in the Arab- 
Israeli Conflict," Pan-African Journal, Vol. 1, No. 219, 
(1968), p. 114.
1 Pi
An Israeli English daily commented on this issue: 
The only way to reach a settlement is for the 
Zionists to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people - 
according to the partition plan and repatriation of the re­
fugees and compensating them. Israel's relations with the 
Arab states will continue to be abnormal until Israel finds 
a way to accommodate positively the rights of the Palestin­
ian people. Jerusalem Post, October 18, 1966.
All studies indicate that while Israel is eager to 
reach a settlement, it insists on the status quo which is
Ill
attaining this goal. Dayan and Prez were of the opinion 
that there was only one way to solve the problem conclu­
sively, and that "was by defeating the Arabs so decisively 
in battle that they would be forced to accept a dictated 
settlement at the conference t a b l e . T h e  logic behind
this premise was that "force was, after all, what Arabs
20understood best."
The alternative proposal was adopted by Eban, who, 
while agreed to the same principle, pursued a subtle stra­
tegy which required a great deal of skill in execution. He 
viewed the Middle East as a region of fragmented sovereign­
ties which eventually would accept the Zionist state as a
21partner for mutual benefits. Further, he foresaw the 
dominant role of Israel in the region. However, in order 
to realize this dominance, a peace settlement on Israeli 
terms was the only feasible solution. Accordingly, in his 
view:
The challenge to Israel's foreign policy lay 
in its ability to organize pressure on the Arabs 
to normalize their relationship with Israel and at
abhorrent to the Palestinians and the Arabs as a whole.
The alternative to the Zionists is to force such settlement 
by force of arms, a policy which in fact has precipitated 
three major confrontations,
IQ^Lughod, op. cit.. p. 37.
Dayan said after the 1967 war, "If one thinks mili­
tary defeat brought the Arabs closer to peace, he is very 
much mistaken." Avnery, op. cit., p. 206,
20Lughod, op. cit.. p. 37.
^^See Chapter VIII, footnote 1, p.
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the same time make it crystal clear that under no 
circumstances would the Arabs ever be in a position 
to bring about a solution other than one envisaged 
by Israel. 22
Realizing that direct negotiations with the Arabs 
were not yet possible, Eban envisaged international pres­
sure to compel the Arabs to accept Israel's terms for peace. 
To him, therefore, the road to a Middle East settlement 
must pass through Washington and Moscow and to a lesser ex­
tent London and Paris. His plan was to persuade these 
powers that peace in the Middle East was of direct concern 
to them, and that they could initiate such steps as pres­
suring the progressive regimes and influencing the conser­
vative ones. On the other hand, they could impose sanc­
tions by withholding arms shipments to their Arab allies
thus depriving them of the capacity to counter Israel's 
21power. Consequently the Arabs would sue for peace.
The Great Powers were inclined to ignore the Middle 
East issue if the situation was calm. On the other hand,
22Lughod, op. cit.
^^This policy means that, while the Zionists will 
have adequate military power, the Arab states will have a 
much, much smaller quantity. This leads the observer to 
the conclusion that a settlement for Israel in order to be 
enforced must place Israel in a position to dictate her 
own terms. The only position from which to bargain is that 
of the conqueror. This doctrine now dictates the policy 
which the Zionists had maintained since the 1967 war, namely 
to force the Arab states to sigh a peace treaty on Israel's 
terms. Perlmutter, op. cit., p. 627.
For example, Israel protested the sale of Mirage 
Jets by France to Libya on January 9, 1970, as she had pro­
tested all arms sales to the Arabs from any source includ­
ing the U.S.S.R.
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they "became alarmed when "border incidents intensified lest 
confrontation "between the Powers might develop. The retal­
iatory raids by the Zionists, while intended for military 
offensive purposes, had'great propaganda value. The raids 
signified that a helpless alien state was being perpetually 
harrassed by those who wanted its destruction. Thus, while 
the raids were primarily for offensive reasons, they con­
veyed the impression that they were initiated in self-de­
fense, to repel the attacks by the neighboring hostile 
states. By this strategy, world opinion was alerted to the 
fact that tension existed in the region, and in pursuit of
peace it would pressure the Arabs to reach a peaceful set-
24tlement of the issue.
Thus, by escalating the military situation along 
the Syrian-Israeli armistice line, in April, 1967, the 
Zionists succeeded in realerting the Powers to the explo­
siveness of the region, as the surprise attack on June 5, 
1967, brought these powers and the U.N. into international 
cri si s.
The Palestine Resistance Movement
The Zionist policy toward the Palestine Arabs in 
particular and the Arab states in general was guided by 
two factors: ideology and practical needs. As to the lat­
ter, the Zionists, in pursuit of acquiring the maximum
24ibid.. p. 626.
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amount of territory took advantage of Abdullah's naivete
through the secret negotiations as manifested in the Rhodes
Agreement and violated the cease-fire agreements whenever
it was to their advantage. As to the ideological factor,
Israel's most immediate objective was to stake a claim to
mandate Palestine by liquidating the cultural and natural
affinity of the Arab inhabitants and ultimately to excise
26them from the territory.
For that reason, Zionist policy toward the Palestine
issue fluctuated according to expediency. At first they
considered the Palestine issue merely a local one concerning
27the Palestine Arab community and the Zionists alone.
However, since the Palestine Arabs had no organization, the 
Arab states had to adopt their problem. For that reason, 
the Zionists began to recognize the Arab states as party 
to the conflict.
Despite the fact that the Palestine Arab community
25Rodinson, op. cit., p. 39»
26
Christopher Sykes, Crossroad to Israel. (London;
Collins, 1965), p. 65.
27As the impasse persists, Israel is trying to per­
suade the Arabs in the occupied territory to have local au­
tonomy thereby severing all connections with Jordan. But 
this policy has not succeeded mainly due to the fact that 
the West Bankers prefer to be under an Arab government and 
because the Jordan government had declared that:
"Every Jordanian on the West Bank of the Jor­
dan is still and will continue to be a Jordan citi­
zen. The government declares that any collabora­
tion with the enemy. . . will be considered trea­
son. . . . "  New York Times, June 22, 1967.
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■became conquered people and a Zionist state was established 
in their land, they have not capitulated nor weakened their 
resolve to liberate their homeland. This is manifested in 
their recognition by the Arab states and especially by the 
formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization under 
Arab League sponsorship. This development is of grave poli­
tical importance since two opposing nationalisms compete 
for the same territory. "There can be no real resolution 
to the conflict short of political elimination of one or
pQ
the other protagonist."
To Israel this was an imminent and clear danger=
It realized that the long dormant Palestine Arabs whom it 
called hitherto "conquered people" or simply "Arab refugees", 
were emerging as an independent force and that a Palestine 
national liberation movement was in the making.
This movement represented a resistance to occupa­
tion of their homeland. To the Zionists this resistance 
violated the basic principle upon which the concept of Is­
raeli defense and border security was based. The commando 
movement was directed from the neighboring states. This 
turn of events caused discomfort with the Zionists who had 
always taken the position that the Palestine Arabs were 
merely conquered people and they were the occupying power.
28Moshe Dayan, "A Soldier Reflects on Peace Hopes," 
Jerusalem Post, (December 30, 1968); cited in Lughod, op. 
cit., pi 31. On this point, see also Hashim Sharabi, Pal­
estine and Israel, (New York, Pegasus, 1968), p. 128.
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As the resistance movement intensified in frequency and 
daring and became a fact which the Zionists were reluctant 
to live with, it gave the Zionists a pretext for retalia­
tory action against the neighboring states from whose terri-
2Qtories this resistance was initiated. The policy of re­
prisals was in accordance with the basic strategic principle 
which the Zionists had espoused, namely of waging war out­
side Israel's boundaries.
In both the 1956 and 1967 wars, the Palestine resis­
tance movement gave rise to major conflicts. In fact, from 
1953 on, violence along the armistice line was occasioned 
by infiltrators' activities initiated by border villagers 
not organized by the central government at A m m a n . N e v e r ­
theless, these activities brought about reprisals carried 
out by regular Israeli army units. A United Nations observ­
er verifies this condition;
But when the Arabs do something wrong, it is 
usually stealing a sheep or picking a fruit in Is­
rael. When the Israelis act, it is usually to take 
over more land or set up milltaiy positions, or 
clobber the Arabs somewhere. 31
^Lughod, op. cit.. p. 35.
As commandoes were showing increasing proficiency, 
Eshkol stated on May 17, 1967, that Israel had "no . . . 
other choice but to adopt counter measures against the foci 
of sabotage and the abettors." New York Times, March 6, 
1967.
• J Q
Bytan, op. cit., p. 105.
^^Samuel Merlin, The Search for Peace in the Middle 
East, (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 196bJ, p. 226.
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In pursuing this policy, Israel followed a precedent.
^^The United States Government sent troops into 
Mexico on March 15, 1915, after the failure of all its 
other efforts to contain the marauders who hurried the 
frontier zones. The American forces were not withdrawn un­
til early the following year. On June 20, 1916, the 
Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, addressed a note to 
the Mexican Government:
"It would be tedious to recount instance 
after instance, outrage after outrage, atrocity 
after atrocity, to illustrate the true nature and 
extent of the widespread conditions of lawlessness 
and violence which have prevailed. During the 
past nine months in particular, the frontier of 
the United States along the lower Rio Grande has 
been thrown into a constant state of apprehen­
sion and turmoil because of frequent and sudden 
incursions into American territory and depreda­
tions and murders on American soil by Mexican 
bandits. . . . Representations were made to 
General Carranza, and he was emphatically request­
ed to stop these reprehensible acts. ; . . In 
the face of these depredations . . . , the per­
petrators of which General Carranza was unable 
or possibly considered it inadvisable to apprehend 
and punish, the United States had no recourse other 
than to employ force to disperse the bands of 
Mexican outlaws who were with increasing boldness 
systematically raiding across the international 
boundary . . . .  This Government has waited month 
after month for the consummation of its hope and 
expectation . . . .  Obviously, if there is no 
means of reaching bands roving on Mexican terr­
itory and making sudden dashes at night into Am­
erican territory , it is impossible to prevent 
such invasions unless the frontier is protected 
by a cordon of troops. No government could be 
expected to maintain a force of this strength 
along the boundary. . . . for the purpose of 
resisting this onslaught of a few bands of law­
less men, especially when the neighboring states 
make no effort to prevent these attacks. The most 
effective method of preventing raids of this nature, 
as past experience has fully demonstrated, is to 
visit punishment or destruction on the raiders. .
. . The first duty of any government (is) the 
protection of life and property. This is the para­
mount obligation for which governments are in­
stituted, and governments failing or neglecting 
to perform it are not worthy of the name." Quoted 
in Eytan, op. cit., pp.106-107.
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Thus the Israeli-Arab policy had the objective of 
destroying the Palestine resistance in embryo, as in the 
cases of Kibya, Essamu and Karamah, By breaking this 
resistance they hoped to maintain peace and stability along 
the armistice line and to serve notice to the neighboring 
states that should they tolerate commando actions from 
their territories, they will automatically invite repri­
sals, To achieve this objective, border incidents were 
increased and intensified in order to force the Arabs, 
especially Jordan which had the longest border of four 
hundred fifty miles with Israel, to sign a peace treaty 
legitimizing Zionist conquest. This attitude of Israelis 
was a calculated policy to serve its political purposes. 
Maintaining a high but tolerable level of tension served 
to consolidate its hold over external supporters for poli­
tical and financial ends. Internally, it solidified and 
strengthened the nation's unity. Explaining Israel's 
psychology in this respect, professor Max Rodinson, a 
French Jew wrote ;
Zionst Israel throve on a bellicose atmos­
phere and threat of danger. The world could not 
allow her to be destroyed, Jews the world over 
would rally to the aid of those who in time of 
peril they could not help regarding as their broth­
ers, Zion's salvation lay in permanent danger.34
^^Hashim Sharabi, "Prelude to War:■The Crisis•of 
May-June, 1967," The Arab World, Vol. XIV, No, 10-11,
(n,d,), p, 23,
^^odinson, op. cit,, p, 70,
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Jordan, under King Abdullah, was receptive to such 
pressures, but it came to a halt when Husayn became the 
ruler. Thus, a new policy of systematic coercion was em­
barked on, the assumption of which was that the language 
of force was the best the Arabs could understand. Its 
principal aim was to compel Jordan to sue for peace with 
the assumption that if Jordan, the most involved in the 
conflict, agreed to a peace treaty, the other Arab states 
would follow. But this policy produced the opposite reac­
tion in Jordan, for instead of suing for peace, Jordan em­
barked on a counter policy to the reprisal raids by organ­
izing the National Guard, arming the Jordan population, es- 
pecially the border villages.
Bor a decade after the Suez crisis, despite some 
border incidents, the threat of armed conflict was at a 
minimum. The lull was interpreted as signifying a poten­
tial for p e a c e . H o w e v e r , with the large-scale military 
attack on the Jordanian village of Essamu in December, 1966, 
a sudden confrontation seemed imminent. This was attribu­
ted to increasing activity of the Palestinian resistance,
^^Lughod, op. cit.. p. 33.
^^The president of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter­
national Peace, Joseph Johnson, was dispatched to the Mid­
dle East by the Palestine Conciliation Commission for an­
other attempt at conciliation in the early ’60s. (New Out­
look, Vol. VII, No; 5, Tel Aviv, 1964, pp. 16-24.) Also the 
French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, visited the Middle 
East in an attempt to bring about a dialogue between the 
Arabs and the Zionists. (New Outlook, Vol. IX, No. 4; cited 
by Lughod, op. cit., p. 34T)
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"but in fact was a calculated move to test the conhesive- 
ness and the capability of the newly formed Arab Command, 
particularly since the activity had not appreciably dis­
turbed the lull. The commando activities meant to the 
Palestinians the right to their land and homes. To the 
Zionists, by contrast, this was not an issue, for in the
logic of the letter's strategy, the question of Arab rights
to their ancestral homeland in which they lived for four­
teen centuries, like the question of Jerusalem, now belong-
37ed to the non-negotaible category.^ Micheal lonidee, a 
long time observer of Middle Eastern politics commented:
They ^Palestine Arabs_y were attacked both 
ways. It was morally wicked of them to fight to 
prevent the Zionists enjoying what was theirs; 
they were weak and incompetent to fight and failed.
As aggressors, they had no right to win; for their
military incompetence they deserved to lose. They 
should have been loyal to the United Nations deci­
sion to partition, for the rule of law must be 
honored; they must accept the consequences of defeat, 
for victory goes to those who are strong. The 
Jews were there of right; anyway they had beaten 
the Arabs in war. It is right for the Jews to 
fight to acquire; wrong for the Arabs to fight to 
hold.38
To Jordan, in particular, it appeared that the 
commando activities precipitated Israeli reprisals which 
Jordan wished to avoid. Cognizant of their weak military 
posture, the states of the Arab Command made it a point not
37 ^Sharabi, op. cit., p. 29» Manchester Guardian,
May 8, 1969. ------
^^Micheal lonides, Divide and Lose : The'Arab Revolt, 
19555-58, ( London: Goeffrey !sies, i960;, p. 79.
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to furnish Israel with the slightest pretext for starting 
a premature war. Accordingly, at the Arab Summit Confer­
ences, it was agreed that:
All commando actions against Israel had to 
be submitted to review by the United Arab Command 
before they were carried out, since it alone had 
the authority to judge if the proposed operation 
was a 'coordinated action' as defined by the Arab 
states. 39
In Jordan, however, Husayn refused to permit the Commandoes 
to roam freely in his territory, to have headquarters in 
Jordan, or even to use the radio station. Furthermore, he 
forbade the P.L.O. to tax the refugees or recruit them into 
the liberation army.
Jordan and the Fedayeen in post-1967 period. The 
Palestine commandoes (Fedayeen) became a formidable force 
guarding Jordan's frontier and cooperating with the army 
alongside of which they fought the 1967 so-called six-day 
war. This changed the image of the Fedayeen who no longer 
were men in hiding operating from secret bases. Now they 
were viewed as great fighters and patriots. Even Husayn 
acknowledged their prestige when he remarked, "If this con­
tinues , we might all reach the stage where we are all
^^Vance and Lauer, op. cit.. p. 27.
^^On January 27, 1967, Husayn withdrew his recog­
nition of the P.L.O. Furthermore, Jordan declared that it 
would boycott all organizations connected with the Arab 
Summit in which Ahmad Al-Shuqayri, head of the P.L.O., 
would take part. Al-Ahram reported that Jordan's attack 
on Shukayri was a pretext to boycott the summit and disable 
the U.A.C. At the same time, Husayn requested 700,000 
pounds of the Leaguers budget for River Jordan projects. 
Al-Ahram, January 28, 1967.
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Fedayeen.
The new role of the commandoes made it clear that 
the June War had not ended on the 6th day because Israel 
had not won a victory, especially not against the commando 
anyway. Nor had Husayn won the battle to halt their oper­
ations inside his country because they became:
. . .  A law unto themselves, obeying commanders in 
Syria and Egypt. . . . Above all they forced Jor­
dan to maintain the illusion of continuing a war 
with Israel when the King wanted to continue the 
search for peace. 4-2
In order to minimize the Israeli retaliation after 
the War, Husayn declared that he would not tolerate the 
commando operations in his country and sought to hold back 
all-out commando escalation. He was confronted with a cri­
tical situation. While commando activities were keeping 
the enemy off balance, they were inviting reprisal raids 
which adversely affected Jordan's economy, especially by 
damaging the irrigation canals, dams and other projects.
Replying to criticism and challenging other Arab 
governments, he continued: "If anyone thinks he is a bet­
ter Arab national than I am, let him show it in his own
4^New York Times. April 7, 1968, IV, p. 131, and 
December 8, 1968, IV, p. 14.
^^New York Times, April 7, 1968, IV, p. 131.
The conflict between the Palestine commandoes and 
Husayn precipitated the Jordan Civil War in September,
1970, during which thousands of Palestinians, especially 
in the refugee camps, were killed.
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country and not use Jordan as a "base."^^
Husayn's stand on the Palestine issue since May 30, 
1967, and his cooperation with the commandoes during the 
war transformed his position into a positive light. Even 
Nasser declared that as long as Husayn's policy aimed at 
ridding Palestine of Zionism, no Arab would stand against 
him.
In Jordan, the support given the commandoes by the 
presence of the Iraqi army placed their activities largely 
beyond the control of Husayn. In any case after the 1957 
War, it became imperative for Husayn to give full support 
to the commandoes v/ho enjoyed the support of the majority 
of his subjects. In the Press Club speech he defended the 
legality of the commando activities:
I am asked 'Why don't you stop the Fedayeen, 
the commandoes, in their raids against Israel?' I 
reply, 'I would not stop them.' It's their land 
that the Israelis are occupying and they see no way 
out for them except to struggle to achieve their 
rights. If they can't succeed in regaining the 
occupied land, then their aim is to exercise their 
right of active resistance to the forces of occupa­
tion. To practical people this may seem quixotic - 
but to people with anger in their hearts and a con­
viction that they are in the right, the practica­
bility of their acts is of no consequence. Nor the 
sacrifice. And I am not willing to be responsible 
for the security of the forces of occupation.
. . . 'There is no difference in my aim in 
seeking a peaceful settlement and their aim in a 
settlement by conflict.' What we both want is a 
restoration of our rights. I would never accept
'^ N^ew York Times, op. cit.. p. 132; and Vance and 
Lauer, op. cit., p. 2TT~
^twew York Times, op. cit., p. 134.
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a peace that did not fully restore these rights. 
When we have regained them there will cease to be 
a reason for commando action. It is the intoler­
able situation that produces the commandoes, not 
the commandoes who provoke the situation. 45
The Fedayeen leaders have repeatedly insisted that 
they do not want to take over political administration in 
Jordan. Such a move, they argued, would only play into the 
hands of Israeli military "hawks" who want total polariza­
tion brought about by the departure of Husayn, the ending 
of British-American influence in Jordan, and the growing 
of Soviet influence instead.
The Fedayeen and Nasser testify to the value of 
having an ally on good terms with the West. Furthermore, 
the moderation of Husayn made Nasser look relatively tough. 
Yet there are more important reasons for cooperating with 
Husayn. One, until the Fedayeen agree on a unified leader­
ship of their own, they would like to see cooperation and 
direction from Husayn, Two, the Commandoes consider Jor­
dan the best place from which to regain their usurped land. 
Conseq.uently, they would not like to see Jordan swallowed 
by any of its Arab neighbors, for such contingency would
^^King Husayn's Speech at the Press Club, Washing­
ton B.C. April 19, 1969: Also Al-Risalah Al-^lakiyyiah. 
(Amman; Ministry of Information, n.d.), p. 27.
Adopting the same attitude regarding the Fedayeen, 
Syrian Premier Zayn said in a Damascus Press Conference on 
October 10, 1966:
"We are not guardians of Israel's safety. We 
are not resigned to holding back the revolution of 
the Palestine people. . . " Theodore Draper, Israel 
and World Politics. (New York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 37.
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invite Israeli intervention which conld. result in the oc­
cupation of parts if not all of Jordan, Lastly, hy estab­
lishing a "Commando Government" to replace Husayn's regime 
would mean the end of Jordan as a state which would cost 
the Arabs a seat in the United Nations.
The Jordan RLver Dispute and the Summit Conferences. By 
I960, the Arabs showed mounting anxiety over the progress 
being made by Israel to divert the Jordan waters to the 
Negeb. In response, the Arabs threatened to divert the 
"Arab River" from its sources in Syria and Lebanon. Jor­
dan was the first to call for joint Arab action declaring 
that the water problem was a part of the Palestine question 
which concerned all the Arabs. Jordan was especially con­
cerned because the Israeli projects would deprive her of 
badly needed water for irrigation, since the Israeli project 
was designed to divert these waters before entering the 
Jordan territory.
The loudest provocation was made by Dayan in 1959, 
when he threatened that "unless the Arabs cooperate in 
finding a solution to the Jordan waters, we will take it 
by force. . . .
^^The Economist, December 14, 1968, p. 25.
Major General Ezer Weisman warned that if a "Com­
mando Government" takes over in Jordan, the Israeli army 
would intervene. Cl^stian Science Monitor, February 21,1970, 
Recently, Dayan stated that tïusayn's " Western 
friends" were the deterrent to a large scale military 
action in Jordan, Ibid.
47Filistin. October 20, 1959.
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The first call for a summit was made by President 
Nasser on December 23, 1963, The conference convened in 
Cairo from January 13 to 17, at which the heads of states 
decided to create a special commission to supervise the 
diversion of the Jordan waters, and entrusted the Unified 
Arab Command with the task of preventing an enemy aggres­
sion aiming at obstructing the plan. It was also agreed 
that a budget of fifteen million pounds be spent in arming 
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon,^®
The Arab summit caused an immediate response in 
Israel which viewed the Arab plan as an act of physical 
aggression. As work began, Israel bombarded the sites 
of the operation.^^ Furthermore, Prime Minister Levi Esh­
kol in a speech in the parliament on January 16, made his 
government's policy clear. He warned that the Arab plan 
would be regarded as an "encroachment on our soil; hence 
military confrontation would be inevitable."^® Appealing 
to world puplic opinion, Israeli Foreign Minister Sharette
^^Mohanmnad Faraj, ■ Al-Ummah Al-Arabiyyiah A1 Al= 
Tareeq. II Wahdat Al-Hadaf. Cairo; Par Al-Fikr Al-Àra‘bi. 
1564)r P« 474; Also Khaiil, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 172.
The only project of any significance was the Mu- 
khiba Dam in Jordan. The other projects were abandoned for 
lack of military security. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Gold War. 
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 153.
^^Merlin, op. cit.. p. 23.
^®Ibid.; Also Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
The Arab t’lan to Divert the Headwaters of the River Jordan, 
(^ tampiilet, n.p., April, 1965; No. 14, p. V.
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declared to an Amsterdam conference:
The summit meeting should he considered a 
defiance to all the world and should not he look­
ed upon casually as long as it represents defiance 
to the world which created the state of Israel. 51
In the meantime G-olda Meir in an interview with Le Monde
threatened, . .We know our power and capability to con-
52front every attempt to do us harm.
The Arah argument was hased on the fact that the 
diversion of the waters hy Israel will present a problem 
of s a l i n i t y . " I n  due course," the Jerusalem Post stated, 
"The Jordan will he reduced to a little more than a season-
^^Taraj, op. cit., p. 4-81.
^^Quoted in Ibid.. p. 483.
Under Secretary of State, Alexis Johnson in a speech 
to the Citizens Committee of American Foreign Policy in the 
Near East declared that the United States was determined 
"to avoid taking sides in the regional disputes . . . hut 
this does not mean that we will stand idly hy if aggression 
is committed." He also warned that,"In the coming months 
many of our policies will he put to test." "The Arabs took 
Johnson's statement as a warning to them not to attack 
Israel militarily or hy diverting the Jordan waters before 
they reach Israel." New York Times, February 3, 1964. 
Senator Keating further threatened :
"The United States must declare that it will 
not allow the Arabs to obstruct Israel's diversion 
of the river waters, and it should explain its op­
position in this matter, and that the Sixth Fleet 
should stand now and in the future ready to stop 
any Arah adventure or military activity against 
Israel." Quoted in Faraj, op. cit., p. 486.
Senator Harrison Williams also added, "We must ex­
plain to the world continually that we will support Israel, 
and oppose anyone who opposes it with all our resources." 
Quoted in Ibid.. p. 487.
^^Daily Star, November 3, 1965.
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al trickle and the Negeb shall live."^^ While the Negeb 
prospers, thousands of Jordanian farmers would lose their
EC
only means of livelihood. Furthermore, the Arab states 
reject Israel's claim which is based on territorial sover­
eignty, and insist that the creation of the Zionist state
56was an illegal act by the United Nations.
Dangers of the project to the Arabs. The water
carrier project was designed to irrigate the Negeb desert.
In his introduction to the Israel Year Book of 1956, Ben
Gurion elaborated on the importance of the Negeb. He wrote:
The Negeb is the weakest point of Israel and 
a source of danger to its future. In the Negeb are
the greater Jewish aspirations. . . . The small
state of Israel cannot wait any longer leaving the 
Negeb desert in its present condition which consti­
tutes half of the territory, because if this state 
does not exploit it, this very desert will plan 
the evident end of Israel. 57
"The battle of the Negeb is the battle of Israel's
58survival."^ To the Zionists the Negeb has economic, mili­
tary and strategic importance. Economically, this water
^‘^Jerusalem Post, August 15, 1962.
55The Jordan Ministry of Agriculture claimed that 
almost 50^ of the country's vegetable produce would be 
lost. Such produce was sold in Kuweit and Saudi Arabia, 
yielding a substantial income.
56Omar Z. Ghobashy, The Development of the Jordan 
River, (New York: Arab Information Center, 1961), p. 43.
^^Israel Government Year Book, 1956.
^^Ali M. Ali, Nahrul Urdun Wal Mu ' amarah A1 
Sah^ouniyyiah. (Cairo: National Publishing House, n. d.).
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scheme has heen refered to as "the backbone of the national 
water project." Irrigating the area would enable Israel to 
increase its population by 500,000 by 1970, and by 1,500,000 
by 1980.59 Haim Weisman, Israel's first president, esti­
mated that five million Jewish immigrants would enter Is­
r a e l . B e n  Gurion was even more optimistic as he urged 
all Jews to emigrate. "This is not a state of 600,000 or 
so Jews who live in it . . . but a state destined for the 
whole people and its doors are open wide to every Jew.
In a speech before the Parliament, he declared, "By tempo
of immigration and the speed with which it is absorbed .
62. . will Israel's security be determined."
As to strategic importance, Israel's population 
are concentrated in a small coastal area on the Mediterran­
ean. The emptiness of the Negeb is a source of danger to 
Israel, as it is a factor to help the Arab forces attack 
from the south. Realizing this, the Israeli militarist and 
Ben Gurion agree that "the development of the Negeb and 
living in it is an absolute necessity to the security of 
Israel. . . . Thus, while Israeli planners dream of
^^Economist. December 14, 1963.
Jewish Observer, February 28, 1964.
^^Israel Government Year Book. October, 1952; also 
Alfred Lilienthal. Other Side of thi~Coin. (New York: Devin- 
Adair, 1965), p. 26TI
62
Israel Government Year Book, October, 1951.
•^^ Ali, op. cit.. p. 13.
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"dispersing settlements throughout the length of the state 
for political and security r e a s o n s , t h e y  also plan to 
transform the desert into a productive center. Further­
more, the Negeb borders on the Red Sea, an essential out­
let to Africa and Asia. The existence of Elat on the Sea 
represents a wedge separating Egypt from Jordan, thus in 
fact dividing the Arab World into East and West. Earlier, 
as a condition for peace, Nasser had demanded that the 
Negeb be returned to Arab control, according to the Berna­
dette Plan. Israel rejected this demand because the Negeb, 
if in the hands of the Arabs would constitute a danger to 
Israel. Denying it to the Arabs prevents military encir­
clement extending from Morocco to Kuweit. Thus it was not 
an accident that in 1948, in violation of the Truce agree­
ment, the Israeli forces penetrated the sector and occupied
65Elat, a strategic point of Arab territory.
In order to reap maximum results from the Negeb, 
that desert must be irrigated and colonized. Ben Gurion 
has been a major proponent of the agricultural settlements.^^ 
He wrote:
The aim of agriculture is not only food 
production. There is also problems of state- 
manship, sociology, colonization and defense 
involved. . , . There is great need for distrib­
uting the population over the whole countfy;
srael Government Year Book. October, 1958, p. 61.
^^Shwadran, op. cit.. p. 275-278.
66Though Prime Minister, he lives in the Negeb.
The idea is to be the example for "youth go south."
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conquest and development of the desert and changing 
the professional structure of the settlers, 67
Settling and colonizing the Negeb requires hundreds 
of thousands of immigrants. Such large numbers would be 
needed not only to increase agricultural production but 
also to augment the present population and help in the de­
fense of the state. Ben Gurion elaborates:
Israel can have no security without immigrants. 
The population of Egypt alone numbers 23 millions.
. . . Aliyah (the return of the Jews to the Land of 
Israel) is not only the redemption of Jews from 
physical and spiritual extinction in the diaspora 
and the supreme historic mission of the state of 
Israel; it is paramount for our security.
Security mesins settlement and peopling of the 
empty areas north and south; the dispersal of the 
population and the establishment of industries 
throughout the country; the development of agri­
culture in all suitable areas; the building of an 
expanded economy that will provide our people with 
a livelihood and liberate them from dependence on 
material aid from without. These things are imper­
ative for our survival. Upper Gallilee and the ex­
panses of the south and the Negeb are the country's 
weak points, and no military force can assure us 
their continued possession until we settle them as 
speedily and as closely as possible. 68
Here lies the crux of the Arab opposition to divert­
ing the Jordan waters to the Negeb. To the Arabs it would 
be self-defeating for otherwise they would give the enemy a 
prosperous life economically and strengthen his position 
militarily.
67
Israeli Government Year Book, 1951, P. 37 and 
1959, p. 1^.
^^Ibid., 1959, p. 22. See Security and the Mddle 
East, (a report submitted to the President, April, 1954,) 
pp. 142-14.7, for the economic value of the Negeb.
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Verifying the critical character of the situation, 
the London Daily Telegraph concluded that the plans to di­
vert the Jordan headwaters together with Arab arms buildup
were "leading step by step to an inevitable collision in-
69volving missiles and possibly nuclear weapons."
Diversion of the Jordan waters by Israel which she 
considered her share under the Johnston Plan, had not yield-
70
ed the anticipated results for purely technical reasons.
In order to obtain the full benefits from these waters, 
Israel needed the control of the headwaters which were lo­
cated in Syria. Only through military occupation, in the 
absence of a peace treaty, could the Zionists' water plan 
materialize.
To that end, Israel used the Palestine commando 
activities as a pretext to reach these headwaters. Israel 
was doing its best to create the same situation that pre­
ceded the 1956 tripartite aggression, particularly by giv­
ing world wide publicity to ths Palestinian resistance,
which, cleverly exploited, won for the Zionists world-wide
71sympathy.
The United Arab Command
69Quoted in Merlin, op. cit., p. 24.
70There was an unwritten agreement between Jordan 
and Israel to take 60-40# respectively. Jerusalem Post. 
April 14, 1965; also New York Times, April 17, 1965, p. 2.
71Vance and Lauer, op. cit., p. 11.
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The United Arah Command was established at the 
Cairo simmit conference in 1964. Its aim was to consoli­
date the Arab armed forces in the face of expansionist 
Zionism. However, its immediate objective was to prevent 
Israel from diverting the Jordan River waters. Accordingly, 
the forces of Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Republic 
were placed under the command of the Egyptian commander. 
General Abdul Hakim Amer.
According to the Command's plan, each state became 
responsible for repulsing Israeli attacks on its own terri­
tory, unless such attacks involved the occupation of Arab 
land.
The Joint Defense Agreement does not mean 
the immediate intervention of the Egyptian army.
. . . The raids must remain the responsibility of 
the various fronts, even if there were one single 
army. 72
This principle was applied during the Israeli raid on the 
Jordanian village of Essamu on November 13, 1966, and the 
Israeli-Syrian aerial battle on April 6, 1967.
Though a dramatic expression of Arab military unity, 
the United Arab Command could not have represented any im­
mediate danger to Israel for it would have required many 
months to make the command an effective instrument against
her.
7^A1-Ahram. November 18, 1967.
^^Although Husayn expected a future Arab-Israeli 
confrontation, he had hoped that it would not occur before 
the Arabs were ready for it. In an interview with the Per
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Jordan had an important role in any Arab plan for 
an offensive against Israel. It had a 450 mile border 
with Israel and the easiest access to the latter's vital 
centers. Only from the West Bank could an Arab invasion 
be successfully mounted and a thrust to cut Israel at her 
narrow waist could take place. However, Arab nationalists 
argued that Jordan could not be relied upon because it bene­
fited most from the Palestine conflict with minimum mili­
tary operations; that it was basically opposed to the re­
vival of Palestine nationalism as well as to any change in 
the territorial status quo which had existed since the 
Rhodes Agreement of 1949. Furthermore, Jordan's very exis­
tence was dependent upon Western financial,military, and
Spiegel, he reflected that "the Israeli aggression took us 
a year or a year and a half too early." Quoted in Draper, 
op. cit., p. 96.
Husayn charged that since Essamu attack, Israel had 
been trying to build up the Arab-Israeli differences into 
an East-West struggle with deliberate intention of embroil­
ing the Big Powers. P. J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Mil­
itary in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion. 1921-1957,
(New York; Eraeger, 1967), p. l5$.
In this policy, Husayn saw a crisis which most pro­
bably would culminate in "an Israeli plot to bring about 
a war before the Arabs were ready. . . .  I hope we are not 
moving toward a trap set for us into which we might fall." 
New York Times, May 29, 1967, p. 3.
ïn September, 1965, at the Casa Blanca Conference, 
General Amer, head of the U.A.C., told the Arab heads of 
state, "It would take at least four years of intensive pre­
parations before the Arab armies would be in a position to 
challenge Israel." Aubrey Hodes, Dialogue with Ishmael,
(New York: Punk & Wagnals, 1968), p.
In an interview with Le Monde, on September 16,
1966, Amer declared: "Our problem at present is less to de­
stroy Israel than to contain her in her frontier and dis­
suade her from aggression on the Arab world."
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diplomatie support, it was amenable to Western pressures. 
This dependence limited her participation in any serious 
Arab action against the Zionist state. Viewing Jordan as 
a weak link in the Arab front, some Arab nationalists con­
cluded that this situation could be resolved by a change 
in the Jordan regime. But succinctly this meant liquida­
tion of the Jordan reactionary regime should precede the 
liberation of Palestine; "the road to Tel Aviv leads through 
Amman.
The Jordan official stand on this question was that 
Jordan was the inheritor of the sorrows and aspirations of 
Arab Palestine, as it was the main bulwark against the 
Zionists. Accordingly, in the view of the Jordanian Govern­
ment, Jordan had the prime responsibility to be the front­
line for the defense of the rights of Arab Palestine, and
that any Arab invasion of Israel should be spearheaded by
75the Jordanians.
As late as March, 1966, Nasser had taken the posi­
tion that an attack on Israel from the south was militarily 
not possible. An attack must come from the east, from the 
territories of Syria and Jordan. In an interview with the 
Lebanese newspaper Al-Hawadith on March 26, 1966, Nasser
Harkabi, "Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy," 
Adelphi Papers, No. 53. (London: The Institute of Strategic 
Studies, December, i960), p. 19.
^^Ministry of Information, Al-Urdun Wal Qadiyyiah 
Al-FilistiniyyiahWal-Alaqat Al-Arabiyyiah, ÇAmman: n.d.), 
p. 29. àee also Al-Husayn l6n Talal. in.p.. 1957), p. 60.
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declared;
We could annihilate Israel in twelve days 
were the Arab states to form a united front. Any 
attack on Israel from the south is not possible 
from a militaiy viewpoint, Israel can be attacked 
only from the territory of Jordan and Syria, But 
conditions in Jordan and Syria have to be in order 
so that we in Egypt can be sure we would not be 
stabbed in the back as in 1948. 76
Nasser held the position that only unifying and or­
ganizing the Arab armies into one unit could prevent Zion­
ist aggression and that a united Arab command could not be 
effective unless the forces of one Arab state could oper­
ate freely and fight in the territory of any other Arab 
country.
The Israeli attack on the border village of Essamu, 
which ostensibly was aimed at the commando bases in that 
town, was out of proportion to the objective, Husayn's 
failure to retaliate resulted in demonstrations and riots 
throughout Jordan, and the government was urged to arm bor­
der villages. For several weeks the monarchy was seriously 
threatened, and Husayn's position was weakened within Jor­
dan and within the Arab w o r l d , T h e  raid made it more 
difficult for Husayn to continue his moderate policy toward 
the Zionists.
^Al-Hawadith (Beirut), March 26, 1966,
^^New York Times. November 20, 1966, pp, 24-49, 
'^^Ehouri, op, cit,. p, 235,
Husayn disclosed that the incidents were fabricated 
to create a case for retaliation. New York Times, May 28, 
1967.
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In response to the Essamu incident, the Arah League 
Defense Council met in early December, 1966, and unanimously 
agreed that Iraq and Saudi Arabia should advance troops to 
Jordan to help strengthen its defenses. However, this was 
prevented for two reasons; one, Husayn feared that the pre­
sence of these military contingents might be used to inter­
vene in Jordan's internal affairs, and they might serve as 
a pretext for an Israeli attack. Two, the Israeli govern­
ment warned that it would not tolerate the stationing in 
Jordan of troops from other Arab countries as it did in 
1956.
These influences climaxed in Husayn's declaration 
that his agreement to accept outside military assistance 
was dependent upon two conditions: one, Jordan must be faced 
with an immediate military threat from Israel, and two,
Egypt must request the withdrawal of the United Nations 
Emergency Force and replace them with the Egyptian troops 
fighting in Yemen.
Thus, inter-Arab conflicts, particularly the Husayn-
^%bid.
Jordan accused the Ü.A.R. of failing to send its 
airforce to defend Essamu. The U.A.R.'s reply was that it 
had no long-range bombers for such a mission, and blamed 
Husayn for his refusal to permit the armies and the air­
forces of the Arab Command to be stationed in Jordan.
Most Arab governments were of the opinion that Jor­
dan had accepted the League Council decision only to play 
a trick, to intimidate Egypt into withdrawing its forces 
from Yemen. Others accused Husayn of sabotaging Arab de­
fense plans.
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Nasser rivalry, prevented the realization of the Nasser 
plan: the creation of an integrated Arab army which could 
operate from any Arab territory for the express objective 
of halting Israeli aggression, and eliminating Zionist ex­
pansionist policy. Jordan's strategic importance in such 
a plan was paramount in view of the fact that its cease­
fire line with Israel extended over a 450 mile border and 
the greatest length of it almost cuts through densely pop­
ulated areas of Israel. Another fact was that the salient 
at latrun and Qaiqilia were but fifteen miles from the sea, 
which placed Tel Aviv within shelling range. In addition, 
any Arab pincer attack from Jordan could result in cutting 
the Zionist state into two parts disrupting its lines of
communications, and which could result in a decisive vic-
80tory for the Arabs. A third fact was that unlike the 
situation in Sinai, no expanse of desert or long line of 
communications separated either Syria or Jordan from Israel, 
a tactical necessity for the Arabs.
Only when Husayn became convinced that the Zionist 
threat to his country was imminent, did he consent to the 
entry of Arab forces into Jordan and requested the reac­
tivation of the United Arab Command.
®^Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, op. cit.. p. 132.
General Glubb, commander of the Jordan Army, was 
of the opinion that as long as Jordan cooperated with the 
Arab states its front lines near the waistline of Israel 
prevented the latter from mounting any attack upon any Arab 
country. Ibid.. p. 244.
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Jordan's position was that all the Arab states 
should be exposed to the Israeli borders, so that the
Q-i
pressure on Jordan be minimized. With this in mind, 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia accused Egypt of having become 
"a pane of glass" hiding behind the U.N.E.P, shield. Jor­
dan's Prime Minister Wasfi At-Tall accused Nasser of ha­
ving entered into a "gentleman's agreement" with Ben Gurion
go
in setting up a buffer patrolled by the U.N.E.P,
The whole question of the U.N.E.P. has been 
brought up by Jordan in the Arab Defense Council 
where Jordan has been under heavy pressure to 
admit foreign troops to defend the country against 
Israeli attacks,
Jordan responded by insisting that other 
Arab state also go on a war footing for the bat­
tle with Israel and specifically Egypt was asked 
to get rid of the U.N.E.P. so that the Egyptian 
army- the biggest in the Arab World- can take 
part in the battle.
The Egyptian response has been that the 
U.N. force was symbolic (it numbered about 3,000 
men) and would have no effect whatsoever if it 
tried to stop Egyptian army movements, 03
As border incidents became more tense particular­
ly on the Syrian sector which resulted in an aerial battle 
in which seven Syrian jets were downed on April 7, Husayn 
declared that the situation looked serious and feared that
®^raq declined Jordan's offer to allow Iraqi 
troops to be stationed in Jordan, declaring that the offer 
"has come too late." Husayn had refused entry to Arab 
troops after the Essamu incident in December, 1966, as 
advised by the Leagu's Council, New York Times, May 25, 
1967; Also see Vance and Lauer, op. cit.. p, 397
^^New York Times. May 21, 1967, IV, p. 1,; Also 
Copeland, op. cit., p. 280.
^^Washington Post. January 8, 1967.
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"Israel and Zionism might succeed in setting off an explo­
sion."®^ Aggression on Syria could he followed hy others 
on Jordan. Husayn's position following the Essamu affair 
resulted in his further alienation from the Arab states. 
Since the moral and political support which he enjoyed 
outside the Arab World had also waned, he felt isolated.
At this point, he reversed his policy deciding on joining 
the Arabs for good or for worse. Under these circumstan­
ces, Husayn came to the conclusion that the Arabs, in order 
to face the common enemy, must achieve unity at all costs:
It would be a great tragedy if we were not 
able to face the threat as one. This is the time 
when we feel that our quarrels and differences are 
put aside.85
In an interview with the New York Times, Husayn declared
that should war result in the defeat of the U.A.R., "our
be 
,,87
Qf~
position here is finished." Jordan would inevitably 
attacked because " Israel views the Arab World as one.
Earlier, Husayn had refused to allow any Arab 
armies to enter Jordan. However, after realizing the 
extent of the enemy threat, he requested suoh forces to 
enter Jordan, declaring "but now things are serious, (so)
QQ
that we need all the help we can get." As late as May
®^New York Times. May 29, 1967, p. 3.
®^Ibid.
®®Ibid.
®?ibid.; Also Vance and Lauer, op. cit. p. 35. 
881 bid.
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29, just one day before his signing of the Pact in Cairo,
Husayn declared;
Even at this time I am trying to establish 
a link with all our brethren in the Arab World to 
meet this threat to our future. If things do go 
terribly wrong, I expect help from anywhere.89
In Husayn's view, political unity was unattainable under 
the prevalent conditions, but military unity was feasible. 
To head off further Zionist expansion of Israel's geog­
raphical frontier, reactivation of the United Arab Com­
mand was the answer. The major goals of the U.A.C were:
. . . Re-establishing a balance between Arab 
and Israeli forces in three years allotted. To 
mean anything, this balance had to give the Arabs 
a slight superiority in order to make the Israelis 
stop and think and to discourage them from planning 
any kind of military adventure.90
The idea of the U.A.C. caused the Israeli leader­
ship and its press to become increasingly concerned about
the planned military strength in the Arab states. Husayn
was reportedly planning on doubling the strength of his
91army and an increase in his airforce. In this connection,
the Israeli Chief of Staff, General Rabin, declared that
"if this increase really materialized, Israel would have
no choice but to reappraise some of its basic policies
92t oward J ordan."
G^Ibid.
90Vance and Lauer, op. cit.. p. 17.
S^Ibid.. p. 16.
^^Merlin, op. cit.. p. 24.
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The Husayn-Nasser Pact of May 30, 1967
Although Jordan's security, unlike Syria's, was 
not directly threatened at the time of the closing of the 
Straits, she, nevertheless, could not stay out of the con­
flict for the following reasons: first, she was a signatory 
to the Arab defense pact of 1964, which had never been re­
voked despite the frequent disagreements among the Arab 
states which rendered the peace unoperational, The adher­
ence of Jordan to the Syria-U.A.R, Pact was almost inevit­
able because any Israeli military initiative of a serious 
nature would involve the three Arab governments jointly. 
Under the legal dictum of pacta sunt servanda, it would 
have been just as inappropriate and unlikely for Jordan and 
Syria not to come to the assistance of the U.A.R., as it 
would have been for the United Kingdom and Prance to aban­
don Poland to the German invasion of 1939.
Second, Jordan constituted the "center of gravity" 
in the Arab world in regard to occupied Palestine. Con­
vinced that Israel was the main and permanent threat to his
kingdom, and well aware that "Tel Aviv's principal objec-
Q'3
tive was to occupy the West Bank of the Jordan," Husayn
came to the conclusion that it was best for Jordan to join
the pact in order to strengthen its position against another
^-^Ministry of Information, Al-Urdun Wal Qadiyyiah 
Al-Filistiniyyiah V/al-Alaqat Al-Arabiyyiah, (Amman: n.d.). 
p. 35.
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QA
Essamu.
With 450 miles of firing line, Jordan could not
stand alone separated from Arah cooperation, Arab support,
and Arab sympathy no matter how long foreign assistance
was extended. As long as Jordan's borders were exposed to
the Zionist front, to an enemy that initiated offensive
action, and which could occupy Jordan territory, Jordan
felt threatened and insecure.
As long as there is Zionist ambition in the 
Arab part of Jerusalem, no Rhodes Agreement, not 
a thousand treaties like that of Rhodes, are cap­
able of preventing the Zionists from violating the 
truce line and occupying the Arab part where the 
Solomon Temple and the Wailing Wall are located, 95
The Israelis were well aware that the Arab Legion
alone could not prevent their forces from occupying the West
Bank, not only because of the smallness of the Jordanian
army but also due to the extent of its weapons, especially
96the virtual absence of an airforce.
'^^ V/inston Burdett- Encounter in the Middle East,
(New York: Atheneum, 1969), p. 291.
To this end he invited Saudi Arabia and Iraq to send 
reinforcements. While Saudi Arabia sent troops, "The Iraqis 
gave us a flat 'No!'" Vance and Lauer, op. cit., p. 39.
^^Nashashibi, op. cit.. p. 355.
9^In 1948, Prime Minister Huda commenting on this 
condition:
"It is not a sign of greatness or power in a 
nation to have the army deprived of war planes to 
protect its skies and defend it against aggression.
. . . Jordan had previously forwarded these re­
quests to Britain, but received only promises. Ab­
dullah sent a delegation to London to buy war planes 
and the delegation returned after it had bought 
three passenger planes. . . .  I had seen Israeli
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Third, in case of an Egyptian-Israeli confrontation,
Jordan would not be excluded despite the assurances of the
Western powers and Israel that it would be saved in case of
an Arab defeat. From experience, Jordan would be involved ,
as the 1956 and 1966 incidents showed. In both cases, Jordan
became target because the Fedayeen operated from its ter- 
07
ritory. The conclusion was obvious: the differences
among the Arabs were significant only to the Arab camp,
98"To Israel, we were all alike. We were all Arabs."
Foui’th, since the Palestine issue was central, and 
Jordan's commitment was uneontestable, the "Jordanians take 
the Palestine question very seriously," because it affects 
Jordan more than the Egyptians, the Syrians, the Iraqis, or 
any other Arab nation. Thus, it became clear that without
planes invade Jordan's skies and pass over Amman almost 
touching the roof of the Palace. Every day, Israeli planes 
pass over Jordan in comfort and security as long as Israel 
knows the extent of the Jordan air force," Nashashibi, op. 
cit.. p. 177.
At the time Jordan joined the Pact on May 30, 1967, 
its air force consisted of twenty-two Hawker Hunters with 
sixteen pilots. Jordan was to receive thirty-six Star- 
fighter F-104s from the United States within the following 
fifteen months. Vance and Lauer, op. cit.. p. 35.
The Syrian Chief of Staff, General Sweidani, in 
support of the Fedayeen activities said:
"These activities are legal and it is not 
our duty to stop them, but to encourage them, 'We 
are constantly ready to act inside Jordan and in­
side Israel in order to defend our people and their 
honor. We will mobilize volunteers and will give 
them arms." United Nations Security Counci1,Provi- 
sional Verbatum Record, October I4, 1966, p. 13.
98Vance and Lauer, op. cit., p. 35.
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Jordan's cooperation, the possibility of an Israeli de-
99feat would be absolutely impossible.
Fifth, internally, the country needed stability.
The majority of the population were Palestinians, who, 
although were offered citizenship and shared in the economy, 
were not assimilated. For two decades, they viewed the 
Jordan rulers with suspicion, even as traitors to their 
cause. They regarded Husayn as strongly pro-Westem, and 
thus somehow pro-Israeli. This made him anti-Nasser, their 
Saladin. Their suspicions were verified every time Husayn 
attacked Nasser and embarked on a propaganda wave against 
the Arab progressive regimes, considered by the Palestin­
ians as their only hope of recovering their usurped land.
In addition, Husayn, on several occasions, broke diploma­
tic relations with Egypt and Syiûa.
Economically, Jordan has been non-viable. Its 
economic capabilities were small and limited; half of the 
country is a desert and a high percentage of the popula­
tion consists of unproductive refugees, who for two de­
cades have lived under the auspices of the United Nations, 
The most productive economic activity in Jordan was tourism 
which brought in thirty five million dollars; while budget 
deficits were covered by British, then Arab, then American, 
then again Arab subsidies.
99lbid.. p. 127.
^^^Nashashibi, op. oit.. p. 355.
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Because outside assistance could not last forever, 
and since internal factors could not guarantee the continu­
ation of Jordan as an independent political entity, it 
became imperative that Husayn march in the procession of 
Arab nationalism, if he wished to save his position. Thus 
the political currents in Jordan such as the disturbances 
following the Essamu affair, popular emotions, political 
pressure, and even certain maneuvers by the United States, 
all made it imperative for rapproachment with Nasser. Having 
been constantly branded by the progressive regimes as the 
stooge of imperialism, Husayn could not resist the pressures 
from Cairo, Syria, Iraq, the refugees, the Palestine lib­
eration Organization and the Nationalists. His move, it
•• " 101 
appears, was a political, not a military calculation.
^^^Burdett, op. oit. ,p. 291.
Prom 1965 onwards, the P.1.0. became established 
and assumed the role of an independent force. "It became 
a state within the Arab states." In Jordan, government 
restrictions on their activities, politically and militari­
ly, were harshly imposed. This was a part of Husayn's 
policy to completely eliminate their raids into Israel 
in return for which Israel would not take punitive actions 
against Jordan.
As the P.1.0. threat to Husayn's regime was inten­
sified, especially through dividing the population of the 
East and the West Banks, Jordan responded by declaring the 
P.1.0. as subversive, illegal political party. Husayn 
ordered its offices closed, for to him the aim of the Orga­
nization was "to replace Jordan's monarchy with some other 
political authority.." Vance and lauer, op. oit.. p. 22.; 
Also James Ohace, (ed.), Conflict in the Middle~*East, Vol. 
40, No. 6, (New York; H.W. Wilson, 1969j, p. 98.
In reply to Husayn's action, Ahmad Shkayri, head 
of the P.1.0. declared, " The kingdom of Jordan must become 
the Palestine Republic," and "the first that that must be 
done is to station an army of the P.1.0. in Jordan." Vance 
and laeur, op. cit.. p. 29.
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This agreement enhanced Nasser's position as leader of the 
Arah world and strengthened his hand militarily. Another 
advantage was to put an end to the enmity between Nasser's 
socialist regime and Husayn's conservative monarchy, A 
third advantage was strengthening Husayn's position vis a 
vis his population who had been accusing him of "being soft 
on Israel." Husayn's move may have been intended to keep 
Nasser and Cairo-controlled P.L.O. from fomenting opposi­
tion to his rule. Thus, the agreement aimed at lessening
the likelihood that the Nasserites and the P.L.O. in Jordan
102would try to overthrow his regime.
Sixth, the U.A.C. had actually worked, as the 
U.A.R. came to Syria's aid and Israel had, in fact, been 
deterred. Impressed by Nasser's confidence in his command 
to the extent that he could hold his own against the ag­
gressor, Husayn decided that he "could not be absent from 
a spectacular Arab v i c t o r y . F o r  personal as well as 
tactical reasons, he decided to cooperate, for the alterna­
tive would be militarily dangerous and politically suicidal. 
The rising fever of nationalism presented Husayn with no 
other course. If the Arabs won the war and he stayed out,
^^^New York Times. May 31, 1967, p. 16; Vatikiotis, 
op. cit., p. l62.
^^^Burdett, op. oit., p. 291.
"The proof of this is that Nasser never called on 
us. It was we who called on him," Vance and Lauer, op. 
cit., p. 49; Vatikiotis, op. cit.. p. 163.
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he would he isolated. If they lost, it would he his fault,
and he would he viewed as a traitor. Thus, the signing of
the pact "was simply the less of two evils,
Seventh, he apparently realized that Israel was
surprised hy the show of Arah might and decisiveness when
it was not receiving encouragement from Washington which
105counseled reason and negotiations rather than fighting.
Eighth, Husayn's policy, ever since he came to
power, had heen to avoid the mistakes of Ahdullah who uni­
laterally disconnected himself from the rest of the Arah 
public opinion. To Husayn, therefore, Jordan's destiny was 
imperatively connected with that of the entire Arah nation.^*^^ 
To that end, cooperation became a must, especially when
dealing with the Zionist threat. Being a man of honor with
with ancestral pride, it was better to go down as a loyal
107Arah in victory or defeat,
*^^ % e w  York Times. April 7, 1968, p. 130,
^^^Burdett, op, cit,, p. 290,
^^^Al-Urdun Wal Qadiyyiah Al-Falistiniyyiah Wal- 
Alaqat Al-Arabiyyiah. p. 3,
^^'^Burdett, op. cit.. p, 291.
On his coronation, Husayn said, "How could I face
my people and the Arah Legion if I ever forgot the oath I
made to them: Jordan acknowledges the brotherhood that 
links together all the people of the great Arah nation,
Jordan is hut a part of the Arah nation and the Arah Legion 
is hut one of its armies." New York Times, April 7, 1966, 
p. 130.
The Pact was in accordance with the Arabic proverb, 
"My brother and I will fight my cousin, but my brother, my 
cousin, and I will fight the outsider."
149
In view of the deteriorating military situation 
which resulted from Israel's large scale raid on Essamu, 
and the Syrian-Israeli air battle on April 7, Husayn anti­
cipated possible confrontation with the opposing superior 
force, which alone, he could not possible repel. To 
him, it became absolutely essential that the United Arab 
Command be r evita l i z e d , T h u s ,  a pact similar to that 
between Syria and the U.A.R, was signed by Husayn and Nas­
ser on May 30,
While the U.A.R, was to be the mainstay of the 
United Command in view of its greater strength, the posi­
tion of Jordan was to be secondary, "We Jordanians tried 
to pull our weight as a diversion, thus minimizing the dam­
age when war came. This was the plan, because unlike Is­
rael, the Arabs were without a unified plan,"^^^ "All we
111had in Jordan was a plan for defense,"
Jordan, since Abdullah's reign, had experienced 
frightful indecision in political direction. It had been 
under the stress of internal difficulties; economic and 
political, and under constant external threat from a relent-
n oR
Six Syrian Migs were brought down in one hour, 
Vance and Lauer, op, cit,. p, 11,
lOSlbid.. p, 45.
Due to disagreements after the Summit in 1964, re­
lations among the Arab states deteriorated and the Pact 
was put out of commission,
^^^Ibid,, p, 48,
^^^bid,, p, 56,
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less enemy whose unlimited objectives included the occupa­
tion of Jordan's territories. Unable to stand alone and 
having been in cross currents of inter-Arab conflicts, Jor­
dan changed allies as circumstance dictated; once with Iraq, 
once with the Saudis, once with the Arab Nationalists, once 
signing the defense pact, trying to sign the Baghdad Pact, 
dismissing Glubb, retaining British officers in the army, 
then once attacking Israel and once Nasser, once to the 
right and once to the left. What is the secret? The se­
cret is that Jordan did not know where it was and what it
112wanted. "I mean, the Jordan rulers." It was evident
that "the events that dictated the policies of London and
11^Washington, found their echoes falling in Amman."
Perhaps, desiring to liberate himself from the sub­
ordinate and extremely dangerous circumstances in which he 
found himself and his country engulfed - dictation from 
certain Western powers under whose shadow he was sustained, 
the clear and immediate threat of expansionist Zionism, and 
the Arab Cold War - Husayn decided to plunge into the inter­
national arena as an equal partner. This culminated in his 
calling on Nasser in Cairo and signing the Defense Pact on 
May 30.
Husayn signed the Pact after Israel's mobilization. 
By joining the Pact, he agreed to open the borders of Jordan
n  ?
Nashashibi, op. cit., p. 356.
^^^Ibid.. p. 357.
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to Iraqi, Syrian , and Egyptian forces and to allow the 
P.L.O. to operate freely in his territory. The Pact placed 
his array under the operational command of an Egyptian Gen­
eral. The sudden revival of the U.A.C. meant one thing to 
the Zionists; the Arabs had decided to attack. The Husayn- 
Nasser agreement settled the internal debate between "hawks" 
and "doves" in Israel.
Jordan's Role in the 1967 War 
On June 5, an allout Israeli air and land attack 
was conducted against Egypt. After the start of the fight­
ing, Eshkol sent an ultimatum to Husayn through General 
Bull, chief of the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization, in 
which he summarily told Husayn that operations had started 
against the U.A.R. and added that if Jordan did not inter­
vene it would suffer no consequences. The message read;
V/e shall not initiate any action whatsoever 
against Jordan. However, should Jordan open hos­
tilities, we shall react with all our might, and 
he /%.ng Husayn^ will have to bear the full respon­
sibility for all the consequences. 115
Infuriated at such an ultimatum, Husayn remarked,
"Did the Israelis think that Jordan was a nation of desert
mice?" Husayn replied to General Bull, "They started
^^%odes, op. cit.. p. 90.
115Draper, op. cit.. p. 115.
^^^New York Times. April 7, 1968, p. 131.
Brigadier General Aluf Uzzi Narkis, commander of 
the front facing Jordan stated in a press conference in Tel
Aviv on June 13, 1967, that the Zionists had hoped that
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117the battle. Well, they are receiving our reply by air."
The Zionists claim that Jordan could have stayed 
out of hostilities, especially after an ultimatum was de­
livered to him. To Husayn, this was inconceivable since 
it was imperative that Jordan should come to the aid of 
her ally, the U.A.R.
Israel’s surprise at Jordan's involvement can be 
attributed to either inattention or to duplicity, particu­
larly since Israel considered as inevitable two or three
1 “1 Q
fronts should war come. This policy was declared on 
June 2 when Allon at a rally in Tel Aviv said:
There isn't the slightest doubt about the
outcome of this war and each of its stages, and we
"King Husayn would limit his participation in this war to 
symbolic air and artillary attacks, which could have been 
pictured as fulfilling his obligations to Nasser under the 
terms of the May 30 U.A.R.-Jordan military alliance."
Quoted in Richard Pfaff, Jerusalem: Keystone of an Arab- 
Israeli Settlement. (American Enterprise Institute for ïtib- 
lic Research, Washington, 1969), p. 34.
However, it became apparent that a unique opportun­
ity to occupy Jerusalem and the West Bank availed itself 
following the annihilation of the Egyptian airforce. Thus, 
Husayn's "limited participation" in the war became the pre­
text for conquering the West Bank.
117'Vance and Lauer, op. cit., p. 65.
On June 7, when Husayn requested a negotiated cease­
fire, Dayan answered, "We have been offering the King an 
opportunity to cut his losses ever since Monday morning 
(the 5th). Now we have 500 dead and wounded in Jerusalem, 
so tell him that from now on I'll talk to him only with the 
gunsights of our tanks!" Ibid.
lift
Two Zionist pilots taken prisoner by Jordan told 
that they had been training for a year and a half on models 
that were exact replicas of the objectives they each would 
have to attack. Ibid., p. 106.
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are not forgetting the Jordan-Syrian fronts 
either. 119
The Zionist ultimatum to Husayn could he inter­
preted as a maneuver to keep the Jordan forces from attack­
ing and possibly thrusting toward the sea, thereby cutting 
Israel into two and disrupting its communication. To coun­
ter this, a substantial part of the Israeli army had to be 
deployed against the Jordan forces, thereby delaying, if 
not preventing, a full attack against Egypt.
To Husayn, it must have seemed that sooner or later 
a full thrust to occupy the West Bank, possibly even the 
East Bank, would be made. Since Husayn's decision did not 
give comfort to the Zionists' plans, Eban in the Security 
Council announced:
Jordan's responsibility . . .  is established 
beyond doubt. This responsibility cannot fail to 
have its consequences in the peace settlement. .
. . Jordan had become the source and origin of Jeru­
salem's first ordeal. The inhabitants of the city 
can never forget this fact or fail to draw its con­
clusions. 120
Another interpretation of Husayn*s decision to share 
in the hostilities might have been based on the remote pos­
sibility of eliminating the Egyptian airforce. Even if 
Husayn stayed out, his position would be highly precarious,
^^^Harretz. June 4, 1967, quoted in Howard Kook, 
"June 1967: The Question of Aggression," The Arab World, 
June, 1969, p. 10.
120Abba Eban, "Never have Freedom and International 
Morality Been so Righteously Protected," Text of the address 
by Israel's Foreign lAinister in the General Assembly of the 
U.N. June 19, 1967, (Washington: Embassy of Israel), p. 16.
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and inevitably he would have had to comply with the Zion­
ists demands such as ceding the West Bank, including the 
Old City of Jerusalem, perhaps the irrigated land on the 
eastern bank of the River Jordan too. Under such circum­
stances, he would be in danger to enter internally and 
subjugated externally. Thus, a decision to enter the war 
whatever the consequences, seemed morally appropriate.
Embittered about the defeat in the so-called six- 
day war, Husayn said:
I did'nt fight under real war conditions.
I never declared war on Israel and I never made 
was with Israel, Naturally, I responded to each 
of Israel's acts of aggression, in 1956, in 1967, 
and still more recently in i960.
A state of war has existed in the Middle 
East since 1948. During this period we have had 
an armistice, not peace. Nor have the conditions 
of this armistice been easy; more often than not 
they have been ruptured by the Israelis,121
Husayn, however, puts the blame on Arab politics,
as being responsible for the debacle. In particular, he
blsimed Syria for delaying sending its airforce which, with
the Iraqi and Jordanian airforces, were supposed to bomb
Israeli airbases in the hope of neutralizing as much as
122the efficiency of the enemy's airpower. The King jus- 
^^^ance and laeur, op. cit., p, 109.
p. 61,
While Israel started out with excellent intelli­
gence, supply and communications services, and a well- 
planned offensive strategy and a unified command, their 
airforce superiority was the decisive factor in winning 
the war, CM the other hand, the Arabs had not have the 
time to unify their forces, or plan an offensive strategy. 
The New York Military analyst, Hanson Baldwin testified:
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tified his military action as a "response" to a planned 
Israeli aggression against an ally, the U.A.R.; that Jor­
dan did not initiate hostilities, since "a formal decla­
ration of war in the sense of the Third Hague Convention 
of 1907, would naturally have meant the recognition of 
Israel.
The Responsibility of the Zionists for the War
Prior to the conflict, Husayn-Nasser disagreements, 
together with Arab disunity, enhanced Israel's security.
But Israel's armed attacks on border villages and the sub­
sequent threatening statements by high Zionist officials 
regarding the Arab proposals of diverting the River Jordan
altered the picture. The Arabs, in order to discourage an
125Israeli attack, entered into a military alliance.
"Since the vaunted superiority in numbers of 
the Arab armies was never brought to bear on the 
fighting front, Israel, probably had an over-all 
numerical superiority in troops actually involved 
and a clear cut superiority in firepower and mo­
bility in the actual battles. . . . Many of the 
2,000 tanks and self-propelled guns used by the 
principal Arab armies do not appear to have been 
engaged at all. . . . "  New York Times, June 8,
1967.
^^^Shabati Rosenne, "Directions for the Middle Hast 
Settlement - Some Underlying Legal Problems," Law and Con- 
temporary Problems, (Duke University School of Law, Vol. 
XXXIII, No. 1, (Winter, 1968), p. 50.
^^^As late as January 22, 1967, Husayn withdrew his 
ambassador to Cairo when Nasser assailed him for preventing 
the Arab armies from entering Jordan. Draper, op. cit., 
p. 44.
^^^Khouri, op. cit., p. 281.
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According to the U.N. observers, the raid on Essamu 
resulted in eighteen soldiers and civilians killed and 
fifty-four wounded. Many buildings were demolished. The 
fact that moderate Jordan was the target of retaliation 
seemed ill-judged to most the world.
By a vote of 14-0-1, the Security Council censored 
Israel for the large scale military action in violation of
the armistice agreement, and warned against repetition of
127such acts. Similarly, the severe retaliation in the air 
over Syria and Jordan was disproportionate in size and ef­
fect, and increased the pressure on Nasser to intervene if 
his ally Syria was attacked. An American diplomat commen­
ted;
It is difficult to see how an Israeli leader 
could have failed to foresee that such repeated 
massive reprisals must eventually place the leader 
of the Arab coalition /Wasse^ in a position where 
he would have to respond, 128
To Nasser, the most prestigious leader of progressive Arab 
Nationalism , the overthrow of the Ba'ath government in 
Syria by an Israeli attack would seriously upset the bal­
ance of power of the Middle East in favor of Zionism and
12 Q
its allies, the conservative regimes of colonialism.
By closing the Straits and concentrating some of
^^^Yost, op. cit.. p. 305.
127'Ibid., New Zealand abstained.
^^^Ibid.. p. 319.
^^^Sharabi, op. cit.. p. 23.
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his troops in Sinai, Nasser was discharging his obligation 
to his ally Syria. The Russians informed Nasser that the 
Israelis had timed the swift strike at Syria for the end 
of May "in order to crush it and then carry the fighting 
over into the territory of the U . A . R . T h e  New York 
Times reported on May 12 that Israeli leadership had de­
cided that the use of force against Syria "may be the only 
way to curtail increasing terrorism." The Jerusalem Post 
in an article entitled "It May Be Time to Act Against Syria" 
reported that the Minister of Transport, Moshe Carmel, one 
of the leaders of the Ahdut Haavoda Party, suggested that 
"the time may have come to act vigorously against Syria
l^l
whatever her relations with the Soviet Union."
By signing the pact with Husayn, Nasser hoped that
the Israeli threat to attack Syria had abated sufficiently
1
to allow him to de-escalate Egyptian military pressure. 
^^ Opbid.
An announcement by Tass on May 23 stated:
"The Foreign Affairs and Security Committee 
of the Knesset have accorded the Cabinet on 9 May, 
special powers to carry out war operations against 
Syria. Israeli forces concentrating on the Syrian 
border have been put in a state of alert for war. 
General mobilization has also been proclaimed in 
the country. . . . "  Cited in a speech in the Gen­
eral Assembly in June, 1967, by Abba Eban.
^^^Jerusalem Post, March 23, 1967.
^^^Sharabi, op. cit.. p. 24.
In reply to a question by British M.P. Christopher 
Mayhew on June 2, 1967, "And if they don't attack, will you 
let them alone?" Nasser said, "Yes, we will leave them 
alone. We have no intention of attacking Israel." Similar 
assurances were repeatedly given to the U.S. by the highest
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According to Eric Rouleau, Cairo correspondent for Le Monde;
All that the U.A.R. now required to withdraw 
its troops from the frontier was public declara­
tion by Israel renouncing its intention to attack 
Syria. 133
To the Zionists, the signing of the pact by Husayn 
completed the encirclement of Israel by hostile states.
While Nasser's action was defensive in nature to remove the 
threat of invasion of his ally, Syria, to the Zionists it 
meant that if war started, the conflict would be waged all 
along their extensive frontier.
Arab-Israeli relations were based on the following 
assumptions: one, due to Arab encirclement, and to a large 
measure the presence of Jordanian forces in close vicinity 
of populated centers particularly in the central sector 
and Jerusalem, the entire country became a frontier. Two, 
the state, therefore lived under the shadow of destruction. 
Three, the existence of the resistance organizations which 
waged guerilla warfare created unrest. Pour, to liquidate 
these dangerous conditions, the alternative policy of Israel 
v/as to turn the armistice agreement into a final peace. 
However, since peace was unattainable under normal condi-
Egyptian authorities. (Yost, op.cit.« p. 317.) Hykal of 
Al-^ram said, "Even if Egypt left Israel alone, Israel 
would not leave Egypt alone. Israel can only feel secure 
with Egypt impotent, wounded under its feet, bleeding and 
near to death." Prittie, op. cit., p. 312.
^^^Sharabi, op. cit.. p. 26. 
^^'^Avnery, op. cit.. p. 30.
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tions, a policy of imposing peace through military superi­
ority was therefore adopted. A pre-emptive strike, it was 
calculated, would eventually bring the adversary to the 
peace table.
As to the Jordanians, although under the command 
of an U.A.C. general, they could not mount an offensive.
They had a negligible airforce and their troops had been 
defensively deployed since 1948, a policy which General 
Glubb had implemented. However, it v/as the introduction 
of Iraq.i, Syrian and Egyptian forces into Jordan's terri­
tory that the Israeli leaders had always worried about,
1^5not just the arrival of the Egyptian General.
"If Husayn thought by May 30 that he could not af­
ford to stay out of Nasser's war, Israel's reaction was not 
too d i f f e r e n t . strategically, Israel has always been 
fearful of encirclement. A British study in 1965 revealed 
that:
Whereas Israel fighting on narrow fronts might 
be able to hold both Egyptians and Syrians at once, 
even against superior odds, she would be extremely 
vulnerable to a simultaneous broad-fronted attack 
from Jordan which would quickly cut her communica­
tions between north and south. 137
The theory of encirclement adopted by Ben Gurion
^^^Kerr, The Middle East Conflict, p. 30.
^^^Draper, op. cit.. p. 97.
^^^David Wood, "The Middle East and the Arab World:
The Mlitary Context," Adelphi Papers, No. 20, (London: The
Institute of Strategic Studies, July, 1965), p. 5.
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led to organized raids between 1953 and 1956 under the
direction of Dayan's "units 101" and culminated in the
oinai invasion in October, 1956,^^® "It is this doctrine
that moved the army to war on June 5, 1967, when Dayan be-
139came defense minister."
Striving to avoid war, Nasser requested reactiva­
ting the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Commission, which the 
Zionists boycotted since 1956, and he proposed open discus­
sion with world powers concerning the Palestine problem.
He came to consider the totality of the question rather than 
the individual aspects, such as straits, commandoes or even 
the attack on S y r i a . " N a s s e r ' s  intention was not to re­
store the status quo ante bellum obtained before the Israeli
attack of 1956, but that of 194&"^^^ He had already told 
the United States that he "was prepared to let all ships, 
even those carrying oil, pass through the Straits of , Elat, 
as long as none of them carried the Israeli flag."^^^
The Armistice Commission, like the U.N., was an in­
stitution held in great contempt by the Z i o n i s t s . ^^3 T h g
^^^Speoial units 101 for retaliatory raids such as 
the one on Kibya, in which 40 houses were destroyed and 50 
civilians were killed. See Avnery, op. cit., p. 108.
^^^Perlmutter, op. cit.. p. 626.
^^^Sharabi, op. cit., p. 25.
^^^bid. ; also New York Times, May 29, 1967, p. 1.
^"^^Avnery, op. cit.. p. 30.
^^^Khouri, op. cit.. p. 236.
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Sinai invasion of 1956 caused the Armistice machinery to 
break down. Thus the United Nations Emergency Force was 
created to replace the Armistice machinery.
The stationing of the U.N.E.F. on the Egyptian side 
of the border was a bilateral agreement between the U.N. 
Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government. The force, 
accordingly could be withdrawn at the request of the host 
n a t i o n . A l t h o u g h  relative quiet reigned on the frontier, 
the absence of progress toward a settlement of outstanding 
questions continued. Realizing this, the Secretary-General 
cautioned:
It is an unhappy statement to have to make, 
but it is a reality all too apparent that, despite 
almost a decade of relative quiet along the long 
line on which the U.N.E.F. is deployed, relations 
between the peoples of the opposite sides of the 
line are such that if the United Nations buffer 
should be removed, serious fighting would, quite 
likely, soon be resumed. 145
As Nasser became a target for ridicule by the Heads 
of the Arab states who accused him of hiding behind the 
shield of the United Nations Emergency Force, there was no 
alternative to requesting the withdrawal of the force. In
144^ihe confusion over the legal basis for U.N.E.F, 
operations was increased in 1967. The views of the present 
Secretary-General are contained in his report on the with­
drawal of the force. United Nations, G.A.O.R., Fifth Emer­
gency Special Session, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 5, pp. 4,
9; and U.N. Document A/6730, 1967.
IASThe Secretary-General indicated that the con­
tinued presence of the U.N.E.F, as a buffer might contri­
bute to prolonging the efforts toward a settlement. U.N. 
E.F, Report of Secretary General, 21 U.N. G.A.O.R. Annexes, 
Agenda Item 21, p. 2, U.N. Document A/6406, 1966.
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an effort to prevent confrontation, the Secretary-General 
offered to station the U.N.E.F. on the Israeli side of the 
truce line. His offer was r e j e c t e d . B y  removing the 
U.N.E.F. the Israeli strategy had been less interested in 
thwarting an Egyptian attack than to make sure that U.N. 
forces did not affect her ability to strike at her neigh­
bors from a short distance whenever she chose. On the 
other hand, had the Israeli leaders really believed that 
Israel's survival was at stake, they could have easily pre­
cluded an Arab invasion by accepting U. Thant's appeal to 
station the U.N.E.F. on their side of the Armistice line.^^^ 
Israel's goal had been to destroy the Arab military man­
power and military equipment before the Arabs had an oppor­
tunity to unify their forces and develop a superior capa­
bility.^^8
The Israelis were convinced that the Middle 
East arms race would ultimately lead to a balance 
in favor of the Arabs. This, in the Israeli view, 
required 'preemptive' action to place Israel in a 
strong mllitary position guaranteeing Israeli ex­
istence. 14-9
Conditions were favorable indeed. Egypt deployed 
its forces according to a defensive plan.^^^ Militarily,
^^^Khouri, op. cit., p. 282.
4^?Ibid.
^^®Ibid.
^^^James F. Sams, "U.S. Policy and the Middle East
Crisis," Middle East Forum, Vol. XIIII, No. 2, (1967), p. 53.
ISOMohammad Hasanein Haykal, "This is the Actual 
Crisis," Al-Ahram, June 19, 1970, p. 3.
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such deployment was erroneous since the units were isolated
from each other hy difficult terrain, creating gaps through
which the enemy did in fact penetrate, surprise, and sur-
151round the Egyptian forces with unbelievable efficiency.
The same mistake was committed by the Syrian and Jordanian 
military tacticians. Thus, the defensive plan devised be-
152fore the June V/ar "was an omen for an unavoidable defeat,"
The news agencies reported a declaration by Israeli 
military leaders regarding the deployment of the Arab force;
One look at the map of deployment of the 
Egyptian forces in the front persuaded every one 
of us that before him was a unique opportunity 
which may never occur again to administer a smash­
ing blow to the Egyptian forces, 153
At Washington, Eban, in a meeting with Secretaries
Rusk and McNamara, General Earl Wheeler, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave his official estimate of the
Defense Department, Eban related:
General Wheeler was called in to join the 
meeting and he gave the official evaluation. He 
had no information of any Egyptian intention to 
attack; he declared if anything it was the Israeli 
army that was pressing to begin hostilities. And 
he repeated that in the Pentagon's view, Israel 
had nothing to fear. Her army was in their esti­
mation far superior to that of Egypt, 154
152ibid,
^^^Ibid,
154.David Kimche and Dan Bawly, The Sand Storm: The 
Arab-Israeli War of 1967, (New York; Stein and Day, 196b),
p, 126,
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This evaluation was shared hy the C.I.A, Director, Richard
Helms - that an Israeli initiative in the air against the
155Arabs would result in a victory in three to four days.
The Arab plan was defensive, and no war was contem­
plated or planned. In a report from Cairo by James Reston 
of the New York Times, he stated that the U.A.R. did not
wish war and was "certainly not ready for war" and had been
156making no preparations within the country itself.
In an interview with Le Monde. General Izhaq Rabin, 
Chief of the Israeli General Staff, conceded to the afore­
mentioned analysis by declaring:
I don't believe that Nasser wanted war. The 
two divisions he sent into Sinai on May 14 would not 
have been enough to unleash an offensive against 
Israel. He knew it and we knew it. 157
For Israel, therefore, the issue was not one of se­
curity. It became evident that her real intention was not
to defuse the crisis but to choose the appropriate moment
158to strike, as favorable conditions prevailed.  ^ Thus a 
preemptive strike to cripple the Arab airforces was admin­
istered. It was of the Pearl Harbor variety with devas-
15Qtating results.
^^^Ibid.. p. 13; L'Oriente, June 13, 1967.
^^^New York Times. June 4 and 5, 1967.
^^^Jerusalem Post, February 29, 1968.
^^^Sharabi, op. cit., p. 26.
^^^Copeland, op. cit., p. 282.
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On the ideological side, Eretz Israel (Greater 
Israel), which entailed territorial acquisition and the 
"ingathering" of the Jews from diaspora through accelerated 
immigration, has been for a long time the guiding principle 
of the official policy of the Zionist state.
From the Israeli standpoint the anticipated rewards 
of military action by far exceeded those of diplomatic ne­
gotiations. Armed with highly sophisticated intelligence,
with analyses of the over-all political and military situa­
tion of the Arab states, with favorable world opinion, and 
with a disunited and neutralized United Nations, it acted 
not spontaneously, but calmly.
But if the Zionist aim was to teach Egypt a lesson
by annihilating its airforce, why go on to seize the Jordan 
West Bank and the Syrian Heights? The answer can logically 
be found in the fact that the temptation was overwhelming 
to make the most of the chance of a lifetime. However lim­
ited its ambitions were, the Zionist state could only defend 
itself by taking the offensive action and could only safe­
guard its territory by expanding it.^^^
^^^Sharabi, op. cit.. p. 26.
Al-Ahram reported that Newsweek said that Israeli 
intelligence was in cooperation with the intelligence of 
the Maghrib, and that led to, or was the main reason for, 
the Arab defeat in 1967 because Israeli intelligence was 
very effective in getting the secret information of the
Rabat Arab summit. Al-Ahram, February 28, 1967. See also
Vance and Bauer, op. cit., p. 106.
^^^Kerr, op. cit., p. 29.
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To the military minded Zionists, this gave them a 
pretext to strike first;
Our security is based first of all on our 
ability by the prestige of our army to deter any 
enemy from threatening our existence. And second­
ly, if this deterrent fails, to hit first and win 
quickly. Thereby avoiding any invasion of our con­
stricted territory. 162
Having mobilized the entire population and allowing 
the economy to come to a halt, Israel's only alternative 
was to go to war.
If we back down now, every Arab will believe 
that our military force is a bluff. If this be­
lief spreads, there is nothing to hold back the 
Arabs from starting a guerilla war along all our 
fronts, cutting off the Jordan waters, and doing 
anything else they like. So we had better fight 
now. 163
By the spring of 1967, it was clear that neither 
the U.A.R. alone nor the Unified Arab Command were in a 
position to attack Israel or to withstand a surprise as­
sault. But world public opinion was led to believe 
otherwise. The skillful Zionist propaganda, as always, had 
simplified the issue to an Israeli "David" versus an Arab­
ian "Goliath."
Thus, the Zionists came to the conclusion that the
~\ CO
Avnery, op. cit.. p. 23.
,  p .  26.
^^\'iichael Howard and Robert Hunter,"Israel and the 
Arabs, the Crisis of 1967," Adelphi Papers, No. 41, (London; 
The Institute of Strategic Studies, October, 1967), p. 11. 
Also see Allen Horton, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict of June 
1967," American University's Field Staff, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 
p. 4.
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time was right to effect a crippling blow to the combined 
Arab force. This decision, like that of 1956, was for "a 
preventive war" to render the United Arab Command iiiopera- 
tive.^^^ At the same time, it aimed at effectively elimin­
ating the Palestine Resistance Movement. On May 29, 1967, 
Eshkol gave an assessment of Israel's military capability 
and announced, "The Israeli defense forces are capable to­
day of meeting any test with the same capacity that they 
demonstrated in the past."^^^ This estimate was based on 
the declaration by Rabin on March 24 when he said that the 
arms balance had definitely tipped in favor of Israel and 
it would continue to be so in the future. Significantly, 
he added that there was no chance for a peace settlement 
with the Arabs and that in case of war Israel would win.
This confidence in military capability led Eshkol 
to his tjireatening statement on May 19 in which he said:
We shall hit when, where, and how we choose.
. . . Israel will continue to take action to pre­
vent any and all attempts to perpetuate sabotage 
within her territory. Israel will continue to foil
^^^Israel had been planning for the 1967 War long 
before it took place. Israel's Chief of Staff, Rabin, was 
quoted as having stated as early as 1965 that Israel would 
have to strike first while she was still able "to disrupt 
any Arab timetable for war against us." George de Carvahlo, 
"Desperate Arab-Israel Struggle for Scarce Water: An An­
cient Hatred Builds Toward War," Life, June 8, 1965, p. 50.
^^^Israel Digest, June 2, 1967, a speech on May 29,
1967.
lG7ibid., April 7, 1967.
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every scheme to divert the sources of the Jordan 
River, and will defend its rights to free naviga­
tion in the Red Sea. 168
The Aftermath of the War 
The victory accomplished the following for the Zion­
ists: one, it destroyed large amounts of Arab military 
equipment, and in so doing was able to alter the balance 
of power at least for the time b e i n g . T w o ,  the Straits
were opened. Three, Egypt was prevented from using the
170Canal as a source of revenue. This resulted in more de­
pendence on the U.S.S.R. Four, occupation of the West Bank 
added coveted, strategically and agriculturally valuable 
territory, and at the same time Israeli victory increased 
Arab hatred which has and will continue to be a major factor
^^^Howard and Hunter, op. cit.. p. 14.
The New York Times seemed to indicate that Israeli 
threats and declarations were backed by certain Senate 
leaders. On June 6, Senators Dirkson and Javits announced, 
"Legally, we are an ally of Israel." New York Times, June 
7, 1967, p. 18.
Igq
"There were those who thought thax Israel’s 
1967 blitzkrieg had won her 10 years of peace, but in fact 
her strategic position, never brilliant, was only marginal­
ly improved since her power was the key to the situation." 
(Peter Young, The Israeli Campaign, 1967. (London: Kimber, 
1967), p. 185)
There was also the belief that "Israel's victory 
had substantially eased its defense problems. It had not." 
Prittie, op. cit., p. 284.
170Dayan said that "Egypt does not want the Suez 
Canal to operate while we are sitting on the east bank.
It might turn into a permanent arrangement. . . . While 
Cairo wants to have us withdraw, any attempt to force such 
a withdrawal would mean war." New York Times, November 5.
1968, p. 9.
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of Israel's internal, as well as external, security. Five, 
it regained emotional, economic, and political support from 
world Jewry, and enabled her to strengthen ties with the 
United States, Six, it enhanced Israel's self-confidence, 
heightened the morale and prestige of the army, and magni­
fied its feeling of superiority. Seven, the territory under 
its control was quadrupled, thus adding to her security by 
removing the military threat of the Arab armies from the 
population centers. The new borders gave Israel every stra­
tegic advantage its military ever sought. The expansion 
after the 1967 war has shortened the Jordanian border, and 
the military threat of Jordan was minimized since the Jor­
dan forces were pushed back to the River where they are re­
mote from Israeli settlements. In the south, the Negeb and 
Sinai separate Jordan and the U.A.R. forces from population 
centers as does the occupation of the Golan Heights. The
Zionists wanted the territory, but not the inhabitants, as
Eshkol stated, "We received a beautiful dowry, but unfor-
171tunately we got the bride." Eight, the result placed
her in a strong bargaining position to demand a peace treaty
on her own terms.
The war brought no solutions to the basic problems 
since not all of its objectives were obtained. Nasser, 
Husayn and Syrian President Attasi continued in power and 
emerged more united.
^^^Prittie, op. cit., p. 229.
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During the course of the June War, Nasser's 
attitude toward Jordan and myself had changed com­
pletely. Perhaps he learned the truth about us, 
as we did about him.
As a œ suit of our several meetings. . . his 
point of view turned out to be quite similar to 
mine. . . .  We want to make common cause in the 
diplomatic battle we were to wage and to bring 
about Arab unanimity in the viable solution. We 
agreed on this at the time of the summit confer­
ences in Khartoum; it holds true today. 172
The P.1.0. activities had increased to dangerous propor­
tions in frequency, intensity, and daring. Further, the 
war created another major refugee problem. By occupying 
the West Bank and the Holy Places in particular, Israel 
weakened the position of the moderates led by Husayn. By 
annexing all Jerusalem and insisting that it is non-nego- 
tiable, Israel minimized the chances of peace while anta­
gonizing non-Arab Muslim countries, such as Turkey and Iran 
with whom it had economic and diplomatic relations.
Furthermore, as it defied the advice of the French 
not to strike first, Israel lost the confidence of its for­
mer close ally which stopped shipping military equipment. 
The position of the French Government in this regard was 
stated on June 2, 1967:
France is not pledged in any way or any mat­
ter to any of the states concerned. For her own 
part, she considers that each of these states had 
the right to live. But she deems that the worse 
would be the opening of hostilities. Consequently, 
the states that would be the first - wherever it 
might be - to take up arms will have neither her 
approval nor, even less, her support. 173
172Vance and Bauer, op. cit., p. 116.
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Murville, speech before the U.N., June 22,
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However, the most consequential negative result was the 
breaking of relations by the Soviet Union, which assumed 
a pro-Arab policy and looked with suspicion on the loyalty 
of its Jewish nationals.
Furthermore, by renouncing the armistice agreement, 
claiming that only a cease-fire situation existed, Israel, 
in fact, invited the resumption of hostilities. In view 
of her military superiority, this condition is to her ad­
vantage, as she has been conducting ftequent air strikes 
as well as military operations inside the Arab territories, 
under the pretext of retaliation. This situation resulted 
from the fact that a cease fire is imposed by the Security 
Council, while an armistice agreement is considered a legal 
commitment by the parties themselves to end hostilities. 
However, despite Israel's disregard for the International 
Organization, the U.N. still insists that the armistice 
arrangement and the U.N. machinery are legally in force.
As to Jordan, the loss of the entire West Bank, 
which constituted the backbone of the kingdom, dislocated
its economy and multiplied the number of refugees on the
17 SEast Bank.  ^The West Bank was the most fertile and most 
productive part of Jordan, while tourism constituted the 
largest source of foreign exchange. "Most experts agree
1967, cited in Vital Speeches, Vol. 33. No. 19, July 15. 
1967, p. 590.
^^^Khouri, op. cit., p. 287.
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By occupying the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip,
172
that the East Bank cannot siirvive without outside economic 
176assistance.
Although Jordan lost the Battle, it did not lose
the war. King Husayn, instead, gained popularity among
the Arabs because he dared to fight in fulfillment of a
177Pact in defense of Arab nationalism.
Conclusion
The Rhodes Armistice aimed at ending hostilities 
and was considered as a first step toward peace. However, 
this optimism did not materialize as the Arab-Israeli re­
lations assumed a unique character: a state of war existed
Israel also inherited one million inhabitants, whose loy­
alty continueto be to Jordan. The occupation government 
has partially solved some economic problems in the West 
Bank. It authorized the export of surplus agricultural 
products to Jordan, its original market. In the first 
year after the war, $16 million worth of exports reached 
Jordan. To that end, the occupied areas as well as Jordan 
have become a useful market for Israeli exports, Prittie, 
op. cit.. p. 301.
Through this commerce, Israel has fulfilled a 
part of its long range policy to secure markets for its 
products in the Arab states. At the General Assembly,
Eban declared this policy as his fourth principle, which 
he called, "open frontier." Speech on October o, 1968.
^^^Khouri, op. cit., p. 288.
At the Khartoum Summit Conference, Jordan was given 
an Arab subsidy of $100 million annually. The U.S.A., ac­
cordingly, ended its subsidy which lasted since 1957.
^^^Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 164.
As a result of kusayn*s decision to fight, he 
emerged as a hero of the Arab masses and gained admiration 
abroad. Even Nasser, on June 9, gave him accolade by cal­
ling him "a noble and courageous man." Considering past 
discord between them, this public recognition changed 
Husayn's status in the Arab world. George Lenczowski,
"Arab Bloc Realignment," Current History, (December, 1967), 
p. 348. ^
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and a no-peace no-war situation persisted.
Although Jordan did not participate in the 1956 
Suez war, different circumstances, however, surrounded it 
in 1967, which dictated its involvement in the six day war. 
Immediately prior to the war, Jordan's security was threat­
ened, a situation which required an immediate response,
Israel had posed an immediate threat to the econo­
mies of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan by its plans to divert 
the Jordan waters. Since the Arab states were militarily 
unprepared to challenge the enemy, they decided on merging 
their armed forces under the command of an Egyptian General.
Paced with an external situation. King Husayn em­
barked on the most critical decision in the history of Jor­
dan. On May 30, 1967, he signed an alliance which would 
include Egypt, Syria and Iraq, The result was the six day 
war and its devastating consequences to Jordan's economic, 
military and political positions.
Husayn's decision not to stay out of what appeared 
to be an Egyptian-Israeli confrontation, was determined by 
several factors. The most disturbing factor was the fact 
that Jordan had been persistently threatened and insecure. 
Husayn was aware that Israel's policy was to occupy the 
West Bank. Only if Jordan became a member of an Arab Com­
mand, would such threat diminish. Another factor was 
Husayn's personality. Since Jordan v/as signatory to the 
Arab Command, it was inappropriate for him not to come to
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the assistance of his allies. To avoid this negative char­
acteristic of Abdullah, and to appear as a national hero, 
he had no alternative. Husayn was under no illusion that 
the destiny of Jordan was connected with the Arab states, 
and that without his cooperation, elimination of Israel 
would be an impossibility. Even if he would not fight, he 
could not place obstacles before an Arab plan to conquer 
Palestine or at least limit the Zionist danger. In any 
case, Husayn might have decided that he could not be absent 
from a spectacular Arab victory from which he would benefit 
greatly, A fourth factor of great significance was Jordan's 
need for stability, Husayn's association with the West in 
defiance of Arab nationalism, the Arab states, and the ma­
jority of Jordan's population, rendered his regime endan­
gered, By joining the Arab venture he could alter inter­
nal and external conditions to his personal advantage: he 
would pacify the turbulent public opinion and appear as a 
hero to all. In any case, Husayn had no alternative but 
to take that course of action even if given assurances by 
Israel and the Western powers.
The 1967 v/ar resulted in a new phase of Jordan- 
Israeli relations. Paced with a highly dangerous situa­
tion, Husayn was placed in an exceedingly weak position.
The war resulted in the loss of the valuable productive 
land which Abdullah had acquired in 1948, and a new wave 
of refugees entered the East Bank rendering the bad economic
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situation intolerable. Most importantly, however, was 
bringing the war to the East Bank, The economic, social 
and military problems forced Husayn to submit an unprece­
dented proposal for peace. Paramount among them was the 
recognition of Israel as a state within secure and recog­
nized boundaries. This was a drastic departure from the 
Arab earlier position: that Israel was "Mazoumah," - an 
imaginary state.
Husayn's decision was further dictated by external 
forces, which limited his alternative courses of action.
His Western allies - the U.S. and Britain - who wished to 
see Nasser and the Ba'ath regime in Syria fall, also became 
unhappy about Husayn's participation in the war, but both 
governments refrained from supporting Jordan's position. 
Furthermore, the fact that the international community - 
including the U.S.S.R. - had resolved that Israel "was there 
to stay" made any other decision impractical.
Peace had become Jordan's most urgent objective as 
an economic crisis ensued. The loss of the West Bank de­
prived Jordan from sorely needed foreign exchange. Israeli 
military attacks and air strikes on the East Bank rendered 
the irrigated land useless, thus compounding unemployment 
and causing inflation which an unviable state like Jordan 
could not endure for long.
Husayn's efforts to reach a "Jordanian solution" 
were futile in view of the objection of the Arab states
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and due to the stand taken by the Palestine Resistance 
Organization, which always rejected any peace on enemy 
terms.
CHAPTER V i n
ISRAEL'S PEACE TERMS
At the General Assembly on October 8, 1968, For­
eign Minister Abba Eban proposed nine principles by which 
peace in the Middle East can be achieved.
First, the establishment of peace. The sit­
uation to follow the cease-fire must be one of 
just and lasting peace. . . . Peace is not just 
mere absence of fighting. . . .  We propose that 
the peace settlement be embodied in treaty form.
It should lay down the precise conditions of our 
coexistence including an agreed map of secure and 
recognized boundaries. . .
Second, secure and recognized boundaries. .
. . We are willing to seek agreement with each 
Arab state on secure and recognized boundaries 
within the framework of a permanent peace. . .
Third, security agreements. . . . The in­
strument establishing peace should contain a 
pledge of mutual non-aggression.
Fourth, open frontier. . . . The freedom 
of movement now existing in the area , especially 
in the Israeli-Jordan sector, should be maintained 
and developed. . . .  We should emulate the open 
frontier now developing within communities of 
states, as in parts of Western Europe (Scandina­
vian type frontier). Within this concept we in­
clude free-port facilities for Jordaion Israel's 
Mediterranean coast and mutual access to places 
of religions and historic association.
Fifth, navigation. . . . The arrangement 
for guaranteeing navigation should be undeserved, 
precise, concrete, and founded on absoluteequality 
of rights and obligations between Israel and other 
littoral states. . .
Sixth, refugees, A conference of Middle 
Eastern States should be convened together with 
the Governments contributing to refugee relief
177
178
and the specialized agencies of the United Nations 
to chart a five-year plan for the solution of the 
refugee problem in the framework of a lasting peace 
and the integration of the refugees into productive 
life. . . . Under the peace settlement, joint ref­
ugee integration and rehabilitation commissions 
should be established in order to approve projects 
for refugee integration in the Middle hast with 
regional and international aid. . . .
Seventh, Jerusalem, . , • Our policy is that 
Christian and Muslim Holy Places should become 
under the responsibility of those who hold them 
in reverence,
Eigth, Acknowledgment and recognition of 
sovereignty and right of national life , . , .
It should be fulfilled through specific contractual 
agreement to be made by the governments of each 
Arab state,•, , by name.
Ninth, regional cooperation, , , . Examina­
tion of a common approach to some of the resources 
and means of communication in the region in an 
effort to lay the foundation of a Middle Eastern 
community of sovereign states, 1
The Zionist-Arab Policy 
Israel’s major objective is the signing of peace 
treaties with the Arab states, which under international 
law, would be binding , and would replace the cease-fire 
and the armistice agreement with recognized boundaries.
To the Israeli leadership, the cease-fire line
2
and the armistice regime "have been killed by the war," 
According to them, this regime was inadequate for the 
security of their state, because the 1949 armistice clear-
^Embassy of Israel, Forward to Peace, (Washington, 
D,C,: n,p., October, 1968), pp, II-I3,
2
Prime Minister Golda Meir on "Meet The Press," 
September 28, 1969.
It should be emphasized that Israel's continued 
disregard for the U.N, Armistice machinery which she boy­
cotted precipitated almost every dsipute since 1949,
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ly stated in Article 4, paragraph 3, that " the conclusion 
of a partial or general armistice agreement does not end 
the state of war." Thus the Zionist policy seeks transi­
tion from cease-fire to negotiated settlement designed to 
end all acts of hostility.
Accordingly, Eban declared that apart from the 
cease-fire agreement, there was no valid contractual 
engagements. Thus a durable edifice of relations embo­
died in treaties should be erected. "The old era is ended 
. . . .  In our view, the transition must be from suspend­
ed war to stable p e a c e . A t  the Security Council, he said:
We cannot return to the shattered armistice 
regime or any system of relations other than a 
permanent contractually binding peace. . . . The 
fragile armistice lines must be superseded by 
agreed and secure national boundaries . After the 
cease fire lines, a permanent and mutually re­
cognized territorial boundaries is our only pos­
sible destination.4
At the Khartoum Conference, in December, 1967, 
the Arab States including Jordan, emerged more moderate 
than before. They decided on a political rather than a 
military solution. However, they held to the principle 
of no recognition, no negotaition, and no peace, until 
the Zionists responded to Arab demands of complete with­
drawal from all territories occupied in the 1967 war. This
demand had been rejected in view of their feeling of in-
^Hew York Times, October 4, 1967, p. 1.
^Israel Information Service, From a State of War
to a State of Peace, (New York; n.p,, November, 19b7J, p.10.
180
vincibility and the resultant military superiority.
Although the Israelis had achieved a military vic­
tory, they have not succeeded in reaching a peaceful solu­
tion to the twenty-year conflict, particularly recognition 
from the Arab states. Recognition to the Israelis is 
paramount hecause it would end all acts of belligerency 
and boycotts; it opens markets with unrestricted trade in 
the neighboring Arab states; it channels the huge military 
expenditure to peaceful development of their state. Thus 
the most urgent item in the Zionist policy is the need for 
authentic recognition by the Arabs of Israel's roots in 
the Middle Eastern reality. Eban attacks the Arab leaders 
for their reluctance to recognize the depth and authenticity 
of Israel's roots in the life, the history, the spiritual
5
experience and culture of the region. Integrating the 
Zionist state in the area had been of vital importance, 
as Foreign Minister Sharette had declared; "It is a cardi­
nal principle of our foreign policy to seek integration in 
the region to which we belong."^
The Zioniàts recognize Arab resistance to the estab­
lishment of an alien state in their midst. Eban verifies 
this point:
Israel Information Service, Not Backward to Belli­
gerency But Forward to Peace. (New York; n.pi, June,-196Vj, 
p. 1È. ; Also New York Times and London Times, June 4, 1953.
While bulles gave credence to Arab fears of "expan­
sionist Zionism,"he urged Israel to cease considering itself 
an alien state. Ibid..
^London Times, Marck 12, 1952.
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It became evident that the neighboring coun­
tries have deep abhorence toward this new state 
which was established against their will, for it 
is the first time in many generations that a non- 
Arab, non-Muslim nation was able to have independ­
ence in the Middle East. The neighboring countries 
have been used to see the Middle East as a compact, 
Arab area. 7
At the same time, the Israeli leadership resolved to con­
tinue the occupation of the Arab territories which came
o
under their control legally or illegally. As Prime Minis­
ter Levi Eshkol declared; "Today, the whole world bears 
witness that there is no power that can uproot us from this 
land.9
In a speech before the Security Council, Eban em­
phasized the permanence of the Zionist state, and seem to 
threaten that the Middle East is doomed unless the "God 
Chosen" people save it. He declared:
This, then, is the first axiom. A much more 
conscious and uninhibited acceptance of Israel's 
statehood is an axiom requiring no demonstration. 
There will never be a Middle East without an inde- ^n 
pendent and sovereign state of Israel in its midst.
Israel has not abandoned its insistence on direct
face-to-face negotiations with the Arab states. Prime
7
Cited in Hafez, op. cit.. p. 161.
O
Both Jordan and the U.A.R. complained that Israeli 
forces continued their advance and occupied territory not 
held by them before the cease-fire had gone into effect.
U.N. Document S/7953. June 8. 1967; New York Times, June 8, 
1967.
^^Israel Information Service, Not Backward to Belli­
gerency But Forward to Peace. (New York: n.p., June, 19Ü7), 
pTUT
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Minister Meir insists that;
It's not enough that even the Arab countries 
would make a statement that we have a right to ex­
ist. Actually we are not in need of that kind of 
a statement. . . .  We want them to sit down with 
us and conclude peace agreements and for them to, 
by the signature of the peace agreemtns, say, 'No 
more wars.' 11
Similarly, at the General Assembly, Eban, expressed Israel's
need for security; he said that a mutual non-aggression
pledge should be signed to insure the future security of 
12the area.
To the Israelis, the Arab insistence on returning 
to the armistice line which prevailed on June 4, is an 
alibi for refusal to make p e a c e . P r o m  the Zionist point 
of view, this is tantamount to Israel giving up her security
^^Meir on "Meet the Press," September 28, 1969.
The Zionist leadership declared that recognition of Israel 
by the Arab states is not essential to the continuation of 
it. New York Times, October, 4, 1967, p. 1.
^^New York Times, October 9, 1967, p. 3.
Regarding the fragmentation of the region, the 
Israeli leadership differ. The first believes that instead 
of contending with one huge pan-Arab state surrounding it 
on all sides, Israel much prefers to deal with several 
smaller states, like Jordan and the Lebanon with whom the 
prospects of arriving at a settlement are far brighter. 
Merlin, op. cit., p. 340.
Ben Gurion and the Leftist groups, however, believe 
that as long as the Middle East is divided into small 
states each must show that it is more anti-Israeli than 
others and especially than Nasser himself. If however, 
the Middle East were consolidated into a unified framework, 
this need for outbidding would gradually disappear. A 
strong, unified Arab leadership enjoys the necessary pres­
tige, would not be inhibited in negotiating with Israel. 
Ibid.. p. 340.
^^Eban, Security Council, November 13, 1967.
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without obtaining a genuine and irrevocable binding peace.
Eban Declared:
We shall do no such thing. After 21 years 
of seige and thousands of years of struggle to 
maintain and preserve our identity, we cannot put 
Israel's existence under the mark of interrogation 
which hovered over no other nation.14
Ihe existence of Israel as a sovereign state is
the point of departure for any s o l u t i o n . O n l y  a signed
peace treaty can guarantee this demand.
We shall not commit the irrational course 
of returning to the political anarchy and stra­
tegic vulnerability from which we have emerged. 
National suicide is not an international obliga­
tion. .. . We cannot reconcile ourselves with 
the intermediate situation of neither war nor peace, 
Thus, the armistice lines must be superseded by 
accepted frontiers. It is in our view that the 
new situation should rest on contractual agreement 
which commit and engage the responsibility of Is­
rael and each Arab State.16
On September 18, 1967, Israel rejected "foreign
guarantees" of her security, and reiterated her position
that peace can only come about through direct negotiations
with the Arab states. Eban declared;
No external declarations or guarantees. . , 
can replace the sovereign responsibilities of the 
governments concerned. . . . May and June teach us 
a lesson about the limitations of international 
guarantees in the present state of world power 
balance. The Middle Eastern peace with its rele-
^^Eban, General Assembly, September 19, 1969.
IS-^Avnery, op. cit.. p. 211.
^^Eban, General Assembly, September 25, 1967. 
Israel's insistence on peace treaties an fixed 
boundaries can be ascribed to their fear of international
184
vant provisions and agreements for enforcement 
must spring up from within the region. It cannot 
be grafted on to it from outside. The Middle East 
is not an international protectorate. It is a 
region of sovereign states which bear the main 
responsibility for adjusting their mutual relations.17
However, the main conviction common to all Zionist 
leadership is that the Arabs do not want peace, that Arab 
nationalism is an inherent threat to Israel, that the sup­
port of Western powers is important for Israel's security, 
and that the superiority of its military is essential for
its very existence. All of these elements of a vicious
18circle that has contributed to the present impasse.
Furthermore, the Israeli leaders insist that if 
concessions were to be made in reaching a final peace
1 Q
settlement, the Arabs should make them. Ex-Prime Minis­
ter Ben Gurion shares this conviction , that peace was 
impossible because the Arabs were and would remain un­
willing to make peace. He, like most Zionist leaders, 
insist that making peace is entirely up to the Arabs and 
that Israel could do nothing to initiate it. Peace means
pressure xo withdraw;
"People in the U.S., Britain, and France have for­
gotten 1956, but we haven't. The memory haunts us. We 
won the Sinai campaign with guns and lost it with words."
New York Times, August 20, 1967.
17Eban, speech before the General Assembly, Sep­
tember 25, 1967. Also Washington Post, September 9, 1967.
Avnery, op. cit.. p. 105.
^^Merlin, op. cit., p. 224.
185
Arab recognition of the status q.uo from which Israel could
20not and would not budge.
In December, 1952, Israel informed the U.N. of 
its willingness to negotiate peace treaties and gave "a 
blueprint" for the general economic, political and diplo­
matic issues. "The Israeli view was that a peace settle­
ment should include a non-aggression clause and gave as­
surance that any Arab fears of expansion by Israel was un­
founded. . . . "  London Times, December 2, 1952.
In 1948, Israel increased its territory by 30fo and 
in 1967 it quadrupled its land area. The 1955 and 1957 
wars in particular refute such assurances, especially when 
Israel refuses to abide by the U.N. withdrawal resolutions, 
which can mean only expansion. Thus, the Arab distrust of 
the Zionist aims and policies have so far precluded Arab 
initiative for peace settlement. Vance and Lauer, op. cit.,
p. 120.
The frequent statements by major Zionist leaders, 
who at the same time have been the decision makers in Is­
rael, indicate expansionist policies. The following are 
examples;
On July 18, 1957, Walter Eytan declared that, "Is­
rael has not taken anything that belongs to another person." 
Cited in Ministry of Education and Guidance, Yawmul Naksah. 
(Amman: Al-Mutbaah Al-Wataniyah, 1959), p. 11.
As late as November, 1965, hardly six months before 
the Israeli attack of June 5, 1957, the Israeli representa­
tive to the U.N. declared:
"I should like to inform the committee quite 
categorically that the government of Israel covets 
no territory of any of its neighbors. . . .  We 
have all signed the Charter obliging us to respect 
each other's political independence and territor­
ial integrity. My government full and unreservedly 
accepts this obligation toward the other 120 state 
members of the United Nations." (U.N., Document 
A/SPC/PV .505. November 8, 1955.)
Menachem Beigin, leader of the Herut Party (the 
largest in Israel) and a cabinet member, declared in 1955:
"I deeply believe in launching a preventive 
war against the Arab states without further hesi­
tation. By 30 doing, we will achieve two targets: 
firstly, the annihilation of the Arab power; and 
secondly, the expansion of our territory," (Prom 
a statement made in the Parliament, October 12, 1955.)
Another spokesman of the Herut declared in 1955: 
"Peace with the Arab countries is impossible with the pre­
sent boundaries of Israel which leave Israel open to at­
tack." He advised that "Israel should take the offensive
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Israel gives the impression that unless peace pre­
vails the Zionist state will be destined to extinction. 
Though victorious in three wars, and with military and poli­
tical superiority, she had refused the United Nations' re­
solutions as well as the mediation of the major powers to 
reach what she claims indispensable. Thus, while peace is 
most advantageous to her, for it would free military expen­
diture to developmental plans and open new markets in the 
neighboring Arab states, allowing Israel to become the 
Switzerland of the Middle East and to achieve its goal of 
economic, financial domination of the region, the question 
still stands, "Why is Israel so deficient in the art of
immediately and capture strategic points along its borders 
including the Gaza Strip and then should take over the 
British-backed Kingdom of Jordan." (New York Times. Janu­
ary 25, 1956.)
In 1951, Prime Minister Ben Gurion also stated that 
the state of Israel:
"Has been resurrected in the Western part of 
the Land of Israel and that independence has been 
reached in a part of our small country. . . . It 
must now be said that it has been established in 
only a portion of the Land of Israel, Even those 
who are dubious as to the restoration of the his­
torical frontiers as fixed and crystalized from 
the beginning of time will hardly deny the anomaly 
of the boundaries of the new state." (Israeli 
Government Yearbook, 1951-52, p. 64; and 1952, pp. 63, 65.)
President Chaim, during his visit to Jerusalem on 
December 1, 1948, told his audience:
"Do not worry because all of Jerusalem is not 
nov/ within the state, . . . The old synagogues will 
be rebuilt anew and the way to the Wailing Wall 
will be open again. With your blood and sacrifices 
you have renewed the covenant of old. Jerusalem 
is ours. . . . "  (Dov Joseph, The Faithful City:
The Seige of Jerusalem, 1948, (New York: Simon and Schuster,
196O), p. 322.)
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peace?"
The answer may be found in the fact that the Zion­
ist leadership wished to concentrate on building a superior
military machine to impose its will on the people of the
21region, enforcing a pax judica.
In the Zionist view point, there is no alternative 
to direct negotiations, normalization of relations, and a 
peace treaty concluded by intimidation. This is their cur­
rent official stand, since post-1967 war conditions yielded 
for them more territory, brought their forces closer to 
the Arab capitals, and at the same time, removed the threat 
from their population centers. Due to the military weak­
ness of the Arab states, these conditions are highly advan­
tageous to Israel.
Por the first time in our history, time is 
working in our favor. The cease-fire situation may 
not be ideal for Israel but it is infinitely worse 
for the Arabs. 22
The overriding concern of the Zionist policy is to 
maintain military superiority and an aggressive policy be­
cause it is rooted in a movement of colonization. Its re­
lationship with its adversary is based solely on force.
Thus, any peace settlement for Israel had to be enforced 
by bargaining from a position of strength. Prime Minister
21Sharabi, op. cit.. p. 27.
^^Rew York Times. August 20, 1967, IV, p. 5. 
^^Sharabi, op. cit.. p. 26.
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Meir emphasized this point;
I maintain that a strong Israel is not only 
the best guarantee for peace, but is the best in­
centive for peace because there is no sense in 
making peace with a weak Israel. A weak Israel 
can be thrown into the sea, . . . The less hope 
there is to bomb Tel Aviv, the more hope there is 
for peace.24
Since the Arab counter-demands are not acceptable 
to the Israeli leadership, in view of the latter's super­
iority of military stance, Israel planned to strengthen 
its deterrence, maintain military power and hence induce 
peace. In 1956, Israel tried to impose the status quo by 
force of arms. Following the 1967 war, the Zionist leader­
ship hoped that the Arabs become weary of waiting, and, 
therefore sue for peace.
Since peace settlement is still a remote possibi­
lity, Israel operates according to the policy that a state 
can grow and prosper without peace. Eban declared that 
"peace with the Arabs is an important objective of our 
policy but is not a condition for the existence of the
^^"Meet The Press," September 28, 1969.
Subsequent American Administrations share this 
view. Recently, Presdient Nixon said:
"We recognize that Israel is not desirous of 
driving any one of the other countries into the sea. 
The other countries do want to drive Israel into 
the sea. . . .  Once the balance of power shifts 
where Israel is weaker than its neighbors, there 
will be war. . . .  We will do what is necessary 
to maintain Israel's strength vis a vis its neigh­
bors, not because we want Israel to be "in a posi­
tion to wage war. . . but because that will deter 
its neighbors from attacking it."White House 
Release, " A Conversation With the President," July 1,
1970, pp. 15-16.
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state of Israel,"  ^In the meantime, Israel embarked on 
absorbing new immigrants, integrating the varied communi­
ties into a national entity and developing its economy.
The 1967 war placed Israel in the strongest bar­
gaining position they ever envisioned. With a superior
2fi
military machine they hoped to dictate peace. According­
ly, on June 12, the Israeli cabinet agreed on the follow­
ing general policy;
First, a peace settlement would be sought 
to replace the 1949 armistice agreement, , , , 
Second, negotiations would be sought directly 
with the Arab states rather than relying on any 
U,N, machinery or the good offices of powers out­
side the region. Third, no territory captured 
, , , will be returned unless the Arabs recog­
nize Israel's right to access from the Red Sea 
to Elat, her southern por$ and Israel's right to 
complete military security,27
In this connection, Eban declared that the war did, in
fact, bring Israel closer to the achievement of its an-
It is regrettable that the U.S.A. which claims 
"neutrality" on this issue, failed to recognize the fact 
that while the Jews have not been "thrown into the sea," 
the so called American "neutral" policy has significantly 
contributed to "throwing the Arabs in the desert," Al- 
Fath /”P.L,0._7 (Beirut), Vol. I, No. 6, 1970,
25
•'^ Merlin, op. cit,. p. 244.
oc^
■ The late Israel Foreign Minister Sharette, in 
his book. Travelling in Asia, disputed those who believed 
the axiom,"you can reach peace through force," Quoted in 
Ibid, p. 245.
^^New York Times. June 12, 1967, p. 1.
Except for recognition, Husayn and Nasser have 
indicated that the Arabs would agree to all Zionist de­
mands put forth before the 1967 war. See king Husayn's 
speech in New York Times.April 11, 1969.
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oient empire. Hoping for a positive Arab response, he 
deolared that "the objeotive of suoh negotiations will be
to resolve some of Israel's historio problems and to insure
2ft
the nation's stability." Eban may have envisioned the
revival of "Greater Israel" open to unlimited immigration,
its oommeroe thriving and its boundaries seoure.
Regarding the proposed seoure frontier, Eshkol,
in early September, 1967, declared that;
No better natural border can be found between 
Israel and the U.A.R. than the Suez Canal, . . .
The River Jordan must become the natural boundary 
with Jordan.29
Similarly, as early as June 11, 1967, Dayan had deolared 
that he had no intention of returning the Gaza Strip to 
the U.A.R. or the West Bank to Jordan, and urged that Is­
rael "dig its claws into the areas it had occupied."
^^New York Times. June 12, 1967, p. 18.
Ivanon, "Israel, Zionism and Imperialism," 
International Affairs. (Moscow), No, 6, (June, 1968), p. 13.
The issue of long range peace versus the demands 
for short term security has been widely discussed inside 
Israel. Professor Devontin of the Hebrew University Law 
School cautioned:
"A secure border. . . isn*t a natural boun­
dary like a mountain or a river. . . .  A border is 
secure when those living on the other side do not 
have sufficient motivation to infringe on it. . . 
we have to remind ourselves that the roots of 
security are in the minds of men, since that is 
where the sources of insecurity also lies. . . .
The term "secure borders" . . . ceases to be an 
honest one when you ^Zionists 7 expand settlements 
up to the new border, so that in order to make the 
new line "secure" you need still another strip of 
some ten kiolometers. . . " "To Make War or to 
Make Peace in the Middle East," New Outlook, pp. 5-6, quo­
ted in Parker T. Hart, The Annals of American Academy of
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Applying force to compel the Arabs to come to the peace 
table, Israel threatened that "nothing was to be returned 
until the Arabs make peace and recognize the state of Is­
rael.
It was also declared that "Israel has more right 
to the West Bank of Jordan than the Hashemite Kingdom of 
J o r d a n . I n s i d e  Israel and outside it, there are organi­
zations which oppose territorial concessions by Israel as 
a price for peace. Zionist statesmen, both hawks and doves, 
have been in agreement regarding plans for the establish­
ment of "Greater Israel." This plan has become the official
■>2
policy of that state. There is ample evidence to this 
conclusion. At the end of February, 1968, the Minister 
of the Interior issued an order that Israeli law was to 
apply to the occupied territories. Discarding interna­
tional reaction, he officially announced these territories 
were no longer enemy territories, and declared that new 
settlements were to be set up in the occupied areas, 
Confirming this policy, Labor ivlinister Allon declared
Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 390, July, 1970, p. 105.
^^New York Times. April 7, 1968, IV, p. 24.
31lbid.
A Syrian spokesman commented: "We no longer know 
whether Israel is trying to guarantee its rights to exist 
or its rights to expand." Ivanov, op. cit., p. 15.
32Ivanov, op. cit., p. 13.
3^1bid., p. 14.
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earlier, that "new villages should be established in the 
occupied zone to make Israeli existence there an approved
fact."34
As Arab resistance to peace talks persisted, Israel 
began to revise its policy. In November, 1968, Eshkol 
said in parliament that the River would be Israel's security
■jR
border as distinguished from the political frontier.
But added that in any settlement, no Arab army would be 
permitted to be stationed in the West Bank. This plan 
agreed with Allon's which entailed that the River be the 
eastern boundary between Israel and Jordan.3^ The Allon 
plan also involved the return of most of the West Bank to 
Jordan, provided all Jerusalem remain in Israeli hands.
In addition, a nine-mile wide strip along the River broken 
by entry points be retained by Israel. This proposal, 
however, was rejected by both the U.A.R. and Jordan. The
34u .N. Document S/8581. May 8, 1968.
3% e w  York Times. June 18, 1968, p. 17; Also The 
Economist, November 23, 1968. p. 29.
3^U.N. Security Councul Document 8581, May 18, 1968; 
Also The Economist, November 23, 1968, p. 29.
The Israelis declared their intentidn of retain­
ing wedges of land jutting along the River from Beisan 
valley to the Dead Sea. This would provide for a security 
belt of fortified settlements along the mountEiin ridges, 
Israeli guns would be placed on high precipitous cliffs 
controlling an expanse of twenty miles to the east, thus 
preventing Arab tanks from crossing the river or reaching 
the West Bank. Essentially, therefore, since no Arab 
troops would cross the River, then the "Israeli Maginot 
line" would in effect become the frontier," New York Times, 
June 18, 1968, p. 41.
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major reason for the rejection was Israel's insistence 
that Jerusalem must he retained by it, therefore, was 
not a negotiable issue.
A distinctive characteristic of Israel's strategy 
has been to protract conflict rather than solving it. To 
the Zionist leadership, attitudes of compromise by the 
Arabs eversincethe Geneva Protocol in 1949, has been a 
source of embarrassment. Even the peace mission of 
Tunisian President Habib Bourgiba provoked discomfort
TO
in the Israeli ruling circles.^ Accordingly, a change 
in the attitude of Israeli leadership would require a 
radical transformation in their military-diplomatic 
thinking and a shift from the offensive to a concilia­
tory strategy. Due to Arab disunity and military weak­
ness, and in view of the Zionist apparent resolve for 
expansion, Israeli decision makers are not yet prepared 
for such change. Israel needs some fifty years of fric­
tion and tension to establish strong and stable institu­
tions capable of bringing about conditions of permanent 
equilibrium.
The philosophy of the Israeli military establish­
ment as personified in Defense Minister Dayan, is one of
37
Sabin et al., op. cit.. p. 12; Economist.
June 22, 1968, p. 3Ô. 
38Sharabi, op. cit., p. 27,
39lbid.
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a crusader who sees no doors open toward peace, and who 
believes that the very thought of peace is demoralizing.
A member of his parliament described him saying, "He is 
and will always be an Arab fighter. He is the Israeli 
equivalent of what the Americans used to call an Indian 
f i g h t e r . H i s  views seems to reflect those of the ma­
jority of the Zionist leadership; that alien settlers must 
fight the native population. Dayan counselled:
Let us not today fling accusations at the 
murderers. Who are we that we should argue a- 
gainst their hatred. For eight years now, they 
sit in their refugee camps in Gaza, and before 
their very eyes we turn into our homesteads the 
land and the villages in which their forefathers 
have lived. . . .  We are a generation of settlers 
and without the steel helmet and the cannon, we 
cannot plant a tree and build a house. . . . Let 
us not shrink back when we see the hatred ferment­
ing and filling the lives of hudreds of thousands 
of Arabs who sit all around us. Let us not avert 
our eyes so that our hand shall not slip. . . . 
This is the fate of our generation to be prepared 
and armed, strong and tough, or otherwise, the 
sword will slip from our fist and our life will 
be snuffed out.41
In December, 1967, Dayan proposed a solution to 
the Palestine question, which should guarantee the Jewish 
character of Israel, settle the refugees elsewhere and
^^Avnery, op. cit.. p. 133.
41lbid.
A neutral observer of the U.N. commented:
"It seemes to me to be symptomatic of a 
certain blindness to the human reaction of others 
that so many Israelis professed not to understand 
why the Arabs, who had been driven from their 
lands should continue to hate and try to injure 
those who had driven them out." E.L.M. Bums,
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seoure Arab recognition of the new state within demarcated 
b o u n d a r i e s . Such solution could mean the outright annex­
ation of Arab territories and the creation of the histori­
cal "Greater Israel." This solution is based on the pre­
mise that, " If everything was achieved until now by war, 
why should we be interested in peace now? Why shouldn't 
we expect further gains in future wars?”^^ Such policy 
reflects a colonizing, expansionist movement,and such 
pliilosophy seemed to have precluded any hope for peace 
in the foreseeable future.
Contrariwise, as the impasse persisted, the Is­
raeli leadership proposed prescriptions for peace. They 
came to believe a change in Arab outlook could be induced, 
thereby making it possible that a peaceful resolution of 
the conflict could be achieved. Eban proposed:
. . . You must achieve two processes in the 
Arab mind. First, eradicate the concept of irred­
entist war which which will make Israel disappear 
from the future of the Middle East. . . .  Then 
you might after a period of time make transition 
to a more affirmative relationship in which they 
think not only of the absence of war but the 
presence of peace.45
Whatever methods and instruments Eban had in mind-such
Between Arab and Israeli. (London: Harrap, 1962), p. 162 
^^Avnery, op. cit.. p. 146
43ibid.
^tcbid., p. 148.
^^Merlin, op. cit.. p. 224.
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as economic incentives or economic deprivation, the use 
of force, exiles and "reservations'* are reminiscent of the 
stick- carrot approach applied to subdue the American 
Indians and the Africans inside their own territory. The 
Zionist leadership have placed the entire blame on the 
Arabs for not submitting to their demands of negotiation, 
recognition and the conclusion of'peace treaties. By 
causing bad economic, social and political conditions 
in the Arab states, Israel hoped to induce a change in 
Arab attitude toward peace. At the end of 1968, Eshkol 
wrote that peace had:
. . . now entered the realm of practical 
politics in which Egypt and Jordan could no longer 
conceal from themselves a long standing truth, 
namely that they need peace with us no less than 
we need peace with them,46
Although Israel had thought that a military vic­
tory would convince the Arab leaders of the need for peace, 
only Husayn responded affirmatively in view of the imme­
diate economic need, for while Egypt and Syria could live 
without their lost territories, Jordan could not survive 
without the economics of the West Bank, But Israel also 
knew that Husayn had declared that was never strong enough 
to oppose Nasser and negotiate a separate treatyf^ In fact,
46prittie, op. cit,, p, 309.
47Vance and Bauer, op, cit,, p, 119.
In this connection, Dayan had declared that "Jor­
dan informed Israel that she did not want to negotaite a 
separate peace with Israel without Cairo's approval,"
New York Times, November 6, 1968, p, 41.
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Husayn, in order to avoid king Abdullah's mistake of 
conducting secret and separate peace talks with Israel, 
declared that he would not do such thing behind Nasser's
back.48
Conclusion
Israel's offers for peace in the Middle East are 
addressed to the Western World, not the Arabs, Such pro­
nouncements portray the Zionists as desirous of peace, 
while picturing the Arabs as war-like.
The Israeli leadership insist on changing the Ar­
mistice agreement of 1949 with a lasting peace arrangement 
signed into treaties with each of the Arab States, and 
legalizing the Zionist conquests, while preserving the 
status quo. While Israel demands recognition and secure 
frontiers, it insists on retaining certain parts of the 
Arab land which the Israeli military establishment consi­
der as strategically essential for the security of their 
state.
Jerusalem is key to any successful peaceful solu­
tion. Despite Jordan's declarations which stressed that 
the return of the Old City would be basic to any negotiated 
settlement, Israel's answer was that the City had become the 
united capital, hence a "non-negotiable" question.
Sabin, et al., op. cit., p. 13; New York Times. 
December 8, I960. See also King Husayn's Uneasy Lies The 
Head, (New York: Geis, 1962), p. 109.
198
Integrating Israel in the region became a cardinal 
principle of the Zionist foreign policy. They insist on 
establishing and developing economic relations with the 
neighboring states based on the "Open Frontier" idea, to 
enable Israel to become the Switzerland of the Middle East, 
whose industrial product would be marketed in the vast and 
populous, yet underdeveloped Arab countries.
To achieve this goal, normal relations must be 
established: recognition extended and cooperative attitude 
instilled. Thus, the Israeli leadership insist on face 
to face talks; that peace negotiations must be conducted 
directly by the parties to the conflict; that a third 
party suoh as the United Nations would only hinder progress 
toward a final peace.
While the Israeli leaders demand acceptance of 
their state sind integrating it in the cultural, political 
and economic life of the region, they, however, persist 
on regarding it essentially as European in character. In 
the meantime, in order to preserve Israel*s "racist" char­
acter, they disclaim any responsibility for the Palestine 
refugees. Yet, Israel indicates her readSmeaa to partici* 
pate in programs for their rehabilitation and re-settlement 
elsewhere.
In pusuing a policy toward recreating the "Greater 
Israel," and a Pax Judica, the Israeli leadership place 
maximum emphasis on the military machine. They maintain
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that peace in the region could be guaranteed only if Is­
rael is militarily stronger than her neighbors. This mil­
itary mentality has precluded Arab positive response to 
Israel's demands which appeared to be coercive in nature 
rather than aiming at any just and equitable settlement.
One may conclude that by making demands backed by force, 
Israel's leaders may very well have been influenced by their 
current thinking that "if everything was achieved until 
now by war, why should we be interested in peace now.
/ Q
^^Avnery, op. cit.. p. I48.
CHAPTER IX 
PEACE EFFORTS BY JORDAN
The Rhodes Armistice Agreement of 1949 constituted 
the only legal instrument of relations between Jordan and 
Israel, king Abdullah's aim was to convert it into a per­
manent peace, but Israel's refusal to abide by U.N. resolu­
tions, and Arab opposition to any negotiations from a posi­
tion of weakness precluded such possibility. Thus, in view 
of the strong anti-Zionist feeling, King Abdullah sought 
substantial concessions, which Ben Gurion and his militar­
ists opposed while advocating provocations on the Jordanian 
frontier in the hope of forcing Jordan to submit and sign 
a separate peace treaty.^
King Abdullah had been engaged in secret negotia­
tions with the Zionists until shortly before his assassin­
ation. However, the more the Zionists reached an agreement 
with Abdullah, the less they became interested in responding 
to Egypt's proposals, thus, in effect, destroyed excellent 
chances for peace. For if the most important Arab state - 
kgypt - had reached an agreement, the smaller states, such
^New York Times, October 15, 1950.
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as Jordan would follow as did take place at Rhodes,
Israel had hoped that the 1956 Tripartite Aggres­
sion would force Egypt and the Arabs to the peace table.
Theopposite resulted as the Arabs became less willing than 
ever before to deal with Israel, The insistence of the U.N. 
and the United States on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, 
and the support given the Arabs by the Soviet Union, all 
strengthen the Arab position, hence refusal to negotiate.
Following the 1967 war, the Zionists rejected all 
efforts for mediation by the U.N. and others, and insisted 
on direct negotiations. Having suffered most from the war, 
Hysayn took the initiative and urged the Arab leaders to 
meet at a summit conference. With permission from Nasser 
and other leaders, he set out to seek a compromise poli­
tical solution to the Palestine question. It was reported 
Husayn, through a third party, had expressed willingness 
to end the state of belligerency, to demilitarize the West 
Bank, to guarantee for Israel its borders as existed under 
the arïïiistice- as on June 4, 1967- and to provide the Jews 
with safe access to their Holy Places inside the Jordanian 
sector. But the most important concession, however, was his 
offer not to press for the implementation of the U,N, res­
olution calling for the repatriation of the refugees. Is­
rael, however, rejected these offers and insisted on more 
concessions by Jordan and on direct negotiations.
Continuing his efforts for peace, Husayn called
202
for an Arab summit, but to no avail due to a split within 
the Arab leadership on matters of policy. Finally when 
uudanese President Ismail Al-Azhari joined Husayn and Nas­
ser in their call for a summit conference, the other Arab 
leaders agreed, and the Khartoum Summit began at the end 
of August, 1967.^
The Khartoum Conference
At this summit, the Arab leaders agreed to have a 
permanent peace among themselves.^ Husayn and Nasser 
emerged as the moderates advocating a political rather than 
a military solution to the Palestine question. Husayn was 
chosen to improve Arab-American relations and to help im­
press on the United States the need to pressure Israel to 
reach a peaceful settlement. However, the leaders of Syria, 
Algeria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization advo­
cated initiating guerilla warfare against the Zionists to 
keep them off balance and to force them to give up the con­
quered lands. Eut the moderate argument prevailed. They
2
The Syrian representative boycotted the confer­
ence and departedfbr Damascus before the end of the meetings. 
The King of Lybia and the President of Tunisia, unable to 
attend because of ill health, sent high ranking officials.
The King of Morocco, opposed to Arab top level conferences 
sent his Prime Minister. Ahmad Shukayri, leader of the P. 
L.O., attended, but left the meetings protesting the de­
cisions reached. Khouri, op. cit., p. 312.
^An agreement was reached to end the Yamani war. 
Jordan became involved as it sided with the monarchists of 
Saudi Arabia and the Royalists of Yaman. Khouri, op. cit., 
p. 313.
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all agreed on three important decisions; non-recognition 
of the state of Israel; indirect negotiations to be con­
ducted through the U.N. or the Great Powers; withdrawal of 
Zionist forces from all occupied lands before negotiations; 
elimination of all traces of aggression; and that the Arab 
states would continue to protect the rights of the Pales­
tine Arabs. Despite these decisions, no reference was 
made to any military action or to the need for destroying 
I srael.^
The Arabs have always insisted on indirect negotia­
tions. They feared that such face-to-face talks or recog­
nition before withdrawal would enable the Zionists to gain 
legal status prior to her withdrawal. The Arabs had learn­
ed a lesson. After the Rhodes Agreement of 1949, it was 
hoped that the Partition Plan and the U.N. resolution re­
garding the refugees would be implemented. However, once 
Israel had gained de-facto status as a result of the armis­
tice negotiations, it refused the Partition Plan and stated 
that there was now ".a new reality."
At Khartoum, both Husayn and Nasser made clear their 
readiness to make substantial concessions to Israel. In 
exchange for their occupied lands, they offered important 
concessions short of actually recognizing the Zionist state
5
and negotiating a formal peace treaty with her. Husayn 
4lbid.
^Ibid., p. 314.
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was eager to reach an early peace settlement along the 
lines suggested by the U.N. resolution which he accepted 
without reservation. In compliance with that resolution 
he explicitly stated that Jordan was prepared to accept the 
demilitarization of the West Bank and to grant Israel a 
corridor to the Wailing Wall in the Old City. Jordan, how­
ever, was not prepared to reach any agreement with Israel 
without Egyptian accord.^
Since the June War of 1967, a major objective of 
Jordanian foreign policy has been the recovery of those 
territories occupied by Israel in the course of that war.
In an effort to realize this objective, an accommodation 
with the Zionists had to be reached. In return, Husayn 
was prepared to adjust the June 4 frontiers. He proposed 
to:
Consider the possibility of adjustments of 
the Israeli frontier to take into account the mili­
tary insecurity created by the narrow waistline 
around Tel Aviv and the Salient of Latrun. 7
The United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967,
provided for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
the occupied territories; the termination of the state of
belligerency; respect of territorial integrity and political
^Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy, No. 1, The Middle
East, (Washington: Department of State, n.d.), p. lO,
7
Albert B. Sabin et al., The Arabs Need and 'Want
Peace, But - , (New York: n.p., n.d.), p. l2, (Mission of
American Professors for Peace in the Middle East, June 24 
to July 5, 1968.) See Washington Post, July 7, 1967.
independence; and the right of every state in the area to 
live in peace v/ithin secure and recognized boundaries.
The establishment of the cease-fire was followed 
by a long period of negotiations which culminated in the 
Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22 adopted
g
unanimously by all its fifteen members. Israel, however, 
insisted that its acceptance of the Resolution was condi­
tional upon direct negotiations with the Arab states. 
Husayn’s comment on this insistence was that direct nego­
tiations are not the only method for solving disputes. 
According to Article 33 of the Charter mediation, concilia­
tion, arbitration, adjudication, and the U.N. Security 
Council and General Assembly are recommended as legitimate 
methods for settlements. To Husayn, therefore, Israel's 
refusal to implement the U.N. resolution was tantamount to 
rejecting its provisions of withdrawal. This refusal con­
tradicts President Eisenhower's statement in.1956 which 
stated:
Should a nation which attacks and occupies 
foreign territory in the face of the United Nations 
disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its 
own withdrawal? If we agree, then I fear we have 
turned back the clock of international order. 9
The Position of Jerusalem 
Husayn believes that Jordan's destiny is tied with
g
See supra. Chapter IV, p.
^Quoted by Husayn in his address to the National 
Press Club, Washington, B.C., April 10, 1969.
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the issue of Palestine and its people; that Jordan is the
primary home and base for all the sons of Palestine; and
that Jordan constitutes the first line of defense of the
Arab nation against the Zionist danger. If the Palestine
problem was ;.in Arab problem as a whole, it is for the most
part a Hashemite, Jordanian problem.
We /Tn Jordan/ believe that the Palestine 
issue is our most important and most dangerous pro­
blem. To us, it is a matter of life or extinction. 
It is the greatest challenge which we face in tiiis 
region before others. . . . Therefore, whatever we 
had done and will do in this country 2^ordan/ is 
for Palestine and because of Palestine. 10
During his tour throughout the Arab countries in
April, 1968, Husayn appealed to the heads of the Arab states
for more funds to strengthen his armed forces which were
being attacked daily. At the same time, he declared that
he was speaking as king of both banks of the River Jordan,
11and also as guardian of the Holy Places of Jerusalem.
Although Husayn made it clear that while immediate 
withdrawal from all occupied territories, including the 
Old City, was not a prerequisite for negotiation the other 
parts of the resolution, he however insisted that Israel 
must publicly declare its acceptance of the principle of
^^llusayn's Ajlun speech, July 14, I960, p. 4; also 
se(: the I'JGOnomist, February 20, I960, for Jordan's claim.
Jordan declined a proposal by the U.A.R. for an 
Arab Palestine entity in the West Bank and Gaza. However, 
Husayn agreed to a plebiscite. New York Herald Tribune, 
March 8, I960.
^^New York Times. December 21, 1968, p. 12.
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w:l thdrav/al. He further emphasized that the Arabs have cer­
tain inalienable rights which cannot he abandoned under any 
circumstances.
I announce firmly and distinctly that we will 
stand by our rights and not to move one inch from 
our position. . . . All occupied lands are ours; 
sacred Jerusalem is ous. 12
To Jordan, therefore, any form of settlement must 
include the return of the Old City to her control. The is­
sue of Jerusalem concerns Jordan more than any other matter. 
In addition to its spiritual importance to the Arab people, 
Muslims and Christians, it is vital to the Jordan economy. 
Without it, Jordan would not be complete. It would be 
"England without London, France without Paris, or Italy 
without Rome.
The Arab states are adamant that East Jerusalem be 
returned to the Arabs. At the Press Club in Washington,
Husayn gave Jerusalem a special place:
Any plan of withdrawal must include our 
greatest city - our spiritual capital - the Holy 
City of Jerusalem. . . .  We cannot envision any 
settlement that does not include the return of the 
Arab part of the City of Jerusalem to us with all 
our Holy Places. . . .  14
ew York Times, December 21, 1968, p. 12. Husayn 
denied the rumor circulated in the London Observer that he 
was willing to renounce soverei^gnty over the Y/est Bank as
a price for a political settlement.
^^Husayn's speech at the Press Club, November 7,
1967.
^^Husayn's Press Club Speech, April 10, 1969.
In March, 1968, for example, King Paysal of Saudi
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In hi s biography, Husayn further emphasized the 
place of Jerusalem as spiritual with universal application;
As far as Jerusalem is concerned, it is not 
a question of our giving up our rights. They are 
not our rights alone, hut those of all Moslems.
This is no longer a Jordanian problem, but a Moslem 
problem, an Arab and a Christian problem. . . . But 
we cannot give up our rights to Jerusalem for they 
go back more than a thousand years. Jerusalem is 
a religious problem. . . .  1^
[Arabia called for holy war, "Jihad", to restore Old Jeru­
salem. See haysal's statement in Mew York Times, February 
7, 1968; and for King Husayn's position see Mew York Times, 
February 17, 1968, December 21, 1968, and April ll, 1969.
15Vance and Bauer, op. cit., p. 121.
The Islamic Conferences held in many Islamic cities, 
all voiced strong objection to the present status of East 
Jerusalem. The resolution adopted by the World Muslim 
League at its meeting in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in October, 
1967, was indicative of tliis attitude;
"The Miuslims must realize that the problem of 
Jerusalem and the territory usurped in Palestine is 
a general Islamic problem, and a sacred problem, 
and that struggle (jihad) in the cause of God for 
the liberation of al-Masjid al-Aqsa and the occupied 
lands from the grasp of the aggressors is a sacred 
duty imposed upon all the Muslims, and not merely 
upon any one Muslim people.
. . .  Mo solution or settlement will be ac­
ceptable if it does not involve the restoration of 
Jerusalem to its previous status." Islamic Review 
and Arab Affairs. January, 1968, p. 11.
While the Vatican wished to see Jerusalem estab­
lished as a corpus separatum, as originally envisaged in 
the 1947 partition plan, the Mational Council of Churches, 
also urged the creation of an international control over 
the Holy City. In its resolution of July 7, 1967, it de­
clared:
"V/e support the establishment of an inter­
national presence in the hitherto divided city of 
Jerusalem which will preserve the peace and integ­
rity of the city, foster the welfare of its inhabi­
tants, and protect its holy shrines with full rights 
of access to all. V/e encourage the earliest pos­
sible advancement of U.N. proposals to make such 
arrangements practicable.
V/e cannot approve Israel's unilateral annexa-
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Israel says that it carmot retreat from the issue 
of Jerusalem reunification which it regards as mere exten­
sion of municipal services and integration rather than an­
nexation. However, the Israeli government insists on two 
points; one, retention of Jerusalem and, two, the necessity 
of negotiations prior to withdrawal. The Jordanian offi­
cial stand regarding Jerusalem is that "as long as Israel 
insisted that East Jerusalem is not negotiable and must 
remain a part of Israel, there can be no negotiations."^^ 
Accordingly, in the Jordanian view, "The way Israel can 
help toward a settlement is to end all talk about East Je­
rusalem not being negotiable and stop the changes they are
17making in the city."
tion of the Jordanian portions of Jerusalem. This 
historic city is sacred not only to Judaism but 
also to Christianity and Islam," New York Times, 
January 14, 1968.
^^Sabin et al., op. cit.. p. 12.
The two positions on this issue are irreconcilable. 
Upon his visit to Old Jerusalem following the June War, 
General Dayan declared:
"The Israeli Defense Forces liberated Jerusa­
lem. V/e have reunited the torn city, the capital 
of Israel. V/e have returned to this most sacred 
shrine, never to part from it again." Facts on 
File, X%VII, June 7, 1967.
In an interview with Eric Rouleau of the La Monde 
in April, 1969, Ben Gurion stated his formula for peace.
"in exciiange for peace . . .  I would return all the terri­
tory conquered in June, 1967." When asked if this would 
include East Jerusalem, Ben Gurion answered, "Certainly 
not]" La Monde. April 23, 1969, p. 4.
17Sabin et al., op. cit., p. 14: New York Post, 
October 21, 1967:
Examples: within a week after occupation of the 
Old City, some 100 Arab homes near the Wailing Wall were
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Withdrawal and International law 
The Security Council Resolution (242) of Novem­
ber 22, 1967, emphasized "the inadmissibility of the 
acquisition of territory by war," This unanimous deci­
sion is in accordance with the Stimson Doctrine of 1932. 
Similarly, the Spanish expression, "La victoria no da 
derechos," which means victory bestows no rights, has 
been the basis for many important treaties in the Ameri­
cas.
International law is clear on the issue of con­
quest by force and the fruits of aggression. The Stimson 
Doctrine explains the position of the United States re­
garding the invasion of China by Japan in 1932. In the
razed. New York Times, June 19, 1967. A month later, 
another one hundred Arab houses were leveled in the same 
vicinity. New ^tlook (Israel), September, 1968, p. 39.
The Washington Post also reported that "buses and trucks 
at the Damascus Date were waiting to take displaced Arabs 
to Jericho and beyond." Washington Post, June 20, 1967.
At the same time, the Israeli Jerusalem Post of June 19, 
was ur^ng Israeli settlers move into the Old City. New 
York Times. June 18, and July 3, 1967, carried the program 
for settling Zionist families in East Jerusalem, aiming at 
changing the demographic character of the Old City. See 
Jordan’s protest to the U.N. Secretary General on this 
issue. U.N. Document A/7107 (S/8634)
Describing the condition in the Old City, the 
Economist reported that;
"The U.N. mission investigating occupied 
territory will find that the Muslims and Chris­
tians in Jerusalem are in poorer shape than other 
West Bank Jordanians. They can be blamed for not 
wholeheartedly accepting the Israeli conquest and 
be seen as the principle victims of the Arab re­
fusal to negotiate on Israel’s terms, but even on 
those the majority who at least cooperate, Israel’s 
legislation bears hard. All Arabs are classed as
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Buenos Aires Declaration of 1936, and the Lima Declara­
tion of 1938, the United States took the position that;
The occupation or acquisition of territory 
or any other modifications or territorial or boun­
dary arrangement obtained through conquest by 
force or by non- pacific means shall not be valid 
or have legal effect. I8
The Charter of the O.A.S, signed at Bogata in 1948, also
declared, "no territorial acquisition or special advantage
obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall
iq
be recognized,"
On November 16, 1956, Under Secretary of State
'absent' but have to pay high income-tax. Their tourist 
trade is gone. They are losing more and more land through 
Israel's land expropriation. What is clear is that no new 
Jerusalem is being built in the Holy Land. There is sim­
ply this sad Old Jerusalem whose treatment by Israel may 
well prove the crux of whether there is peace or war." The 
Economist. May 4, 1968, pp. 30-31.
Comparing the economic conditions of Jerusalem Ar­
abs before and after the June war, G. Lenczowski noted that 
the Arabs of East Jerusalem were enjoying a rate of econo­
mic growth even greater than Israel prior to the war. Per 
capita agricultural production in Jordan reached an index 
of 193 (1957-59=100) just before the war, compared to only 
146 for Israel. The overall rate of growth for Israel bet­
ween 1958 and 1966, averaged 9.3 percent annually, while 
for Jordan, it wasalmost 9.7 percent. Moreover, Israel 
has been the recipient of almost $5 billion in outside 
financing since 1948, while capital flow into Jordan was 
much more modest during this same period. George Lencz­
owski, (ed.) United States Interests in the Middle East. 
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, l968), pp. 64-73,
IfiReport of the United States delegation to the 
Eighth International Conference of the American States,
1938, pp. 132-133, quoted in Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest 
of International Law, Vol. 5, ( Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1965), pp. 880-881.
l9
U.N. General Assembly Official Record, 91, 1956.
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Herbert Hoover, told the General Assembly that " the
basic purpose of the Charter is peace with justice. . . .
Peace without justice in not enough, for without justice,
20peace is illusiory and temporary."" Similarly, King
Husayn told the Assembly on June 26, 1967, that "peace
21
to be the future relations in the Middle Hast." He 
also made the Arab position clear: that a military solu­
tion or any forced solution is a "prescription for war"; 
that it is necessary to go back to the situation that 
existed before June 5; and that all traces of aggression 
must be erased. He added:
To permit Israel to retain its gains as 
a bargaining weapon is to permit the aggressor 
to use the fruits of his aggression to gain the 
ends for which he went to war. This is immoral 
. . . .  Should all traces of aggression not be 
completely erased, Jordan will survive and with 
us will arise the Arab nation. 22
Stressing the illegality of conquest by force,
and that military supremacy cannot create legal rights
in occupied territories, Secretary General Dag Hammer-
skjold, in a report concerning the Suez invasion of 1956,
stated the position of the World Organization:
The United Nations cannot condone a change 
of the status juris resulting from military action 
contrary to the provisions of the Charter. The
ZOU.N. G.A.O.R.. 91, 1956.
21King Husayn's Speech at the General Assembly 
Emergency Session, June 26, 1967.
22King Husayn's Speech at the Press Club, Washing­
ton. D.C., November 7, 1967.
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Organization must, therefore, maintain that the 
status juris existing prior to such military action 
he reestablished by a withdrawal of troops, and 
by the relinquishment or nullification of rights 
asserted in territories covered by the military 
action and depending upon it. 23
Before the outbreak of hostilities in June, 1967, 
Israel and the U.S. Ambassador Goldberg, insisted that 
peace could be achieved through the restoration of the 
status quo ante in the Gulf of Aqaba. However, when Is­
rael emerged victorious and in control of large territo­
ries, Goldberg changed the formula and stated that re­
verting to the status quo ante would be a"prescription for 
renewed h o s t i l i t i e s . S u c h  declaration by the repre­
sentative of a major power, had in fact, encouraged Israel 
to refuse to withdraw. Confident of its military domi­
nance, Israel has been insisting on face-to-face talks 
with the individual Arab states under duress, and only 
on "conqueror's terms,"
2 ^Report in connection of G.A. Resolution 1123,
11 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No, 66, at 47, U.N. 
Document A/3512 (1957;.
The Arabs in Old Jerusalem, since 1967, have been 
deprived of their freedom to belong to the Arab community.
In 1948, Eban, then Israel's representative at the U.N. 
argued that internationalization of Jerusalem would deprive 
110,000 Jews of their right to belong to Israel and that 
such action by the U.N. would be morally incorrect, poli­
tically unwise, and a violation of U.N. principles.
It is academic that living under international 
administration difler greatly from living under conquer- 
er's laws. See Memorandum on the Question of Jerusalem 
submitted to the U.N. Trusteeship Council, Seventh Session, 
Lake Success, May, 1950.
U.N. Document A/PV 1527, June 30, 1967, pp. 16-17. 
25 Anthony Nutting," The Tragedy of Palestine From
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While debating the Tripartite Aggression on Egypt 
in 1956, Ambassador Henry G. Lodge reiterated the U.S. 
position regarding acquisition by military means. At the 
General Assembly on March 1, 1957, he said that the U.S.:
. . . called upon Israel to withdraw and 
called for the withholding of assistance to Is­
rael if it did not withdraw. The U.S. views in 
this respect have been steadfast. . . .  We have 
recognized that it is incompatible with the prin­
ciples of the Charter and with the obligations of 
membership in the U.N. for any member to seek 
political gains through the use of force or to 
use as bargaining point a gain achieved by means 
of force.26
Similarly, the position of the French Government 
was stated by its Foreign Minister Murville at the General 
Assembly;
. . . The French Government has taken a stand 
since the end of the military operations. It 
goes without saying. . . that no fait accompli 
on the spot regarding the territorial boundaries 
and the situation of the citizens of the states 
concerned should be considered permanent. 27
Accordingly, Israel should not dictate conditions for
peace since its behavior and occupation are illegal as
they are governed by military considerations. This places
her in violation of the international declarations as well
as the U.N. resolutions.
the Balfour Declaration to Today," Address delivered at the 
annual conference of the American Council for Judiasm, No­
vember 2, 1967, (London: Arab League Office), p. 6.
^S.N. GOAR. 1956, p, 1277.
27French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Mur­
ville Speech before the United Nations General Assembly, 
June 22, 1967, quoted in Vital Speeches, Vol. 33, No. 19, 
July 15, 1967, p. 591.
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Israel Defies The United Nations
One crucial factor contributing to the deadlock 
is that Israel does not regard the Security Council Res­
olution as an instrument ready for implementation, but
considers it as "a set of principles subject to discus-
28
Sion and agreement and not a self-executing document."
Such unilateral interpretation frees Israel from the obli­
gation of implementing it, particularly when implementation 
is to her disadvantage,
Israel's refusal to abide by the U.N. resolutions 
can be ascribed to certain attitudes which have been borne 
by its leadership for the last twenty years. Although it 
was created by a U.N. Resolution, Israel has violated the 
orders of the International Organization throughout its
pQ
history. In 1966, in an interview with Premier Eshkol, 
Eric Rouleau of the Le Monde, put the question that the
^^New York Times. November 7, 1968, p. 2,
PQ
The following are examples;
1. Resolution (l8l)- II of November 29, 1947, 
regarding partition;
2. Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, 
which provided for the return of the refugees and compen­
sating those who desired not to return;
3. Resolution 273 (III) of May 11, 1949, which 
provided for the admission of Israel to U.N. membership on 
condition that it will respect and implement the afore­
mentioned resolutions;
4. Resolution 394 (V) of December 14, 1950, which 
entrusted the Palestine Concilliation Commission with the 
protection of the interests and properties of the refugees;
5. Resolution 237 of June, 1967, regarding the re­
turn of the refugees;
6. Resolution 2253 (ES-V) of July 4, 1967, which
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Arab staties think Israel should abide by the U.N, resol­
utions, "wouldn't you think that these offer a basis for 
negotiations?" Eshkol's reply was "absolutely not."^^
The Zionist leadership have been dissatisfied with 
the U.N. for not giving them what they always asked for. 
The% seem to insist that the World Organization owes them 
statehood, protection and survival. Thus they demand to 
be treated by the U.N. as "primus inter pares." Recog­
nizing the impotence of the U.N. and assured of unswer­
ving support of the major powers, she embarked on a policy 
of fait accompli, which never failed. Not even the murder 
of U.N. Mediator Count Polke Bemadotte by Zionist terro­
rists of the Stern Gang on September 17, 1948,^^ was to
12count against her.
restrained Israel from annexing Jersalem;
7. Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which pro­
vided for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occu­
pied territories.
^^Quoted in Samuel Merlin, The Search For Peace in 
The Middle East. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1968), p. ^3%.
^^Glubb, Soldier With the Arabs, op. oit.. p. 448.
12ROdinson, op. cit., p. 40.
In a security review of top Parliamentary members 
of Eshkol's Party, Dayan rejected the U.N, resolution and 
added that the decisive factor as far as Israel was con­
cerned was the position of the United States; that the 
attitude of the U.S. has more importance for Israel than 
the Security Council Resolution. U.N. Document S/8650,
June 21, 1968.
In connection with the use of force policy which 
had been the landmark in Israel's behavior, a leader of the 
British Labour Party, T.E.M. McKitterick observed:
"What brought Israel into existence was in
the end not an agreed decision but the force of
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According to the Israeli leadership, the crisis of 
1967 resulted from the fact that for twenty years, the U.N, 
was unable to solve the Palestine conflict, and that in 
early summer, 1967, the Security Council had abdicated its 
function when it could not prevent the diversion of the 
River Jordan and the activities of the fedayeen. In this 
connection, a spokesman in Tel Aviv communicated that "the 
Prime Minister doubts whether the United Nations could do 
much either for us or the A r a b s . T h u s ,  the Israelis
arms, and all the U.N, was able to do afterwards 
was to take note of the fact and try to prevent 
any further changes from being made by similar 
methods. The implication is a very far reaching 
one- that a collective security organization is 
bound by its very nature to favor the staus quo,
while initiative for change comes not from agree­
ment but from force. T.E.M. McKitterick, Pabian 
International Essays, (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 12l.
Before 1948, the British, the Arabs and the U.S.S.R. 
were trying to show that the Partition Plan could not work. 
Accordingly, the U.S.A. tried to create a U.N. Trusteeship, 
instead. Secretary of State James Porrestal, who objected 
to the establishment of the Zionist State failed to per­
suade President Truman to commit U.S. troops to enforce 
the Trusteeship Plan. Warren Austin, the U.S. ambassador 
to the U.N., was abôut to present a joint American-British
Trusteeship Plan instead. However, the U.S. decided on an
alternative: to support the creation of Israel, to recog­
nize it, and to insure its survival as a part of the West­
ern World. This policy was dictated by the fear of Soviet 
infiltration in the region. It should be recalled that the 
U.S.S.R. voted for the creation of Israel, and recognized 
it only a few days after its proclamation.
Secretary of State Rusk voiced the thinking of the 
U.S. in adopting this policy:
"If we did nothing, it is likely that the 
Russians could and would take definite steps to­
ward gaining control in Palestine through the in­
filtration of specially trained Jewish immigrants." 
See Avnery, op. cit.. p. 194.
Jerusalem Post. April 2, 1967.
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conclude that the present condition of the U.N, clearly 
indicates to the small powers that they cannot yet count
34on obtaining their security from the World Organization. 
Israel's problem, therefore for the most part, is politi- 
can and psychological, given its character as an alien 
national entity forcibly thrust into a hostile environ­
ment, To the Zionist it was logical that they must chart
35their own course by displaying military strength.
This military strength has been the vehicle for 
their expansionist policies, and currently being applied 
to force a peace settlement, french Foreign Minister Mur­
ville does not approve of or support such policy. He said;
The Israeli Government, basing itself on 
such a war map and deliberately putting aside 
for the future and further intervention by the 
U.N. Organization or third powers, declares that 
it intends to discuss peace terms with each of 
the Arab countries concerned individually, with­
out, however, defining these terms, even though 
they seem to go beyond freedom of navigation 
through the Gulf of Aqaba.36
Jordan's Peace Proposals 
In 1967-68, Israel had been saying that the June 
war had "shattered beyond repair" the armistice agreement 
and that a new reality had come about. The Arab are now 
willing to convert the 1949 Armistice arrangement into
^^Embassy of Israel, Forward to Peace, (Washington: 
n.p., October, 1968), p. 4.
^^Kerr, The Middle East Conflict, op cit., p. 28.
Vital Speeches, op. cit., p. 590.
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a peace settlement. Israel, however, persistently re­
jected these proposals , Even the peace campaign of Pre­
sident Bourgih in 1954 was ingncred, hut at the same time
37succeeded in exposing Israel's real intentions and policies.-' 
The Zionists' consolidation of their grip on the occupied 
territories makes the Arabs apprehensive of direct nego­
tiations, much less recognition.
Israel's peace offers are not, by their very na­
ture, directed to the Arabs at all. They are addressed to
3 Q
the Western World, The Arab position has been that there 
is nothing to negotiate as long as Israel assumes this at­
titude. Therefore, and promise from the Arabs for direct 
talks remain slender. John G. Campbell, a student of the 
Middle East politics observed:
Israel, for its part, consistently expressed 
its desire to sit down with the Arabs and talk peace 
terms. Basically, Israel's attitude was more reason­
able in that it wanted peace while the Arabs did not, 
but from the view point of the latter, what Israel 
wanted was recognition and legal confirmation of 
unjust gains won by the sword. Israel's attitudes, 
moreover, did nothing to disarm Arab suspicion or 
mitigate Arab hostility even if that had been pos­
sible. . . . Israel paid remarkably little heed 
to the necessity of coming to some terms with the 
fact of living in the heart of the Arab World. . . .
The Government of Israel did nothing toward the sol­
ution of the problem of the Arab refugees.39
^^Erskine B. Childers, "Palestine: The Broken Tri­
angle ," Modernization of the ^ a b  World, J.H. Thompson and 
R.D. Reischauer, (editors), (^Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nos­
trand Company, Inv., I960), p. 154.
38l b i d . ' '
39john C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East,
(New York: Praeger, I960), pp. ü2-ü3.
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For the Arabs, direct negotiations as a first 
step are inconceivable. They suspect that direct talks 
could lead to a trap due to the fact that the power eq­
uation is manifestly in Israel's favor. Any settlement 
thus arrived at would inevitably conform to the actual 
distribution of power between Israel and the Arab In 
other words, it would enable Israel to impose maximum 
penalties on the Arabs in terms of territories, refugees, 
control of waterways and recognition. It means that by 
coming to the conference table, the Arabs will be required 
to sign on the dotted line,^^ Interestingly, a member of 
the Israeli parliament, Uri Avnery, understands the Arab 
position regarding direct talks with Israel. Assuming 
an Arab viewpoint, Avnery asks:
What does Israel want from us? Only re­
cognition of its lawful existence. We on our 
part have many concrete demands; retreat from the 
cease-fire lines, repatriation of the refugees, 
and 30 forth. If we agree to direct peace nego­
tiations, we are ready to accord to Israel recog­
nition, In other words, we are giving you in 
advance what you want without receiving anything 
in return. After making such a mistake, Israel 
could say at the negotiating table that it does 
not want to concede anything. Therefore, secret 
negotiations by mediators must come first. We 
must know what Israel wants to give up in return
The Israeli Government rejected the return od the 
refugees since 194-8, In a letter to Bernadotte from the 
Israeli Foreign Minister, the reasons given were security 
and economy. Spectator, May 12, 1961, p. 675,
Agwani, Mid East, (March-April, 1969), p.11.
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lor recognition before any Arab leader can make
any open move. 41
Conversely, Husayn declares his trust in the U.N. 
and the judgement of the Big Powers, and realizes the neces­
sity of their involvement in the Middle East conflict. To 
him the issue of peace in the region is too important to 
be left to the parties concerned, particularly when failure 
to find peace could precipitate World War III.^^ The Zion­
ists, however, are walled up behind the cliche that only 
the parties to the conflict must be parties to the peace, 
and that no external intervention could replace the direct 
negotiations by the parties concerned.
In November of 1967 at the Press Club, Husayn de­
clared that he was not speaking for Jordan alone but for
^^Avnery, op. cit., p. I84.
'^ "^The role of the U.S. was again problematical.
She was on the winning side, and superficially her policy 
seemed successful. But on the deeper level, it was clear 
that the swiftness of Israel's victory had saved the U.S. 
from having to make some very difficult decisions. Had 
the war gone badly for Israel, the U.S. might have been 
forced to intervene and risk a confrontation with the Sov­
iet Union." John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and 
the Superpowers, (2d ed.; New York: fiandom House, 1^ *70),
pp. 73-74.
According to New York Times of June 12, 1967, "The 
Johnson Administration appeared content to let the Israelis 
capitalize on their strength" by not pressing for a cease­
fire. "The administration's greatest pressures to have 
Israel halt the fighting did not develop until June 9, while 
Israelis were making their final bid to seize high ground 
in Syria."
Although Israel accepted the ceasefire on June 7, 
the fighting stopped on June 9. The delay of Israel's com­
pliance with the ceasefire order caused by the U.S. atti­
tude resulted in Israel's occupation of more land not held 
by it on June 7.
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the entire Arab nation. He stated that a grave injustice 
had been suffered by Arab Palestine in 1948 and unless 
justice was restored there would be no hope for peace.
This is still the Arab position in its true meaning. Al­
though the Arabs in the past were reluctant to find a solu­
tion, today they are desirous to cooperate with maximum 
efforts to reach a permanent peace with justice.
In accordance with the Security Council Resolution, 
and as a basis for "just and lasting peace", Husayn offered 
the following proposals;
1. The end of all belligerency.
2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sover­
eignty, territorial integrity and political in­
dependence of all states in the area.
3. Recognition of the right of all to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free 
from threats or acts of war.
4. Guaranteeing for all the freedom of navigation
through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.
5. Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability of 
all states in the area through whatever measures 
necessary including the establishment of demili­
tarized zones.
6. Accepting a just settlement of the refugee pro­
blem. 44
Husayn's position is that Jordan was prepared for 
an overall political settlement which included Jordan's re­
cognition of Israel's right "to live in peace and security."
^^Husayn, Press Club, November 7, 1967.
There was also a tacit understanding that an ef­
fort would be made primarily through King Husayn to improve 
Arab relations gradually with the U.S.A. and win American 
support for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied area. 
Khouri, op. cit.. p. 313.
^4bid.. April 10, 1969.
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Thus Husayn indicated that the Arabs would agree to vitual- 
ly all the demands put forth by Israel before June 5, 1967. 
He knows that an accommodation of some kind would restore 
the Arab occupied areas in the West Bank to his kingdom, 
making it viable economically.^^ Thus he could declare 
"if we cannot achieve an Arab solution, then we must have
A C
a Jordan solution," To that end, the king shuffled his 
cabinet and brought in new members who were willing "to 
follow the king in seeking a political settlement in the 
Middle East."^^ Prime Minister A.M. Rifa'i was sent on a 
tour throughout the Arab states to consult the Arab rulers 
about "how far they will back Jordan in any settlement 
with Israel."4^
This attitude represented a major change from 
Jordan's position since such a statement indicated that 
the Arabs face a Zionist state as a fact of life.^^ The
^^New York Times, November 11, 1968, p. 5.
4Glbid.. p. 4.
4^lbid, December 27, 1968, p. 2.
^^Ibid,, December 1, 1968.
"Middle East Stalemate," Newsweek Magazine, 
November 20, 1967, p. 73.
King Husayn wrote about his visit to many foreign 
nations following the 1967 war:
"Wherever I went, one point was made abun­
dantly clear: in spite of the tragic turn in Pal­
estine problem, world opinion was convinced that 
Israel is in this part of the world to stay."
Vance and Lauer, op. cit.. p. 115.
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king also called upon Israel to match this new and posi­
tive approach hy offering terms to consider, for if the 
Zionists wish to live in peace with one hundred million 
Arabs and become accepted neighbors, they should initiate 
proposals leading to a just solution. He demanded that:
Israel must contribute to a solution to 
the Palestine problem as a whole so that the 
peace will be definitive, and now is the time 
to do it. A peace between Jordan and Israel or 
Palestine and Israel is simply useless. We have 
shown that we are ready to go a long way toward 
its realization and to accept the challenges of 
building a better future for this region as an 
indivisible whole. Now it is Israel's turn. It 
is up to them, the victors, to prove by actions 
that they really mean to live in peace with the 
Arabs and be accepted in this world on which they 
have encrusted themselves like a scab.50
It became apparent that the deadlock has been
caused by Israel's insistence on face to face talks, and
recognition, and due to the fact that these conditions
are beyond implementation under the present conditions.
Since the Zionists' demands denote dictated peace and
intimidation , the Arabs, including Husayn reject them.
A European official remarked that the Zionists should have
recalled that intense hatred of the Germans had prevented
the Israeli government from holding direct talks with West
German officials, and added:
How can it be expected that these Arab coun­
tries, v/hich for twenty years have refused to ne­
gotiate with Israel - however a great shock they 
may have suffered and possible even because of
50Vance and lauer, op. cit.,p.119
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this shock- will he any more ready to negotiate 
today than they were yesterday? It is probable 
that never has any dialogue been harder to imag­
ine. . .51
To Jordan the alternative is indirect talks throu­
gh the United Nations Mediator, Jarring. This alternative 
is not wholly acceptable to the Israeli leadership. Eban, 
whose tactic is to have the Rhodes talks repeated, agreed 
to hold such talks in Cyprus, but on condition that the 
Arabs will yield some day to direct talks. He said:
We do not mind Jarring being there making 
it a United Nations conference as at Rhodes, but 
we eventually will all have to come to the same
table. We have to see the whites of their eyes.52
Eban recognizes Husayn's special position in 
view of his great losses in terms of territory, revenue, 
and population. Added to that his unrelenting efforts to 
arrive at a satisfactory peace settlement. Accordingly, 
Eban declared that in the framework of face to face ne­
gotiations, Husayn, most especially, would get a fair 
shake. Enticing Husayn to negotiate, Eban added:
We don't intend to negotiate a deal which
^4viurville, Vital Speeches, op. cit., p. 590.
^^New York Times. April 7, 1968, p. 129.
Commenting on this attitude, Husayn described the 
Zionist position as one which does not differ from that of
a man who robbed a bank, and wanted to open an account in
that same bank with the money he robbed. The Arab posi­
tion can be summerized, "return our money first, then we 
will discuss the matter of opening the account." Husayh'-s 
speech at the Press Club, November 7, 1967, Cited in 
Kalimat Al-Husayn, July, 1967- July, 1968, (Amman: Minis- 
try Of information, n.d.j, p. 5b.
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woulrl humiliate him in the least. He will receive 
new boundaries commensurate with his dignity, 
though I do not think he can expect to get back to 
June 4 lines. 53
The Economist reported that while the U.A.H. rejected the 
offer officially, Husayn seemed more inclined to accept it. 
Hard pressed by the activités of the Palestine Resistance 
movement, by Israeli retaliation, and by economic disloca­
tion, Husayn was anxious to get some form of talks going 
so long as Egypt gave its consent.However, to confirm 
his stand on the issue of direct talks, Husayn consistent­
ly declared that Jordan would make no move for peace with­
out the U.A.R. Simultaneously, he transmitted a sense of
crisis and urgency about the need for an early break in
55the impasse.
To Husayn who suffered most damages from the war,
56peace is most urgent. Thus, accommodation with the Is­
raeli leaders became imperative. However, due to his
^% e w  York Times, April 7, 1968, IV, p. 129. 
^^Economist, March 2, 1968, p. 23.
Sabin et al., op. cit., p. 12.
•i m e  Mi ni stp»?' Abdiil— ' i
55c
Jordan's Pr e'Mn s er À du -Mun em Al-Rifa'i 
said in connection with separate peace that:
"It was impossible without the United Arab 
Republic, although not necessarily without Syria, 
Iraq or other Arab countries." Ibid., p. 13; also 
Hew York Times, December 8, 1968.
56The material losses of the armed forces amount­
ed to seventy million Jordan dinars (approximately #200 
million). Al-Risalah Al-Malakiyyiah (The Royal Message), 
(Amman: Ministry of Information, 1968), p. 22.
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sensitive political position in relation to the Arab states,
particularly the U.A.R., a peace settlement has to include
the other Arabs countries." Jordan will not make a separate
57peace treaty with Israel without Cairo's approval." Al­
though both Jordan and the U.A.R. receive Arab subsidies, 
it appears that contributors trust the judgement of Cairo 
as to the conditions of such peace.
In clarifying his feeling about the Zionist state, 
and reflecting the feeling of all the Arabs too, Husayn ,
in November , 1967, told a press conference in Paris,"
58"We are not against the right of any nation to exist,"
but declared further that the Arabs do not object to the
Jews living among the Arabs peacefully, but they object
to the creation of a foreign political state within the
Arab World. This is what Israel represents.
The Jews could live with the Arabs as a 
nation, not as a military or political danger 
. . . .  The future of the Jews does not reside
in racist Zionism, but in free association as
fellow countrymen. 59
Husayn's attitude toward peace has been influenced 
by the attitudes of many foreign nations. World public
^^New York Times, November 6, 1966, p. 41; Also 
Vance and Lauer, op. cit., p. 130.
58Aubrey Hodes, Dialogue With Ishmael; Israel's 
Future in the Middle Fasti ( New York; Punk & Wagnalls',' 
T5ÏÏ^7 p: 1-59.-----------
5Q^King Husayn's Press Club Speech, November 7,
1967; Also New York Times, April 16, 1964, p. 1.
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opinion is convinced that "Israel is in this part of the 
world to stay," Accordingly, Husayn had to adjust his 
position and declare that Jordan recognize the right of 
Israel to live in peace and security. However, his fear 
of expansionist Zionism is real, as the aftermath of the 
1967 conflict clearly show. President Charles De Gaulle 
told king Husayn in Paris that "if Israel has the right 
to live in peace and security, Jordan certainly has earned 
the same r i g h t . I n  this light, Husayn sees that Israel's 
relations with the Arabs has two alternatives; it can 
defeat the Arabs, expand into their territories and compel 
them to accept it as conqueror; or it can live in peace 
as an unwelcome neighbor. This state of affairs would 
change if the Jews end the military nature of their state 
and abandon their racist philosophy.
In conclusion, two crucial matters seem to stand 
out in Husayn's peace initiative: one, the return of the 
refugees to their homes and properties, for the "refusal 
to accept a solution to this issue constitutes a fatal 
blow for any hope for accepting other Arab proposals; 
two, Israel must return the occupied territories in which 
the Zionists conducted themselves like no occupation army 
had done in recent years. For instead of occupation and 
establishing military and civilian controls, they exprop-
^^ Ibid.
G^ Ibid.
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riated the land and colonized it. Such conduct has never 
been practiced throughout the last two hundred years,
As the deadlock for peace continues, Husayn per­
sisted in his challenge to the Zionist leadership to 
modify their position as the Arabs done. He expressed:
We are reaching the end of the line. Either 
of two things can happen: we take our chances to 
establish peace, or we lose it forever. , , . If 
it is lost, this would be the fault of Israel and 
not the Arabs, Israel must take the next step to 
show that she really wants peace.63
The Israeli hawks may win and go on winning, but
without attaining peace, thereby demonstrating Hegel's
aphorism about the impotence of victory. Dictating peace
by force of arms would inevitably lead to absolute despair
which would render any peaceful settlement impossible.
Cautioning about this dangerous consequence, Jacob Talman,
professor of history at the Hebrew University said, " we
Jews have shown how strong the power of despair could be,"^^
fi?
King Husayn, Press Club Speech, November 7, 1967.
^% e w  York Times, April 7, 1968, IV, p. 24.
Compare Israelis position after the 1967 war when 
it emerged dictating peace terms, with its position in 
1958, when the U.A.R. and the Arab Union were formed. In 
1958, Ben Gurion believed that Arab groupings would dis­
play hostility and expansionist attitides toward Israel. 
Accordingly, he proposed to conclude a non-aggression 
agreement with the Arabs on the basis of the status quo.
His offer was discarded. See G, Barraclough,""Suivey of 
International Affairs, 1956-58, (London: Oxford University 
Press, ±962j, p. 3bV.
^^Cited in Parker T, Hart, "An American Policy 
Toward the Middle East," The Annals of American Academy 
of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 390, July, 197Ü,
F.“ TO'5:----- - ------------------------
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Conclusion
j'eace efforts by Jordan had started even before 
the Mandate ended. Although hostilities erupted in 1948 
and ended in the Rhodes Agreement, King Abdullah continued 
his efforts to reach a final peace with Israel, for he 
realized that only under peaceful conditions could Jordan 
prosper and his plans materialize.
Aside from border incidents, a technical peace pre­
vailed, However, the 1967 war ended the calm. As Jordan 
lost all the territory acquired by Abdullah in 1948, a new 
reality was created, and a new political situation estab­
lished.
Despite King Husayn's moderation and offers for a 
just and lasting settlement, which included recognition 
of Israel and its right to live in peace with secure boun­
daries, no progress toward peace has yet been achieved.
This is ascribed to Israel's desire to impose maximum pen­
alties on the Arabs in terms of recognition, territory, 
waterways, the Jordan waters and the Palestine refugees, 
Jordan and the Arab states insist that the U,H. 
resolution of November 22, 1967, must be the basis for a 
future peace. Since the resolution dictates relinquishing 
of territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 War, it was 
rejected by the Zionist leadership, Dayan on"Meet the Press' 
on December 12, 1970, verified this policy when he stated 
that this resolution was "not our Bible,"
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To Jordan, the return of the Old City represents 
the main prerequisite for peace, for the question of Jeru­
salem "is no longer a Jordanian problem, but a Moslem pro­
blem, an Arab and a Christian problem,"
Although an alien state existing in the heart of 
the Arab world, Israel paid remarkably little heed to the 
necessity of coming to terms with the Arabs. Its attitude 
did nothing to disarm Arab suspicion. Israel, further, 
did nothing toward a solution of the Arab refugee problem.
Israel claims that peace is crucial to its contin­
ued existence. However, the Zionists demand that such 
peace be concluded on their own terms. Israel wants recog­
nition to legalize its unjust gains won by the sword, and 
insists on face to face negotiations to achieve this objec­
tive.
To the Arab states direct talks would mean uncon­
ditional surrender, therefore tantamount to signing on the 
dotted line. Israel's consolidation of its grip on the oc­
cupied territories made the Arab apprehensive about such 
direct talks. Therefore, they insist on direct negotiations 
through a United Nations mediator. The Arabs learned a les­
son from the Rhodes talks which resulted in devastating con­
sequences to the Arabs. The Arabs fear that mere meetings 
with the Israelis will confirm recognition. Israel, having 
secured this important goal, could refuse to concede anything.
Israel’s insistence on face to face talks seems ab-
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surd even to foreign observers. Finding a parallel between 
the Jewish- Nazi case on the one hand,and the Arab- Zionist 
case on the other, French Foreign Minister Murville re­
minded the Israeli leadership that their intense hatred of 
the Germans prevented them from holding direct talks with 
V/est German officials.
Finally, King Husayn also remided the Jewish people 
that Zionism, as a colonial system would disappear sooner 
or later; that Israel should abandon her racist policies 
and live in association with the people of the region, 
peacefully.
CHAPTER X 
JORDAN- SYRIA RELATIONS
The Great Syria Plan 
Students of Arab politics consider Syria the back­
bone of any Arab grouping or union. Throughout its histo­
ry, particularly since World War I, Damascus has been the 
center of Arab self-determination, while itself too weak 
to dominate any Arab bloc. Syria, therefore, became the 
prize for Arab primacy, and held so central a position that 
for an Arab state to have an Arab policy came to mean for 
it to have a plan concerning Syria either to seek to ex­
tend its influence or to prevent a rival from entrenching 
itself there. The tireless Hashemite solicitude for Syria 
was matched with determination by Egypt and the Saudis to 
obstruct a north Arabian federation, with Syria as its 
center.
Syria held the balance of power in inter-Arab 
relations. To Egypt, the loss of Syria meant its moving 
into a rival sphere of influence, with the consequent 
emergence in North Arabia of a unit strong enough to chal­
lenge it. Thus, for more than a century, Egyptian policy 
has been to prevent this development. This fact explains
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Nasser's speedy incorporation of Syria in 1958, when it 
was ready to go to whomever offered her assistance. It 
also explains the spontaneous creation of the Arab Union 
to counter the Egyptian move, calculated to take what the 
Hashemites claimed as their priority right in terms of 
geography.
For Egypt to take a place commensurate with its
size, wealth and development, it must operate in three
circles; the African circle; the Muslim circle; and the
Arab circle,^ In the Arab circle, however, Syria, rather
than Egypt was considered by the Arabs as the heart and
2
main source of Fan-Arabism, To Egypt, therefore, the 
only agent for its expansion in Asia has always been 
Syria, which has been regarded as the "Arab Prussia,"  ^
Syria is a particularly good observation post 
from which to view great power politics in the Middle East, 
It was to a large extent on the plane of internal Syrian 
politics that the decisive battles over the Baghdad Pact
^Gamal Abdel-Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolu-
tion, (V/ashington; Public Affairs iPress, 1959}, pp. 94-9Ü
2
The immediate effect of the failure in the Pal­
estine war in 1948 on the Egyptian thinking, was outright 
denunciation of Pan-Arabism, Inter Arab cooperation and 
solidarity were considered to have failed the vital test. 
The isolationists saw in Arab weakness and disunity an 
opportunity to demand that Egypt abandon the idea of Arab 
unity and concentrate on Egyptian affairs, Anwar Chejne, 
"Egyptian Attitude Towards Pan-Arabism," Middle East Jour­
nal, Vol. 11, (Summer, 1957), p. 260,
^Musal Al-Alami, "The Lesson of Palestine," Middle 
East Journal. Vol. 3, (October, 1949), p. 390,
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and the Eisenhower Doctrine, as well as the Soviet Union's 
hid to establish a sphere of influence, were waged* Con­
sequently, discord in Syria is exported to its neighbors 
and beyond, so that the sources of international crises 
often are traced to Damascus.^
Jordan's relations v/ith Syria have been based on 
two main factors; one, Faysal's twenty-one month rule in 
Damascus and the resolution by the Syrian Congress in 1920 
which proposed uniting the Syrian regions; two, in Abdul­
lah's view, Syria was given to the Hashemites. If Paysal 
lost it to the French, it was Abdullah's duty to restore
it. This was the basis for Abdullah's campaign to unify 
s
Great Syria.^
In order to enforce his scheme, Abdulah made the 
Great Syria Plan a national program. Thus, on July 1, 
1941, his cabinet passed the following resolution:
Syria, in view of its geographic position 
and natural resources, cannot survive, particu­
larly from an economic point of view, except if 
united. Previous events have made it clear that 
any barriers separating parts of this territory 
will create political anxiety and hinders economic 
development and prepares the v/ay for intrigues 
spread by enemy power.6
On March 6, 1943, shortly after Eden's speech in
Patrick Seale, The Struggle For Syria: A Study 
of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, (New York; Qxf0^  
University Press, 1965), p. 3.
^Ibid., p. 8.
^Journal of Middle Eastern Society of Jerusalem, 
Vol. I, 1 ^ 7 7  p:"109'.
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which Britain promised to support Arab unity, a number of 
Transjordanian dignitaries submitted a memorandum to Amir 
AbdulJ.ah concerning the Syrian unity. The memorandum stres­
sed that a Great Syria government should be established 
with the aid of Great Britain and that "His Highness Amir 
Abdui;iah Bin Al-Husayn shall be invited to become the head
7
of the Syrian state," Owing to French, Saudi and Egyptian 
hostility to this plan, Britain was inhibited from promot­
ing it declaring that the project must wait the return of 
stable conditions in the region. As the plan was placed 
in abeyance, a substitute scheme had to be devised. It 
was the Fertile Crescent Scheme.
The Fertile Crescent Scheme 
This plan was proposed by the Prime Minister of 
Iraq., Nuri Al-Sa'ed in 1943, and submitted to the British 
Minister in Cairo, iüchard Casey. The document was secret-
O
ly circulated among the Arab leaders. The Plan proposed 
a federation between United Syria and Iraq. It also pro­
vided a solution to the Palestine question, since Palestine
7
Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab Lea- 
gue: A Documentary Record, Vol. ÎI, (Beirut; Kiiayyais, 
Tgïï2'jV"p:"l'3.
o
Ibid., p. 9.; Also see Majid Khadduri, "The Arab 
League as a Regional Arrangement," American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 40, (October, l94bj,p. 762.
The memorandum was entitled: Istiglal Al-Arab V/a- 
V/ahdatuhum: Muthakkirah Pi Al-Qadiyyiah Al-Arabl3fylah.
See Khalil, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 9.
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was to unite with Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq.
The Great Syria and the fertile Crescent Plans
had one important point in common: the exclusion of Egypt
and the Arabian Peninsula from the North Arabian federation.
Although Al-Sa'ed's plan left it open for other Arab states
10to join, Egypt was left as secondary partner. The poli­
tics of both plans created tv/o rival blocs in the Arab 
■-vorld. This explains why the Egyptian Prime Minister, 
Mustafa Al-Nahhas, initiated the idea of the Arab League 
to eclipse the Hashemite bloc v/hile insuring Egyptian 
dominance in the proposed Organization.^^ Thus the found­
ing of the League doomed Abdullah* s Great Syria and al- 
Sa'ed's Fertile Crescent Plans.
^The outcome would have placed the Jews under Arab 
rule, though given certain autonomy). The Jews would not 
have been allowed to live in other parts of the Crescent. 
Sami Hakim, Mithaq. Jn.mi "at Al-Duwal Al-Arabiyviah Wa-' A1 
Wahdah Al-.^a5iyyia!h, ÇCairo; Anglo-Egypiian Press, 1966).
had this taken place, Zionism would not have been 
able to strike roots in the Arab homeland, causing insta­
bility in the Middle East and endangering its security, 
with its implication of a dangerous super power confront­
ation.
^^Al-Sa'ed verified this point saying:
"I have assumed that these states are not 
inclined to join an Arab federation or an Arab 
•Usbah’ from the start. But if the union of Iraq 
and Syria does materialize, it may then very likely 
be that these states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Sudan) 
may in the course of time show their desire to join 
the union," Ibid., p. 10.
^^George Kirk, The Middle East in the tfar. (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1952), p7''3‘"J6lAlso Burhan Gazal 
et al., Al-Ahdaf Al-Watggiiyyiah Wa Al-Dawliyyi^ Li Jami- 
'at Al-Duwal Al-Arabiyyiah, (Dsunasous: The Hashimiyyiah 
I^ ess,- 19î?'3T;"pT TF. --
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■<7ith unrelenting insistence, Abdullah pursued his
Flan. On Llay 18, 1943, he sent a message to the British
Government urging their support for the establishment of a
Syrian unity within its natural boundaries. He based his
drive on natural and legal rights. He said:
I wish to inform the British Government that 
my position is not dependent only on being the 
heir of the Arab Revolt and the trustee for its 
national principles, but also as head of an in­
dependent Syrian regional state. I emphasise that 
the Syrian unity is an essential principle of the 
Arab unity idea as well as a basic national demand.12
Sensing British coolness toward the project, Abdullah 
decided to take the i n i t i a t i v e . O n  April 8, 1943, he 
addressed a message to the Syrian people in which he al­
layed their fears about the monarchial form of government 
and urged for a complete union based on the ideas of the 
Arab Revolt.14
Abdullah Renews His Campaign 
When Free France promised independence to Lebanon
^^Sha’ar, op. cit.. (4th ed.), p. 23.
^^Musa, op. cit.. p. 441: Also Mohammad Izzat 
Darwazah, Hawla Al-Qawmiyyiah Al-Arabiyyiah. Vol. I,
pp. 90.     —
Commenting on i.-ritain's attitude toward Arab unity, 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Jamali said:
"The bare fact is that the Western powers 
never wanted to support Arab unity, for it was the 
West that divided the Arab homeland for imperial­
istic interests. Therefore, the West prefers to 
keep the Arab land divided for the benefit of its 
child, Israel," Fadil Al-Jamali, Thikrayat Wa- 
Ibar, (Beirut; Modem Book Company), 2nd ed., l9o5, p. l82.
^^Sha'ar, op. oit., p. 216.
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Syria in July, 1943, Abdullah took the opportunity and
addressed a manifesto to the people of Syria in which he
urged them to unite according to the decision of the Syrian
Congress of 1920, He said:
The First World War resulted in the inde­
pendence of Iraq., Hijaz and Yaman, Only the Syrian 
regions remained disunited and in disagreement. 
Syria, with its natural boundaries is one father­
land united by bonds of nationalism, geography and 
history, . . , If foreign interests have led to 
disunity and dismemberment of Syria, the principles 
of international justice, the right to a natural 
life and the promises of the Allies to the Syrians 
in particular and the Arabs in general, should 
certainly prevent the disruption of our own true 
home, our one fatherland and our one family.
Now the trend is to found some sort of unity 
between the Arab countries. , , 15
This address coincided with the elections in Syria, His
objective was to influence the electorate to pressure their
politicians to support the idea and pave the way for a
^^Suriyya Al-Kubra: Al- Kitab Al-Abyad Al-Urduni, 
(Amman, 194Vj, pp. 75-7?.
Shortly before the outbreak of VAVII, France con­
templated the establishment of monarchy in Syria, In view 
of Abdullah's compromising approach to the Palestine prob­
lem, his alliance with Britain, as well as his good beha­
vior since the establishment or of Transjordan, he appeared 
to become the king of Syria, New York Times, July 30, 1939. 
However, the coming of the War and the opposition of Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt, and the disapproval of Iraq.- which desired 
to install Amir Abdùl-Ilah in Damascus, forced the abandon­
ment of the plan. New York Times. August 7,' 1939.
The Plan was envisioned by Gabriel Puaux, the High 
Commissioner in Syria, He wrote:
"Y/hat I had to propose to the French Govern­
ment was to amend the Franco-Syrian treaty. . . .
A treaty with a king would offer the best chances 
for stability. , , , But could the French Republic 
create kings? I would not have dared to present 
such a plan to a man like Poincare, but to Daladier 
I had the audacity to submit it. He listened to
me attentively,, . , , However, the idea of in-
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convention to be held in Amnan. The appeal, however, did 
not succeed since the dominant National Bloc opposed it 
firmly. Even Iraq objected because the plan would endanger 
the Fertile Orescent idea which she championed. Iraq,.also 
urged Abdullah to desist from his attempts to seize the 
Syrian throne for that would antagonize the Syrian national­
ists and the Saudi-Egyptian camp,^^
But to Abdullah, his claims were real, and his 
drive to achieve this goal seemed limitless. He based 
his claim on the following considerations,
1, His legally established right to the 
Transjordan Amirate which is an important section 
of the Greater Syria.
2, His effective assistance to the Allies 
during the Second V/ or Id War, , ,
3, His being the first heir to the rights
of his father, Xing Husayn I, to watch over
Syrian interests in particular and Arabrights in
general,
4, A promise given him in 1921 by Churchill 
that he would be the head of the Syrian State, • •
5, The desire of the Syrians for a con­
stitutional monarchy in the event of Syrian unity
stituting a Syrian monarchy seemed to startle 
everybody," Gabriel Puaux, Deux Anne*es au 
Levant, Souvenirs de Syrie et du Liban, 19:^9-40, (.Paris:
n r p . ' v m s j , "  pp’. 40-41:  ----------------
The plan centered on a son of Ibn Saud, not Abdul­
lah, Both Prance and the Saudis had identical goals. The 
Saudis always objected to a strong Hashemite state which 
might attempt to reconquer the Hijaz, The French wished 
to prevent the British or their allies, the Hashemies, 
from growing strong in which case French influence in the 
region would be limited. Furthermore, it should be recal­
led that Abdullah had planned to attack the French in an 
attempt to restore Faysal's throne in Damascus,
^^George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World 
Affairs, (Ithaca, N.Y,; Cornell University Press, 1956),
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or a federation of the Arab countries, being 
realized. 17
According to Abdullah's plan, the united Syrian
state would encompass Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and
Lebanon, under a constitutional monarchy, under his rule.
To that effect, he communicated with Paris El-Khouri,
a prominent Syrian statesman known for his support for
the Hashemites. He emphasized that the purpose of unity
was a national duty rather than a personal ambition:
The Syrian situation is a national question 
and not a personal one. It concerns the Syrian 
group of countries alone. . . . Here I want to 
express my regret that some people believe that 
I am working for myself. This is not true. Per­
sons like yourself know that. . . . Pree Prance 
has promised the country its independence and its 
sovereignty . . . .  When this was proclaimed, 
Transjordan expressed its desire to be annexed 
to Syria or to annex Syria to it. I approved 
this for the sake of unity and the security of 
the homeland. I don't know what the future form 
of government will be, whether it will be a 
republic or monarch!al, and this is a sacrifice 
on my part. 18
The correspondence with Khouri revealed that the
aim of the Syrian National Bloc was the maintenance of
the republican regime, owing to their underlying fear of
Abdullah's personal ambitions and British infleunce in 
IQTransjordan.  ^ Thus, his overtures were viewed with dis-
^^King Abdullah, Memoirs. (New York: Philosophi­
cal library, 1950), p. 263; Also Khalil, op, cit.. Vol. 
II, pp. 13-14.
1ft
Sha'ar, op. cit.. p. 223.
IQAccording to the Anglo-Jordan Treaty, Trans­
jordan before its independence in 1946, was not allowed
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favor, since the ruling aristocracy tended to support a
republican Syria within its mandate frontiers, for upon
20it rested their economic and political power.
Abdullah Defies the League States 
In a memorandum to his Prime Minister, Abul-Huda, 
Abdullah, on August 24, 1943, stressed that while Trans­
jordan wholeheartedly supported all efforts for a com-
prenensive Arab unity, no strong unity could be attained
21unless the Syrian region was united. During the talks 
for the formation of the Arab league, Abul-Huda contin­
ued to participate in the discussions with the understand-
22ing that it would lead to the unification of Great Syria.
On October 4, 1944, only three days before the signing of 
the League’s Protocol, Abul-Huda suggested to the Council 
that Syria and Transjordan be given the opportunity to
to conduct foreign relations. Consequently, if Syrian 
unity were to become a reality, Britain’s influence would 
have been inevitable. Hakim, op. cit.. p.
20George Kirk, "Cross Currents Within the Arab 
League," World Today. (January, 1948), p. 17.
21
Sha'ar, op. cit., p.211; Also Khalil, op. cit..
Vol. II, p, 17.
Emphasizing his right to the Great Syria which he 
made his ultimate objective, Abdullah declared, ". . . 1  
say today, as I have always said, that any policy which 
does not include the ultimate union of north and south 
Syria is sterile. . . . "  Oriente Moderno, (September, 1939)# 
p. 504. “
22
New York Times, September 17, 1944. For the dis­
cussion between Al-^ahhas and Abul-Huda on this issue, see 
Al-Hayat. (Beirut), April 1, I960.
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negotiate the Syrian unity before joining the League, 
iVhile Jamil Ivlardam advanced an alternative solution, that 
Transjordan be returned to Syria, he reminded Abul-Huda
27
that the Anglo-Jordan treaty would preclude such unity.
To Abdullah, this meant that Abdullah would not become the 
head of the union. This created a deadlock and forced 
Abdullah to postpone the project,
Reaction in Syria and Lebanon 
when Jordan secured its independence in 1946, 
Abdullah embarked on an active campaign to realize his 
ambition. In his speech from the throne on November 11, 
1946, he formally proclaimed that the Great Syria Plan
2swas the principle objective of Jordan's foreign policy. 
Moreover, he envisioned a larger Arab unity revolving 
around Jordan: ". . . I offer my throne as a rallying point 
for that federation.
^^Æusa, op. cit.. p. 445.
^%ajid Khaddouri, "Fertile Crescent Unity," The 
t f ‘
Eâi 
25,
Near Eas and the Great Powers, ed, R.N, Frye, (0am- 
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 143.
Seale, op. cit., p; 13.
On Novemher 19, 1946, Jordan's Foreign Minister, 
Mohamad Al-Shurayqi, said in parliament:
"The Jordan policy will continue to consider 
the Syrian general unity as the basic and the prin­
ciple goal of its program."
See Khalil, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 27.
^^New York Times, May 26, 1946; Palestine Post,
May 26, 19W.-----------  --------------
To a German interviewer, Abdullah revealed his 
passion for Arab unity as he said, " I am convinced that
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At the same time of his independence, Abdullah
stated to the Egyptian periodical, Akhir Sa*ah, that he
would continue to fight for the creation of Great Syria
and added, "my demand for Great Syria is as natural ad
Egypt's desire for unity of the Nile V a l l e y . S i n c e
to Abdullah partitioning and disunity were unnatural, he
was determined to unite the Syrian provinces.
My father fought neither for the indepen­
dence of Lebanon, nor for that of Syirla, nor 
that of Transjordan; . . . .  My policy is clear;
I want a state which includes Syria, Transjordan, 
Palestine and Lebanon. Yes, Lebanon....... 28
Such statements were met with hostility in both Syria and
Lebanon. It is significant to recognize that splitting
the Hashemites between Amman and Baghdad contributed to
their ineffectiveness in dealing with the Syrians. Thus
the Damascus leadership would inq.uire why Amman and Bagh-
29dad did not unite first before coming to bother them.
Lebanon was always concerned about its independence 
hence suspicious of Abdullah's ambitions. On November 13,
1945, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, Hameed Paranjiyiah, 
declared his country's position regarding the Great Syria 
Plan. He said:
one day an Arab Bismarck will come who will unite these 
countries. . ." Geislher Wirsing, Englander. Juden und 
Araber in Palastina, (Jena: Diedericks, 193b), p. 235».
^^Les Cahiers. Vol. 5, p. 16.
^^{ullu Shay' (Beirut), March 28, 1947.
^^Vatikiotis, op. cit.. p. 14.; Seale, op. cit.. p. 14.
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In our view, this question does not exist.
The Lebanese government has repeatedly announced 
its deprecation of such an idea. . . . The policy 
of Lebanon is clear. , . . Lebanon enjoys her in­
dependence and sovereignty within her present boun­
daries. She has joined the Arab League on this 
basis and will accept no alternative to this policy.
Lebanese President Bishara Al-Khouri, declared his
country's position on the controversial issue, on November
26, 1946;
The Great Syria project has become a chronic 
issue. Prom time to time the government of Trans­
jordan steps it up, this producing a counter ac­
tion in Syria and Lebanon. Some people think that 
Lebanon is not included in the project. They won­
der why the Lebanese government objects to it.
Quite contrary to what is thought, every change in 
the status quo in the Arab countries weakens Leban­
on's^posîTi on. Moreover, in the event of realizing 
the project, Transjordan desires, as a first step, 
the reconsideration of the Lebanese boundaries.
The second step is that of rounding up the states 
of the Fertile Crescent. It suffices to point out 
to those who do not see any danger to Lebanon from 
this project what is mentioned in the statement of 
the Foreign Minister of Transjordan in November of 
1946. The statement maintained that 'Lebanon con­
trolled some regions and areas which were compelled 
to join it and accept a particular form of govern­
ment. ' 31
However, owing to vehement objection of Syria and 
Lebanon, and the threat by the latter to withdraw from the 
League, a consequence which Abdullah was not prepared to 
take the responsibility for, he declared that Lebanon would 
not be included in Great Syria. In November, 1946, he re­
stated his position;
^^Khalil, Vol. II, p. 21.
^^Bishara Al-Khouri, Haaa'iq Lubnaniyyiah. (Beirut; 
Awraq Lubnaniyyiah, I960), Vol. II, ppZ 2bV-77.
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. . . Nothing will prevent my ascent to the 
throne of Damascus, . . .  I have received formal 
and definite promises on that subject; my Greater 
Syria does not include the Lebanon. I have all in­
tentions to respect the independence and sovereignty 
of that country. The opposition against my project 
is not justified. . . .  32
Abdullah added that he was not seeking a new throne 
nor wider possessions, but emphasized his right to the 
Syrian crown. He stated;
I shall never cease ray efforts to achieve the 
unity of Syria. . . . But . . .  I am not seeking a 
new throne for myself, nor have I any personal de­
sire for another crown. . . .  33
Determined to bring about the Syrian unity, Abdullah 
took issue with the League. In August of 1947, he stressed 
that the League's covenant aimed at preserving the status 
quo and thus obstructing his project, particularly since 
the League was a major instrument in the hands of Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia, his major opponents.Accordingly, he pro-
^^Les Cahiers. Vol. VII, p. 317.
Jamali relaiies that relations between Shuri Al- 
Quwwatli and King Abdullah were strained over the Great 
Syria plan since Quwwatli was president of Syria. Jamali 
carried a message from the Egyptian ambassador in Baghdad 
since he was to visit Egypt. The message advised Parouk 
that the U.N. partition plan was very bad for the Arabs 
who should unite to avert a possible tragedy. "Ask King 
Parouk to assure King Abdullah that he will be the King of 
Palestine after uniting it with Transjordan, and Abdullah 
in return will abandon the Great Syria Plan." Jamali, op. 
cit.. p. 31.
^^Middle East Opinion. December 2, 1946, p. 12.
Seale wrote thax Abdullah had enlisted the aid of 
the Druze in his plan. They live in the region bordering 
Jordan, and are traditionally resistant to rule from Damas­
cus, Seale, op. cit.. p. 123.
^^Sha'ar, op. cit.. p. 275.
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posed the convening of a conference of the heads of the 
Arab ooitntries of North Arabia to meet in Amman on January 
4, 1948. By excluding Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Abdullah 
assumed that he could be more successful once discussions 
were l o c a l i z e d . H e  sent his Foreign Minister to deliver 
the invitation personally to the presidents of Syria and 
Lebanon.Accordingly, Abdullah proposed that the confer­
ence should deal with the following questions:
1. To arrive at a decision regarding Syrian unity.
2. To consider Syrian unity as a question that con­
cerns the states in the Syrian region alone and 
which will be arrived at according to the de­
sires of the Syrian people who are related to 
this issue geographically, historically, and 
nationally. . . .
4. To determine the position of Palestine with re­
spect to the Syrian unity in order to stop Jew­
ish immigration.
5. To call a federal convention to write a consti­
tution for the union.
6. As soon as the state of Great Syria is established 
it will be followed by the formation of the Fer­
tile Crescent in fulfillment of the ideas of the 
Great Arab Revolt. 37
Syria and Lebanon vehement objected to Abdullah's 
intrus!on in their internal affairs and to his violation of 
their national sovereignties.^® For this reason, on August
^^Shwadran, op. cit.. p. 239. Also World Today.
Vol. IV, No. 1, (January, 1948), p. 21.
^®Shwadran, op. cit.. p. 239.
^^Musa, op. cit.. p. 444. Also George Kirk, "Cross 
Currents within tne Arab League," world Today, (January,
1948), p. 21. ^
^®When he visited Turkey in 1947, Abdullah soli­
cited Turkey's support for his Great Syria Plan, and in
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27, 1947, the presidents of the two coimtries met in Beirut 
and declared their hostility to "every idea that aimed to 
change the status quo and the republican form of government
•30
in both Syrian and Lebanese countries,
The Jordan project was rejected, especially by the 
Maronite Christians, who demanded that Lebanon's independ­
ence be respected. Maronite Patriarch Anton Aridah declared 
his opposition to any unity plan and demanded that Lebanon's 
independence be guaranteed by the Great Powers,Lebanese  
Prime Bîinister Riyad Al-Sulh added, "Friendly cooperation 
between the Christians and Muslims in Syria and Lebanon was 
more valuable than building an empire.
The Maronites objected because they feared the loss 
of their sovereignty and their republican regime. Unity 
was viewed as a threat to their political power and privi­
leges. On February 12, 1947, Lebanon's Foreign Minister 
Henry Far'oun said in the Parliament that such a project 
encroaches on the independence and sovereignty of the Arab
return he would support Turkey's viewpoint on the Alexan­
dre tta question which has been a source of tension between 
Turkey and Syria. This meddling in Syrian internal affairs 
detracted from Abdullah's popularity in Syria. Middle East 
Opinion. January 20, 1947, p. 6.
^^Bishara Al-Khouri, op. cit.. p. 140,
^Sîicola Ziadah, Syria and Lebanon. (New York: 
Praeger, 1957), p. 95.
^^Frye, op, cit.. p. 144.
Christians and Muslim ruling families did not desire 
to see their authority pass to Damascus. See George Kirk, 
"Cross Currents . , ,", p. 17.
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League states. The Parliament also suggested that a com­
plaint against Jordan be filed with the League and the U.N.^^ 
Lebanon further warned that if Transjordan continued to 
raise the issue it would withdraw from the League,
Between 1945 and 1952, Lebanon's foreign policy 
towards the Arab states revolved essentially around the 
policies of Transjordan and Iraq. The basic question was 
that, despite the formation of the Arab League, the Hashe­
mite attempts to implement a North Arabian Federation was 
not halted, Lebanon's alignment with Syria was dictated 
by their mutual interest to safeguard their positions in 
relation to the inter-Arab rivalry between Iraq and Jordan 
on the one hand, Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the other. How­
ever, while Syria would enter into unity schemes with a re­
publican rule, the foreign policy of Lebanon was character­
ized by a reluctance to enter into formal political align­
ments,
Syria's position was that it did not wish a monar-
chial regime. This official stand was stated by Foreign
Minister Khalid El-Azm;
From the beginning of the Arab national move­
ment, Syria has always striven hard to achieve unity 
of the Arab countries, . . • Syria made many sacri­
fices for her freedom until finally she achieved her 
independence and sovereignty, , , ,
Syria, accordingly, has no desire to join a 
union which would encroach upon the attributes and 
rights enjoyed by other sovereign states, nor would
^^Lebanon, Parliamentary Debates, February 12,
1947, p, 387, ------- ---- ---------
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she accept a constitutional system, which is con­
trary to her republican regime, as was framed by 
her constitutional assembly twenty years ago, and 
which she is still interested in maintaining. 43
In Syria, President Al-Quwwatli after his election 
in July, 1947, openly attacked Abdullah and declared, "If 
Transjordan really wants unity, let her people join the 
mother country, Syria, as a free r e p u b l i c . T h i s  decla­
ration marked a shift in Abdullah.'s approach; if a union 
between Syria and the Hashemites were to materialize, it 
should be v/ith Iraq.^^
These efforts, however, did not hold Abdullah, who 
at the end of September, 1947, issued another statement ex­
pressing his intentions, that he was working actively for 
the Plan.^^ This alarmed the Syrian Parliament which held 
a special session on September 29, 1947, and issued a warn­
ing to Abdullah to discontinue his efforts.
At the League Council in Beirut in October, 1947,
^^Frye, op. cit.. p. 147.
"^tcbid.. p. 150.
^%irk, "Cross Currents . . . ", p. 25.
^^The British opposition on this issue was voiced 
in the House of Commons by Foreign Secretary McNeil who 
officially denied British encouragement on the grounds that 
the Great Syria controversy was an internal Arab problem, 
and that Britain could take no position on the question for 
its only interest in the area was the preservation of peace 
and stability in the Arab countries. Great Britain, Parlia­
mentary Debates. Commons, Ser. V. Vol. 4OO, Col. 9.
^'^Musa, op. cit.. p. 440. Also Shwadran, op. cit..
p. 239.
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Abuullah's %)rojoot faced great opposition. He then was 
persuaded to announce on October 14, "that he would refrain 
froiL pressing for the Great Syria Plan until the Palestine 
problem was s o l v e d . P a c e d  with the opposition of all 
the Arab states, Abdullah decided to act unilaterally. To 
that end, he approached the Palestine problem on a personal 
basis. This policy dictated reaching some sort of accommo­
dation with the Zionists which culminated in the secret 
negotiations and the ill-famed Rhodes Agreement. The ten­
sion in Jordan's relations with the Arab states finally re­
sulted in the annexation of East Palestine on April 24, 
1950, as a temporary substitute for a larger Great Syria. 
Abdullah's strategy was by winning Arab Palestine, Syrian 
monarchists would be encouraged in their support and agi­
tation for his plan.
The Great Syria Plan and the Syrian Coup D'etat 
The main obstacle to Abdullah's ambition was the 
Syrian National Bloc led by Al-Quwwatli. However, on harch 
30, 1949, the national bloc lost power to the military as 
Colonel Husni Al-Za'im was successful in executing a coup 
d'etat which v/as backed by the army and the nationalist re­
formist elements, such as the People's Party, v/hich had 
been formed in 1948 to promote Syria-Iraq u n i t y . Z a ' i m
Shwadran, op. cit.
/ Q
After the Syrian coup, in order to show magnani­
mity Abdullah extended an invitation to President wwwatli
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was primarily concerned v/ith the se carl ty of Syria against
Israel. An announcement of a Syria-Iraqi agreement would
50strengthen Syria's hand at the Rhodes Armistice talks.
L.oreover, since Syria was militarily weak, its union with
Iraq, would have given her substantial support particularly
against Israel. Za'im and his army officers favored a
51quick union with Iraq. Nuri proceeded with caution and 
demanded that Syria clarify her foreign policy. The Hashe­
mites had thought that the coup by Za'im and his flirtation
with Iraq were, in effect, paving the way for their ambi- 
52tious plan.
Anxious for an economic alliance with the Arab 
states especially Iraq and Jordan, Za'im "welcomed federa­
tion as long as the Hashemite King (Abdullah) does not
to come to Amman where he could form a government in exile. 
Sha'ar, op. cit., p. 277.
l'or candid American complicity in the Za'im coup, 
see Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations. (Kev/ York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1969;, p. 50 ff.
50Seale, op. cit.. p. 47.
^^V/hile Egypt withheld its recognition of Za'im's 
regime, in view of his pro-Hashemite policy regarding Great 
Syria, Turkey was happy about Za'im's statement and indi­
cated that it would recognize his regime. London Times. 
April 13, 1949.
^^Although Britain was not publicly promoting unity 
plans to avoid antagonizing the French, the Saudis and the 
Egyptians, they probably would have liked to see the plan 
materialize. A British diplomat comments:
"Arab unity is like a train. V/e shall neither 
try to push it or stop it, but if we see it gather­
ing speed, we might even jump on board," Seale, 
op. cit.. p. 82.
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become supreme r u l e r . H o w e v e r ,  Za'm's personal con­
tacts with the French during his visit to Cairo changed
his policy and ended, for the time being, any chances for
understanding v/ith the Hashemites.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in contrast to Iraq, and 
Jordan, were ready to satisfy Al-Za'm's request for re­
cognition and economic aid.^^ France, meanwhile, promised 
military assistance. Encouraged by his accomplisliments, 
Za'im declared;
My journey to Cairo was an unpleasant sur­
prise to Jordan. The lords of Bagdad and Amman 
believed that I was about to offer them the crown
of Syria on a silver platter, but they were dis­
appointed. The Syrian Republic wants neither 
Great Syria nor Fertile Crescent. We will pit our 
forces againt these two projects of foreign in-? 
spiration. To counter the military measures taken 
by the Amman Government, we have concentrated our 
forces at the frontier, and have decided that all 
persons entering into contact with the government 
of Jordan or traveling to that country will be 
charged before a military court for the crime of 
high treason and will be senteneed to death. We 
have decided to call up new draft of 20,000 men.
We are awaiting the immediate arrival of large 
quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment of 
all kinds. Our army will soon be second only to 
that of Turkey in the Middle East. Our airforce 
will surpass the Israel and Turkish airforces 
combined. We will tolerate no threat or pressure, 
whether it came from Iraq, Jordan or any other 
country. . . .  As for Jordan, which is and remains 
a Syrian province, she will sooner or later re­
join her mother country and become the tenth Muha- 
Fazah ^^District 7of the Syrian Republic. It must 
not be thought %iat certain foreign powers sup­
port the projects of Great Syria or Fertile Cresc­
ent: we have assurances that Great Britain is for
^^London Times. April 8, 1949.
^^Ziadah, op. cit.. pp. 99-109.
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the statue quo and that the United States and 
France would never accept any change in the sit­
uation. 55
This shift in policy drew upon Za'm the hostility 
of pro-Abdullah elements who were working secretly for the 
creation of a Syria-Iraq-Jordan bloc. Meanwhile, Jordan 
and Iraq radio and press renewed their attacks on Za'm's 
regime. In order to enforce Za'm's position vis a viz the 
Hashemites, King Ibn Saud threatened on June 16, 1949 that 
he and King Parouk "will not remain with arms folded in the 
face of attack on Syria,
Most sources agree that the Hashemites, displeased 
with Za'm's attitude towards them, and with his pro- Saudi- 
Egyptian policy, "wished to see established in Damascus a 
government more friendly to them, were ready to pay to 
bring him d o w n . T h u s ,  on August14, 1949, Colonel Sami 
Hinnawi overthrew the Za'm's regime in the second coup of 
the year.
With Hinnawi, the People's Party which advocated 
Iraqi-Syrian unity, came to power. In its meeting on 
December 12, the Syrian Parliament gave high priority to 
the question of union with Iraq, and declared it a basic 
constitutional goal. By uniting Jordan with the Syria-Iraq
Journal D 'Egypte.(Cairo), April 27, 1949, quoted 
in Seale, op. cit.. p. 57.
^^Ibid., June 19, 1949.
Seale, op. cit., p. 73. Also At-Tall, op. cit.. 
p. 589 re a conspiracy to overthrow Abdullah.
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federation, the Fertile Crescent would emerge under the 
Hashemites. It looked as if Damascus would have to re­
nounce the republican regime if the scheme were to become 
a i*eality. Although the Syrian parliament declared itself 
"favorable to the attachment of Syria to Iraq and Jordan," 
the plan was abandoned. This was a measure to save the 
League from dissolution or the withdrawal of Saudi Arabia, 
or creation of two hostile blocs in the Arab world.
With Hinnawi in power, unity seemed imminent. How­
ever, the opposition in Syria rallied the army under the 
leadersliip of Colonel Adib Al-Shieshakli, who executed the 
third coup on December 19, 1949. The new regime announced 
that the coup was justified because the;
Syrian army had proof that Hinnawi. • . was pre­
paring a union with a nei^boring state. . . . The
Syrian army faithful to the republican constitu­
tion, is resolved that the regime shall be retained.61
Under the influence of the anti-Hashemite elements, 
Shieshakli visited Cairo and Riyadh and concluding commer­
cial agreements, thereby committing Syria to the anti- Hash-
6?
emits camp, and causing unity plans to lapse.
^^While on a state visit to London, only four days 
after the pro-Hashemite coup, Abdullah stated that Great 
Syria "is a natural necessity. . . .  It will be governed 
by the Hashemites." New York Times, August, 1949.
59Dennis Weaver, Arabian Destiny. (Fair Lawn,N.J.: 
Essential Books, Inc., 1956;, p. Zbl.
60lbid.. p. 262.
^llbid.. p. 264.
62 A six million dollar interest-free loan from
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Observers agree that king Abdullah was a states­
man, a good political strategist, but was a poor tactician. 
The latter trait was manifested in his failure to persuade 
Arab public opinion of the merits of his plans. Realizing 
the insurmountable obstacles in swaying the Syrians to 
agree to his program, Abdullah, as a last resort. Invited 
Nazin Al-Qudsi, the Syrian Prime Minister, to Amman. The 
purpose of the visit was "to remove the causes of mis­
understanding between Jordan and Syria, and to establish 
diplomatic representation."^^ In a final attempt to reach 
an agreement with Syria on the issue of union, even a sym­
bolic one which would serve as fulfilment of his obsession, 
he declared that he would accept a republican regime as 
a price for unity. In his portrayal of magnanimity, he
added," you are free to choose a republic which I will
65accept or the monarchy which I shall not oppose."
Saudi Arabia, and a five million pound loan from Egypt as 
the price for underwriting Syrien independence. See Seale, 
op. cit.. p* 92.
^^Glubb, Soldier With the Arabs. op. cit.« p. 217.
As a poor tactician, Abdullah made tke Arabs sus­
picious of his intentions. As a strategist, while for 
immediate personal ends, his plans may have been crucial 
to Arab unity. He would make a move only if favorable 
conditions prevailed. He once said, " Politics is like 
chess. You cannot rush your pawns across enemy territory, 
but you must seek favorable openings." London Times. Feb­
ruary 6, 1948.
64Sha'ar, op. cit.. p. 271.
^ ^Mustafa Khar sa, Muthakkarat Al-Malik Abdullah. 
(Beirut: AUSfiaktaba Al-Asrivlahc lybOj. p. 2obi Musa, op. 
cit.. p. 447.
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With the removal of Hinnawi, the Hashemites feared 
that their Great Syria project was lost forever. This fear 
was verified as the Shieshakli Government declared:
The new Syrian Government is resolved to op­
pose by all possible means the fusion of Syria and 
Iraq, and the realization of the projects of the 
Fertile Crescent. . . .  We will never consent to 
be placed under the tutelage of a Hashemite sover­
eign. 66
Despite the difficulties he encountered, Abdullah 
never gave up the idea for Arab unity with Great Syria as 
its center. Shortly before his assassination he declared, 
"All my life I have fought for true Arab unity. I shall 
never give up the struggle until my death." However, 
the assassination of Riyad Al-8ulh, the Prime Minister of 
Lebanon on July 16, 1951, in Amman while visiting Abdull^, 
which was follov/ed by the assassination of the king in Jeru­
salem on July 20, ended for all practical purposes the pro­
ject of Great Syria, and the career of a colorful Arab 
ruler.
Conclusion
Jordan's relations with Syria during Abdullah's
^^Weaver, op. cit.. p. 268, also Le Monde, Febru­
ary 23, 1954.
London Times, July 21, 1951.
^^Eversince 1957, the Syrians attributed to Husayn 
the desire and intention to realize his grandfather's am­
bitions of annexing Syria, Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 162; 
also Hashim Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, (ïfew York: 
Pegasus, 1969), pp. 6b-b7.
258
rule were based on the King's personal aspirations and in­
dividualistic policy objectives. The Great Syria idea 
held a prominent place in plans for Arab unity as was de­
clared to be the major foreign policy objective of Trans­
jordan.
Insisting that Transjordan was the nucleus for his 
projected united Syria, Abdullah pursued his ambition by 
urging Britain and the Syrian royalists to accomplish this 
goal: "my policy is clear. 1 want a state which includes 
Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and Lebanon."
Abdullah's foreign policy was unmistakably dictated 
by personal and dynastic aspirations. While Arab national 
interest appeared to be a secondary objective, speaking in 
the first singular, he conveyed this fact, while insisting 
that what v/as good for him had to be good for the Arabs in 
general and the Jordanians in particular. However, his 
success in building a Hashemite empire was obstructed by 
a complicated external setting. His plan was thwarted by 
the determination of Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Saudi Ara­
bia. Added to that was French opposition and Britain's 
half-hearted support. Preferring a Republican to a monar - 
chial form of government, and insisting that unviable Jor­
dan should be annexed to Syria to preclude foreign influ­
ence, the Syrian leadership placed an insurmountable ob­
stacle before the King's plan. Although Abdullah devoted 
his life to the realization of this personal goal, his
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death in 1951, ended a chapter of Jordan’s personalized 
foreign policy.
CHAPTER XL 
JORDAN-IRAQI RELATIONS
Introduction
In the San Remo Conference of April, 1920, the 
peace makers drew lines on maps that formed the basis of 
Iraq, and Jordan. These two territories were sliced from 
the defunct Ottoman Empire and entrusted to Britain as 
mandatory power under the League of Nations, While v/est- 
ern diplomats were sharing spheres of influence in the Arab 
homeland, the Arabs started setting up kingdoms, by par­
celling the Arab territories, the Western diplomats had 
Balkanized instead of stabilizing the region, thus, contrib­
uting to the present instability in the Middle East.^
While it may be argued that many states in the Pertile Cres­
cent were artificial creation of the European powers who
came to control the area at the end of V/orld War I, Trans-
2
jordan, perhaps, was the most artificial of them all,
^Philip Ireland, The Near East, (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1942). This book explains the rea­
sons why Western Powers concluded that mandates and frag­
mentation were best for the Arabs.
Also see Anis Sayigh, Al-Hashimiyoun V/a Al-Thawrah 
Al-Arabiyiah Al-Kubra, (Beirut: Modern Press, 1966).
2
Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 7.
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As a political force in North Arabia, the Hashem­
ite rulers never enjoyed a strong political base, since 
they were regarded as "imported" kings, imposed by Britain 
and functioned under her close direction.^ Recognizing 
their status among the Arabs, eager to restore Arab glory 
under their banner, and aware of their formidable rivals- 
the Egyptian-Saudi bloc- it seemed logical that the rulers 
of Iraq and Transjordan should consolidate their front in 
alliance or union.
Early Alliances
After 1941, the two Hashemite rulers of Iiraq and 
Transjordan established closer relations and consulted 
each other on matters of foreign affairs and other issues 
of mutual interest.^ Their representatives held identi­
cal viewpoints during the formation of the Arab League* 
later, both rulers established relations and entered into 
treaties v/ith Turkey.
In 1945, continued cordial relations inspired them 
to discuss the possibility of uniting their countries. In 
order to coordinate political strategy, Amir Abdullah sent
^"A Study in Contrast: Turbulent Iraq and Jordan," 
Y/all Street Journal. Vol. 152, July 29, 1958, p. 10.
Un-til 1924, the Hashemites were rulers in the Hijaz, 
the western region of present Saudi Arabia. The conquest 
of that territory by Ibn Saud placed the Hashemites at the 
mercy of Britain which had promised them an Arab Kingdom.
^îajid Khaddouri, Independent Iraq.(London: Oxford 
University Press, I960), p. 343.
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his son Crown Prince Talal to discuss the salient points 
of Abdullah's unification plans. On February 4, 1945, the 
Regent of Iraq Abdul-Ilah, and Prime Minister Nuri Al-Sa^ed 
met with Amir Abdullah at Shunah, his winter Palace. The 
British High Commissioner was also invited. An agreement 
was reached on establishing some sort of union with the 
knowledge and encouragement of Britain.^ Amir Abdullah was 
reported to have declared:
I believe that when a union between Iraq 
and Transjordan is realized, other Arab countries 
will follow their example. . . .  I am still work­
ing for Syrian unity. 7
With this statement, Abdullah served notice that he had
not abandoned his ambition to become the ruler of a large
Arab state without Iraq.
In his speech from the throne dealing with Arab
unity, he informed the Parliament of the proposed unity
with Iraq, and expressed hope that the proposed Hashemite
union would serve as a prototype for future unification
agreements in the Arab world:
Please be informed, honorable Deputies, that 
we are firmly decided on a close uni^ between our­
selves and our sister, Iraq, whose aim is the coor­
dination of efforts and attitudes in the two sister 
countries. The door is not closed between the 
states of the Arab League and ourselves for any 
confederal cooperation, brotherly, pact, or feder-
^Hew York Times. January 17, 1945.
^"Transjordan and Iraq, Scheme for Union," The 
Times Weekly. (September 25, 1946), p. 23.
^New York Times. February 12, 1946.
263
ation of such nature; for v/e are and shall remain, 
God willing, ready to give advice to all now and 
in the future. 8
In Iraq, however, the nationalists viewed the pro­
posed alliance as an instrument to create dissention among 
the League*3 members, and feared Transjordan's interference 
in Iraq's internal affairs in support of Abdullah's expan­
sionist policies. It was also argued that Transjordan's 
treaty with Britain might lead to indirect British inter­
ference in Iraq's internal affairs, a particularly sensitive 
area in Iraq's thinking.^
The plan for full union failed because of the ill- 
feeling and distrust which it had aroused. Although a 
treaty was finally passed by the Iraqi Parliament on Ilay 4, 
1947, by a majority of 83 to 49, with only two opposed 
while the rest abstained, the final outcome was a treaty 
of alliance and brotherhood. It was signed on May 14, and
Khalil, op. clt.. Vol. II, p. 23.
After gaining independence, it was rumoured that 
Abdullah might become the king of the Iraqi-Transjordan 
union and that King Paysal II of Iraq would become his suc­
cessor instead of Abdullah's son Talal. Talal was to be 
compensated by becoming the vice-roy of Palestine. This 
plan was said to have been approved by the British Foreign 
Office but was denied by the latter. New York Times,
March 30, 1946.
^Oriente Moderne. April, 1947, p. 186.
The new Anglo-Jordan treaty put Jordan with Britain 
"on reciprocal instead of one-sided basis." It was consis­
tent with the League's Charter by denying Britain the right 
to station its R.A.P, in any part of Jordan. It further 
provided for an Anglo-Jordanian Defense Borad with equal 
number of military representation charged with "The formu­
lation of agreed plans in the strategic interests common 
to both countries. . . . "  Keesings Archives. 1946-48, 
p. 9175.
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went in force on June 10, 1947. It provided for a ten- 
year alliance, according to which "both countries were to 
engage in joint military training and stipulated that 
neither country should become a party to a treaty with a 
third party in any matter contrary to the interests of the 
other. In case of aggression or domestic uprising in 
either country, the other should provide forces to quell 
disturbances. It further made provisions for unifying dip­
lomatic representations in certain areas.
Prelude to Union 
Undoubtedly, the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 was the 
most important event in the history of Jordan. On April 
24, 1950, King Abdullah annexed Eastern Palestine, and 
along vath the land, Jordan also received hundreds of thou­
sands of refugees who have disrupted the country economi­
cally and politically. Until then, Jordan's population 
was made up mainly of Bedouins, who remained supporters of 
the King. Later, however, the Palestinians constituted an 
entirely new force in the country. With little loyalty to 
the King, they were more active politically than the Jor­
danians. This new element was persistently looking for a 
leader to restore their usurped homes, and thus became an 
agitative force and a potential threat to the monarchy,
TO
English text in Khalil, op. cit., Vol. II, 
p. 226. Arabic text in Majali, Qissat Kuhadat^t Templer, 
In.p. ; n.d. ), p. 29. See also Transjordan Legislat'ion, 
1947, pp. 102-5.
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Successful in defying the League in his annexation 
of East Palestine as recommended by the Jericho Conference, 
Abdullah felt encouraged to revive his life-long dream, the 
Great Syria Plan. However, his personal discussions with 
Syrian Prime Minister Al-Qudsi came to no avail due to the 
objection of Syria to monarchial regime, Lebanon's refusal 
to become a part of the plan, and finally due to general 
Arab suspicion of his personal ambitions.
As all his efforts failed, Abdullah embarked on an­
other scheme in the field of foreign affairs. It was the 
proposal for union between Iraq and Jordan. It appeared 
that such a union was motivated as much by his personal am­
bitions as it was by his attempt to deal with the problem 
of succession to the Jordan throne. A week before his as­
sassination Abdullah had invited a major Arab personality, 
a Lebanese, Riyad Al-Sulh to help realize his plan. On the 
matter of Jordan-Iraqi unification, he confided to Sulh:
For some time now, Riyad Bey, I have been ab­
sorbed in the issue of the fate of Jordanian throne 
after me. I do not see in Talal or Naif a suitable 
man to mount the throne and administer the country. 
For this reason, I have been turning this subject 
over in my mind for a long time. To my mind, the 
best way to solve this problem is an agreement with 
Iraq on a unification or union of the two regions 
(al-qutrayn - Iraq and Jordan) under my crown, with 
the provision that the whole kingdom reverts after 
me to his majesty Faysal the Second. 11
^^Al-Hayat, February 18, 1958; also Nashashibi, op. 
cit.. p. 334.
Prime Minister Majali in his memoirs relates that 
Abdullah discussed with him the question of succession (be­
cause he had the premonition that his end was near) because
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Again, the Iraqi ruling circle favored a gradual 
union to he completed at the end of five years. It was to 
commence v/ith a union of the two crowns, thus preserving 
the Hashemite control over both countries. It further pro­
vided that only a descendant of the Hashemite dynasty could
12succeed to the joint throne.
ïalal's health had become hopeless. Abdullah further indi­
cated that he wished to have Husayn declared Crown Prince. 
Abdullah ended by saying;
"You are mistaken if you thought that I don't 
like Talal, but Talal is my son and the father 
wishes to see his son more successful than he is.
I realize that Talal is ill and the interest of the 
country dictates the resolution of this question 
before me. However, I do not insist on this but 
leave it to the Prime Minister. Inform him of this.
It
Majali adds that Abdullah told him that he depended on him 
to persuade the Prime Minister to implement this plan. 
Majali, Muthakkirati, p. 106.
Grallman, the biographer of Prime Minister Nuri Al- 
Sa'ed wrote that Nuri, in order to further cement the Hashe­
mite throne, wanted King Faysal II of Iraq to marry Husayn's 
sister. This plan did not succeed, as Faysal was about to 
wed a Turkish princess, but he was killed in the Iraqi coup 
on July 14, 1958. V/eldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General 
Nuri. (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1964J, p.
1 p
This plan was published in liwa Al-Istiglal. 
(Baghdad), October 4, 1951.
The well informed Egyptian paper Al-Ahram reported 
that King Abdullah had concluded and signed a three-point 
secret agreement with Abdul-Illah and Nuri, the authenti­
city of which was verified after Abdullah's assassination. 
Al-Ahram, June 6, 1952.
During his funeral in Amman, the Iraqi delegation 
invoked the question of these discussions and claimed that 
Prime r.linister Rif ai was informed as correspondence on this 
question were exchanged. Although the Iraqis were criti­
cized for their conduct - "You came not to console but to 
take Jordan" - certain discussions were conducted between 
Huda, Nuri, and Abdul-Illah. (Majali, Rluthakkirati, p. 108) 
Reference was to Regent Abdul-Illah, Prime Minister 
Nuri and Saleh Jabre. Majali told them:
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The new government, headed by Huda, appeared to 
prefer a Jordan-Iraqi union. For this reason, an Iraqi 
mission came to Amman for the purpose of bringing about 
unity.
However, following Huda's visit to Saudi Arabia, 
his thinking changed. He appeared to defend the right of 
Talal to the throne and thus preclude the union with Iraq.^^
"V/e also want unity, but unity can be com­
pleted through official discussions of the two 
countries and not in this manner. "
Majali, Muthakkirati. p. 108.
l^ihid. ,  p .  1 1 1 .
During the trials of the People's Court in Bagdad, 
Mohammad Hasan Salman, the head of the three-man mission 
disclosed on October 13» 1958, that;
"The murder of King Abdullah was considered 
as an opportunity for the realization of a union 
between Iraq and Jordan. . . .  As such a union was 
one of our national goals, I agreed to undertake 
this task. . . . We contacted our nationalist col­
leagues such as Sulayman An-Nabulsi, Hikmat Al-Misri, 
Abdullah Ar-Rimawi, Anwar Al-Khatib, Mamduh Sukhan , 
Zuhayr Darwazi, Dr. Shawayhat, Akram Zuayter and 
others. The idea of the mission was that in the 
event of the nationalist candidates' victory those 
members could be persuaded to work for union with 
Iraq." (Muhakamat Al-Sha'ab, Mahadir Jalsat Al-
Ivlahkamat Al-Askariyyiah Al-Ulya Al-Khassah, (Baghdad:
Wizarat Al-bifa'a, 1959)» iV, p. 1255-5.) See also Ann 
Dearden, op. cit., p. 96; and Majali.Muthakkirati. pp. 110- 
111.
^^vlajali, MuthakMrati. p. 111.
In a secret session of the Parliament on December 
18, 1951, (after Abdullah's death and the traditional 
change of government) Huda told the Parliament:
". . .If the proposed union aimed at the uni­
fication of defense or the army, or at any other 
practical joint action, we would have considered it 
useful and fruitful. But the written and unequivo­
cal plan is confined to the unification of the crown 
provided the army continued to receive foreign aid 
as before, and provided it preserves its present
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Foreign Policy Under Talal
On both banks of the Jordan there was a strong
feeling for the maintenance of Jordan's sovereignty under
the leadership of Talal. Talal's extreme popularity was
based on his pure nationalism and his long opposition to
15the policies of his father and to Britain. His popular­
ity was further strengthened in viev/ of the popular belief 
that his illness, which was used as a pretext for depriving 
him of the throne, was merely a fabrication staged by the 
British, and an "invention of political i n t r i g u e s . B r i ­
tain was believed to be favoring the idea of unity with 
Iraq, which meant Talal's loss of the Jordan throne. But, 
since public opinion supported Talal, Britain abandoned 
the idea.^^
In foreign affairs, Talal stressed Arab cooperation;
that Jordan was an independent state and the Jordan people
were a part of the Arab nation. He began to bring Jordan's
policy in line with Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia and away
1 ft
from Iraq and Britain. The establishment of the Arab
status and composition for another five to ten years 
after which time, the question of what may be done 
concerning the army or any other real cooperation 
in economic matters will be considered." Khalil, 
Vol. II, pp. 46-47. Also London Times. December 20, 1951.
^^Majali, Muthakkirati, p. 112.
^^Ibid.; also London Times. July 4, 1952.
^'^Abidi, op. cit.. p. 89.
18
Talal visited Saudi Arabia from 8-19 of November,
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Collective Securlty Pact in January, 1952, which Jordan 
joined, verified Talal's Arah policy.
During Talal's 340 day rule, public opinion became 
apprehensive about the poor economic conditions of the 
country, the lack of material resources, and the political 
stability of the state. Accordingly, a consensus of opin­
ion was that Jordan's present viability could not maintain 
it as a separate state for long. Although the West saw 
that Jordan's economy would inevitably be connected with 
that of Israel, the Arabs instead saw that annexation of
Jordan by any of its Arab neighbors could solve its chronic
20economic problems. Despite its shaky position, however, 
Jordan's geographical location made it of far greater im­
portance to the League and to the defense of the Mddle 
21East.^^
Pursuing a policy of Arab cooperation, Talal deemed 
it more appropriate to seek financial aid from the Arab 
states even if such dependence could lead to an economic 
union with them. Foreign aid was deprecated. At this 
point the government was urged by the Deputies to state its
1951 at the insistence of Prime IVlinister Huda. Majali, 
Muthakkirati, p. 117.
^^Musa, op. cit., p. 565.
Plans for the development of the Jordan River 
Valley, such as the Johnson Plan during the Eisenhower Ad­
ministration, were based on this idea.
Jordan and its Legion," The Economist, Vol. 59» 
No. 14, (July 15, 1950), p. 128.
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22position on the question of a Jordan-Iraqi union. To 
discourage a union with Iraq, to which he objected earlier, 
Huda, on a radio broadcast on January 12, 1952, said that 
a political unity with Iraq was primarily aimed at the uni­
fication of the crown and such a union would not alleviate
o\
economic conditions.
The interest of Irad- ruling circles to absorb Jor­
dan had not diminished. Thus, Abdul-Illah and Nuri con­
tinued their visits to Amman and to Lausanne, Switzerland, 
where Talal was hospitalized. Although these talks were 
secret, Abdul-Illah in an effort to make such a union fea­
sible insisted that a member of the Hashemite house. Prince 
Zayd (Abdullah's brother), should be appointed as head of 
the Advisory Council. However, Huda refused this demand 
on the basis that the Jordan Constitution does not allow 
it.24
A medical board concluded that Talal was suffering 
from schizophrenia. On this basis, the Parliament met in 
a secret session on August 11, 1952, whereupon Huda de­
clared Talal's son. Prince Husayn,to be the constitutional 
king. A Regency Council was appointed to rule the country 
since Husayn was not of age.
The first question to be discussed by the Council
pp
Mddle Eastern Affairs, February 3, 1952, p. 53*
2^ Ibid.
24i;iajali, Ivluthakkarati, p. 120.
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was the issue of Jordan's continued existence as a nation. 
A series of articles appeared in Palestine newspaper dis­
cussing this very issue. The authors argued that the eco­
nomic and financial capabilities of Jordan were not com­
mensurate with the great responsibilities which she inher­
ited as a result of the Palestine tragedy. Since complete 
dependence on foreign aid involved many dangers, the only 
solution to this dilemma was the establishment of a union 
betv/een Jordan and another Arab state, such as Iraq, whose 
resources would be sufficient for the needs of the union. 
Furthermore, a federation was viewed as a national neces­
sity and such a limited union would expedite a fuller Arab 
unity.
Iraq was chosen due to its abundant resources com­
pared to the other Arab countries. In addition, foreign
ties of both countries were identical and both countries
25were ruled by the same dynasty.
This proposal was met with approval by the public 
opinion of Jordan, particularly in the West Bank where it
was received with enthusiasm and support in view of their
26fear from Zionist expansionism. However, due to Huda's 
resolute opposition to any form of union with Iraq this 
idea v/as abandoned, to the displeasure of the Iraqi leader­
ship.
^^Majali, Muthakkirati, p. 123.
^^ Ibid.
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There was little, if any, sentiment in Nuri*s ap­
proach to Jordan. He viewed the country in a factual way, 
and always considered Jordan as:
. . .  an artificial political entity and inevitably 
hound to become linked in time with a neighboring 
Arab country. If Jordanians were given free choice, 
the majority would opt for union or for federation 
with Iraq. 27
Nuri was concerned about Jordan's political posi­
tion in the face of pressures from other Arab countries.
The army was unable to stabilize the internal situation and, 
at the same time, to meet Zionist aggression. Under the 
Arab Solidarity Pact of 1950 and the Jordan-Iraqi Treaty 
of 1947, Jordan had the right to call on Iraq for help in 
case of an external aggression. Further, in case of inter­
nal upheaval, Iraq also reserved the right to "free and
wider movement within Jordan, should disorder become wide- 
28spread."
Nuri always kept in mind the possibility of Iraqi 
intervention in Jordan, because he espoused the policy 
that rich and powerful Iraq was the guardian of poor, un= 
stable and weak Jordan which could at any time be swallowed 
by its neighbors. Thus, on September 20, 1956, he sent 
supplies to three points along the route to Jordan under 
the pretext that "Iraq's sole aim in anything undertaken
20
in the military field was to save Jordan from Comiaunism. "
27Gallman, op. cit., p. 137.
ZGjbid., p. 140.
29lbid.
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During the tripartite aggression on Egypt, Husayn 
proposed opening a new front froia the Jordan side against 
Israel. But the cabinet advised caution for tv/o reasons: 
one, hostilities could mean gambling with the .Vest Bank 
and the possibility of losing it; and two, under the Jordan- 
Iraq treaty, if Jordan became involved in the conflict, the 
Iraqi army would also march into J o r d a n . T h i s  the govern­
ment sought to prevent in view of the serious differences 
with Iraq's foreign policy, particularly on the question of 
union. In any event, at the invitation of Husayn, Syrian 
and Iraqi forces entered Jordan on November 3, 1956. when 
the Jordanian Prime Ilinister demanded that Iraqi troops be 
placed under the Jordan-Saudi-Syrian joint comroand, the 
government of Iraq refused and declared that its forces had 
entered Jordan at the personal request of Husayn and that 
their presence in Jordan was specifically in accordance 
with the Jordan-Iraqi Defense T r e a t y . I n  any event, 
at the insistence of the cabinet, the withdrawal of Iraqi 
troops was secured,
Husayn*s Reign
t’ajali, Kuthakkii'ati. p. 205.
An Iraqi delegation arrived in Amman to decide on 
a united military plan. According to the plan, an Iraqi 
division entered and camped in East Jordan. It was agreed 
that the Jordan General Ali Hayari would command the com­
bined forces. However, the Iraqi government refused to 
place its forces under the cormuand of the Egyptian General 
Amer who was the head of the Arab comi.'iand. Ibid., p. 206,
^^Ad-Difa'a, November 5, 1956.
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liusayn assmried his constitutional powers on Kay 2, 
1953» In his letter of commission to Prime IVjinister îwulqi, 
Husayn instructed:
■7e hope that the program of your cabinet will 
aim at strengthening the national sovereignty and 
safeguarding of the Arab rights through cooperation 
and understtmding with all Arab states. Purther, 
one of our objectives is to preserve the cordial 
relations with the allied and friendly states. 32
Although the Prime Minister agreed to abide by the 
King's wishes in developing strong bonds between Jordan 
and the Arab countries, it was clearly understood that Jor­
dan was not prepared to establish political union with the 
Arab states or to sever its traditional relationship with 
Pritain. Due to popular agitation relating to internal 
affairs and to the position of Jordan in relation to the
foreign states, particularly Israel and Britain, Kulqi re-
3 3signed and Abul-Huda was asked to form the next cabinet.
Abul-Huda's foreign policy was based on his prefer­
ence for preserving the Jordan sovereignty. To that end,
^^Musa, op. cit., p. 580.
By contrast, ÿalal's address did not include the 
term "allied" states. This indicated the course of iiis 
policies toward Britain.
•^^ The government was asked to hold meetings of the 
cabinet and the Deputies in Old Jerusalem, but the request 
was denied.
Two reasons were given for Mulqi's resignation. 
According to Al-Bina'a (Damascus) of Kiay 15, 1954, Mulqi 
had received a note from the British government directing 
that Jordan should hold meetings with the Zionists to dis­
cuss outstanding questions. Another possible reason was 
cabling a message of thanks to Andre Vyshinski by the De­
puties for supporting Jordan in the Security Council. Abidi, 
op. cit., p. 115; also Musa, op. cit., p. 595.
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he clearly rejected the idea of a larger Arab federation 
which might result in the loss of the independent status 
of Jordan.
Up to this period, Jordan had never known ideologi­
cal political parties, ihaong the newly established poli­
tical parties was the Al-Hazb Al-V/atani Al-Ishtiraki (the 
Rational Socialist Party) organized in Amman on July 7,
1954. The Party's most important objective v/as the call 
for an Arab union. The first step to be taken was to unite 
Jordan with Iraq, considering that Iraq was the only coun­
try which possessed large material capabilities, and due 
to the fact that the foreign relations of both countries 
were identical; both countries v/ere ruled by the same dy­
nasty; furthermore, the strength and training of the Iraqi 
army would supplement the Jordan army. All of these fac­
tors would improve Jordan's position vis a vis Israel.
Later on, after the abrogation of the Iraqi-British and 
Jordan-British treaties, Syria would join the union. This 
postponement v/as preferred in view of the fact that Syria 
did not have any international obligation outside the Arab 
states and that Syria should not be burdened v/ith Jordan- 
Iraq-British treaties.
Husayn'3 first effort was to build the country's
•^^Abidi, op. cit., p. 115.
^^Majali, Muthakkirati, p. 143; and Musa, op. cit..
p. 600.
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economy v/itiiout Western assistance. In September, 1953, a 
Jordanian delegation visited Saudi Arabia and Iraq to seek 
financial assistance. Influenced by the Queen I.'iother Zayn 
to develop closer relations with the wealthy Saudi family, 
Husayn met King Baud, whereupon the Irime minister of Iraq 
declared that Jordan could not be viable unless it united 
with I r a q . I r a q ' s  declaration was received unfavorably 
in Jordtin and perhaps more in the various Arab countries. 
Shieshakli, then in power in Syria, worked v/ith Saud to pre­
vent an Iraqi-Jordan union. Husayn’s cousin. King laysal II 
exerted more pressures and succeeded in pulling Jordan to 
his side, thus saving it from becoming a victim of economic 
pressures from other neighbors.
In February of 1955, during the discussions in Am­
man regarding Jordan's joining the Baghdad 1 act, an economic 
delegation from Jordan visited Iraq for the purpose of ob­
taining a loan to finance a number of developmental plans. 
The Iraqi government made one important condition for their
approval of the loan, nai/iely Jordan's joining the Turkish-
■37
Iraqi alliance, known as the Baghdad Pact. This condi­
tion was refused by the delegation on the basis that a loan 
should not be connected with any political conditions. How­
ever, the intervention of Husayn secured a loan of 1,600,000
^^Shwadran, op. cit., p. 213.
'^^ iVIajali, Muthakkirati, p. 167.
dinars.
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Motives For The Jordan-Iragi Union
On February 1, 1958, Presidents Oamal Abdel Nasser 
of Egi'pt and Shukri Al-Quwwatli of Syria, signed a oominu- 
niq.ue announcing the formation of the United Arab Republic• 
It was the first political union between two Arab states 
in modern times.
The U.A.R, was a peculiar union between two states- 
one in Africa, the other in Asia. In some respects, it 
was an unnatural union since Syria has always been con­
sidered a constituent part of the Fertile Crescent region 
whose population had closer relations with northern Arabs 
than with the Egyptians.^9
By 1957, the Ba'ath Party and President Nasser 
had become the two most dynamic forces in Syrian politics. 
Both held similar views on Arab unity and were in agree­
ment on the question that a Syria-Iraq union amounted to 
extending British influence into Syria. These were the 
basis for the Ba’ath alliance with Cairo which resulted 
in the creation of the U.A.R.^®
^^Ibid., p. 168.
^^Salah Al-Din Al-Bitar, a leading Ba’athist said; 
" . . .  the ordinary Egyptian does not yet feel Arab," that 
the Arab idea never went very deep in Egypt. Cited in 
Seale, op. cit.. p. 311.
" °^Ibid.
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I'.'iicheal Aflaq., the Party theoritician, came to 
the crucial conclusion that Arab union must start with 
Egypt, not because she was the Prussia of the Arab World, 
uniting it by force, but because Egypt could and would 
successfully obstruct any unity movement which excluded
her.
Nasser's Arab "unity" plan did not involve terri­
torial mergers as a first step, Egyptian Foreign Minister, 
Mahmoud Riyad verified this policy as he declared, " We 
never asked for union with Syria. V/e always argued that it
«42
v/as premature. , , . Our policy was in fact to avoid union. 
Instead, Nasser wanted Arab solidarity on foreign issues 
under Egyptian direction. To that end, he wished to control 
the foreign policies of the Arab states. Since the Syrians 
have always been especially responsive to any appeal for 
Arab solidarity or unity, control of Syria appeared crucial 
if Egpt's idea were to triumph throughout the Arab World. 
Though a hazardous venture, Nasser was attracted by the 
magnitude of the enterprise. While it appeared that the 
merger would be beneficial to Egypt as well as to Arab unity, 
Syria, in the meantime, was engulfed in unusual circumstan­
ces v/hich rendered its security, even continuation as a
41lbid.. p. 311. 
4^Ibid.. p. 314. 
4^ Ibid.. p. 313.
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viable state doubtful. For one, Syria was gradually being 
brought under Communist influences. Union had in fact 
caused the Comiaunists to lose a decisive round. Ex-Prime 
Minister, Paris Al-Khouri, though a Hashemite loyalist had 
declared ;
Although I did not approve of the union, I 
did not openly oppose it. I thought at the time 
it was the only way to check the progress of Com­
munism in the country. 44
Thus the virtual collapse of the Syrian state dictated
direct intervention by Nasser, for to him and the Ba'ath
subservience to Russian influence was as much an offense
to the Arab nation as was their subjection to western
4-5influences and policies. For another, Nasser and the 
Ba'ath feared the formation, under Western sponsorship, 
of an Arab bloc consisting of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and Lebanon, designed to close the ring around Syria and, 
in the long run, force it to join that bloc,^^
Syria occupied a key position in the Fertile Cres­
cent: it was the center of the most pro-Western group of 
states in the Middle East - bordering on Lebanon, Turkey, 
Iraq and Jordan. Thus Syria's political orientation had 
immediate bearing on Western plans - the Eisenhower Doctrine 
and the Baghdad Pact. When the Syrian Minister of Defense
"^^bid., p. 324.
"Pan-Arab Challenge to iVnkara," The Economist, 
Vol. 56, February 1, 1958, p. 379.
^^George Kirk, "The Syrian Crisis of 1957 - Facts 
and Fiction," International Affairs, Vol. 36, p. 58.
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concluded an economic agreement with the Soviet Union in
September, 1957, the situation in Syria was viewed by the
//est as leading to "Communist control. " Since the United
States had decided to refrain from carrying out her plans,
an alternative was devised;
Syria was to have been declared under Com­
munist control. . , . Iraq.i and Jordanian armies 
would invade Syria. . . . Later, however. King 
Husayn, the key figure in the plan, changed his 
mind. . . .  47
To the Hashemites, the U.A.R. represented Egyptian 
expansion in the area designated for the Hashemite-sponsor- 
ed Fertile Crescent. It was understood that Egyptian type 
of Arabism could not strike roots in North Arabia, while 
Iraq was the natural backbone for Arab untiy movements in 
view of its potential economic wealth, geographic position 
as well as history. Only Iraq could give permanence to it. 
But Iraq v/as occupied with its role in the Baghdad Pact which 
prevented it from taking an effective leading position in 
Arab affairs, and consequently was looked upon as de-Arab- 
ized. However, Iraq's absence from the Arab arena created a
^'^Hashim Sharabi, Palestine and Israel; The Lethal 
Dilemma, (New York: Pegasus, pp. 6b-b7.
^^Salah Ed-Din Al-Bitar, a leading Ba'athist said: 
"Abd al-Nasir's mind was awakened to Arabism 
in 1953 or 1954. It was the first time an Egyptian 
ruler started to think about the Arab world in terms 
other than the mere desire to dominate. But the 
Arab idea never went very deep in Egypt; the ordi­
nary Egyptian does not yet feel Arab. We in the 
Ba'ath, always hoped that a union would foster in 
Egypt the same nationalistic sentiments that fired 
us." Cited in Seale, op. cit.. p. 311.
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vacuum which had to be filled by its counterpart, hüZ/pt.
Tn the Arab world, the creation of the U.A.R. had 
a spontaneous effect, as the wave of Nasserism s e e m e d to 
herald the dawn of the long awaited unity, particularly to 
the younger generation that was brought up in the spirit 
of this idea. In Jordan, mass sympathy with the Republic 
seemed dangerously possible, especially among the Palestin­
ians.^^
The v /a ve of exuberance that swept Syria at 
the start of the union, signified by the trium­
phant crowds that welcomed Nasir to Damascus, and 
widely shared by Arab opinion in the surrounding 
Arab states, reflected a conviction that the tables 
had been turned, that the initiative in the Middle 
East had passed to the revolutionary pan-Arab move­
ment. 51
Less than two weeks after the U.A.R. was proclaimed, 
the Hashemite rulers announced that they were forming an 
Arab Federation. The motive was clearly evident. It was 
a spontaneous move to counteract Egypt's expansion in Syria 
which placed it in a stronger position vis a vis the Hashe­
mites by successfully preserving Syria from possible absorp­
tion by Iraq, or Jordan. The Hashemite kings decided to act 
immediately to halt the spread of Nasserism and üommunism 
and ironically to save Jordan from falling within the U.A.
R.'s sphere of influence. Husayn stated the Hashemite
^^"Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent," 
v/orld Today. Vol. XII, (June, 1956), p. 215.
SOjbid.
51Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 234.
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strategy, in viev/ of the fact that both Iraq and Egypt had
"intensified efforts to win Jordan over as an exclusive 
52ally. " Accordingly :
The new Arab Union with a common defense pro­
gram, had a frontier stretching from Sinai to Ku­
wait. Nasser might have hoped to swallow up Jordan 
one day and so form a land link betv/een Syria and 
s^yp't, but nov/ that Jordan was united with Iraq it 
was not possible. 53
The Arab Federation was, therefore, urgently needed to save 
Husayn's Jordan from becoming swallowed by the U.A.R., to 
keep the country running on lines approved by Iraq, to pre­
serve the Hashemite monarchy, and to extend its authority 
to Jerusalem with its combined military might against Is­
rael.
The Federation gave prominence to the Palestine
question. King Husayn said;
On this day we turn our hearts toward Pales­
tine and we promise before God to work as before to 
achieve our rights, which were stolen by the enemy. 
We will not lay down our arms until we have achieved 
our aims, 55.
^^Hew York Times, March 18, 1956.
^^Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 233.
In their meeting on the frontier, Faysal told Husayn 
"The Iraqi financial support for Jordan . . . wi11 consti­
tute a clear snub to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, who 
have offered to take the place of the British subsidies. .
. . " London Times, March 16, 1956.
54.
Israel protested the presence of Iraqi troops on 
its frontiers, the truce line. Iraq did not sign a truce 
agreement with Israel, as other Arab states have. Musa, 
op. cit., p. 689; also lonides.op. cit., p. 237.
55Cited in M. Pearlinan, "Fusion and Confusion: Arab 
Mergers and Realignments," Middle East Affairs, Vol. IX,
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These v/ere the iimnediate reasons, others justified the move: 
both rulers felt that it was their duty to make a gesture 
of Arab unity v/hich was sparked by their great-grandfather, 
Husayn I, and to which they claimed leadership.
The union seemed more natural than the United Arab 
Republic. Geographically, both countries had a common 
frontier. Internally, there was a marked similarity in 
the areas of sterling currencies, law and courts, and the 
administration of the armies. In addition, Jordan which 
had been in urgent need of financial help would get it by 
allying itself v/ith oil-rich Iraq,^^ Iraq v/ould pay eighty 
percent of the budget, taking into consideration national 
incomes and the chronic annual deficit in Jordan's budget. 
The opening of trade and removal of customs, would relieve 
Jordan from pressures for foodstuffs v/hich would be brought 
from IrEiq to supply the economically inviable Jordan with
(April, 1958), p. 128.
The tv/o unions involved imminent danger to the ex­
istence of Israel. Premier Ben Gurion was among those who 
believed that the Arab Union and the United Arab Republic 
might result in a desire for expansion and a display of 
hostility toward their neighbors Sudan and Israel. Under 
these conditions, he offered to conclude a nonaggression 
agreement v/ith the Arab states on the basis of territorial 
status quo, but his offer v/as disregarded. See. G. Barra- 
clough. Survey of International Affairs, (1956-1958), p.
367.
The Federation would reduce, if not completely 
eliminate Jordan's dependence upon the United States' aid. 
It would ease American responsibility, as it would remove 
the stigina from Jordan for being an American dependency. 
See. S. H. Longrigg, "New Groupings among the Arab States," 
International Affairs, Vol. 34, (July, 1958), p. 316.
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its half million turbulent refugees who had been living
under the auspices of the United Nations.
Since the treaty provided for domicile and freedom
to work in either country, Iraq, v/ould benefit by absorbing
needed labor in its agriculture and various public works
projects which consumed seventy percent of its oil revenues,
57as well as the economy in general. Thus, Jordan's union 
with oil-rich Iraq, meant a boom for her.
Previously, when Jordan accepted an Arab subsidy, 
Iraq, shied away to avoid assuming the economic burden which 
poor Jordan would impose on her. The picture, however, 
changed in 1958, when Iraq contemplated annexing Syria to 
gain an outlet on the Mediterranean. V/hen Syria became un­
available, Iraq rushed to join with Jordan,
The Jordan-Iraq Federation 
The kings of Jordan and Iraq opened a series of dis­
cussions which climaxed in the promulgation of the Arab 
Federation on February 14, 1958. King Husayn believed in 
Arab revolutionary nationalism and identified himself with 
it. To save his throne and the state which his grandfather 
built, he was forced to revert to his grandfather's type of 
nationalism, the principles of which can be summarized as 
f ollows;
Whereas: the Great Arab Revolt led by His 
Majesty the great saviour Al-Husayn Ibn Ali was a
57Expended for reclamation and dam projects.
285
pro damnation of a now dawn for the Arab nation. . , 
V/hereao; the mission of the Arab revolt, for 
which its leader has striven, passed to the sons 
and grandsons. . . .
Therefore; the two Hashemite states decide to 
form a federation between themselves. . . .  58
The Hashemite confederacy was opened to all inter­
ested Arab states that wished to join by agreement with the 
Federal Government. While member states would retain 
their independent, national status and international per­
sonality; currency, customs, lav/ and education, armed forces, 
diplomatic representation and foreign affairs were to be un­
ified. King Faysal would be the head of the federation;
King Husayn his deputy. When other states joined the feder­
ation the question of the head would be reviewed according 
to circumstances. The federal capital would alternate
^^uharaiaad Khali 1, The Arab States ^ d  the Arab 
League: A Documenta.ry Record. Vol. I: Constitutional Devel­
opments , (Beirut : Khayats, 1962), p. 791
^%bid., p. 80. Also See Pearlman, op. cit., p.
128.
In an, effort to support the union, it was reported 
in Baghdad on I/lay 6, 1958, that Britain had informed Iraq 
of its v/illingness to give up its treaty arrangements with 
Kuwait, if the Shiekhdom goined the federation. Middle 
Las tern /if fairs. Vol. 9, ( June-July, 1958), p. 237; also 
lonides, op. cit., p. 2j5.
Although the Hashemites feared that Saud v/ould be­
come the head of the federation, if he joined, they, never­
theless, sought to include him in a three-king front. Saud 
however, maintained strict neutrality for two reasons: one, 
his fear that a strong Hashemite union would inevitably de­
stroy him; second, his fear of Egyptian expansion. Saud 
remembered that Mohammad Ali had conquered the peninsula in 
I8l8 and Nasser mi^t have been operating against that back­
ground. Keith Wheelock, Naser's New ECTpt, (New York; 
Praeger, I960), p. 259. Also Great Britain, British and 
Foreign State Papers, 1957-58, 163, (London; Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1966), pp. 933-936,
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between Baghdad and Miman, and the federation flag v/ould 
be the flag flov/n during the first Arab revolt.
The federation legislative authority rested with 
the union council and the president of the union. The 
council would be composed of forty members half of whom re­
presented each kingdom. The cabinet was small, comprising 
only three portfolios: foreign affairs, finance, and de­
fense. Bach kingdom would have a minister of state, a.Prime 
minister, a deputy prime minister. The Iraqi Prime Minis­
ter was appointed first Premier of the union; Jordan's 
.Prime Ifnister his deputy. Article 62 enumerated matters 
within the jurisdiction of the union government;
1. foreign affairs and diplomatic and consular re­
presentation.
2. Negotiation of treaties, pacts and international 
agreements.
3. Protection of the states of the union and pre­
servation of their security.
4. Establishment and management of the armed forces 
under the name of "The Arab Army." No member 
state may maintain armed units other than police 
and internal security forces. 60
5. Organization of the Supreme Defense Council, 
military service and military recruitment,
6. Customs and customs legislation.
7. Coordination of financial and economic policy.
8. Currency and financial affairs.
9. Highways and communications.
10. Unification of educational policy; programs and 
curricula. 61
^^The army of Transjordan was called the "Al-Gaysh 
Al-Arabi Al-Urduni," while other states called their armies 
after their countries, i.e., the Syrian Army.
^^Arab Information Center, Basic Documents of Arab 
Unification, p. 39; also IChalil, Vol. I, p. 88.
Although Jordan joined the Union, it did not become 
party to the Baghdad Pact. Husayn, op. cit., p. 187.
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Being a federation, with central powers delegated to the 
central government, all othei- affairs and powers would re­
main under the authority of the member states. From a 
political and international view point, the federation 
strengthened Jordan’s position, since Iraq/s military, dip­
lomatic, financial and economic resources became available 
to it, as it became an equal partner.
Dissolution of the Union
Despite its long range program, the federation was 
unofficially ended on July 14, 1958, the day of the Iraqi 
coup d’etat, only a few months after its announcement.^^
It was most easily disposed of partly because of Husayn’s 
voiced hostility to the Iraqi Republic. On July 15, 1958, 
one of the first decisions of the Iraqi cabinet was the 
Iraqi withdrawal from the Federation, and the annulment of 
all measures connected v/ith it. The reason given v/as that
^^See Khalil, Vol. I, pp. 32-37 for Qassim’s speech 
to the Congress of Arab lawyers at Baghdad on November 26, 
1958, in which he disclosed the conspiracy by the Arab Fed­
eration to "attack our sister Syria," causing the Iraqi 
coup. To verify the "conspiracy" see Seale, op. cit.,
pp. 263-282.
The revolution came as a complete surprise to the 
world, particularly since the representatives of the West­
ern powers in Baghdad were not aware of the possibility of 
such an uprising. Commenting on the revolution, Eisenhower 
remarked: "This was the country that we were counting on
heavily as a bulwark of stability and progress in the re­
gion." Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging 
Peace, 1956-61, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,'19657, 
p. 2"6g.
For an excellent detailed discussion of the Iraqi 
revolution, see Majid Ehadduri, Republican Iraq, (Nev/ York: 
Oxford University Press, 1969).
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the union had not been a true one with the interests of the
people as its objective. The Proclamation, signed by the
Prime Minister and issued on July 23, read:
The federation between Iraq and Jordan, 
in the manner it was affected under the previous 
regime, was not a real union aimed at (realizing) 
the interests of the people in the two countries.
It was rather (meant) to consolidate the corrupt 
monarchial system as well as to disrupt the unity 
of the emanicipated Arab (people) and to realize 
the interests of a clique of rulers who did not 
come to office through (the ohoioe of) the people 
and who did not work for the realization of their 
aspirations.
Accordingly, the Government of the Iraqi 
Republic declares its immediate withdrawal from 
this Federation . . .  63
Since king Faysal II was murdered during the coup, 
king Husayn became the head of the Federation. The con­
stitution of the union stipulated that either state could 
intervene to quell internal uprising inside the other.
On that assumption, Husayn could declare, "We might still 
have to take military a c t i o n . T h e  Jordan cabinet urged
Husayn to oppose the new Iraqi regime with force and to
65restore order, but Husayn refused. His decision was
^^Khalil, op. cit.. Vol. I., pp 91-92.
^^Husayn, Uneasy lies the Head, op. cit., p. 205.
The Jordan ambassador to London Se'cTared in this 
connection that "It was the prerogative of King Hussein to 
decide on the measures to counter the revolt in Iraq," Parl­
iamentary Debates. 591, col, 1516.
In answer to a question in the Commons, whether 
British troops would keep order inside Jordan while the 
Jordan army proceed to Baghdad, Prime Minister Mcl/illlan 
said, "That will not be its function. . . movements from 
Jordan to Baghdad are quite difficult on either side." Ibid., 
1443* gc
•'^ Husayn, Uneasy lies the Head, op. cit., p. 199.
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influenced by several factors: one, marching on Iraq would 
mean fighting other Arab population who had taken no part 
in the revolution;^^ two, Husayn was worried about the 
threat to Jordan from an Israeli attack, therefore, he 
could not leave the frontier unguarded. There was genuine 
fear that Israel might seize the moment for a thrust into 
the West Bankf^'^three, it was possible that he received 
no encouragement or support to restore the Federation.
. . . Was there an idea of invading Iraq 
by a combined attack from Turkey, Iran and Jordan? 
(Husayn had legal grounds for such action, as he 
was co-sovereign of the newly formed Arab Federa­
tion of Jordan and Iraq). I f  there was any such 
intervention, it did not materialize. For one thing, 
Husayn's position was too shaky for him to trust 
M s  own army; in late July, 1958, he had to call 
on British troops to protect his throne. 68
^^ Ibid.
G?Ibid.
r o
Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, op. cit., p. 70. 
During the debates in the Hcuse of Ôommôns, the 
leader of the opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, raised the ques­
tion whether "Husayn made his appeal to us or to the U.N. 
as king of Jordan or as king of Jordan and Iraq- the Fed­
eration; whether we have given him any assurance that we 
will assist him should he try to reassert his authority 
over Jordanand Iraq." Mcmillan replied: "As far as I know, 
it will be in his name and title as king of Jordan." Great 
Britain, Parliamentary Debates, (Commons), Vol. 591, 1958,
col. 1439=IW:---  --------
KcMllan also added;
"I should make it clear that it is to the 
kingdom of Jordan that we are sending our help in 
this time of need, not to the union. I must add 
that in making their request, the Jordan king and 
Government said that they had no intention that the 
British troops should be used to release Jordan 
forces to attack Iraq. The obligation remains with 
them and it is upon this basis that we have decided 
to send our help," Ibid., col. 1511.
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In any event, although the new Iraqi revolution­
ary Government antagonized outside powers as little as pos­
sible, "Western inteorvention could not yet be completely
6Q
ruled out as an eventuality."
The precipitate landing of American Marines 
in Lebanon was thus occasioned in reality, not by 
what was going on in Lebanon but by the military 
coup in Iraq, It was not . . .  because Lebanon 
•had accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine and hence was 
in a position publicly and internationally to in­
voke it that the United States intervened. Dulles 
wanted to demonstrate to foe and friend alike that 
the U.S. was capable of more than only words- that 
it was not afraid of the Soviet Union. • . • That 
we were afraid of Soviet reaction if we attempted 
military action. American credibility was at stake; 
intervention after the Iraqi coup seemed necessary.70
The American landing demonstrated American determination
to act militarily in the Middle East. Intervention may
have prevented the Baghdad Pact from collapsing, since
71Iraq, the main partner withdrew. ' It was also accredited
for the survival of Husayn • s regime and probably for en-
72forcing the Saudi monarchy.
G^ Uri 
1969), p. 52.
70
71
^ el Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, (New York: Praeger: 
' Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, op. cit., p. 69.
The passions released by Iraq's joining the Bagh­
dad Pact eventually destroyed the regime which manipulated 
it. "A Baghdadless Baghdad Pact was to become in 1959* a 
living symbol of boomerang," for it resulted in removing 
the Cold Y/ar from the Arab V/orld, Payez Sayegh, Dynamics 
of Neutralism in the Arab World, (San Fransieco: Cnandle’r, 
I ^ H D T - p T T B ^ : ---------------------
72,
In answer to a que s'il on w)ie^ lier’British' troops were
"Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, op. cit., p. 69.
to prevent external aggression, McMillan said:
"Our sole purpose and indeed our only purpose 
is to try to stabilize the position and to prevent
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Immediately after the revolution had succeeded, 
radio Baghdad announced, "A revolution has started in Iraq 
and one in Lebanon, and tomorrow another revolution will 
start in J o r d a n . F e a r f u l  of an imminent revolution 
which would certainly end the Hashemite dynasty, Husayn's 
last resort was to request direct intervention by his West­
ern allies. It was expected that British troops would be 
sent to Jordan due to Britian's long association with the 
king, its familiarity with the country, government and the 
people.Accordingly, the request was made, as Husayn wrote:
a repetition in Jordan of the events which took 
place last Monday in Iraq." Great Britain, Parlia­
mentary Debates, (Commons), op. cit., col. 1444.
J’ustiYying the immediate response by Britain and 
the U.S., McMillan stated in the Parliament:
"But the immediate result of refusing this 
request might well have been the overthrow of yet 
another small and independent country. . , . With 
the end of Jordan's independence what other coun­
tries in the Arab World could have maintained their 
freedom? I do not believe that Honourable Members 
on either side of the House really wish to see a 
dictatorship established in the name of Arab nation­
alism and stretching all across the broad lands of 
the Middle East. To preserve Jordan's independence 
was perhaps a limited objective but there is reason 
to hope that by achieveing this aim, we may at 
least reassure the other independent Arab countries 
and states." Ibid., col. 1509. See also Khaddouri, 
Republican Iraq, op. cit., p. 56,
^^Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, (Commons),
Vol. 591, 1958, col. 2508.
'^ tln the House of Commons, Prime Minister Harold 
McMillan said that the Government of Jordan had made a sim­
ilar request for help to the U.S. Goverruaent, who were con­
sidering it urgently in the light of their commitments in 
the area. The U.S. had sent reconnaisance flights over 
Jordan to precede the landing of British troops. He added 
that the British Government's decision was taken after full
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The Oahinet met and decided to ask the United 
States and Britain to send us troops. Not so much 
physical as moral help. A token force would be 
enough, something to take some of the load at least 
for a short while. . . . V/e d-o not mind which coun­
tries send troops, Vv'e need them for a limited per­
iod only. I look upon this move as a symbol of the 
ties that bind free peoples in times of crisis, 75
In his biography, Hussiyn alludes to the possibility
of a plot against Jordan's monarchy. "We could do nothing
but wait and see v/hat steps would next be taken by the
n Ç\
latest Pharoah across the Nile."
consultation with the U.S. Government. Ibid., Col, 1509.
Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, pp. 204-205; also 
Robert Murphy, Piploniat Among Warrib'rs, (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday, 1^4), p. 39T%
Prime Ivanister McMillan told the House of Commons 
that the action by Britain and the U.S. was a moral one:
"By intervention at the request of President 
Chamoun and of King Husayn of Jordan, Her Majesty's 
Government and the U.S. Government have acted quite 
rightly on moral, legal, and strategic grounds to 
keep both the Lebanon and Jordan outside Nasser's 
fold." Ibid.. Col. 1521
^Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 200. See also 
Parliamentary Debates, 549, 1956, (Toi. 1714.
In the House of Commons, Prime idinister McMillan 
agreed with Husayn on blaming Nasser for the unrest:
"In making this request the King and the Prime 
Minister said that Jordan was faced with an eminent 
attempt by the U.A.R. to create internal disorder 
and to overthrow the present regiiae on the pattern 
of recent events in Iraq. . . .
Jordan's territorial integrity was threatened 
by the movement of Syrian forces towards her north­
ern frontier. They had information that a coup or­
ganized by the U.A.R. would be attempted today. . .
The purpose of this military assistance is to 
stabilize the situation in Jordan by helping the 
Jordan government to resist aggression and threats 
to the integrity and independence of their country." 
Ibid., Col. 1438.
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On that basis, British Prime Minister Harold 
McMillan acted quickly in order "to protect a small and in­
dependent country which had appealed for help against the
threat of aggression and subversion stimulated from with- 
77out." Britain and the United States realized that unless 
they intervened, Jordan and Lebanon would be lost to the 
revolutionary regimes and the situation in the Middle East 
would deteriorate to threaten other conservative govern­
ments and Western interests. Accordingly, while the Ameri-
78to Jordan immediately. They wore withdrawn on November 2,
can forces landed in Lebanon, British troops were flown in­
;
1958.
letter from Prime Minister McMillan to Premier 
Khrushchev dated July 22, 1958, quoted in Great Britain, 
British and Poreign State Papers, Vol. CLXIII, 1957-1958,
p." 5-91.--------  -------------
The British troops were flown over Israel, without 
prior permission explaining why it was so urgent Êr them 
to reach Amman. Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 207; see 
G.B., Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 591, Col, 1556.
Protesting his government's action a British Social­
ist member of Parliament said that instead of sending troops 
to /unman "v/ould not the king be safer here - London - where 
he could be looked after by a couple of policemen?"
Husayn's remark to this statement: "It v/as not me or my 
country those British troops came to protect, it was free­
dom." Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 208.
7ft
Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 56,
In diplomatic commimications to Prime i.iinister Mc­
millan dated July 19, 1958, Premier Khrushchev called the 
western action a "military invasion” at the request of an 
"irresponsible monarch who does not enjoy the support of 
the people and acts against the will of the people," He 
demanded the immediate withdrawal of British and American 
troops from the Middle East, declaring, "The Soviet Union 
. . . cannot be indifferent to what is happening in the 
Middle East, which is in direct proximity to its frontiers." 
G.B., Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 597, pp. 587 ff,
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Having lout hope of restoring the federation,
ünnayn announced the formal dissolution of the union on
August 1, 1958, because the nev/ Baghdad government made
Iraq "incapable of performing its share of responsibility 
7Qin the union."
Husayn feared that in the absence of the balancer, 
Iraq, his regime would be swept by the U.A.R. However, the 
new Iraqi regime did not seem to constitute a threat to Jor­
dan itself as Qassem concentrated on consolidating the posi­
tion of his regime inside Iraq. He manifested respect for 
all the iVrab states: even Jordan was mentioned with good 
will or at least without malice. He was not interested in
annexing Jordan or in the political character of the regime
Ahuq 
81
ftoin jimman. He even regarded the British landing in mman
following the Iraqi coup as Jordan's internal affair, 
and went so far as to suggest that any attack on Jordan
Op
would be considered an attack on Iraq.
^^pâddle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 9, (October, 1958), 
p. 326; for the text' of Jordan cabinet decree see G.B., 
British and Foreign State Papers, 1957-1958, Vol. 163, 
pp.-”g37-^T8:------  ------
The Republic of Iraq signed an agreement of cooper­
ation and solidarity with the U.A.R. on July 19, 1958. G.B. 
British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 930.
Jordan ended diplomatic relations v/ith the U.A.R. 
on July 20, I960, because it recognized the Iraqi revolu­
tionary regime. Musa, op. cit., p. 692,
fto
Dann, op. cit., p. 67.
^^Ivad-Bast kiirror, August 3, 1958, p. 24.
82Hans Tutsch, "A Report from Jordan," Swiss Review 
of V/orld Affairs, Vol. X, no, 11 (February, 1961), pp. 6-10.
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In an attempt to enhance his position, Husayn 
quickly renewed relations with Qassem's government. He 
even "nursed hopes for reestablishing the Jordan-Iraqi fed-
o-,
eration with himself as head." Consequently, he recog­
nized the revolutionary government on October 1, I960, and 
resumed diplomatic relations with it on December 12, 1960,^^
Conclusion
Despite their claim to Arab leadership, the Hashe- 
mites lacked a popular political base. Abdullah's failure 
to unite the Syrian region testifies to this crucial point. 
Although Iraq and Jordan had more in common than any other 
two Arab states, particularly the dynastic aspect, no union 
had taken place until the advent of the U.A.R.
Egypt's intrusion in north Arabia was a clear chal­
lenge to the Hashemites which hitherto considered the Fer­
tile Crescent region as their domain. The U.A.R. not only 
presented a clear threat to the Hashemite plans, but Jor­
dan would become a part of the U.A.R., sooner or later. 
Husayn's evaluation of the situation proved accurate. The 
majority of his subjects were Palestinians whose consensus
^^kiddle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 9, (October, 1958),
p. 405.
^^Hew York Times, December 12, I960.
As a gesture of goodwill, Qassem ordered reburial 
of Paysal II in the Royal tombs. Hans Tutsch, op. cit.
Britain and the United States recognized the new 
regime on August 1, 1958, while Turkey, a member of the 
Baghdad Pact extended its recognition on July 31, 1958, See 
Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 58.
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hailed the U.A.R. as the dawn for a comprehensive Arab 
unity, and Nasser as Saladin, the leader and unifier. 
Husayn, thus, was placed in a precarious position as he 
could not ignore popular pressure for joining the U.A.R.
It was a political crisis of grave consequences. Joining 
the U.A.R. meant forfeiting his claim to leadership while 
assuming a secondary role, perhaps even fading into obli­
vion. One alternative was open to Husayn: immediate unity 
with Iraq.
Husayn's decision was dictated by internal as well 
as external forces. One, a Hashemite union would not be 
considered wholly repugnant for although it was an obvious 
response to the U.A.R,, it, nevertheless, was a form of 
Arab unity. Two, it was the only way by which the Hashe­
mites could preserve their political independence by pre­
cluding the loss of Jordan to Hgypt, their competitor for 
Arab leadership. Such a development would have been detri­
mental to Iraq's position of leadership. Three, establish­
ing the Arab union may have been a tactic by which the 
U.A.R. would collapse, thereby eliminating Egypt's chal­
lenge. Four, such a union would ease the chronic economic 
crisis in Jordan, as Iraq's economy would absorb Jordan's 
unemployed manpower and budgetary deficit. Five, the union 
would strengthen Jordan's military capability in facing 
the Israeli threat, as Iraq's army would share in its de­
fense.
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Jordan held a pivotal position in Arab imity. Had 
it joined the U.A.R., a comprehensive unity would have been 
forthcoming. However, the establishment of the Hashemite 
union emphasized the schism between the conservative and 
the progressive regimes, as it did emphasize the Hashemite- 
Hgyptian rivalry. By declining to join the U.A.R., Husayn 
and Faysal stressed their dynastic interests rather than 
their concern for an Arab unity.
CHAPTER HI 
JORDAN AND THE ARAB liBAGUE
Formation of the league; Baokground 
The Great Syria and Fertile Crescent schemes were 
Hashemite in content, designed to prevent Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia from extending their influence into the North Ara­
bian regions. However, the feeling that it would be "un­
wise to found a League on the Fertile Crescent from which 
Egypt was not a member from the start," made its imple­
mentation impractical.^
Motivated by tangible advantages, Egypt developed 
immense interest in Arab unity movement. To that end, she 
took the initiative in playing the role of builder and 
unifier of the Arab World.^ Thus, on I/larch 30, 1943, 
Mustafa Al-Nahhas, Prime Minister of Egypt, presented a 
tentative proposal for creating an Arab League to the Egypt­
ian parliament. Nahhas was motivated by three consider­
ations: first, he could not reject the Fertile Crescent
^Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon. (New York: Ox­
ford University Press, 194o), p. Also Seale, op.cit..
p. 200.
^Boutrus Ghali, "The Arab League, 1945-1955," 
International Concilliation. (May, 1954), P* 389.
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scheme without being accused of opposing a form of Arab 
unity. He had to submit an alternative^ Second, he be­
lieved that an Egyptian dominated League would serve Egypt­
ian politics. Third, he acted out of motives of personal 
ambition.^
While there was manifest support for the idea, 
there was also suspicion about its practical application. 
Amir Abdullah had indicated that a "loose federation" was 
all that could be achieved, and added, "as long as the 
Syrian countries remained without sovereignty, without 
unity, and under foreign rule, cooperation between them 
and Egypt and Iraq would be ineffective."^ Recognizing 
Egypt's leading role in Arab politics, he agreed to sup­
port the plan and urged the Arab governments to "aim first 
and foremost at achieving the union of Syria.H owe ver , 
during the conferences of the Arab Prime Ministers in Cairo, 
Syria emphatically rejected Abdullah's Great Syria project 
preferring a comprehensive Arab union instead and declar­
ing that "Syria will refuse to have raised in her sky any 
flag than her own save that of an Arab union.
^Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 
op. cit.. p. 403.
^Graves, op. cit.. p. 254.
^Ibid.. p. 255.
^Khaddouri Majid, "Toward an Arab Union; The League 
of Arab States," American Political Science Review. Vol. 40, 
(February, 1946), p. 9^.
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The Pact of the Arab League
The Pact recognized the independence imd sovereignty 
of the League members and their ri^t to secede from the
7
Organization. V/hile membership was limited to the Arab 
countries, only those with independent status were quali-
O
fied to join. Furthermore, the Pact differed from the 
Alexandria Protocol in one particularly important aspect.
The Protocol stipulated that "in no case v/ill the adoption 
of foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy 
of the League or any member state be allowed." The Pact, 
not only omitted this provision, but specifically denied 
such unity in foreign policy matters by stating that "trea­
ties and agreements already concluded, or to be concluded 
in the future between a member state and another state, in 
the future between a member state and another state, shall
"^Lebanon was given specific guarantees for her in­
dependence.
Q
Burhan Ghazal, Al-Ahdaf Al-Qawmiyyi ah V/al-Bawliy- 
yiah Li-Jarai'at Al-Duwal AÏ-Àrabiyyiah, (Damascus; Hasliiy- 
yiah Press, 1953J, pp. 23-^4.
Because of their colonial status, the membership 
of Worth African Arab states was suspended. Jordan, how­
ever, was considered a full member since Britain had pro­
mised its independence in 1946. Bevin declared in the U.N. 
"Regarding Transjordan, it is the intention of his Majesty's 
Government to take steps in the near future for establish­
ing this territory as a sovereign, independent state and 
for recognizing its status as such." London Times, January
18, 1946.
Amir Abdullah signed the League Charter on April 2, 
1945. It was published in the Official Gazette on April 19, 
and became effective on May 10, Musa. op. cit., p. 397.
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not be binding or restrictive upon other members," Thus, 
while the Pact emphasized the sovereignty of the members, 
it rendered the Organization ineffective and reduced it to 
a mere meeting place.
The Great Challenge; Abdullah Annexes Arab Palestine
Jordan's View of the League 
The Arab League v/as an idea conceived by Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nuri Al-Sa'ed, adopted by Mustafa Al-Nahhas, Prime 
Minister of Egypt, and approved by Britain's Foreign Sec­
retary Anthony Eden.^^ Lacking direction and orientation, 
and armed with minimum, previous political experience and 
association, certain Arab states were brought together into 
the Organization which King Abdullah described as "a quiver 
containing seven heads. Except for Najd and Yaman, all
other member states were directly or indirectly under for- 
12eign control. As an inter-Arab organization, the League
^See Article 9 of the Covenant of the League of 
Arab States, Khalil, Vol. II, p. 59; end Ghazal, op. cit., 
p. 49.
^^Lord Altrincham, the British Minister of State in 
the Mddle East, said that if the White Paper had not been 
issued, the whole Arab world would have been against the 
Allies in the most serious and dangerous years of the war. 
The way to safeguard Western interests in general and Bri­
tish in particular was to act with the Arabs assembled in 
their own League. Cited in Elli Kedouri, "Pan-Arabisra and 
British Policy," Political Quarterly, Vol. 28,(April-June,
1957), p. 145.
^^Sha'ar, op. cit., p. 238.
1?Notice Abdullah's reference to Saudi Arabia as
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served as a front for promoting political ambitions of some 
founding states,
The Arabs viewed the League as a primary medium 
for inter-Arab relations, or as a foundation for Arab soli­
darity only when Egypt's own interest required it.^^ Jor­
dan considered the League as having lost its purpose as an 
instrument of collaboration among the Arab countries, be­
cause it had become an integral part of the Egyptian for­
eign ministry. The League v/as a victory for Egyptian dip­
lomacy against rival Hashemite plans for the Fertile Cres­
cent and Great Syria, As long as the League continued 
to be "a tool in the hands of the Egyptian government” and 
as long as its headquarters continued to be in Cairo, Jor­
dan would not consider it an effective instrument to serve
comprising only the eastern part of the Saudi Kingdom,
Hijaz, the western part, was conquered by Ibn Saud in 1924, 
causing the Hashemites to lose their kingdom. However, 
Abdullah and Ibn Saud signed a treaty on July 27, 1933, in 
which Abdullah recognized Saudi control over Hijaz. Khalil, 
Vol, II, p, 212; also Musa, op, cit,, p, 346,
^^Reference to Saudi and Egyptian opposition to the 
Great Syria-Eertil Crescent plans. See L*Orient, March 28, 
1947; Seale, op. cit,. p, 312,
^^Eerr, The Arab Cold War, p, 128, Jordan believed 
that as long as the League Secretary-General is an Egs'ptian 
then the organization would continue to be an "arm of the 
Egyptian foreign policy," See Sha'ar, op. cit., p, 239.
See also Mustafa Kharsa, Muthakklrat Al-Malik Tbdullah,
(Bei rut : Bar Al-Tali'ah, l96^), Seale, op, cit., p, 200,
John Philby, advisor to the late ibn Saud, said of 
the Arab League : it is, "frustrated bÿ the jealousies and 
disentions, corruption, and incompetence of its Member 
States" , , . , Whether the Arab League "can survive the 
internal stress of house divided against itself is very
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all states on an equal footing. To that end, on January 
15, 1963, Jordan asked that the League Headquarters be 
officially transferred to either Beirut or Damascus.
The All-Palestine Government 
Abdullah's entry into the Palestine war of 1948 was 
based on earlier plans for annexing the Arab part of Pales­
tine.^^ Thus, when Britain contemplated ending the mandate, 
Abdullah began to toy with the idea of uniting Palestine 
with Transjordan. His intention violated the League Poli­
tical Committee resolution of April 12, 1948, which was 
unanimously passed and which provided that:
The entry of the Arab armies into Palestine 
for the purpose of saving it should be viewed as 
a temporary measure free from any of the character­
istics of occupation sind division of Palestine, 
and that following its liberation it should be 
handed to its owners so that they might rule it 
as they please. 17
To counter Abdullah's claim and to keep the name 
of Palestine alive, the Arab League authorized the Arab 
Higher Committee to proclaim at Damascus on September 29, 
1948, an All-Palestine Government (Hukumat 'Umum Pilastin)
much open to doubt." John Philby, Arabian Jubilee. (New 
York: Day Company, 1953), cited in Security and tffe I/Iiddle 
Bast, A report submitted to the President of the U.S..
1 ^ 1 ,  1954, p. 22.
^^Hiddle Lastern Affairs, XIV, (April, 1962, p. 123, 
^^Nashashibi, op. cit.. p. 77.
^"^Khalil, Vol. II, p. 166.
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with headquarters in Gaza. A congress of Palestine Arabs
assembled at Gaza on October 1. The congress called itself
the National Assembly and by acclamation elected Amin Al-
Husayni as its president and resolved that:
On the basis of the natural and historical 
rights of the Arab people of Palestine to freedom 
and independence . . .  we the members of the Nation­
al Assembly of Palestine meeting at Gaza declare 
on this day, October 1, 1948, the sovereign inde­
pendence of all Palestine which borders Syria and 
Lebanon in the north, Syria and Transjordan on the 
Last, the Mediterranean Sea on the west, and Egypt 
on the South, and proclaimed the establishment of 
a free and democratic state working for the reali­
zation of the freedom and rights of the people. .
. . 19
To Abdullah, installing the All-Palestine Govern­
ment was a design to prevent the realization of his own 
plans, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia, his main rivals, were
in agreement that a union v/ith Palestine must be prevented 
20at all costs. To this Abdullah reacted violently and ex­
changed telegrams with Ahmad Hilrai, the leader of the Gaza
^®0n July 10, 1948, the Secretary-General of the 
Arab League announced that the Political Committee had 
approved the establishment of:
"A provisional civil administration shall be 
set up in Palestine (whose function shall be) to 
manage the public affairs and (to provide) the nec­
essary services on condition that it shall not have 
competence at present over the higher political af­
fairs. . . .
Third, the jurisdiction of the Civil Adminis­
tration Council shall extend to all the areas at 
present occupied by the Arab Armies or which may 
be occupied until the whole Arab Palestine is in­
cluded. . . . ” Khalil, Vol. II, p. 566.
^^Arif Al-Arif, Al-Nakbah, (Beirut; n.d.), p. 703.
20 — — — —
Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 406.
305
Government. On September 16, 1948, he cabled:
The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan will not allow the formation of any adminis­
tration which deprives the people of Palestine of 
the freedom of choosing their government after the 
present conflict is concluded. This government will 
not allow the formation within its security zone, 
which extends from the borders of Hgypt to the bor­
ders of Syria and Lebanon, of a military organiza­
tion which gives allegiance and benefits to certain 
personalities. . . .  21
In another telegram on September 20, he said:
V/hat has been organized under the name of 
All-Palestine Government, whether decided by the 
League or those who aspire to rule, turns the clock 
back to pre-May 15 conditions. . . . This means 
that the partition which you fought against would 
occur. The soldiers of the Arab Legion who died 
trying to prevent it would not like tampering with 
the destiny of the land. The government of the 
Hashemite Kingdom is determined to keep under its 
control the pacified territory which extends from 
the borders of Egypt to the Lebanese-Syrian fron­
tier. . . .  22
In a third cable to Abdul-Rahman Azzam, the League’s Secre­
tary-General, Abdullah said:
Ahmad Hilmi Pasha in his reply said that the 
formation of the All-Palestine Government v/as de­
cided by the Arab League. The Jordanian delega­
tion denies this. Anyhow . . . since the Jordan 
army is still fighting in Jerusalem alone . . .  we 
refuse the introduction of another authority into 
territorial jurisdiction of our military government, 
particularly those personalities who wish to govern. 
. . . Thus, to preserve the League, we announce 
that v/e shall not accept any changes inside the 
security zone controlled by Jordan. The creation 
of such new authority compels the Palestinians to 
accept something they did not choose. To this we 
do not agree, and we will attempt to prevent it.
^^Ahmad Tayi'a, Safahat Matwiyyiah’an Filistin.
(Cairo: Al-Shaab Publishing House, n.d.), p. 15Ù.
Z^ibid.. p. 151.
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However, if this government were formed find accepted 
bv the United Nations, as it did the Jewish claims, 
then the League would have agreed to the partition 
against which it fought. 23
In a letter to Prince Paysal Bin Saud dated Septem­
ber 30, 1948, Abdullah stated;
I would like to remind the representatives of 
the Arab states in Paris that we (Jordan) did not 
deny the existence of a Palestine government, but 
opposed denying the Palestinians the right to choose 
for themselves the form of government following the 
victory. If I had accepted a state encompassing 
all Palestine before victory, then I would have been 
made the laughing stock. My fear is that the United 
Nations would recognize this government (All-Pales­
tine) as they accepted the Jewish claims; thus, par­
tition would take place. . . .  24
Purthermore, in another letter to Riyad Al-Sulh, Prime i/dn-
ister of Lebanon, Abdullah complained:
. . . V/hile we in Transjordan have been carrying 
out our military operations and bearing the heavi­
est of military burdens alone, the League decided 
to set up in Gaza a feeble state for all Palestine 
in order to get rid of its responsibilities. . . ,25
The proclamation of the Gaza government v/as of lit­
tle attraction to the Palestinians under Jordan's control, 
whose immediate need was safety rather than independence. 
Furthermore, Gaza was geographically separated from Last
Palestine by the Zionist forces, and while the Palestinians
were not allowed to live in Egypt, they were integrated in 
Jordan. As the Palestine question crystalized, the Gaza
^^bid.. p. 152.
^'^Sha'ar, 4th ed., op. cit., p. 243.
^^Sha'ar, 1st ed., op. cit.. p. 282.
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Oovernment fell into oblivion. This situation augmented 
Abdullah's authority to claim absolute control of East Pal­
estine, This was accomplished by popular conferences staged 
with this end in mind.
Conferences and Unity 
Abdullah's opposition to the All-Palestine Govern­
ment v/as based on the fact that his army was in control of 
Eastern Palestine whose population enjoyed safety under 
Jordanian administration. Second, these people wanted a 
settlement to normalize their lives, and Abdullah was con­
sidered the only leader who could accomplish such results. 
Third, since Jordan contributed most to the Palestine con­
flict, saving the Arab part would be possible under the 
King’s direction.
Responding to the Gaza National Assembly, a confer­
ence was held in Amman on the same day, October 1, 1948, 
and adopted the following resolution:
V/e shall not accept any solution brought about 
by the previous leaders of Palestine whose bad be­
havior precipitated the present tragedy. 27
The conference authorized Abdullah to speak on their behalf,
to negotiate and to deal with the problem as he saw proper.
"V/hile the other Arab leaders sat waiting, watching, hoping,
blaming each other, Abdullah acted."
^^London Times, January 4, 1949.
27Musa, op. cit.. p. 535.
28Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 124.
3ü8
On December 1, 1948, another conference was held 
in Jericho. It called for the unity of Palestine and
PQ
Transjordan with Abdullah as King. The resolutions of 
the conference were cabled to the Arab governments and to 
the Arab League. After discussion by the Cabinet, a reso­
lution was passed:
The Government of Jordan apprecitates the de­
sire of the Palestine people represented at the 
Jericho Conference for the unity of Transjordan 
and Palestine, This desire coincides with the v/ish- 
08 of the Government of Jordan and we will proceed 
to take the necessary constitutional steps. 30
In its meeting on December 13, the Parliament de­
clared its endorsement of the Government’s policy with re­
gard to annexing Arab Palestine.
Abdullah's activities were met with indignation by 
most of the Arab states, and the League itself. Abdullah, 
v/ho did not believe in the power of the League, boycotted 
its meetings. "The absence of the Jordan delegate was
promptly exploited by Nahhas who moved that Hilmi be invited
•30
to attend the session." In response to this motion, Ab­
dullah instructed his minister in Cairo to appear at the 
Council meetings but to refrain from participating in case 
the territorial disposition of Palestine was discussed. Cn
PQ
■^ Musa, op. cit., p. 536. 
^PAI-Difa'a. April 25, 1950. 
^^Musa, op. cit., p. 536.
3p
Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 410.
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r.'jarch 27, 1950, Abdullah informed the ]..eague that he would 
nob send a delegation until Egyptian press attacks were 
stopped, and "until certain points are c l a r i f i e d , H e  
accused the ]-eague of inventing the Gaza Government to op­
pose his ambitions, and stated also that the Organization 
was being dominated by those who opposed unity, namely 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Abdullah further presented three 
conditions for returning to the League: one, that no dele­
gation from the Gaza Government attended the meetings; two, 
no discussion of annexation should be carried on; and three, 
Egypt should apologize to Jordan for press attacks on Abdul­
lah.
In an attempt to prevent uniting both banks of the 
Jordan, the representative of Lebanon presented on March 
29, 1950, a proposal calling for automatic explusion of any 
League member who signs a separate treaty with Israel. By 
that time, it became common knowledge that Abdullah had 
carried on secret negotiations with the Zionists in search 
of peace, in violation of the League resolution 292 of 
April 1, 1950.^^ This resolution was approved by all states 
except Iraq and Yaman.^^ This resolution, which censored
%^.bid.
^^London Times, March 28, 1950. 
36,
^^Khalil, Vol. II, p. 165.
Prye, op. oit.. p. 168.
Iraq supported Jordan on account of Hashemite dy­
nasty in both countries; Yaman to pay a debt. Abdullah had
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Abdullah, iailed for lack of a unanimous vote, bxpulsion 
would merely have deepened the conflict among the states, 
and at the same time it could have encouraged Jordan - 
which at the time was conducting secret negotiations - to 
come to an agreement with Israel. Thus the failure of 
the League is to dissuade Abdullah from annexing Palestine 
emphasized the Organization’s inability as an instrument 
of leadership.
Abdullah, however, attacked the League's objection 
to unity and welcomed expulsion. "If the League ostracized 
us for annexation, w e l c o m e . H e  was of the opinion that 
it would not be in Jordan's interest to withdraw from the 
League but declared that if Jordan's interests were in con­
tradiction with the League's policy, he would protect the 
interests of Jordan, even if that would result in leaving 
the League. He further stated that Jordan was no longer 
bound by the League resolution of 1948 on the grounds that 
the Arab armies had not liberated Palestine and that the 
Arab states had concluded armistice agreements with Israel, 
thereby accepting the U.N. Partition Plan. To Abdullah, 
annexation was best for the Arabs. By annexing the West 
Bank "we protected the remaining part from being lost to
supported Imam Ahmad's legitimacy against a rebellion. 
Sha'ar, op. cit., p. 240.
V?’"Prye, op. cit.
^^London Times, April 10, 1950.
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the Jows."^^
In his speech from the thi'one on the occasion of 
■unity, Abdullah declared;
The Jordan ^iveiÿ^ is like a bird whose wings 
are its east and west 'Banks. Its natural right is 
to unite and merge. . . . The unity of the two banks 
is an indisputable fact which evolved from the es­
tablishment of strong ties ever since 1922. Such 
•visible ties include: unity of currency, common de­
fense, common ports, facilitation of travel and cus­
toms exchange of cultural and legal programs. All 
these endowed each bank with a most favored position 
by the other. . . . The difference of opinion which 
resulted after the armistice stemmed from misunder­
standing of the Jordan-PaleStine relationships which 
my government has been trying to explain.
Iiîy government considers the decision of the 
Political Committee of the Arab League on April 12, 
1948, as null and void, since the other Arab states 
had accepted the Armis'tice, which, in effect, impli­
citly meant their approval of the United Nations 
Partition Plan. 40
Tension caused by the Palestine question endangered 
inter-Arab relations and threatened to break up the Organ­
ization. The situation dictated a reversal with repect to 
Jordan»s expulsion. As a compromise measure, it was pro­
posed that the West Bank be considered a trust in Jordan's 
hands. Jordan qualified the annexation by announcing that 
its policy was not to divide Palestine, but to restore it 
as a unit and to give it back to its original owners.
On April 24, 1950, the United Parliament adopted
^Sha'ar, op. cit.. p. 244.
^^Ibid.. p. 246.
^^Husayn, Al-Urdun \Va Al-Qadiyyiah Al-Pilistini:priah 
Wal-Alaqat Al-Arabiyyiah'. ÇAmman; hS.nisiry of Poreign Àr- 
fairs, n.d,;, p. 32,
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the following resolution which provided for the unification 
of the two banks but without prejudicing the final settle­
ment of the Palestine question;
. . . Therefore, the Jordanian Parliament represent­
ing both banks . . . resolve and declare the follow­
ing:
Pirst: the upholding of the complete unity of 
the eastern and western banks of the Jordan and 
their merging into one state - the Hashemite King­
dom of Jordan - headed by his Hashemite Maiesty 
the Exalted King 'Abdullah Bin Al-Husayn, (a state) 
based on a parliamentary, constitutional regime, and 
on equality of rights and duties among all citizens.
Second: the affirmation of (the determination) 
to preserve all the rights of the Arabs in Palestine 
and the protection of these rights by all lawful 
means - and with the full right (to do so) without 
prejudice to the final settlement of the just cause 
(of Palestine) and v/ithin the framework of national 
aspirations, Arab cooperation, and international 
justice. 42
The Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
After the 1948 war it was natural for the Arab gov­
ernments to emphasize military matters and to coordinate 
their future military policies for common defense of their 
states and to safeguard peace and security of the area.
^^On April 21, 1950, a new cabinet was formed with 
representatives from both banks. The annexation resolution 
v/as signed by Abdullah the same day. Musa, op. cit., 
p. 538; Al-Difa'a, April 25, 1950. English text in Khalil, 
Vol. I, p. 54.
Britain recognized the unity of both banks in a 
letter dated April 24, 1950. V/hile Britain indicated that 
it would extend its protection to the new Jordan territory 
under the 1948 treaty, the Old City of Jerusalem was ex­
cluded in deference to the United Nations internationaliza­
tion plan of December 9, 1949.
Israel protested the British approval but Britain 
replied that "this was the concern of Britain and Jordan 
alone and that Israel should not fear Britain unless it 
attacks its neighbors." Musa, op. cit., p. 545; Shwadran, 
op. oit., p. 297.
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Another immédiate reason was to prevent the Hashemites 
rom realizing their aiahitions in North Arabia. The 
gyptian-Saudi camp, in support of Syria and Lebanon, and 
in order to obstruct possible Iraqi and Jordan expansion, 
proposed a more grandiose scheme which no responsible i^rab 
could possibly reject: the Collective Security Pact of 
1950.'^'^ Although Iraq and Jordan disliked it, they could 
not oppose it. This explained Jordan-Iraq reluctance in
During their meeting in 1949, President Eishara 
Al-Khouri of Lebanon and President Husni Al-Za'im of Syria 
revealed their opposition to the Great Syria-Pertile Cres­
cent Plans, and presented their policies as follows:
"1, Lebanon and Syria are two independent 
countries and the one supplements the other econo­
mically and supports it politically. . . .
2. As far as our relations with the sister 
Arab states are concerned, we know that some of 
them have ambitions in our two countries and that 
some others do not. In spite of that, we should 
preserve the balance between them and assume in 
their conflict the role of mediator or graciousness, 
V.'hat prompts this role is the presence of Arab king­
doms v/ith ambitions.
3, V/e should attempt to strengthen the Arab 
League and oppose within its framework eveo^ plan 
that aims to establish the Great Syria project or 
the Fertile Crescent scheme. Moreover, we should 
show deference to the rulers of both Iraq and Trans­
jordan for it is not wise to challenge them. It is 
enough to defend ourselves without provoking any­
one," Eishara khouri, Haqa'ia Lubnaniyyiah. (Beirut:
Awraq Lubnaniyyiah, I960), Vol, II, p. 232.
In a debate in the Egyptian Parliament a question
was raised: "What action would be taken in the case of the 
unification of two states such as Iraq and Jordan?" The 
Foreign Minister replied that "If unification were by force 
of arms other Arab states would be entitled to thwart it." 
quoted in Security and the Middle East, p. 23.
“^^Tom Little, "The Arab League: Area Assessment,"
Middle East Journal, k. No, 2, (April, 1956), p. 143.
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signing the Pact.^^
Ironically, the Pact was advocated by King ïalal 
and the Chamber of Deputies, while the Cabinet was cool 
toward it. The accession of Jordan to the Pact on Febru­
ary 16, 1952, indicated Talal's triumph over the Cabinet, 
The Collective Security Pact preserved the status 
quo in the Arab world, and represented a victory for the 
•t^gyptian-Saudi camp against the unity of North Arabia for 
it forbade any acts of aggression against the territorial 
integrity, independence and security of any Arab state.
The Arab states agreed that an armed attack on any 
member would be considered an attack on all.^^ Article 2 
relates specifically to this point, and Article 5 provided
^•'^Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 4IO.
^^Talal devoted great attention to closer relations 
with the Arab states but made no mention of "The friendly 
and allied states," particularly Britain, in his address 
to the Parliament. (Jordan, Chamber of Deputies Debates, 
The Official Gazette, 15 November 1951, pp. 12-14.)
47j. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle 
East, Vol. II, (Princeton: Van Üostrand, 1956j.
Cairo accused Abdullah of smuggling arms to the 
Druz and warned Jordan that Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia 
were opposed to the Great Syria Plan, that they were inter­
ested in "maintaining the balance in the Arab orient and 
putting an end to Hashemite ambitions." London Times, 
January 29, 1949.
^^Article 1 states:
"Being anxious to maintain and stabilize se­
curity and peace, the Contracting States hereby 
confirm their determination to settle their inter­
national disputes by peaceful means whether in 
their mutual relations or in their relations with 
other states." Khalil, Vol. II, p. 102.
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for creating; a permanent m;ilitary commission in order to 
organize the plans of joint defense and to prepare their 
means and met h o d s , A r t i c l e  8 provided for the creation 
of an economic council to be concerned with economic and 
financial affairs such as unifying currency and creating
CQ
an Arab Common Market. Since Jordan joined the League,
its policy has been in complete agreement with that of the
51League on almost every issue relating to Arab interests.
The absence in this treaty of explicit obligations 
to use their armed forces to defend other Arab states was 
the main reason for the reluctance of some of the Arab coun­
tries to aid Egypt during the 1956 tripartite aggression. 
Mahmoud Khattab, Al-Wahd^ Al-Askariyyiah Al-Arabiyyiah. 
(Cairo: Modern Technical Press, 19691, p. 38.
^^’Aisha Ratib, Al-Alagat Al-Dawliyyiah Al-Arabiy­
yiah, (Cairo: Dar Al-Nahdah Al-Aratiyyiah, p. 72;
and Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 101-105.
The Pact was signed by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi
Arabia and Yaman on June 17, 1950. Iraq and Jordan signed 
it with reservations on February 2, 1951, and February 16, 
1952, respectively. It became in force in August, 1952.
Iraq requested more power in the hands of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to coordinate training programs and supply pro­
blems of the armed forces of each member state. It also 
reserved the right not to be bound by the League in finan­
cial matters. Jordan made the following stipulations: one, 
the provisions that a two-thirds majority was binding on 
all members should be replaced by a clause stating that 
execution of any decision should be the responsibility of 
only those who voted for it. Two, "aggression" should be 
defined and refer to an act by a non-League member. Three,
the general mechanism of the Pact should be further revised
and simplified. Four, the Pact should not affect treaties 
between League members and other states. Five, an author­
ity should be appointed to define the "threat of war,"
Harry Howard, "Middle I'iaster Regional Organization: Pro­
blems and Prospects", Proceedings of the Academy of Poli­
tical Science. Vol. 24, (J"anuary, 1952j, p. ^46.
51Jordan is a member of the Arab Common Market. 
Husayn, Al-Urdun \Va Al-Qadiyyiah Al-Filistiniyyiah . . ..
p. 27.
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Conclusion
Jordan's relations with the League have been far 
from cooperative. This was caused by Abdullah's belief 
that the Organization had been the major obstacle to achiev­
ing his personal ambitions in the Fertile Crescent.
Abdullah's hostility to the League appeared to de­
rive from personality conflict. Compared to the other Arab 
states, Jordan lacked the fundamental criteria for state­
hood: its foreign relations, economy and army were, until 
1956, exclusively in the hands of Britain. Accordingly, 
Abdullah's claim to leadership lacked viability.
Although Jordan was given a special permission to 
become a founding member of the League - since Transjordan 
was not independent in 1944 - and had become signatory to 
all resolutions, Abdullah was never at ease with the Organ­
ization. He held that it was an instrument for advancing 
Egypt's interests^ thus it was of no value since his poli­
cies were for the most part contrary to those of Egypt. 
Anticipating Egypt's drive for leadership under the guise 
of the League, he dismissed the idea that the League could 
be the catalyst for Arab unity.
Abdullah's challenge to the League was manifested 
in his violation of its resolutions pertaining to the an­
nexation of Arab Palestine, Determined to eliminate any 
rivals, he defied the League's plan to install the All- 
Palestine Government of Gaza by unilaterally annexing
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j'jastern Palestine and disbanding the former's para-military 
organizations. His challenge exposed the League's weak­
ness, thereby establishing a dangerous precedent. Accord­
ingly, Abdullah always stressed that if Jordan's interests 
and the League's policies were contradictory, he would sac­
rifice the League and protect the interests of Jordan.
This policy has been pursued. Thus bilateral alli­
ances and agreements rather than all-League coordinated 
policies were entered into. King Husayn's espousal of Arab 
policy proved beneficial to Jordan. He took advantage of 
the League as an all-Arab Parliament to establish better 
relations with the other Arab heads of state. Under the 
auspices of the Organization, Jordan called summit confer­
ences and received financial subsidies. Paramount was the 
Arab financial aid which Jordan has been receiving as budge­
tary support since 1967 replacing the American subsidy.
CHAPTER XEII 
JORDAN ' S ARAB P O U  GY
The Arab Solidarity Pact
The Arab policy of King Abdullah may be charac­
terized by almost complete lack of cooperation with the 
other Arab heads of state, except Iraq. His disregard of 
the League and animosity toward most Arab rulers resulted 
in his alienation, which, in turn, caused him to adopt 
parochial Jordanian nationalism. However, this situation 
changed somewhat after Husayn II became the King.
Upon becoming the ruler. King Husayn stressed the 
policy that Jordan's bonds v/ith the sister Arab States 
should be preserved and strengthened. ’’Jordan is nothing 
but a part of the Arab nation and the Arab Legion is but 
one of its armies."^ This policy was reiterated by his 
first Prime Minister, Pawzi Al-Mulqi, in his statement to
p
the Parliament on May 24, 1953. The ssune policy was fol­
lowed by Abul-Huda, as directed by Husayn in his letter of 
commission: "The foreign policy of Jordan is based on com-
^George Harris, Jordan, (New Haven: HEAP Press,
1958), p. 104.
^Jordan, Official Gazette, May 6, 1953, p. 191.
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piete understanding and absolute cooperation with the Arab 
s t a t e s . H u s a y n  continued;
As to foreign policy, Jordan's relations with 
all Arab states must always be on the best terms 
just as if they were between different parts of one 
nation. The unchanging policy of Jordan takes into 
consideration the interests of the Arab states as 
an indivisible unit. . . .  4
On that basis, following the Qibya incident, Husayn 
requested the aid of the Arab states. The League's Politi­
cal Committee, meeting in Amman, promised to pay to Jordan 
two and one-half million dinars. While the army was sup­
ported by the British subsidy, it became the duty of the 
Arab states to equip and maintain the National Ouand. Thus, 
on July 5, 1954, Husayn wrote to the heads of the Arab 
states that "owing to limited resources, Jordan cannot face 
the Zionists alone," and added that "unless the Arab states 
aid the Jordan National Guard soon, it will be too late."^ 
The Arab states immediately donated one million dinars of 
the promised two and one-half.
Since the Arab states did not send large military 
aid, Husayn decided to open negotiations vâth Britain aiming 
at increasing the British subsidy to be paid as rents for 
the British bases in Jordan, not as charity. However, these 
negotiations did not yield the expected results, particu-
^Musa, op. cit., p. 596.
"^Husayn I bn Talal. (n.p. : n.d.), p. 17.
^Musa, op. cit.. p. 608,
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larly when Britain v/as revising its Middle East policies, 
which included the establishment of a Turkish-Iraqi alli­
ance. Thus, Britain wished to postpone the negotiations 
until talks with Iraq, on the Baghdad Fact were concluded, 
aiming at enticing Jordan to accede to the Pact.
From 1955 onward, friction ensued between the Uni­
ted States and Britain on the one hand and Arab Nationalists 
on the other. The West desired that the Arab League states 
be included in Western alliances.^ However, Egypt espoused 
neutralism while Iraq, responded approvingly to Western 
plans for a Dliddle East Defense Organization because it 
felt threatened by Soviet closeness to its territory and
believed that the Kurdish minority in Iraq might be incited
7
to revolt by the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, Iraq's association 
with Britain dictated such cooperation. Most importantly, 
however, was Iraq's realization that a union between Jordan 
and Iraq, then perhaps with Syria and Lebanon, could not 
materialize due to the opposition from Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, Iraq began to break away from the League 
and declared its intention of joining the Baghdad Pact, 
which it signed on February 24, 1954.
Fearful of Iraq's supremacy and possible annexation, 
Syria consulted with Egypt and Saudi Arabia and signed the
^bid.. p. 610.
^John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, (New 
York; Praeger, I960), p. 53.
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Q
Arab Covenant on March 2, 1955. The main features of the 
alliance were: federation of all the Arab states which re­
pudiated the Baghdad Pact; maintenance of the status quo 
and friendly relations among the Arab states; and the coor­
dination of foreign, economic, and cultural policies of the
Û
states acceding to the alliance. This step rendered Jor­
dan a victim of inter-Arab political struggle. It was re­
ported that Husayn was in favor of the Baghdad Pact, but 
the array officers were sharply divided.
In view of these developments, Jordan v/as approached 
by Britain as Abul-Huda declared that his government con­
templated the revision of the Anglo-Jordan treaty of 1948.^^ 
Simultaneously, Jordan was evading the Arab Covenant and 
appeared to be more inclined to the Y/estem approach of 
joining the Baghdad Pact,^^ The Arab offer of the /irab 
Covenant was politely rejected as "premature'* since Jordan
®Text in Khalil, Vol. II, p. 239» also Al-Ahram, 
March 7, 1955.
^Abidi, op. cit., p. 123.
^^The British Foreign Secretary announced in Parlia­
ment that his government would grant 350,000 pounds annual­
ly to Jordan for the maintenance of the National Guard,
In addition, Britain gave Jordan a gift of 12 Vampire 
fighters in 1955. (Great Britain, Parli^entary Debates, 
(Commons), Vol. 537, February 16, 1955, Col, 51; also An- 
thony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden. 
(Cambridge; Houghton Mifflin Company, I9S0), p.
Egypt also approached Jordan with similar aid when 
Salah Salim, a member of the Revolutionary Council, visited 
Amman. Al-Difa'a. March 4, 1955.
^^Al-Difa'a. March 4, 1955.
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was still tied to Britain "by the treaty of 1948, and be­
cause Husayn did not wish to provoke further dissention
12among the Arab states.
Cognizant of the deep apathy between Egyptian- 
Byrian-Saudi bloc on the one hand, and Iraq on the other, 
Husayn exploited the situation by presenting a counter plan, 
thereby sealing the fate of the Arab plan. He always in­
sisted that the other Arab countries must share in defense 
responsibilities with Jordan. In a letter to the Arab 
heads of state, he wrote:
I invite the heads of state to plan for fu­
ture events Israeli aggression^ with one united 
idea. Jordan is your country and your first line 
of defense and the front line of attack. I hope 
for your agreement, for there is no strength ex­
cept in unity and in sacrificing our persons for 
(Arab) unity. 13
The Jordan-Syria Alliance 
Following the dismissal of Glubb, Husayn was in­
vited to visit Syria where he was welcomed as an Arab lib­
erator.^^ On April 11, 1956, the King, President Al-Quw- 
watli and their Prime Ministers agreed on the following:
^^Pilistin, January 12, 1956.
The Aral) offer was announced in Damascus on Janu­
ary 11, 1956, It provided for a payment of 100 million 
Egyptian pounds over ten years; establishment of an Arab 
bank for economic development; financing development pro­
jects; sale of Jordanian bonds in the other Arab countries. 
Al-Ahram, January 12, 1956.
^^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal, op. cit., p. 75.
^tlbid., p. 99.
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1, Since Israel follows an aggressive policy 
while discarding U.N, resolutions, thereby creating 
a state of tension and insecurity along the truce 
line . . . the two parties agree to coordinate their 
defense plans and to improve cooperation between the 
two armies to repel Zionist aggression.
2, That both parties confirm that their poli­
cies are based on joining no foreign alliances, 15
Since the Arab Collective Defense Pact of 1950 
proved ineffective, the Arab countries entered into bilat­
eral and multilateral agreements with each o t h e r . S y r i a  
and Egypt concluded a special alliance which in effect com­
bined both armies under one command. On October 24, 1956,
Jordan joined the alliance and placed its army under the
17united command. This alliance may have been the immedi­
ate cause for the Israeli invasion of Egypt five days
n O
later. As the Tripartite Aggression was underway, Husayn, 
^^Ibid.. p. 101.
In May, Quwwatli visited Amman and signed with Jor­
dan which provided for actual unification of war efforts 
by creating a war council. Other provisions of the agree­
ment included;
a. elevating diplomatic representation to 
the rank of Embassy;
b. eliminating passports;
c. facilitating transit through Syria; and
d. admission of more Jordanian students to 
Syrian colleges. Ibid.. p. 103.
^^Jordan-Lebanon, May 21, 1956; Jordan-Iraq, June 
13, 1956; Jordan-Saudi Arabia, September 7, 1956. Syrian, 
Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian troops entered Jordan on November 
7, 1956 and November 15, 1956, respectively. Ellistin. 
November 17, 1956; Musa, op. cit.. p. 647.
17
'Al-Husayn I bn Talal. o p . cit.. p. 107; Hasan 
Mustafa, Al-Ta'awun Àl-*Askari Al-Arabi. (Beirut: Dar Al- 
Tal'ah, 1965), 2d ed., p. 53.
Ifi
Eden, op. cit.. p. 579.
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in fulfillment of his obligations under the alliance, 
proposed opening the Jordanian front, hut Nasser declined 
the offer since it was Britain and France who attacked 
E g y p t . B u t  Husayn cabled Nasser declaring, " vVe are 
with Egypt in her distress. With all my resources and
"20forces we will join the fight on your side to the end.
V/hile Jordan broke diplomatic relations with Prance,
Husayn warned Britain*s ambassador saying, " My forces
will demolish British airfields and bases inside Jordan
21if these bases were used in attacks against Egypt." 
^^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. p. 110,
Placing the blame on his Prime Minister, Nabulsi, 
the king stressed his determination to help Egypti
"I was determined to help Egypt from the 
first moment by entering the battle before the 
British-French ultimatum. But I was discouraged 
by Nabulsi and some of his ministers and the Chief 
of Staff, who sent an ambassador of a great power 
to alter my decision. Had I encountered sincere 
determination in that Cabinet before the ultimatum 
and we entered the battle at the beginning, it 
would have been possible to change its results, I 
stood by Egypt since the nationalization of the 
Canal burdening myself with great responsibilities. 
Ibid.. p. 232.
Following the attack, Husayn invited the Arab 
heads of state to a meeting in Beirut to discuss the tri­
partite aggression and "to reach an accord on what should 
be done to support Egypt. . . " See U.S. Dept, of State, 
United States Policy in the Middle East, September, 195o- 
Jüne:'T937r ("l?ew vSrkT'greenwooà" Pres'sl lOTT." p. gSOr’'
^%bid.. p. 110.
^4 bid. . p. 232.
In his public speeches, Husayn attacked the aggres­
sors, While declaring Arab support to Egypt. He said:
". . .We say to the Jews sind their support­
ers that the present battle is not the battle of 
Egypt alone, but it is the battle of the entire
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Two important steps were taken by Jordan following
the Suez war: the conclusion of the Arab Solidarity Pact,
22signed on January 19, 1957; and ending the Anglo-Jor- 
danian treaty of 1948.
The Arab Solidarity Pact 
Following the dismissal of Glubb, the British 
treaty with Jordan became worthless. Furthermore, the 
participation by Britain in the Suez attack ended all 
understanding between her and the Arabs, In Parliament, 
many urged ending the subsidy to Jordan by cancelling the 
treaty, and they were supported by the British press. 
Meanwhile, in Jordan, the country's position can be sum­
marized in two points: one, the British subsidy was part 
of the treaty according to which Britain was obligated 
to pay; two, only throu^ this subsidy could the expen­
ditures of the Legion be convered.
In the meanwhile. King Saud, Presidents Quwwatli 
and Nasser met in Cairo and sent Sa’ed Al-Ghazzi, Syria's
Arab nation. . . . History will hold those respon­
sible, and who have helped the aggressor and fail­
ed the international Organization in pursuit of their 
unholy goals. Instead of stopping the Jewish in­
vasion, they supported that aggression, and instead 
of solving the conflict by peaceful means in sup­
port of the United Nations and its Security Council, 
they rejected international principles and endan­
gered peace and security in this land. . . . I call 
upon the Arab nation to share her struggle. . "
Ibid.. p. 113.
22
text in
e #
Text in Khalil, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 287; Arabic 
Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. op. cit.. pp. 138-140.
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Prime I,minister on March 8, 1956 carrying a message to 
King Husayn inviting him to discuss Arab problems.
Husayn'8 reply was that an invitation was previously is­
sued by him personally; that replies were received from 
Quwwatli and Saud were received, but not from Nasser; 
and that only Paysal and Chamoun accepted to meet. In 
his negative reply, Husayn said;
I cannot agree to any diversion from the idea 
which I have already expressed. . . . Taking a new 
stand , as proposed in your message- a stand to 
be limited to the four of us only- does not, in 
my opinion, agree with the noble aims which we 
all wish to accomplish, nor does it serve the 
interests which we all attempt to realize for 
the future of the nation, the defense of its 
dignity, and the guarantees of its destiny. 25
Husayn* s reaction was for self-preservation. He 
always prefered a joint aid to Jordan by all the Arab 
states. Thus, any summit meeting should include his faith­
ful friends, his cousin, Paysal of Iraq, and Lebanese Pre-
26sident Camile Chamoun. This policy contained the shrewd 
realization that the more Arab states he could involve in 
the deliberations, the less likelihood of their reaching
^^Khalil, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 245.
^^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. op. cit.. p. 76.
To iBgypt, the inclusion of Iraq could achieve lit­
tle except to provide another occasion for expressing Arab 
disagreements. In the meantime, Egypt denied that its lack 
of reply implied non-cooperation on the Palestine question.
Survey of International Affairs. 1955-56,(London: I960), p. 
—
Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. op. cit.. p. 146.
^^bid.. p. 105.
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an agreement. Meanwhile, he clung to the British subsidy. 
Husayn's diplomatic drive for a wider Arab Collective Secu­
rity Pact was meant as no more than a smoke screen. Ideal­
ly, he felt that a new arrangement with Britain was the best 
27course. To Husayn, his security and salvation lay in as­
sociation with Iraq, not with the anti-Hashemite camp, re­
gardless of the enticing offers.
Insisting on isolating Husayn from Paysal and 
Chamoun, and in an attempt to break the pro-Western bloc, 
the three leaders wrote again bn March 12, 1956, offering;
Aid to Jordan to replace the British subsidy 
to the Arab Legion and the National Guard in the 
event of the stoppage of the British subsidy. The 
aid to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would con­
tinue for a period of not less than ten years,28
Also, they expressed their readiness to conclude military
29agreements coordinating the military relations with Jordan.
V/hile Jordan preferred association with and friend­
ship to Britain, it was at the same time, under public 
pressure to terminate the 1948 treaty and replacing the 
British subsidy v/ith that offered by the Arab states on 
condition that Jordan's army be included in the United Arab 
Command.Tactfully, avoiding the Arab offer, King Husayn
^^Vatikiotis, op. cit. pp. 124-125.
^®Khalil, op. cit.. p. 246.
Z^Ibid., p. 247.
^^Ibid., 640; Also Al-Husayn Ibn Talal, p. 129.
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refused replacing the British subsidy. However, he indi­
cated his acceptance of a secondary aid. He wrote:
The subsidy which the Hashemite JrLingdom 
obtains from Britain, in accordance with the pro­
visions of the existing treaty between the two 
countries, is a part of Britain's commitments ac­
cording to the treaty. On this basis, Jordan has 
the full right to request the British side to ful­
fill them so long as the treaty remains in force, 
but I welcome any aid you offer to my country. At 
the same time, my country declares that she is 
ready to coordinate military plans among ourselves 
in the face of the common enemy, , , , 31
Prime Minister Rifa'i echoed Husayn's position on
the question of subsidies as he told the Parliament:
If someone claims that the Government should 
abandon this aid and that it should be replaced by 
Arab aid, this means that Jordan's Government must 
exempt Britain from an obligation while retaining 
Jordan's obligation, 32
Husayn’s rejection of the Arab offer appeared to
have been caused by his suspicion of their ulterior motives
which could endanger Jordan's sovereignty. He declared:
Jordan welcomes aid from every Arab country 
which discharges its duty for strengthening our 
forces to resist the common enemy, 'Je, however, 
would reject any aid which is not given with good 
will or has ulterior motives. 33
Thus, the British treaty continued in effect, and with it
the Legion's subsidy. With the coming to power of the pro-
hasser group, the treaty was cancelled in March, 1957.
^^Ibid., p. 247; Al-Husayn Ibn Talal, op. cit., p.
129.
^^.bocuments on International Relations, 1956, p. 46,
p. 347,
^^Al-Difa'« October 2, 1956; Shwadran, op, cit..
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The Ri ::e of Pro-Nasser Nationalists:
The Nab Isi Government
The policy of the Jordan monarchy supported pro­
gressive socialist regimes and ideologies in the Arab V/orld 
provided that they v/ere not violent in nature, employing 
military force to attain their g o a l s.However, fearing 
the end of the monarchy, as was the case in Egypt and Iraq., 
Husayn was never at ease with the revolutionary regimes.
Nasser’s policy to build his policy on revolution­
ary ideology resulted in unrelenting attacks on the con­
servative regimes, including the Jordan monarchy. Since 
Nasserism had a great appeal with the majority of the Jor­
danian pop'ulation, particularly the Palestinians, the pro- 
Nasser leadership succeeded in attaining power under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Sulayman Al-Nabulsi, who made 
unprecedented changes in Jordsm’s foreign policy by adopt­
ing the Eg^rptian foreign policy l i n e . S i n c e  Jordan's 
policies, until that time, were in line with those of the 
7/est, it became the landmark of Egyptian policy to attack 
and critici-ze Jordan in almost every action.
As Prime WIinister desiring changes in his govern­
ment's policy, Nabulsi, on November 27, 1956, made an ela-
Jordan, Al-Urdun Wa Al-Qadiyiah Al-Pilistiniyiah 
%'a Al-alaqat Al-Ara‘biyyiah, op. cit., p. 2b.
Jordan, Chamber of Deputies, Al-Risalah Al-Ras- 
miyyiah - Official Gazette - (December 9, 1956), p. 1;
New York Times, December l7, 1956.
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borate exposition of Jordan's foreign policy* He said:
. . . The Government considers it a national 
duty to greet the struggle of Egypt against the 
British, French and Israeli enemies. The aggres­
sors must abide by the United Nations resolutions 
cind withdraw from the Arab land. The Government 
declares that the action against Egypt is an at­
tack on the Arab nation, the World public opinion, 
the United Nations and world peace. Its result 
would be continuation of Imperialism and Zionism.
The Government will work in cooperation with 
free Arab states in order to eradicate imperialism 
and all its facets from the Arab homeland. This 
can be accomplished by the freedom, unity and 
strength of the Arabs. In this respect, the Govern­
ment will endeavor to promote relations with the 
free Arab countries in the political, economic and 
cultural fields as a first step toward a federal 
union. The Government will abide by the military 
agreement with Egypt, Syria and the joint command. 
Following this, the Government announces that it 
will accept the financial aid offered by Egypt,
Syria and Saudi Arabia in order to replace the 
British subsidy, given to the army and to the 
National Guard.
The Government reiterates that the Arab 
nation is one, and so also is the Arab homeland.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a part of the 
Arab Hoqieland and the Jordanian people are a part 
of the Arab nation. The present Government is de­
termined to lead the people under the leadership 
of His Majesty the King, to the path of unity, free­
dom, strength and honor. . ,
The foreign policy of the Government emerges 
from the fundamental national interest. It is the 
assertion of our rights, sovereignty and freedom.
The foreign policy would be free from any considera­
tion or condition inconsistent with it. There would 
be coordination with the foreign policies of the 
free Arab countries. The national interest requires 
the establishment of diplomatic, economic and cul­
tural relations with all those countries which have 
sincerely stood with the Arabs in all their disputes 
and demands. In the light of this factor, the Govern­
ment is considering the recommendations of your 
sovereign chamber to establish diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union and other countries.
. . .  The Government considers all the im­
perialist pacts, with varying names and natures, 
and among them the Baghdad Pact, a great danger to 
the . Arab nation and homeland. The Government de-
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nounces them and is determined that Jordan will not 
join them or associate herself with with any of 
their subsidiaries.
The Anglo-Jordanian treaty was signed in a 
set of specific conditions. When the treaty was 
signed, there was no equality between the cont­
racting parties. It is unsatisfactory. Britain 
has contravened and violated its spirit and letter. 
Since its conclusion, fundamental international, 
internal and Arab changes have taken place ren­
dering the Treaty outof-date. The Government, 
after acceptance of the Arab financial aid and af­
ter determining other diplomatic, international, 
financial and economic arrangements, will termi­
nate the Treaty and will ask for the withdrawal 
of the British forces from, and liquidation of 
their bases in, the Jordanian lands. 36
Nabulsi's statement was a bold departure from 
previous of J o r d a n . W h i l e  he advocated Arab union, 
he declared that Jordan” . . .  cannot live forever as Jor­
dan. . . .  It must be connected militarily, economically 
and politically with one or more Arab states.”^
^^Ibid.. pp. 1-5,quoted in Abidi, op. cit.. p. 148.
'^^ The Speaker of the House sent on November 7, a 
telegram of protest to the Speaker of British House of 
commons and the Speaker of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies.
He asked that Iraq v/ithdraw from the Bagdad Pact, Ibid.. 
November 25, 1956, p. 3*
Furthermore, the Foreign Relations Committee pro­
posed establishing diplomatic relations v/ith both the U. 
S.S.R. and Red China, and the termination of the British 
treaty. These recommendations were approved by the Chamber 
of Deputies on November 20. Ibid.; See also Al-Husayn Ibn 
Talal.pp. 193-194.
The Chamber, in response to a rally, called for 
investigating the causes which led the Jordanian ambassador 
to the U.N., A.Î/:, Rifa'i, to abstain from voting for the 
admission of Red China, although he was instructed to join 
Syria and Egypt in voting for admission. Ibid.. p. 1. He 
was dismissed on April 10, 1957.
3^New York Times. December 16, 1956.; Hisham Sharabi, 
Government andTPoiitics of the Middle East, op. cit.. p. 187.
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In pursuance of his new policy entailing the sever­
ance of all ties with Britain including the subsidy, and 
of bringing Jordan into the Arab fold, Nabulsi declared 
that Jordan would accept the Arab aid.
The Government declares that it was decided 
as a matter of principle to accept the Arab sub­
sidy offered by Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to 
replace British aid to the A rm y and National Guard 
and will take positive steps to realize this deci­
sion. . . . The Government will be in contact with 
its sister states that offered Arab subsidy to take 
all the diplomatic, international, financial, and 
economic procedures which insure its determination 
to end the Anglo-Jordan Treaty. 39
At the request of Husayn the four heads of state 
met in Cairo and signed the Arab Solidarity Pact on Janu­
ary 19, 1957."^^ According to the agreement, the three 
states pledged to pay the total amount of 12,500,000 Egyp­
tian pounds annually or their equivalent to Jordan under 
the heading "Arab o b l i g a t i o n . T h i s  amount was to be
^^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. p. 133.
This declaration comforted the British side for it 
relieved Britain from paying annual subsidy. The Arab side, 
on the other hand, were faced with a matter of fact. The 
Egyptian Ambassador in Amman met with three cabinet members 
and warned them against the consequences of the "dangerous 
game" as enunciated in the Government statement, and added 
that Egypt preferred postponing the abrogation of the treaty 
Ibid., pp. 133-134; Musa, op. cit.. p. 653.
'^ F^or the text of the Pact see Great Britain, Bri­
tish and Foreign State Papers. 1957-1958. Vol. 163, p. 39#; 
lÆ.alilV Vol. II, pp. 287-268; Al-Husayn Ibn Talal, p. 138; 
Musa, op. cit., p. 649; Jordan, Chamber of beputies, Janu-
27, 195%' "p. -2-. ------------- -----
Sabri Al-Asali signed for Quwwattli who was visit­
ing in Russia. Musa, op. cit., p. 649.
^^Syria was to pay two and a half million, Saudi 
Arabia five million, and Egypt five million. Only Saud
333
devoted to the army and the National Guard. The Agreement 
was valid for ten years and could he automatically renev/ed 
unless the parties agreed to terminate it.
Criticizing the Arah subsidy to Jordan as valueless, 
Burhan Eddin Bashyan, Foreign Minister of Iraq, said on De­
cember 30;
The Anglo-Jordan!an treaty cannot be termin­
ated by the mere giving of annual financial aid to 
Jordan in place of Britain’s aid. Any such aid 
would relieve Britain of the aid it gives annually 
to Jordan, without affecting in the least the Anglo- 
Jordanian treaty. It would in fact, be aid to Bri­
tain more than aid for Jordan. 42
Immediately after the signing of the agreement, 
Britain sent a memorandum requesting that Jordan clarify 
its position regarding the treaty in the light of Arab sub­
sidy, and also to open the negotiations to end the Anglo-
Jordan Treaty of 1948.^^ The negotiations were conducted 
at Amman, and on February 13, 1957, the treaty was abrogated. 
The agreement was unanimously approved by a joint session 
of Parliament on March 3, 1957.^^
paid in full for the first year; Syria and Egypt did not. 
Jordan exempted Saud from his obligation when the Arab 
Union went into effect. Musa, op. cit., p. 651; Husayn, 
Uneasy Dies the Head, p. 161.
Majali wrote that the Syrian Ambassador to Amman 
had stated that the Arab subsidy was merely a promise aimed 
at threatening Britain so that it would not take advantage 
of Jordan's economic needs, and impose on Jordan conditions 
to follow a certain policy. Majali, Muthakkirati, p. 207.
^^"Nasser and Arab Unity," Editorial Research, 1958,
p. 85.
^^Majali, Muthakliirati, p. 210.
'^ '^ rfusa, op. cit.. pp. 651-660; Al-Husayn Ibn Talal,
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However, the honeymoon of the nationalists was short­
lived. It may he noted that until the advent of the Nabul­
si government the King and Cabinet used to have identical 
views on foreign policy, and together held the opposition 
in the Parliament at bay. #ith Nabulsi as Prime Minister, 
the Cabinet became a part of the opposition and elbowed the 
King into isolation. Meanwhile, both the Cabinet and the 
King looked for support inside the country and outside it.
It was, however, clear that Husayn could not turn the bal-
45ance in his favor without external support.
The opposition wanted to change the British-Jordan 
alliance with one with Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, but 
Husayn showed little enthusiasm. If Husayn needed a strong 
ally in his battle against the pro-Egyptian Nabulsi govern­
ment, the United States was also desirous of isolating 
Egypt. '/Yhile the Cabinet's policy v/as encouraged by Nasser, 
the uncompromising attitude of Husayn was also directly en­
couraged by the United States, The Eisenhower Doctrine 
supplied Husayn with assurances against the opposition who 
were branded as Communist inspired.
pp. 151-152; for correspondence, termination of the treaty 
and annexes, see G, B., British and Foreign State Papers, 
1957-1958. Vol. 163, pp, 39-4$.
^^Abidi, op, cit,, p. 165.
4Glbid,, p. 166.
Hanson Baldwin, New York Tim^s correspondent, ob­
served on March 10, 1957, that the differences between 
Husayn and the Cabinet grew "vdth American encouragement,"
See also the'2arka Affair" in Al-Husayn Ibn Talal, pp. 136ff;
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V/h.i le Jordan's relations with other Arab coantrios 
were secondary, its Egyptian foreign policy was pivotal 
as it, more often than not, affected and guided inter-Arab 
politics. The major policy disagreement revolved around 
Husayn's attempts at wresting Arab leadership from Nasser. 
Husayn's success was conditional upon non-Arab support, 
while Nasser's triumph was dependent upon his espousal of 
an all-Arab policy which appealed to the overwhelming major­
ity of the Arab people including the Jordanian subjects.
In this cold war, Saudi Arabia seemed to hold the 
balance in view of its wealth and its sliifting policy from 
one grouping to another. It sided with Egypt and Syria 
when rivalries with the Hashemites were in question; and 
v/ith the Hashemites when the conservative regimes were being 
threatened by the progressive r u l e r s . T h u s  while the 
Saudis opposed Jordan's entry into the Baghdad Pact for that 
was tantamount to strengthening their traditional rivals, 
they welcomed the Eisenhower .Doctrine from which Saudi Ara­
bia would receive financial, military and political sup­
port. Accordingly, the Saudis joined Husayn's send-offi-
also, Majali, I.Iuthakkirati, pp. 217 ff; also Musa, op. cit., 
pp. 661 ff. Por the' statements of Nabulsi and General 
Hayari, C.G.S.,, see Al-Hayah. April 21, 1957; New York 
limes, April 24, 1957; Hlistin, April 23, 1957; Seale, op. 
cit.7 p. 289.
^"^Buring the Zarqa incident, when Husayn accused 
the army high command of plotting to overthrow him. King 
Saud told Husayn, "You can always count on the support of 
my country, my armj»’, my fortunes and myself." Al-Husayn 
Ibn Talal. p. 190; also lendon Times, June 23, 156T.
48j. S. Haleigh, "The Middle East in 1956: A Poli-
336
ci al endorsenent of the iUnerican Plan, which was viewed 
as beneficial to the monarchial regimes. This policy was 
disappointing to Ügypt, whose policies stressed opposition 
to all Western policies in the Arab World, viewed as detri­
mental to Egypt’s leadership in particular and to Arab 
unity in general.
The Qassem-Nasser difficulties erupted as a result 
of the creation of the U.A.R. which facilitated Egypt's 
control of Syria, and partly because Nasser's plan to bring 
Iraq's revolutionary government within Egypt's orbit had 
not succeeded. The outcome of the conflict v/as a reapproach-
ment between Egypt on the one hand, Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
50on the other. As Nasser sought to isolate Iraq, he flirt­
ed with the conservative regimes. However, "the price for 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia was a form of assurance of respect 
for the integrity and independence of their regimes."^
Thus after interruption, Jordan-Egyptian diplomatic rela-
tical Survey," Lliddle Eastern Affairs, IX, I'iarch, 1958, 
p. 93.
^%'isher, op. cit., p. 175.
Islamic ideology still plays a decisive role in 
sustaining the structure of the state in Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. Islamism provides the necessary justifi­
cation for combatting Communism. Ironically, the conserva­
tive regimes are committed to pro-Western policies partly 
due to Islamic conservatism. Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, 
p. 99.
^^George Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics, (New 
York; Praeger, 1961), p. ”146-7.
^^Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 25.
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52tions were stored in August, 1959. A year later, follow­
ing the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Majali, enmity 
broke again, Moreover, because Jordan and Turkey recog­
nized the secessionist Syrian regime with haste, followed 
by the great powers, it seemed that Turkey and Jordan must 
have been "privy to the plot," Nasser’s reply was imnedi-
54.
ate breaking off relations with Ankara and Amman, Vvlien 
the secessionist Syria flirted with Iraq, to form a union, 
hgypt opposed the move. This even had a significant impact 
on Jordan's foreign policy which resulted in Jordan's rap­
prochement with Egypt for Jordan was threatened by the con-
55solidation of the Ba'ath Party in Syria and Iraq,
^^ Ibid.
This was the result of the visit by the League Sec­
retary-General who visited Amman and conducted talks with 
the Jordan government, Musa, op, cit,, p, 699.
^%aza'a Al-Majali became Jordan's Prime Minister 
with the objective of joining the Baghdad Pact, Popular 
opposition compelled him to resign. His assassination was 
connected with Egyptian intrigues.
At the U.N. General Assembly, Husayn accused the U. 
A.Pl. of "incitements to overthrow our Government and assas­
sinate our leaders. . . . "  The Arab League, meeting at 
Shtoura, Lebanon, in 1958 passed a resolution calling upon 
its members "to refrain from all activities that would dis­
turb ’Praternal Relations,'" See Husayn’s speech in Khalil, 
Vol. II, p. 985,
^^Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p, 30,
Husayn could not send a committee to Damascus to 
congratulate Syria for its independence for fear of being 
implicated. Mohammad Faraj, Al-Ummah Al-Arabiyyiah Ala Al- 
Tarq I la Wahdat Al-Had^. ( Cairo: ï)ar Al-ï'ikr, 1964/.
V/hein the Republic of Iraq signed a unity treaty with 
the U.A.R. in 1962, the Jordanian Parliament met for nine 
hours and urged the government to join the treaty. Faced 
with a vote of no confidence, the government fell. Ibid,
^^Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p, 122,
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Nasser's decision to "biiild his policy on revolution­
ary ideology led him to the intervention in Yaman, which to 
him seemed a golden opportunity. His army intervened as 
the champion of revolutionary progress while Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan felt compelled to support the royalists out of 
dynastic solidarity, and were put in an ultra-reactionary 
light in the eyes of their ov/n people,
When the Imam of Yaman was ousted, Husayn sent him
a message of support in which he declared, "V/e confirm to
you that we shall do our national duty fully in all fields
57and in every respect to halt aggression," This declara­
tion was followed by an attempt by Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
to bomb the republican-held territories, but this threat 
was never carried out because the Yamani Republican Govern-
^^Ibid., p. 54.
\vhile Nasser could have had extra-territorial ambi­
tions, in the Peninsula, his move into the Yaman v/as una­
voidable and was not dependent upon Soviet support. He 
told the American Ambassador, "V/hat I am doing in Yaman and 
elsewhei'e I would be doing even if the U.S.S.R, did not ex­
ist." Copeland, op. cit., p. 276.
Hgypt's involvement in Yaman was opposed because 
Saudi Arabia viewed it as establishing a foothold on the 
Peninsula as it was viewed in the light of the Egyptian in­
vasion of Saudi Arabia in 1920. by supporting the republi­
cans against the royalists, the monarchists in Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan would be threatened by similar revolutions. Thus, 
the two monarchs opposed Nasser in Yaman by sending troops 
and arms to the royalists. Even the Shah of Iran became 
involved.
In addition to troops dispatched on September 13, 
1961, Husayn sent one-half of his airforce to Yaman. How­
ever, the pilots defected to Gsiiro instead. Later, when 
relations improved, Husayn gave amnesty to the pilots while 
Nasser, at Husayn ' s req.uest, released the aircraft. Para j, 
op. cit.. p. 474.
57 New York Times. October 22, 1962.
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ment of Abdullah Al-Sallal threatened to declare war on
58both countries if that ever took place.
Husayn’s alliance with Saud on the Yamani war against 
ügypt further widened the gulf between the progressive ide­
ology and conservatism in the Arab world. To confirm their 
alliance, Husayn and Saud met at Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, in
August, 1962, and agreed to establish a unified military
5Qcommand, thereby weakening the Arab Solidarity Pact.
By late 1963 Husayn was no longer able to count on 
Western support as a reward for his anti-Communist policy.
The U.S. became convinced that its policy which was adopted 
in 1958, had been unsuccessful in isolating Egypt from the 
Arab people.Instead, the events in the Arab World 
resulted in the U.S. losing its supporters following the 
Iraqi revolution and the subsequent removal of Lebanese 
President Ghamoun. Only King Husayn was left tied to the 
Western alliance. This situation signaled to both the 
U.S. and Husayn that their policies should be changed to 
accommodate Arab relations. Accordingly, the U.S. adopted 
a policy of "disengagement" from inter-Arab disputes in an 
attempt to avoid confrontation with Arab nationalism.^^
^^Ibid.. November 13, 1962.
5QMustafa, op. cit., p. 50; also Middle Eastern 
Affairs, Vol. 14, (1963J, p. 44.
^^John Badeau,"U.S.A. and U.A.R.: A Crisis of Con­
fidence," Modernization of the Arab World, op. cit., p.
216.
Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, qp. cit., 
p. 154.    —
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As a result, the U.S. recognized the Yamani Republic, and
fi?
extended economic aid to Egypt, Meanwhile Nasser's ex­
changes with Khruschev over Communist influence in Egypt, 
made him America's "chosen instrument" in the Middle East,^^
Husayn, on the other hand, had to depend on his 
own resourcefulness in reestablishing his popularity. He 
increased his visits to the West Bank, and on January 16, 
I960, he announced that Jerusalem would be the second capi­
tal where Cabinet and Parliament would meet from time to 
time.^^ The emphasis on the unity of the two banks was in 
fact a belated response to President Qassem’s as well as 
Egypt's call for the creation of a "Palestine Entity," which 
Jordan had opposed earlier.
By reconciling with Nasser, it was hoped, Husayn 
would enhance his position in the Arab World.While such 
approach would help relax the Arab Cold War, it would also 
minimize the Nasserite pressures in Jordan.However, by 
claiming that liis differences with Nasser were insignificant 
and not deep-rooted, Husayn might have been responding to
G^ibid.. p. 155.
^^Richard Nolte, "United States Policy in the Middle 
East," The United States and the Middle East, ed, Georgiana 
Stevens, (Ëngle Wood Ôliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 
171.
^^Pilistin, January 17, I960,
^^Kerr, The Arab Cold War, op. cit,, p. 151.
GGlbid.
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American policy of strengthening Arab nationalism in the 
face of Communism. Furthermore, Husayn came to realize 
that Jordan's stability depended to a large measure on 
closer relations with Egypt', He declared;
There is no doubt that Egypt loses a great 
deal when Jordan draws away from it. While I am 
speaking to you from the bottom of my heart, Jor­
dan loses more and more as Egypt draws away from 
it. 67
Accordingly, when Nasser called for an Arab summit, 
Husayn accepted the invitation on the SEime day. The Cairo 
conference gave Jordan an opportunity to emerge from its 
isolation, particularly in relation to the Arab republics. 
At the Alexandria summit, also in 1964, Husayn did in fact 
bring Jordan's policy in line with those of the other Arab 
states. Accordingly, he joined Iraq and Egypt in support­
ing the idea of a Palestine entity, and agreed to the ere- 
ation of the Palestine liberation Organization. Having 
recognized the Yamani Republic on July 23, 1964, Husayn 
acted as mediator between Nasser and king Paysal Ibn Saud 
on the Yamani question. Moreover, Husayn affirmed his 
abandonment of neutralism, declaring that Jordan would 
accept Soviet aid, and that American aid could be exchanged 
by aid from the Arab states,
^^Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 5, (I'lay,
1961), p. m : ----------------- -
fift
Egypt never did acknowledge Jordan's annexation 
of Arab Palestine, and considered the West Bank as "occu­
pied by the Jordan army." Ibid., Vol. XI, (December, I960), 
pp. 330 ff.
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Following the Cairo summit, king Husayn visited the 
U.S.A. not to reaffirm M s  loyalty to Washington, as he did 
in 1959 following the implementation of the Eisenhower Doc­
trine, but as an ambassador of all the Arab States to verify
Arab solidarity in the face of Israeli aggression, and its
gq
plans to divert the Jordan River. The Arab summits re­
sulted in almost a turn-about policy by Jordan, as it ex­
pressed identification with the non-aligned bloc. Having 
established closer relations with Nasser, Husayn visited 
India on December 3, 1963, and headed the Jordanian dele­
gation to the conference of the neutralist nations in Cairo 
on October 5, 1964. Moreover, Jordan continued the policy 
of exchanging diplomatic relations with the East European 
states, Husayn's previous activities did not involve the 
U.S. directly, although Jordan's policy had veered away 
from a strictly pro-Western orientation. However, in June,
1965, Jordan joined other United Nations members in cen-
70soring the American action in the Dominican Republic.
This unprecedented involvement in international questions, 
appeared as an act of defiance of the United States wMch 
gained for Husayn a new position with the non-aligned bloc.
Thus improved relations with Egypt restored Husayn's 
prestige which he lost in 1957. VHiile he began to speak 
for the Arabs rather than against them, Paysal I "bn Saud
^^New York Times, April 17, 1964.
'^^bid.. June 8, 1965.
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and Husayn welcomed the era of Arab summitry because it 
provided for peaceful coexistence with the Arab republican
71regimes, hence an assurance for their conservative thrones. 
The summits were an approach to stand united against 
a common enemy, and to concentrate on economic development 
by suspending the Arab Cold War, In this period, Husayn 
acted as his own Foreign Minister. Ironically, in 1964, 
Husayn implemented the Nabulsi platform of 1956, which 
called for closer relations with Egypt and the other Arab
72states, espousing neutralism, and recognizing the U,S,S,R,' 
The era of reconcilliation lasted until 1966, then 
collapsed. This change was caused by the Yamani war, the 
Egyptian sensitivities, and the Syrian prodding. The Soviet 
Union, Britain and the United States, by giving encourage­
ment to rival proteges, contributed to this collapse which 
resulted in a sharply divided blocs; a Syria-Egyptian axis 
confronting a Jordan-Saudi one. In January, 1967, Husayn 
was prepared to withdraw his recognition of the Yamani 
Republic in view of the letter's attitude toward Jordan,
Thus Husayn threatened that until the Yamani Republic changed
its relations with the U,A,R, and its attitude toward the
73monarchies, recognition would be withdrawn.
^^Kerr, The Arab Cold War, op, cit,, p, 146,
"^ T^he U.S.S.R, recognized Jordan in 1964.
^^Al-Ahram. January 26, 27, 1967,
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The rivalry between Nasser and king Faysal Ibn 
Saud, led the latter to organize an alignment of Muslim 
states, which he called the Islamic Conference, ostensibly 
to "stop Communism," but in fact to "stop N a s s e r . V i e w ­
ing the Conference as political rather than spiritual,
7*5Cairo and Damascus labeled it "the Islamic Pact." Dis­
pleased with Husayn's endorsement of the Saudis American- 
inspired alliance, Nasser accused Hasayn as having "wagged 
his tail."*^^ Two months later, when Nasser publicly des­
cribed Husayn as a "debauched king, the adulterator of 
Jordan," Husayn, meekly protested by withdrawing his am­
bassador to Cairo.
7^Copeland, op. cit., p. 271.
7^Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 146.
Eing Fay sal visited tTordah, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, 
Tunisia, Pakistan, Sudan, Mali, and Guinea to invite their 
leaders to meet at Mecca and to discuss the creation of 
an Islamic solidarity as opposed to progressive secularism.
His father. King Ibn Saud, considered Arabism as 
second to Islamism. His idea was spiritual rather than 
political in content. Mohammad Rifa'at, Al-Tawjih Al- 
Siyasi Mlfikrah Al-Arabiyiah Al-Hadithah, (Caire; bar 
Al^ia^arif, 1^54), p. 2^8. ^ee an elaborate discussion 
on the Islamic union in Mohammad Hasanein Haykal, "Tareeq 
Al-îilalik," Al-Ahram, February 13» 1967. Also Ahmad Kamel 
Tubji, Al-Quwwat Al-Musallahah Al-Arabiyyiah Wa Al-Salam 
Fi Al-Yaman, idairo: Al-Dar Al-Qawmiylan Ml-gjl'ba’ah. Wa- 
Al-!Nashr, 1966), pp. 87-91.
7^Kerr, The ^ a b  Cold War, op, cit., p. 155.
At the Casablanca Giiird' Arab isummit, the heads 
of states agreed to "respect the sovereignty of each Arab 
state. . . and non- interference in their internal affairs," 
and "revision of press laws . . .  to prohibit any discus­
sion outside constructive criticism, which would worsen 
Arab inter- relations or does harm to the heads of states, 
directly or indirectly." Ratib, op. cit.. p. 91.
77ihid.
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However, shortly before the 1967 war, Husayn de­
cided to normalize relations with Egypt# On May 30, 1967, 
he signed the defense pact, about which General Mer, in 
the name of the Egyptian army commented,” V/e are glad that 
you are once again in the family picture. It strengthens 
our co nfidence.Compared to pre-1967 period, Jordan's 
relations with the Arab States have been closer and more 
friendly. Perhaps fighting a common war and taking an 
anti-Western stand contributed to this situation.
Following the war, the Arab leaders met at Khartoum 
from August 29 to September 1, 1967, to study the Arab 
situation and to smoothen inter-Arab relations. Among the 
resolutions taken at the conference was an agreement that 
provided for indefinite financial aid to Jordan and the 
U.A.R. The resolution stated:
The kings of Saudi Arabia, the State of 
Kuwait and the State of libya, resolve to be 
obligated to pay the following amounts annually 
and at the beginning of every three months start­
ing the beginning of October until the erasing of 
all traces of aggression: Saudi Arabia, fifty
million pounds; Kuwait, fifty million sterling and; 
Idbya, thirty million sterling. 79
See a brilliant commentary by Haykal in Al-Ahram 
entitled, ”Asl Al-ttLkayah,” January 6, 1967.
King Husayn accused the U.A.R. of "tampering with 
Jordan's security and misleading the citizens,” London 
Times. February 24, 1967.
Vance and Lauer, o^^ cit.. p. 48.78, _______________
With the signing of the ï%ict, Cairo Radio ceased its 
attacks on Husayn and the Jordanian Government, and Nasser 
addressed Husayn as "Dear Brother." Keesings Archives. 
Research Report, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, the 1967 oam-
o a g h : - Œ ë w ^ r E " : - ^ c î g % i e r 8; T. o: -----------------
^^Ratib, op. cit., p. 91.
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Conclusion
Except with Iraq, the policies of King Abdullah 
were characterized by lack of cooperation with the Arab 
states. In order to avoid Abdullah's dangerous course and 
for tactical reasons required to cope with the new circum­
stances that engulfed his regime, King Husayn adoped a 
policy based on "complete understanding and absolute co­
operation with the Arab states."
This policy seemed to be a continuation of King 
Talal's plan to bring Jordan back into the Arab fold, for 
the era when Abdullah thought that he was an island unto 
himself htid ended. Husayn came to realize that he could 
best preserve his throne by pursuing a middle of the road 
policy. Accordingly, while he stressed cooperation with 
the Arab states, he also emphasized western friendship.
This v/as an escape route which Abdullah refused to provide 
for himself, and which ultimately resulted in his demise.
The difference between the two kings may lie in their per­
sonalities )ind to the internal and external settings during 
their respective reigns. Husayn's youthfulness and V/estem 
education, together with the new political atmosphere in 
the Arab world, had great impact on his behavior and poli­
cies. ün the other hand, Abdullah's autocratic mentality 
and superiority complex rendered him inflexible, hence 
scornful of others as he pursued an independent personalized 
policy. By contrast, Husayn adopted a flexible policy v/hich
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enabled hi.ni to exhibit cordiality and cooperation when it 
was in Jordan's interest. Accordingly, it became a land­
mark in Husayn's foreign policy to associate with one state 
or a bloc, Arab or V/estern, when such action provided him 
with economic, political or military advantages. Thus 
Husayn's foreign policy could be described as neutral, per­
mitting him to maneuver without limitations.
Husayn's flui.d policy derived from his quest for 
the security of his regime. He was never at ease with the 
Arab revolutionary regimes which he believed to have con­
stituted the major threat to his throne, even more than 
Israel. This attitude inevitably resulted in the Jordan- 
Arab states cold war.
For one thing, Husayn differed from Hasser on the 
issue of Arab nationalism. Y/hile Nasser's policy stressed 
comprehensive unity - that is liquidation of states -,
Husayn wanted unity based on the equality of member states. 
Accordingly, he accused Nasser of imperialism since his 
plan, according to Husayn, would subjugate other states to 
ligyptian domination. Thus, agreement with Nasser meant 
capitulation which he resisted.
One concludes that Husayn would agree to a compre­
hensive Arab unity providing that he is its leader. Barring 
that, he approved of a confederation whereby each state 
preserved its ov/n leadership. Such policy proved harmful 
to Jordan since Arab public opinion yearned for full unity
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rather than parochialism. Furthermore, to become a leader 
one must secure the trust, allegiance, and the consensus 
of the population. V/hile Husayn could have achieved such 
stature, by espousing parochialism and emphasizing dynastic 
interests, he alienated Jordan while placing obstacles to 
unity.
CHAPTER XIV 
JORDAN-BRITISH RELATIONS
Introduction
Transjordan was a British o.reation which came as
a result of the compromise reached between Amir Abdullah
and Churchill at the Jerusalem Conference on March 27, 1921*^
The Anglo-Jordan relationship was governed by the terms of
2
the Palestine Mandate, The Mandate was an attempt to 
establish European influence instead of direct colonial­
ism which could create national reaction in the colonial 
nation. However, the creation of the ^hnirate was a step 
in the direction of fulfilling Britain's obligation to the 
League of Nations to encourage self-government. The Amirate 
was an administrative unit under the Mandate vâth Abdullah 
as Britain's agent: its financial, military, and political 
relations were entirely in the hands of Britain. Thus, in 
effect, the territory of Transjordan was a colony except 
in name,^ since it was administered indirectly through the
^Sha'ar, 1st ed., op. cit.. pp. 176-182.
^Until August 12, 1927, The Mandate for Palestine 
and Transjordan was one.
^Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs, op. cit., p. 64.
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British Resident.^
The Hashemites did not see in the mandate system 
tin evil. They only saw in it a method of ruling which would 
allow them through cooperation with Britain to preserve 
their thrones. Abdullah considered Britain as a private 
and personal friend under whose protection his dynastic in- 
terests would be preserved. In return, the Hashemites 
chose to advance British policies in their territories at 
the expense of nationalist demands,
Britain recognised the Amirate of Transjordan in the 
Inglo-Transjordanien treaty of May 25, 1923, when the prin­
cipality attained autonomy,^ A second agreement with Bri­
tain was signed in 1928. It provided for the creation of 
a political system with limited constitutional characteris­
tics. The treaty of 1928 "was imposed without consultation
7
or negotiations with the Transjordan people. It also 
undermined Abdullah’s sovereignty, as Toynbee related:
It made no express recognition of Transjordan
^London Times, March 28, 1928,
Commenting on this point, Abdullah said, "This is 
my problem with all the Prime Ministers, . . , They could 
not do anything before they consulted the British Ambas­
sador." Eajali, Muthakkirati, p. 97,
Tiiis state of affairs continued even during Husayn’s 
reign. See Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 152.
c
Anis Sayegh, op, cit,, p. 251.
^The British High Commissioner of Palestine informed 
Abdullah of his independence in a public ceremony on May 25, 
1923. Musa, op, cit., p, 201.
'^ Husa, op, cit,, p. 279.
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independence except in the technical sense in which 
the term was used in British treaties with tracial 
chiefs in the Persian Gulf. 8
Accordingly, the treaty gave Britain a great degree of con­
trol over "all matters concerning the foreign relations of 
Transjordan," military affairs, and more importantly, Trans­
jordan’s finances.9 It was incompatible with independence.
From 1921 until 1956, Jordanian politics were great­
ly influenced by its relations with Britain. This influence 
was the source of contention between the Arab nationalists 
and the Hashemites which was a factor in the uncertainty of 
political life in Jordan.
Abdullah's pro-British policy earned him the respect 
of the Western world. Supported by British relationships - 
a major source of his legitimacy and authority - and by 
contreling the Arab Legion, Abdullah secured for himself 
the separate statehood of Transjordan.^^
After World War II, British-Jordan relations were 
extraordinarily cordial. The 1928 treaty was revised in 
March of 1946. The nev/ treaty recognized the independence 
of Transjordan which became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jor­
dan. Abdullah's ability to obtain independence v/as a re-
O
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey 
of International Affairs, ed. Arnold Toynbee, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1928), p. 323.
^Musa, op. cit., p. 280.
^^Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 48.
^^For the text of the treaty see Khalil, Vol. II,
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ward to an ally. Atdullah declared v/ar on Germany, and
12the Arab legion shared greatly In the Allied war effort.
While the Amirate became independent, Britain re­
tained the right to station troops anywhere in the country 
to protect its vital strategic military interests in the 
region. I'hrthermore, while the provisions of the new 
treaty changed much of the legal terminology of the state's 
institutions, it did not alter the nature of rule and au- 
thori ty.^ '^
The 19AC treaty was superseded two years later by 
the treaty of 1948, Although the new treaty limited Bri­
tish presence inside Jordan to three airstrips only, Jor­
dan's military and financial affairs continued to be under 
the direct British authority. Although Abdullah became 
very active in the field of Arab nationalist politics, his 
foreign relationsvere unequivocally in line with those of 
Britain. To some extent Abdullah's ability to conclude the 
1948 treaty was "due to the revived political opposition in
pp. 379-384; G. B., British and Foreign State Papers, 146, 
1946, p. 461.
] 2
The Arab Legion was assigned to the security of 
the vital communication lines in the Middle mast particu­
larly the oil pipelines, Furthermore, units were given 
guard duties for British installations in the Ivlddle Bast 
theater. In addition, the Legion units participated in 
quashing the Rashid Ali Al-Kilani revolt in Iraq, and in 
fighting against the Vichy French in Syria and Lebanon in 
1941. Musa, op. c i t . p. 400; Vatikiotis, op. cit.. p. 73.
^^Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 49«
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the coimtry.”^ ^ Although the treaty was an improvement
over that of 1946, opposition inside the country was mani-
or 
16
fested.^^ The press attacked Prime Minister Abul-Huda f
yielding to Britain and for including many reservations.
The treaty was not sent to Parliament because the consti­
tution dictated that king and the Cabinet were responsible
17for treaty making.
After the conclusion of the 1948 treaty, relations 
with Britain became cool due to the Arab policy in general 
and to British support of the Zionist state. V/hi.le the 
treaty obligated Britain to come to the aid of Jordan in 
case of outside aggression, the treaty was not sufficiently 
and plainly enunciated. This made the British press and 
politicians who sympathized with Zionism suggest that Bri­
tain would never go to the defense of its ally against Is­
rael. This enabled hostile Arab opinion to doubt British
^^bido. p. 50.
^^Opposition centered on the following points;
1. The population were not consulted because the 
constitution prohibited it.
2. The treaty placed Jordan in a subservient posi­
tion particularly in connection with finances.
3. National aspirations dictated the abrogation of 
the treaty and prevention of the conclusion of any other 
which limits national sovereignty. Musa, op. cit., p. 432. 
For the text of the treaty see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 386- 
389; G. B., British and Foreign State Papers, 151, II, 1948,
p. 90-100.
^^Majali, Muthakkii'ati, p. 64; Musa, op. cit.,
p. 432.
^^Majali, Muthakkirati, p. 64; Vatikiotis, op. cit.,
p. 50.
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1 ftsincerity. This suspicion was verified on several oo- 
iq
casions.
The treaty would expire in 1968. However, it could 
have "been revised after fifteen years and its duration re­
duced "if a complete system of security agreements under
Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations is concluded
20"before the expiry of this period."
This provision served as the basis for the Huda ne­
gotiations in 1954, and the subsequent demand by Britain 
that Jordan accede to the Baghdad Pact in return for abro­
gation of the treaty.
On November 7, 1954, Prime LCinister Huda declared 
that his government wished to amend the 1948 treaty. This 
v/as occasioned by the changes in the international situation
^^Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 301. Britain 
made it clear that it would defend Bast of the Jordan pro­
per, not the West Bank.
^^Cne example was when Britain failed to come to 
the aid of Jordan when Zionist forces in violation of the 
truce occupied Eastern Negeb and the Gulf of Aqaba. The 
British were in an extremely awkward position; "they de­
cided not to comply with Transjordan's request for assis­
tance. This meant that they were giving up their hope of 
obtaining the Negeb for Transjordan, and indirectly for 
themselves." Shwadran, op. cit., pp. 275-278.
Britain justified her action by stating that her 
decision was in deference to the U.N. Another was in 1956 
when the British declined Husayn's demand that the British 
airforce help Jordan in certral Palestine when Zionist at­
tacks were being conducted on peaceful border villages by 
air and large infantry forces supported by armor. Glubb,
A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 302; Musa, op. cit., p. 530.
2D
Article 7. Text of treaty is in Khalil, Vol. II,
p. 387.
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in general, and in i-jgypt and Iraq, in particular. Britain 
had concluded an agreement with Egypt to evacuate the Suez 
Base and negotiations were made with the Iraqi government 
regarding the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty to he re­
placed by the Baghdad Alliance. "Iraq has made ray govern­
ment think of amending our treaty with Britain and negotia-
21tions in this regard will start shortly."
Negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Jordan 
treaty v/ere linked with the success of the Baghdad Pact 
and Jordan’s accession to it. However, Jordan’s failure 
to join the alliance together with nationalist pressure re­
sulted in the dismissal of Glubb and the subsequent termin­
ation of the treaty which formally ended Jordan’s financial 
dependence on Britain in March, 1957.
The Baghdad Pact
Background
The objective of British policy in the Middle East
was the security of a broad belt of territory stretching
from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Gulf containing the 
22oil fields. Per more than two hundred years, Britain
pT
""London Times, November 8, 1954. The termination 
of the treaty was welcomed by Britain. "No longer did Bri­
tain find it advantageous to be associated v/ith an Arab 
state on terms that might involve Britain against Israel." 
M. A. Fitzsimmons, Empire By Treaty, (Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame University Press, 1^64;, p. .
Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 224.
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regarded as its vital interest the free access to these
lands for its transit. Yet, "Britain had no interests in
2 ^these countries thenselves. " British negotiations with 
Eusayn I in December 1915 were to create a unified Arab 
state friendly to Britain to replace the Turks. But the 
introduction of the Zionists into Palestine and the French 
conquest of Syria ruined the plan. The creation of the 
Arab League in 1945 however aimed at creating similar con­
ditions with a bloc of Arab states.
Strategically, Britain considers the îvüddle Last 
as most vital for the security of Europe and was ready to 
accept Arab friendship and guaranteed to keep Palestine an 
Arab territory if the Arabs agreed to enter into security 
alliances with the W e s t . B r i t i s h  Prime Aunister Eamst 
Bevin's statement verified this point; "The Arab friendship 
is more precious to Britain than military bases or armies 
stationed in the Middle East.
The outbreak of the Korean war was the catalyst 
that produced a frenzy of Western activity directed at 
strengthening defenses throughout the world. It was hypo­
thesized that the U.S.S.P. would expand its borders if it 
found Western defenses weak. Secretary of State Acheson 
said:
^^Ibid., p. 361.
^^Jamali, op. cit., p. 58.
25ibid.
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The only way to deal with the Soviet Union .
. . is to create situations of strength, , . , V/hen- 
ever the Soviet Union detects weakness or disunity, 
it exploits them to the full, 26
Since World V/ar II colonial people everywhere have 
risen against white-man rule. The United States had gener­
ally lived up to its promises to support their independence. 
While pressing for emancipation, the U.S. had to make sure 
that it would have the cooperation of those nations in its 
international policy. Consequently, the task of the Ameri­
can post-war policy in the colonial world has been to en­
courage the liquidation of colonialism while simultaneously
integrating the newly emancipated people into its security 
27system.
Extending N.A,T.O. to the Bosphorus made it impera-
o Q
tive to consolidate Mddle East regional defenses. Thus,
the West planned to create the Ivüddle East Defense Organi-
29
zation, to serve as a corollary to N,A,T,0.
Following the 1948 v/ar, the Arab states v/ere anxious
for V/estern aid to prevent Zionist expansion. This led to 
the formation of the Arab Collective Security Pact in 1950, 
which v/as met with favor in London and Washington, But 
Western policies met v/ith a dilemiaa: supplying the Arabs
^^United States, .Department of State Bulletin, Vol, 
}ZI, (February 20, 1950), p. 4??,
^^Peter Fliess, International Relations in the Bi­
polar World, (New York: Random kouse, l$6b), p, 10b,
^^London Times, July 30, 1952.
^% e w  York Times, March 17, 1949, p, 3,
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would mean limiting Zionist ambitions, and would have been 
contrary to British-American attitudes toward Israel. An 
alternative decision was to take a stand favorable to Is­
rael. Thus, on May 25, 1950, Britain, France and the U. S. 
A. issued the Tripartite Declaration which limited arms 
imports into the Middle iSast to keep the Palestine conflict 
under control, thereby emphasizing the status quo in favor 
of Israel. The Declaration read:
The three Governments recognized that the Arab 
States and Israel all need to maintain a certain 
level of armed forces for the purpose of assuring 
their internal security and their legitimate self- 
defense and to play a part in the defense of the 
area as a whole. All applications for arms or war 
material for these countries will be considered in 
the light of these principles. 30
However, while Egypt rejected the M.E.D.O., the Western
governments declared their intention to continue their plans
despite Egypt's objection.
British withdrawal from the Middle East was seen as
a constructive step toward improving Arab relations with
^^United States, Department of State Bulletin, XLI, 
(June 5, 1950), p. 886,
Prime Minister Nuri Al-Sa'ed of Iraq indicated that 
the Tripartite Declaration was an aggression against the 
Arabs, since 'Western policies aimed at maintaining a balance 
of arms in favor of Israel. See Al-Sa'ed’s speech on Radio 
Baghdad, December 16, 1956, cited in Khalil, op. cit.. Vol, 
II, pp. 255-278.
Patrick 'Walker, Member of Parliament incharge of 
foreign affairs in the Labour Party foreign policy said:
”Y/e in Britain have one foreign policy. The Labour Party 
foreign policy centers on maintaining a balance of power 
in the Middle East." Quoted in At-Tall, Khatar Al-Sahyoun- 
iyiah Al-Alamlyiah Ala Al-Islam Wa Al- Maslhiyiah, (Cairo: 
Dar Al-Qalam, 19&4), p. 3VV.
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the V/est. American concern for the security of the Middle 
hast following the withdrawal of the British was occasioned 
by the pov/er vacuum theory. Relaxation of British author­
ity was interpreted by the U.S.A. as an indication of the 
need to defend her own interests directly. Thus the Ameri­
can position was that Britain shoud be replaced by an in­
stitution that 8eve8 the West. Having emerged as the lead­
ing power, the U.S.A. felt the urge to oppose Communism.
The vital interests of the U.S. in western Asia have become 
of politic-strategic character, thus its policy aimed at 
preventing the region from falling into the hands of the 
U.S.S.R.
Secretary of State John Poster Dulles was concerned
about the absence of adequate defense arrangements in the
Middle East. While he affirmed American support to the
Tripartite Declaration, he stressed the advisability of
anti-Communist defense arrangements backed by the U.S.A.
Dulles gave his views of M.E.D.O,, stating:
I believe that there should be established 
an original defense organization in the Middle 
East. It is too costly for these countries in­
dividually to have adequate defense establishments 
of their own. A collective system is much cheaper 
and is more reliable, . . .  31
Dulles added that an all-Arab defense system was unattain­
able, since the Arabs did not see the Communist threat.
The Arabs, however, were concerned with the Zionist threat
■^^London Times, May 23, 1953; Also lonides, op. cit.,
p. 92.
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and that Western sponsorship of Israel had destroyed Arab
32hope for cooperation with the vVest, Hov/ever, the Arab 
states, in an effort to stabilize the region, stipulated 
that an acceptable solution the Palestine conflict would 
be a precondition to their cooperation.^^ But Zionist 
influence in the U.S.A. and Britain precluded such solu­
tion.
The Arab demand was dictated more by their desire
to halt Zionist aggression than their fear of Communism,
as Pierre Rondott observed:
The Arab world became more and more obsessed 
with the Arab-Isr^eli conflict. In its eyes, this 
was the only topic that mattered. The East-West 
conflict did not interest the Arabs nor would they 
listen to the I’ree World's anti-Soviet propaganda. 
Nothing counted with them except the threat from 
Israel. They refused to regard the U.S.S.R. as 
in any way an enemy. Soviet domination which would, 
they imagined, humor Arab susceptibilities seemed 
a lesser catastrophe (should it ever come to pass) 
than Israeli domination with its inevitable commit­
ment, the expiration of Pan-Arabism. 34
In this light, Dulles's attention was, therefore, focused
on the countries in close proximity to the Soviet border,
^^Glubb, Soldier With the Arabs, op. cit., p. 376.
33lbid.
34,•"‘Pierre Rondott, Changing Patterns of the Middle 
East, (New York: Praeger, 1959;, P* 136.
The Arab population dù not fear communism because, 
unlike Western colonialism, they have never had any contact 
with Russia. " . . .  Russia is an unknown qimintity, since 
it has never been in the Arab world. Many Arabs consequently, 
are speculating about Russia and Communism." Security and 
the Rliddle East : The Problem and I ts Soluti on, Proposals 
submitted to the President of the United States, April, 1954, 
p. 110; lonides, op. cit., p. 92; Rondott, op. cit., p. 137.
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for he believed, "In general, the Northern Tier of nations 
show awareness of the danger."
In the early 1950's the Middle East v;as the only re­
gion adjacent to the Soviet territory which remained unat­
tached to a western collective security system. Britain 
and the United States were eager to associate Middle Eastern 
states with their global cold war policy including the nego­
tiation of p a c t s . T h e i r  eagerness was based on their cal­
culation that the value of this territory in fighting limited 
wars ranked high. Thus, cultivating friendship, promoting
stability, and securing peace-time agreements were essential
17to the policy of containing Soviet expansion.
In early 1953, Dulles visited the Middle East. He
^^U.S., Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII, (June 
15, 1953), p. 83TT
^^Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 121.
^^Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the IVliddle 
Ea81, 1914-1956, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, l96'3), p. 1B2.
TfETle Britain declared that the membei' states of the 
Baghdad Pact became partners "to protect themselves against 
any possible aggresive expansion," presumably against the 
U.S.S.P l . ,  the British Government reaffirmed the "defensive 
nature of the Pact," and allayed the fears of Moscow that 
the Pact members have "no aggressive intentions whatever 
against the Soviet Union or any other Gountry." G.B., Bri-
tish and Poreign State Papers, Vol. CLKIII, (1957-1958), 
p T T O : --------- ----------- ----
In a memorandum to the British Government, the U.S.
S.P. declared that the Baghdad Pact was a part of the "closed 
aggressive military blocs," (Ibid., p. 58.; Its true char­
acter is'demonstrated by the fact that one of its organizers 
and members ^ritain/ carried out an attack on Egypt, while 
another member oontribted to this action by making its ter­
ritory available for use by the bombers of the attacking 
party." (Ibid., p. 67.)
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cane to the conclusion that any defense alliances against
ooviet aggression must spring from the desire of the people
and the governments and that the states of the northern
tier due to their closeness to the Russian frontiers would
he willing to form a regional defense organization. This
38
was the origin of the Baghdad Pact,
It was logical to have as the founding states of 
such pacts those which immediately border on the U.S.S.R., 
namely Turkey and Iran. Although Pakistan and Iraq, did not 
share frontiers with the U.S.S.R., nevertheless, they were 
i n c l u d e d . T o  the Rest, the position of Turkey was de­
cisive in the Near Bast, Thus, Turkey was the catalyst of 
the Pact,^^ Accordingly, the Turkish Foreign Ivhnister had 
without difficulty included the Shah of Iran who was anxious 
to secure now weapons to please his army,^^ The Western
^^John Foster Dulles, "Report on the Near Bast," 
Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII, (June 15, 1953), 
pp. '831-315'.----------------
^^The U.S.S.R. concluded non-aggression pact with 
jLfghanistan and sent an economic mission to establish a foot­
hold and to prevent it from joining the Baghdad Pact. Thus, 
Afghanistan, though a Muslim country, served as a wedge be­
tween Pakistan and Iran.
^^Puad Koprulu, Turkish Foreign Minister, was in­
spired by the vision that all Muslim states would come under 
Turkey's leadership. Cited in Seale, op. cit., p. 208.
^^Iran's entry into the Pact was welcomed by the 
U.S. The Soviet Union alleged that the Baghdad Pact was an 
extention of N.A.T.O. tind a violation of Soviet-I rani an 
treaties. The U.S.S.R. said in a note on November 26, 1955: 
"The Soviet Government believes that essential
to confirm the fact that Iran's accession to the
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b a i t  o f econom ic a i d ,  a s  w e l l  a s  arm am ents, a l s o  a t t r a c t e d  
H usayn 's a t t e n t io n  who d e c la r e d  h i s  i n t e r e s t  in  j o in in g  th e  
P a c t  in  ord er  to  im prove J o r d a n 's  d e f e n s e s  a g a in s t  I s r a e l .^ ^  
The B r i t i s h  governm ent was n e u t r a l  ab ou t th e  H ashe­
m ite  p la n s ,  b u t in  th e  r a id -1 9 5 0 's  th e  i n h i b i t i n g  f a c t o r s  
c e a se d  to  ca rry  w e ig h t  and B r i t a in  d e c id e d  to  le n d  Ira q  i t s  
su p p o r t. Due to  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i t  en c o u n te re d  in  I r a n  and 
h gyp t and in  an a ttem p t to  sa v e  i t s  p o s i t i o n  th ro u g h o u t th e  
K id d le  P a s t  p a r t i c u la r ly  in  Jordan and I r a q ,  B r i t a in  d e c id e d  
to  embark on th e  c r e a t io n  o f  th e  Baghdad P a c t .  In  e s t a b l i s h ­
in g  th e  P a c t ,  B r i t a in  e n v is io n e d  an Arab w orld  under I r a q i  
l e a d e r s h ip  h a r n e sse d  to  B r i t a in  th rou gh  th e  a l l i a n c e ,
The c r e a t io n  o f  th e  Baghdad P a c t was m a in ly  f o r  B r i­
t i s h  i n t e r e s t s .  Gampbell w ro te:
P ith  J;uez b e in g  e v a cu a te d  and w ith  o n ly  E g y p t' s  
prom ise on w hich  t o  depend f o r  i t s  u se  in  c a se  o f  
w ar, B r i t a in  lo o k e d  a l l  th e  more t o  i t s  p o s i t i o n  in  
Ir a q  a s  a  means o f  p r o t e c t in g  th e  s e c u r i t y  o f  B r i t a i n ' s
Bag) I dad military grouping is incompatible with the 
interests of strengthening peace and security in the 
Near and Middle East and is contrary to Iran's good 
neighbor relations with the ooviet Union and to cer­
tain of Iran's treaty obligations." Current Digest 
of Soviet Press, January 11, 1956, p. 22.
^^Monroe, op. cit., p. 188.
^^iuithony Eden, op. cit., p. 244.
Beal, biographer of bulles, claimed that Dulles was 
surprised at Iraq's joining the Pact. Robinson Beal, Dulles, 
(New York: Harper, 1957), p. 248.
The Soviet Union stressed that such foreign military 
bases in the Middle East are "being used to undermine the 
sovereign rights of these countries," G. B., British and 
Foreign State Papers, 1958, p. 66.
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i n t e r e s t s  in  th e  M iddle l a s t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in  th e  
J-crsian  l u l f  a r e a . M embership in  th e  Baghdad P a ct  
seem ed th e  b e s t  a v a i la b le  means o f  p r o t e c t in g  th e  
o i l  s u p p l ie s  so  n e c e s s a r y  t o  B r i t a i n ' s  econom y, i t  
m ight a l s o  check  th e  e r o s io n  o f  B r i t i s h  p o s i t i o n  
th ro u g h o u t th e  M iddle E a st e s p e c i a l l y  i f  Jordan w ere  
b rou gh t i n .  44
B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  v/as s t i l l  b ased  on th e  p rem ise t h a t  
h er  M iddle E a ste rn  i n t e r e s t s  c o u ld  b e s t  be d e fen d ed  by r e ­
t a in in g  p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  suprem acy in  th e  a r e a  and by 
an u n y ie ld in g  a t t i t u d e  tow ard l o c a l  n a t io n a l i s m . I t  m ust 
be remembered t h a t  Eden a lw a y s  c o n s id e r e d  Arab n a t io n a l is m  
a s  n o n e x i s t e n t .  By s e v e r in g  Iraq, from  th e  o th e r  Arab 
s t a t e s ,  Eden was im p lem en tin g  t h i s  th e o r y ;  th u s  B r i t a in  s e t
h e r s e l f  a g a in s t  th e  c u r r e n t  p o p u la r  f e e l i n g ,  d r iv in g  th e
45n a t i o n a l i s t s  i n t o  a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  Com m unists.
I r a q ' s  P o s i t io n  
I r a q  v iew ed  i t s  p o s i t i o n  a s  d i f f e r e n t  from  o th e r  
Arab s t a t e s  in  reg a rd  to  d e fe n s e  a rra n g em en ts . I t  was " in  
s p e c i a l  c ir c u m sta n c e s  due to  i t s  p r o x im ity  to  th e  U . S . S . R . ,  
and i t s  common f r o n t i e r  w ith  Turkey and P e r s i a . T h e  
E g y p tia n  e s t im a te  was d i f f e r e n t ;  "Iraq  d e r iv e d  a g u a r a n te e  
more than a d eq u a te  from th e  Arab C o l l e c t iv e  S o l id a r i t y  P a ct." ^ ^  
I r a q ,  h ow ever, d i s l i k e d  th e  Arab C o l l e c t iv e  S e c u r -
^^C&impbell, op. cit., p. 58.
^^Seale, op. cit., p. 264.
^^Monroe, op. c i t . , p . I 8 l .
^^Akhbar Al-Yawra (Cairo), December, 1954, cited in
I b id .
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ity Pact ai'id the League which seemed to be the instrument 
for Egyptian opposition to the Hashemite plans in North 
A r a b i a . I n  fact, Iluri described the Arab Collective Se­
curity Pact as "mere ink on paper; therefore anothei' means 
of defense must be found.
In a meeting with Nasser, Nuri declared his lack of 
faith in the A.0.3.P., and stated:
I cannot depend on the Arabs to defend my 
country. If I tell my people and my foreign fri­
ends that I am going to depend on Syrian, Saudi 
Arabian, and Lebanese armies to defend my country, 
they will say, 'Nuri, you are a fool!' The only 
way to defend my country is to make an alliance 
with the West. I will understand your suspicion of 
the L’ritish, but I am going ahead right away. 50
To Iraq, the Baghdad Pact v/as a means to an end: to
secure its interests as well as Arab interests. By joining
the Pact, Iraq would get rid of the British treaty which
51was a stigma. Another advantage would have been enhancing
^^Seale, op. cit., p. 200.
49lbid., p. 208.
5°Ibid., p. 207.
The Arab rulers made it clear that if Iraq or Jordan
were attacked by Russia it would be because both serve as
Western bases. Therefore, no obligation would rest upon the 
League members to come to their rescue. Security and the 
I.iiddle Bast, op. cit., p. 24.
ed;
^^L'den took this point into consideration. He stat-
"There was another reason why we should sup­
port and may be join the Pact. The Anglo-Iraqi 
treaty of 1930 would expire in 1957, and we had to 
take account of nationalist feelings, even in the 
most friendly countries. It v/as important to get 
rid of any taint of patron and pupil. An attempt 
by the Labour Government to negotiate a new treaty
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I r a q 's  r o le  in  Arab p o l i t i c s  a s  i t  would have boon su p­
p o rted  by B r it a in  and th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  a s  w e l l  a s  th e  P act  
cp
members, A th ir d  ad van tage  would be r e c e iv in g  new arma­
m en ts. A fo u r th  would be an a l l i a n c e  on e q u a l f o o t in g  w ith  
th e  o th e r  member s t a t e s .  T h is  new p o s i t i o n  would have
b rough t Ir a q  t o  th e  le a d in g  p o s i t i o n  i n  th e  Arab w orld  f o r
5 3h a v in g  a la r g e  army and p o w er fu l a l l i e s .
.a lthough th e  Baghdad P a ct appeared  to  be a W estern  
a l l i a n c e  i t  s t i l l  co u ld  have b rou gh t a d v a n ta g es  to  th e  Arab 
W orld. Turkey, w hich had b een  a su p p o r te r  o f  I s r a e l ,  s t a r t ­
ed to  change i t s  p o l i c i e s  tow ard th e  Arabs and prom ised  t o  
h e lp  s o lv e  th e  P a le s t in e  problem  in  th e  U n ited  N a t io n s ,
T u rk ish  Prim e M in is te r  Adnan P .enderes a ssu r e d  N uri th a t  
T u r k is h - I s r a e l i  r e l a t i o n s  w ere s h r in k in g , tr a d e  had d im in ­
is h e d  and th a t  Turkey had w ithdraw n i t s  am bassador to  I s -
T 54 r a e l .
In January of 1955, Nuri insisted that the Pact be
had ended in  r i o t s  and d isa p p o in tm e n t."  Bden, P u l l  
C i r c l e , p . 244.
A special agreement was signed on April 4, 1955, re­
placing the Treaty of June 30, 1930, and constituted Britain's 
accession to the alliance. Seale, op. cit., p. 226.
^^Bden, Pull Circle, p. 243.
^^Nuri argued that if Iraq were to become a lynch 
pin in the Baghdad Pact, it would benefit from the flood of 
Western arms, money, and equipment. Other Arab states would 
follow her lead. Egypt would be faced with the choice of 
isolation or joining as a junior partner. Seale, op. cit.,
p . 2 0 1 .
^^Jamali, op. cit., p. 116.
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used to solve the Palestine question. In Parliament, on
February 2, 1955, Nuri declared;
I explained to the Egyptians that we have two 
foes: the first is Israel, the second is Gommunism. 
As regards the first, Iraq's policy is to seek as­
sistance of as many Muslim combines as possible...
. . I always placed first the Zionist danger and the 
need to secure the support of the world in order to 
eliminate that danger. 56
The Iraqi-American military assistance agreement 
of April 21, 1954, constituted the crucial pint of depart­
ure in gaining Iraq's willingness to take part in the re-
56gional arrangements. Despite enticements, Iraq wavered 
in the early stages of the discussions. This attitude was 
ascribed to three considerations: first, the desire to make 
a better bargain, thus increasing the benefits that might 
be offered; second, the instability of the Iraqi govern­
ment in the first half of 1954; third, the severe criti­
cism of Iraq by the Arab states for contemplating a non- 
Arab allaince which would be damaging to the Arab cause
57while increasing political instability in the Arab world.
^^Monroes, op. cit.. p. 185.
There was an agreement within the Pact that the 
Palestine problem would be discussed at the U.N. General 
Assembly, and attempts be made to implement the U.N. Res­
olutions, and force Israel to obey them. Jamali, op. cit., 
p. 116. ------
^^U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 31. 1954, p.
772.
57In his radio speech on December 16, 1956, Nuri 
revealed that the Egyptian attacks on Iraq had started 
"before the existence of the Baghdad Pact, and even be­
fore we had thought of concluding this Pact. . . . The 
attacks had started in March, 1954, and the Pact was signed 
only at the end of February, 1955." Khalil, II, p. 268.
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The Arab Response
The signing of the Pact brought an immediate re­
action that "Britain, because of its vast oil interests
58in the area, smd influence, had ’got at' Iraq," Nasser, 
due to internal reasons centering around anti-Western feel­
ing, had to move slowly toward alliances with the West. On 
the other hand, Nuri, for external factors focusing upon 
Anglo-Iraqi relationships and in quest for Arab leadership, 
wanted to move fast.^^ Iraq's initiative infuriated Egypt 
because it was bypassed, thus it branded the Pact as the 
"catspaw of imperialism,"^^ While king Husayn described 
Egypt's feelings in this matter as "intolerable," he re­
marked that the Western nations made a fatal mistake by 
rushing into an agreement with Iraq alone.
Nasser had taken the bold step of making Arabism 
Egypt's major foreign policy objective. Thus Arab solidarity 
was wedded to non-alignment,. Thus the policy which the 
Egyptian leadership urged the Arabs to adopt was: the Arabs
^^Husayn, Uneasy lies the Head,op, cit., p, 102,
^%'Ionroe, op, cit.. p. 182,
Shortly after îfasser signed the Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement of 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood made an attempt 
to assassinate him. Cited in Fitzsimmons, op, cit,, p, 130,
^^Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, opy cit,, p, 103
, p, 102,
Husayn told Turkish Prime Minister Menderes that 
any agreement would have to include most of the Arab states 
at once, "for if any Arab states formed a pact without prior 
consultation and agreement with the other iirab states, it 
would be a disaster," Ibid,
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laust unite only with Arabs,
The Egyptian opposition was based on the following 
premises; one, associating with the imperialist powers would 
eventually bring back colonialism in a disguised fonp.
Two, by joining the Pact, Iraq would assume leadership 
position in the Arab world, replacing Egypt. Tliree, Iraq 
would emerge most powerful that Syria, Lebanon and Jordan 
would inevitably be annexed, thereby, in effect, recreating 
the Fertile Crescent Plan, causing the isolation of Egypt.
^^Seale, op. cit., p. 197.
In a meeting witti Major Salah Salem, Nasser's per­
sonal envoy, at Baghdad, Nuri told him: " I am not a soldier 
in Abdul-Nassr's army. Please tell him that I will never 
obey his orders." Ibid., p. 217,
Barely a month after the conclusion of the Pact, 
Israel attacked an Egyptian outpost in the Gaza area kil­
ling over thirty soldiers . " This event was considered 
by the Arab public opinion as the West's answer to the 
Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact." Payez Sayegh, 
op. cit., p. 116.
Furthermore, Egyptian opposition to the Pact re­
sulted in Western denial of military and financial aid. 
Egypt's request for a loan to build the Aswan Dam from the 
World Bank did not materialize since the Bank sought to 
impose conditions which v/ould have subjected the Egyptian 
economy to Western control." The American offer of funds 
had been withdrawn for the political reasons that Egypt 
was opposed to the Bagdad Pact." Anthony Eden, The Suez 
Crisis of 1956. ( Boston:Beacon Press, 1968), p. 53.
^^Hafez, op. cit., p. 215.
^^Althou^ Turkey was always opposed to Arab unity, 
it agreed to an Iraqi-Syrian union since Iraq had joined 
the Baghdad Pact. Jamali, op. cit.. 116.
The traditional rivalry between Egypt and Iraq, 
had for centuries constituted the basis elements of the 
region's politics, while the rest of the smaller countries 
were merely incidental. The relationship resembled Bel­
gium, Holland and Luxemburg when France and Germany were 
at war. Glubb, Soldier With the Arabs, op. cit., p. 377.
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Accordingly, the Arab League was convened to discuss Iraq's
65decision to join the Pact.
The Arab countries have never disagreed on a foreign
policy issue as they did on the Baghdad Pact and the policy
of positive neutrality. Article 10 of the Treaty of Joint
Defense and Economic Cooperation stated:
Each of the contracting states undertakes 
not to conclude any international agreement which 
may be inconsistent with this treaty, and not to 
adopt in its international relations any course 
which may be contrary to the aims of this treaty,66
The Arab states, except Jordan and Iraq, disapproved 
of the Pact, and considered it a trick to help Israel, and 
believed that Jordan would eventually be tricked into sign­
ing a treaty with I s r a e l , E g y p t  declared that the ob­
jective of the Pact was to break up the Arab Collective 
Security Pact, and was tantamount to the return of imper­
ialism which ignores the interests of the Middle East, 
while, at the same time frustrating the work of the League, 
The attitude of Saudi Arabia was outright hostility
65
Seale, op, cit,. p. 212,
GGghalil, Vol. II, OP, cit.. p. 103. 
Although Article 5 of the Pact gavive Iraq a veto 
against the admission of Israel, and while the Pact was not 
designed to take sides in the Arab-Israeli issue, however, 
by preserving the status quo in the region, the Pact was 
interpreted as guaranteeing the frontiers of Israel. Peo­
ple * a Court Proceedings. Baghdad, 1959, Vol. VI, p, 2360, 
Testimony given by î’aoii Al-ïïalid of the Iraqi Foreign 
Ministry on October 30, 1958,
Aft
Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign 
Policy. (New York; Scribner, 1563), p. 7^1.
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to the alliance because it aimed at strengthening the 
Hashemite position which the Saudia had always obstructed. 
Furthermore, the Pact involved Britain with whom Saudi- 
Arabia had outstanding disputes over the Burami Oasis and 
other territories, A third reason for Saudi opposition 
was that, by enticing Jordan to join the alliance, the 
League would collapse leaving Egypt and Saudi Arabia iso­
lated. In an interview with King Saud, he replied to the 
question why he was critical of the Baghdad Pact;
Saudi Arabia is an independent country. She 
has a policy dictated by its own interests. Her 
view of the Baghdad Pact agrees with that of Egypt, 
Syria and other Arab countries based upon a thorough 
study of the Pact which was concluded in secret.
The participation of Turkey, the intimate friend 
of Israel, increases Arab suspicion of the Pact. 
Moreover, we all believe that the purpose of the 
Pact is to do away with the Arab League and to 
work indirectly for. bringing about peace with Is­
rael and the insurance of Zionist objectives.69
The attitude of Syria was no different. The mood
Sunday Times. 
bH
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In his iography, Eden accused the Saudis of under­
mining the Pact. He wrote:
"The agents of King Saud, their pockets bul­
ging with gold, were cooperating everywhere with the 
communists against Western interests. . . . Unlike 
ourselves, they /“the Americans 7 did not feel any 
responsibility for insuring thaT these oil revenues 
were wisely invested. King Saud, at liberty to 
spend his money as ho wished, chose palaces for his 
family at home and subversion for his policies 
abroad, in Jordan, the Lebanon, and Iraq." Eden,
Pull Circle, op, cit., p. 382.
The Christian Science Monitor, in its editorial on 
January 12, 1956, commented:
"The Soviet Union would like nothing better 
than to see revolts which would perhaps overthrow 
the government of Jordan, carry the country into
372
o f  th e  S y r ia n  p e o p le  had a lr e a d y  been  e x p r e sse d  by f o r e ig n  
M in is te r  Ma’r o u f A l-D a v /a lib i e a r l i e r ,  when th e  i s s u e  o f  
W estern a l l i a n c e s  a r o s e .  To th e  S y r ia n s , W estern p a c ts  
aim ed a t  e n tr e n c h in g  I s r a e l  a t  th e  ex p en se  o f  th e  A rabs, 
D a w a lib i d e c la r e d  to  th e  E g y p tia n  d a i l y ,  A .l-L Iisry;
Should  th e  U . S .  pu rsue t h e i r  p r e s e n t  p o l i c i e s  
and sh o u ld  th e  Arab c o u n tr ie s  be fo r c e d  t o  ch o o se  
betw een  becom ing a S o v ie t  r e p u b lic  or  a p a r t  o f  a  
J ew ish  s t a t e ,  th e  Arabs would r a th e r  be a  S o v ie t  
r e p u b l ic ,  70
H owever, th e  S y r ia n  r e a c t io n  to  th e  P a c t was v o ic e d  
by Prime M n i s t e r  S a b ri A l-A s a li  in  th e  Chamber condem ning  
a l l  p a c ts  and em bracing th e  E gyp tian  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  them e:
December, 1954, witnessed the last Byzantine 
discussions inside the Arab League, for then they 
evolved around the questions: shall the Arabs join 
alliances or not? Would they accept help and assis­
tance? Must a decision among the Arab states be 
taken unanimously? The purpose of t M s  discussion 
was to impose the logic of subservience and surren­
der in all Arab States and to make of Iraqi policy 
the example to be followed. Prom that month on, 
imperialist maneuvering has been liquidated in 
Egypt and Syria. No government could come to power 
in Syria except by emphatically declaring "No al­
liances." Previous governments used to say "No 
alliances if they derogate from our sovereignty." 
The difference between the two stands is enormous. 
The latter means nothing else but alignment, 71
The Dilemma o f Jordan
th e  C airo  caiap, and pay i t s  tr o o p s  w ith  Saudi A rabian  r o y a l ­
t i e s  from  A m erica n -d ev elo p ed  o i l , "
70W alter Z, L acqueur, Communism and N a t io n a lis m  in  
th e  M iddle E a s t , (New York; P ra e g er , 1956), p. ^tew York
times, April l2, 1950.
71Payez Sayegh, op, cit., p. 134.
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Jordan was reluctant to join the Pact due to popu-
72lar pressure and the sharp criticism of Iraq, It, there­
fore, v/as in no mood to accept further involvement with 
'iVestern military pacts, particularly since the Palestinian 
majority in Jordan were responding to the Egyptian-Saudi
Arabian anti-pact campaign, and held that the Jest was re-
7sponsible for creating and sustaining the Zionist state,
Campbell observed:
, . . The great unsettled questions of Pales­
tine stood as a mountain barrier in the way of all 
Western efforts to win the cooperation and support 
of the people of that part of the Eliddle East. 74
The League was called for an emergency meeting to 
discuss Iraq's entry into the Baghdad Pact. The U.A.Fi. and 
Saudi Arabia saw in the Baghdad Pact a violation of the 
League Covenant. Abul-Huda counseled taking a moderate 
stand because Jordan's position was based on a good-neigh­
bor policy since it needed help from all Arab states. He 
cautioned against taking any action against Iraq and declar­
ed his intention to conciliate.
Against this background, Abul-Huda proposed to the 
League the formation of a joint peace command which could 
be expanded as a general command during a war, as an alter­
native to joining the Baghdad Paot.?^ This proposal placed
^^Eden, Pull Circle, p. 384. 
74,
^^Vatikiotis, op. cit.. p. 117.
‘Campbelly op. cit.. p. 47.
7S^Documents on International Affairs, 1353, p. 324.
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Jordan, on the side of Egypt and Saudi Arabia whose policies
7 A
aimed at isolating Iraq. However, when Iraq threatened
to withdraw from the League if this resolution was adopted,
a milder resolution was approved by the majority including
Jordan. It stated;
The foreign policy of the Arab states is based 
on the Arab League Charter and the treaty of Joint 
Defense and Economic Cooperation between the Arab 
states. This policy does not approve of concluding 
other alliances. 77
Jordan's problem was that it needed both Egyptian 
and Iraqi help against Israel. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia 
had an eye on Aqaba, Jordan's only port. And lastly, if 
the Arab states continued to fight, Israel would take ad-
O
vantage of the confusion to occupy the V/est Bank. Thus, 
in the summer of 1955, Husayn tried to create better under­
standing between Cairo and Baghdad. His mission to Iraq 
failed when Nuri, "the actual ruler of Iraq," told him,
"Sir, we are in the Baghdad Pact, That is that, and we are
79certainly not backing out of it." Husayn's meetings with
Nasser on the issue led him to believe that "if Nasser had
been consulted in the preliminary stages, the result might
Rn
have been very different." This is supported by Nasser's
^^Seale, op. cit.. p. 216.
77Documents on International Affairs. 1955, p. 325.
7R
Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 105.
79ibid.. p. 105.
GOfbid.
Nasser charged Eden of bad faith on Britain's part
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statement; "1 do not like the way it was done. I have no­
thing against the Pact as such, hut we should have been
8iconsulted properly."
But Husayn had to make a stand. His ties with Iraq 
were dynastic, and economically Jordan was dependent on 
British support. Thus Jordan was in a dilemma as The Econ­
omist explained:
The political pressures of the Arab world 
fall so heavily on troubled Jordan that it had lit­
tle choice but to take cover in neutrality between 
Pgypt and Iraq. Geographically it is in a triangle 
of the bilateral pacts extended by Egypt to Syria 
and Saudi Arabia, but economically it lives on Bri­
tish money and Britain supports the Iraqi defense 
policy. 82
The revision of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty of 1948 was 
aimed mainly at changing the manner in which the subsidy 
was paid. Husayn and Abul-Huda demanded that payments be 
made directly to the government instead of to General Glubb, 
for this would be consistent with national dignity while it
since the treaty negotiations of 1954 implied that Nasser 
"was to be aided in organizing Middle Eastern defense on an 
Arab foundation," Fitzsimmons, op. cit., p. 129.
^^bid., p. 106.
At the end of 1954, Nuri had arranged a meeting with 
Menderese and Nasser, but the latter was opposed to Turkey's 
leadership in the Middle East and refused a meeting with 
Menderese. He, however, was ready to receive the mayors of 
Ankara and Istanbul and a group of Turkish journalists. At 
this point, Menderese visited Baghdad instead, and signed 
the Iraqi-Turkish alliance on February 24, 1955, Monroe, 
op. cit., p. 182; Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics, p. 33. 
For the text of the agreement see G. British""ând Foreign 
State Papers. Vol. XII, 1955-1956, p. 1; Parliamentary 
Papers, Omd. 9859, February 24, 1955.
82The Economist, December 24, 1955.
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would reduce Glubb's influence. Furthermore, the negoti­
ations aimed at exchanging the subsidy for rents of the
8 3British military bases in Jordan. However, Britain re­
fused Jordan's demand, but agreed to pay additional funds 
for the National Guard* Thus negotiations came to a halt 
pending certain developments which were expected to occur 
in the Kiddle Bast.®^
Britain's objection to the revision of the treaty 
before its expiration in 1968, was due to the evacuation 
of the Suez Base, and Britain's desire to secure new defense 
organizations.^^ However, as the Baghdad Pact alliance was 
concluded, and to which Britain adhered on March 30, Abul-
Huda was approached to join the Pact in return for the re-
86vision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty.
^^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. op* cit.. p. 43.
^tcbid. ; Majali, Muthakl-carati. op. cit., p. 152. 
Abul-Huda who was considered Britain's •’man" in 
Jordan, was attacked in the British press while in London 
negotiating the revision of the treaty. He was called 
dictator, and one who had rigged the elections.
The British had conducted talks with Nuri AÎ- Sa'ed 
and arrived at two plans: one, the Arab League would con­
clude a defense alliance with the West, thus the need for 
bilateral treaties would end; two, if the Arab League did 
not take this step, Iraq would end its treaty with Britain. 
Thus the future of the Jordan-British treaty depended on 
the future talks with Nuri, which ended in signing the 
Baghdad Pact in March, 1955. Majali, Ibid.. p. 153.
^^Documents of American Foreign Policy and Relations, 
1954. pp. ------------  ----- -------------
^^Majali, Muthakkarati. op. cit., p. 152.
It was reported that Britain offered to double the 
financial assistance to Jordan if it joined. New York 
Times, December 23, 1955, p. 2.
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Caught in the struggle "between Cairo and Baghdad, 
"Jordan had to do something." Britain supplied the answer. 
Eden wrote:
Jordan was a country for which we had special 
responsibilities: we had brought it into being. , • 
Early in November of 1955 our ambassador, Mr. Duke, 
reported a conversation with King Husayn. The 
Jordan Government were ready to join the Baghdad 
Pact, the King said, provided they received 'the 
necessary backing' from us. A court minister spoke 
in the same sense and General Gluhb reported like 
information to the War Office. All these sources 
agreed that this was the moment of opportunity. If 
the Jordan Government did not act now, they would 
waver indefinitely. . . . I/IacMillan was encouraged 
by his meeting at Baghdad and judged this to be the 
moment to get some other Arab states to join the 
Pact. Iraq, felt isolated as the only Arab present. 
The first new member, he considered, should be Jor­
dan. 87
On November 2, 1955, the President of Turkey, Jalal Bayar, 
accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Pateen Zorlo, visited 
Jordan, ostensibly to return the visits of Kings Abdullah 
and Husayn. However, talks were conducted relating to the 
desire of Turkey to have Jordan join the Turkish-Iraq.1 al­
liance. The Jordan Government explained to Bayar that the 
Palestine war "had all but ruined Jordan's economy" £ind 
demanded economic and military aid as a price for Jordan's 
entry in the Pact.^^
"^^ EdeiLf Full Circle, op. cit., pp. 381-382,
88^ cit., p. 108.Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, op.
Following Bayar*s visit, a delegation headed by 
Hazza' Al-Majali arrived in Baghdad for the purpose of 
securing a loan to finance a number of economic developments. 
The negotiations for the loan were hampered since the Ira­
qis insisted, as a condition for the loan, that Jordan should 
join the Pact. Majali, Muthakkirati, op. cit.« p. 167.
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On November 16, Prime Minister Sa’ed Al-Mufti, sent 
a message to the British Government requesting commencement 
of negotiations for the revision of th treaty. While the 
memorandum detailed Jordan’s economic, military and finan­
cial needs, it also explained the policy of Jordan:
1. Preservation of the Arab Solidarity Pact to 
enable Jordan to fulfil its obligations under it.
2. Supporting Jordan in realizing its demands and 
rights in Palestine and defending Jordan from 
any threat regardless of the sources.
3. Establishment of the following as minimum defense
forces for Jordan:
a. an infantry division
b. an armor division
c. heavy artillery
d. paratroopers
e. commando group
f. an airforce which includes bombers and fighters.
g. a naval force in Aqaba and the Dead Sea. 89
On December 5, Britain announced that Sir Gerald 
Templer, Chief of the Imperial Staff, had been sent to Amman 
to consult with the Government of Jordan on military mat­
ters concerning the Arab Legion, and to conduct negotia­
tions for the revision of the treaty.Britain's action
®%ajali, Qissat Muhadathat Templer. op. cit.. p. 4; 
Al-Husayn Ibn Talal, op. cit., p. 44»
^ ^ n  the House of Commons, a question was raised as 
to "why was a military man sent to undertake an extremely 
delicate diplomatic mission? Was it thought that he could 
buldoze the Jordan Government into joining the Baghdad Pact? 
Will dfTùr. Nutting . . confirm the report that Sir Gerald 
Templer told the Jordan Government that they had better 
make up their mind within 48 hours or take the consequences?" 
Ivlr. Nutting replied,
"There is no truth whatsoever in this statement. 
As to the selection of Sir Templer, he went because 
there were military matters to be discussed with the 
Jordan authorities." G.B. Parliamentary Debates,
Vol. 548, 1956, Col. 594.
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seemed to have been caused by the fact that the British
General Staff were seriously disturbed about the security
of Jordan and the future of the Arab Legion, considered as
qn
the"’lynch-pin' of our Middle East defense plans."
Accordingly, the Jordan Government communicated 
with the British Government requesting her suggestions.
This was done in an official memorandum on December 11,
1955, which included;
1. The Government of Jordan will sign the Baghdad 
Pact.
2. After signing the Pact, the British Government 
will decide on the following: to increase the
Jordan army by 65!^  and to supply heavy and 
medium arms valued at six and one half million 
dinars; Britain will support Jordan's military 
requests from the Baghdad Pact; immediate com­
mencement of negotiations to exchange the Anglo- 
Jordan treaty for a special agreement under 
Article 1 of the Pact; to help in the defense
of Jordan which would require the increase of 
the British subsidy; in return, the Jordan Gov­
ernment will give every assistance to the British 
forces stationed in Jordan.
3. Britain will cooperate in the building and the 
maintenance of the Jordan airforce.
^^Noel Monk, "Trouble Builds up in the Middle East," 
Daily Mail, December 7, 1955, p. 2; Glubb, Soldier With 
the Irahs, op. cit., p. 427.
Other reports were that top Arab Legion officers 
had convinced King Husayn that it would be advisable to 
allow Egyptian-trained Palestinian commandoes to carry on 
attacks against Israel from Jordan's territory. Husayn 
agreed to a plan of admitting five hundred commandoes. The 
plan was to be kept from Glubb. This would have undermined 
Britain's position in the Middle East, since for the first 
time , military action would be conducted v/ithout Glubb' s 
approval and direction. However, when Glubb became aware 
of the plan, he advised the War Office in London of the 
need for vigorous action. The iresuit was the dispatch of 
General Templer, Shwadran, op. cit., p. 326.
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4. Jordan shall not enter in in agreements or 
obligations outside the jurisdiction of the 
Pact.
5. The British Government will agree to come to 
the aid of Jordan in case of armed aggression.
6. The duration of the agreement shall be twelve 
years. 92
According to this memorandum, the Jordan Govern­
ment decided on the following as minimum demand, and was 
sent to the British delegation:
The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan agrees to join the Baghdad Pact on the fol­
lowing conditions:
1. Her Majesty's Government should provide the 
following military units:
a. Inorease by 659^  the Arab Legion forces.
b. Various heavy and medium arms valued at 
six and one half million dinars.
2. Her Majesty's Government should support Jordan's 
viewpoint at the military Commission regarding 
its needs in order to carry its defense res­
ponsibilities according to a military plan 
drawn for that purpose.
3. Her Majest'y Government should commence nego­
tiations with His Majesty's Government for 
changing the 1948 Anglo-Jordan treaty with a 
special agreement. . . • The agreement should 
include the following:
a. The strengtheningoof friendship between the 
two parties.
b. Ending the Treaty, its annexes, and communi­
cations connected with it.
0 . The cooperation of both countries in the
defense of Jordan including drawing military 
plans, common training , and assistance 
which include#;
1. Rer Majesty's Government should pay 
Jordan a financial assistance to be 
spent on Jordan forces.
2. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should 
facilitate the establishment of British 
air force units in Amman and Mafraq.
^%usa, op. cit.. p. 614.
Regarding item 4-, the counter proposal indicated 
that Jordan would not be obligated outside its borders. 
Majali, Qissat Muhadathat Templer. op. cit., p. 8.
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3. The new arrangement shall not obligate 
Jordan outside its borders, 
d. Her Majesty's Government will immediately 
come to the aid of Jordan in case of an 
armed aggression.
g. This agreement shall be in force as long 
as both parties belonged to the Pact. 93
In addition, Jordan insisted that the parties to the Pact 
should support Jordan's position on the Palestine question 
according to the U.N, Resolution of 1947, and to reject 
Israel's entry in the alliance.Jordan also stipulated 
that its entry into the Pact would not in any way affect 
its obligations toward the Arab States under the Arab Soli­
darity Pact.^^ More importantly, the Pact nations promised 
to help the economic development of Jordan and to supply 
arms in addition to those secured from Britain.
Count Jordan Out
Pour Palestinian Cabinet members raised the ques­
tion of whether the Jordan proposal to the British Govern­
ment would be shown to the Egyptian Government. Bkt Jordan
^^Al-Hu^yn I bn Talal. op. cit.. pp. 46-49; Also 
Majali, Qissat Muhadathat Templer. op. cit.. pp. 9-10,
Regarding (3-0-1), the financial aid shall not be 
less than fourteen million annually. Ibid.. p. 9.
As to Arabization of the army, Majali seemed as­
sured that it was possible for Jordan to assume full com­
mand of its forces after four years, instead of thirteen 
under the 1948 treaty. Ibid.. p. 22.
^^Palastin. December 14, 1955j Ibid.. p. 10.
^^Ibid.. p. 10. The member states cabled their 
support for the demand.
^^Ibid., p. 22.
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wanted to consult Egypt and other Arab states after the 
plan had been submitted to Britain. A compromise, how­
ever, was reached according to which both Britain and
97Egypt would receive the agreement simultaneously,^' Oom- 
plieating the matter for Jordan, four ministers resigned 
the following day, a development which led to the resig­
nation of the entire oabintt. Their action was taken 
"throu^ patriotic motives," and in support of Egypt's 
policy which stressed that Israel would sooner or later 
be included in the alliance.® Cognizant of Nasser's in­
fluence in Jordan, Husayn declared that Jordan would not 
join the Pact without Cairo's approval,®®
Nasser's campaign against Iraq's entry into the 
Pact was futile. Thus, after losing the battle with Nuri,
®'^ Ibid., p. 11.
®®Husayn, Uneasy Ides the Head, op, cit, p. 110, 
Although the possibility of Israel*s Joining the 
alliance existed, Iraq's veto would prevent sueh possibili­
ty, if invoked:
"This pact shall be Open for accession to 
any member of the Arab league or any other state 
actively concerned with the security and peace in 
this region and which is fully recognized by both 
the High Contracting Parties, " Khalil, op. cit. « 
II, p, 370; Majlai, Muthakkarati. op, cit,. p, 178,
Israel was not asked to join the ï^ act, but its 
supporters in the House of Commons questioned Eden, who 
replied that the stability in the Middle East is actually 
to the advantage of Israel for its creates a better at­
mosphere for it to become more secure, and added that "
It is impossible that any alliance in which Britain is a 
member would be aimed at Israel," and expressed his hope 
that "Israel should join the Pact in happier days," 
Parliamentary Debate#. March 30. 1955, and April 4, 1555; 
Eden, ÿuïl Circle, op. cit., p, 223»
QQ
^^Husayn, Uneasy lies the Head, op. cit., p, 109,
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Nasser decided to score a victory in Amman by preventing
Jordan from joining the Alliance, thereby ensuring that
Iraq, would be the lone Arab state in the Pact. Thus from
the Egyptian point of view, according to Glubb:
The prospect of Jordan joining the Baghdad 
Pact meant another Arab country renouncing her 
leadership and placing itself under that of Iraq.
She accordingly concentrated all her efforts on 
preventing Jordan's adherence. Passionate appeals 
were directed to the people of Jordan, particularly 
the Palestinians, The fact that Egyptian propa­
ganda stated that the Baghdad Pact was primarily 
intended to help Israel, gives some idea both of 
the gullibility of the Arab public and of the dis­
tortion of facts which was practised by the Egyp­
tian radio stations. So effective was the campaign
that crowds rioted in the cities of Jordan, and the
government in alarm abandoned its intention of join­
ing the Pact. 100
Following the resignation of the cabinet members, 
riots broke out in Jordan against the Pact and Templer had 
to leave Amman. Afraid that other Arab states, and Jordan 
in particular, would join the Pact, Cairo seized the ini­
tiative: "The Baghdad Pact is an imperialist plot."^^^ 
Capitalizing on the issue of British influence in Jordan 
through the army, Cairo urged the people to "get rid of the
British officers in the army. . . . Get rid of the King who
102is keeping Jordan as a tool of the West."
^*^^John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs. (Lon­
don: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 321.
^^%usayn. Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 111.
lO^Ibid.. p. 107.
Husayn's response to Arab pressure was to dismiss 
Glubb which was largely aimed at satisfying Jordan's demand 
to command their army, the most powerful single force in
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A flurry of state visitors to Jordan in 1955 in­
cluding Turkish President Jalal and Generals Bayeir, Templer 
and Amer, clearly indicated the involvement of Jordan in 
alignments and alliances in the Middle East.^^^ Jordan’s 
position towards the Baghdad Pact, its relationship with 
Britain, its internal explosive Arab nationalism placed it 
in an unenviable position. The nationalist groups such as 
the Ba’ath, the Socialists, were vociferously demanding 
that Jordan take an Arab nationalist course which meant an 
anti-Iraq, anti-Pact position. Husayn, however, chose in­
volvement with the West and requested the resignation of 
Abul-Huda's government for its failure to join the Baghdad
the country, and to keep the army on his side. Monroe, op.
cit.. p. 189.
"With Communism filtering into the Middle East and 
Cairo branding Jordan as an imperialist power, there was 
no alternative, Glubb had to go." Husayn, Uneasy lies the 
Head, p. I3 8.
^^^In the wake of suspicions aroused by Bayar*s 
visit, General Amer was sent at the head of a military mis­
sion to Amman in December. In the Officer's Club visitor's 
book he wrote;
" %  visit to the Club which represents the 
youth of the army impressed upon me that I was in 
the company of young officers who wished to ele­
vate the standards of the army of the sister state 
of Jordan. My visit has strengthened my faith in 
the Arabs and Arabism." Vatikiotis, op. cit.. 
p. 122; ^-Difa'a. December 3, 1955.
Amer’s visit and the people's enthusiastic response 
to it increased the anxiety of the Jordan Government. The 
inscription was interpreted as an appeal to the ambitions 
officers who favored Arabization of the Army and to galvan­
ize any resistance among them against a re-negotiated Bri­
tish- Jordanian agreement, but most importantly to encourage 
their opposition to Jordan's entry into the Baghdad Pact. 
Ibid.
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Pact. On May 28, Husayn accepted Abul-Huda's resignation 
and Sa'ed Al-Mufti was asked to form a government. Abul- 
Huda' s resignation was attributed to his desire to uphold 
neutrality in inter-Arab struggles. External and internal 
pressures were being exerted for closer associations with 
Iraq. Meanwhile the nationalists who were influenced by 
the Bandung Conference favored non-alignment and were ac­
tively working for the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi lineup. This 
upset Iraq, and the King had to remove Abul-Huda.
In view of the Cabinet's inability to force the
Pact on a reluctant public, the King decided to assume en-
105tire responsibility for signing the Pact.
^^^Shwadran, op. cit.. pp. 324-25.
In his memoirs, MajaTi indicated that even the ar­
dent nationalists favored joining the Pact.
The pro-Egÿptian Nabulsi group met with Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nuri As-Sa'ed at Baghdad and urged him to inter­
vene with Husayn to have Abul-Huda resign so that they could 
form a government. In return, they promised Nuri that "when 
they assume power, they would work to have Jordan join the 
Baghdad Pact, for in their opinion it was the only way to 
salvation." Al-Husayn I bn Talal. p. 165.
Paramount in Nabulsi's mind was the desire that 
Jordan join the Baghdad Pact during his term in office.
His first request was to ask the King to direct the Govern­
ment to espouse a policy of rapprochement with Iraq in line 
with the Baghdad Pact. Ibid.. p. 165.
^^^According to Glubb, signing the Pact represented 
a unique opportunity to Husayn who was eager to reap the 
following benefits; one, to increase the military capabil­
ity of his army which seemed to reflect his personal ambi­
tion to be the commander of a larger and stronger army.
This would improve his position internally as well as exter­
nally. Two, by joining the Pact, he would be assured against 
Israeli aggression. Three, financial assistance would be 
forthcoming for developmental plans which Jordan needed 
most since its problem was mainly economic. Pour, it would
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According to Glubb, Husayn wanted to sign the Pact 
without the consent of the Government, but General Templer 
advised him against such a step: "His Majesty is a consti­
tutional monarch. . . .  He would expose himself to in­
trigue. Husayn wrote:
I realized that if Jordan joined, the free 
world would gain an enormous victory. I felt that 
if we joined, we should receive more arms and eco­
nomic aid, and the Anglo-Jordan Treaty should be 
changed and its duration shortened so that Jordan­
ian officers would have more opportunities to rise 
in the Arab Legion. 107
Due to the disagreement in the Qabinet and the re­
fusal of some ministers to sign the document of accession, 
Templer communicated with the Jordan Prime Minister on 
December 12, 1955, allaying the fears of these ministers 
that Jordan's accession to the Pact would weaken its posi­
tion regarding the Palestine q.uestion;
It has become clear to me and the Ambassador 
within the last 24 hours that the main disturbing 
point is the fear of some cabinet members that 
joining the Baghdad Pact would somehow weaken Jor-
str eng then his association with the West peirticularly Bri­
tain, thus insuring continued subsidy. Five, because of 
psychological reasons Husayn was eager to clarify the ques­
tion of subservience to Britainr By entering the Pact, 
not only Jordan would become an equal partner in the alli­
ance, but also the treaty relations with Britain would be 
altered in Jordan's favor as it was to be replaced by a 
special agreement. Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs, p. 395; 
Eden, Pull Circle, p. 384; Hafez, op. cit.. p. 2l5T Majali, 
Qissat MuhadaihalE Templer. p. 22.
^^^Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs, p. 396.
^^^Husayn, Uneasy lies the Head, p. 108; Majali, 
Qissat Muhadathat Templer. p. 2 ^
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dan’s position in regard to any future settlement 
of the Palestine question. I am authorized by Her 
Majesty's Government to inform you that as far as 
my Government is concerned, Jordan's entry into 
the Pact shall not affect in any form the position 
of Jordan as to the final solution of the Palestine 
problem.
Assurance to that effect may be added, if you 
wish, to the agreement plan which I sent you last 
night. 108
The Templer-Jordan discussions and airing of issues 
toppled the Mufti Government since the Palestinian minis­
ters would not cooperate with, let alone support, it. On 
December 13, Husayn asked Hazza'a Al-Majali to form a new 
government with the express purpose of joining the Baghdad
10 q
Pact,  ^ To the Associated Press on December 20, 1955, 
Majali stated;
I fully realize the peculiar position of Jor­
dan and the great benefits which Jordan would reap 
according to the demands submitted in the memoran­
dum signed by the previous government which also 
constituted the basis for the foreign policy of my 
government. . . ,
. . .  I consulted more than thirty represen­
tatives, and a large number supported my viewpoint 
regarding the benefits which would accrue to Jor­
dan: to conduct its own affairs, to improve its 
military and economic situation. At the same time, 
Jordan's obligation to the Palestine question and 
to the Arab states would not be affected. . . . 110
^^^Majali, Qissat Muhadathat Templer. p. 12.
^^^Vatikiotis, op. cit.. p. 123.
Majali demanded that Templer return to Britain as 
a condition for forming a new government. Madali, Muthak- 
kirati. p. 172.
Majali wrote Qiseat Muhadathat Templer (Story of 
the Templer Talks) in an attempt to convince the peopleof 
the advantages to Jordan in joining the Pact.
^^^Majali, Qissat Muhadathat Templer. p. 19.
388
Owing to the insurmountable nationalist pressure, the 
Majali Government resigned on the 19th, and the King or­
dered the dissolution of the P a r l i a m e n t . B e c a u s e  of the 
demonstrations, freq.uent changes of government, and the 
fear that Israel might attempt to invade the West Bank, the 
Pact idea was abandoned in favor of neutrality. At this 
point, Husayn felt that continued negotiations meant con­
tinued attacks from other Arab states and that would not 
help inter-Arab relations. Jordan's entry into the Baghdad 
Pact was no longer practical politics because Jordan could 
never afford to incur the resentment of the other Arab 
countries.
Until December 18, Husayn and his government had
been determined to enter the Pact at all costs, Nov/ the
112affirmed policy was on no account to enter it. At this 
point, Husayn declared: "No pacts.
Opposition to the Baghdad Pact was based on the
111
Vatikiotis, op. cit.
^^Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs, p. 422. 
^^^Al-Husayn I bn Talal, p. 56; Musa, op. cit..
p. 627.
Husayn expressed to the United Kingdom Ambassador 
that "in time the question of Jordan joining the Baghdad 
Pact could come up again." Britain decided not to press 
the matter for the time being for "we might spoil all,"
Eden, Full Circle, p. 385.
On the 'S.'iB.C. Alec Kirkbride, former British Resi­
dent and Ambassador to Amman, said on June 10, 1956, that 
it was a mistake to bring Jordan into the Pact because it 
had no border with the U.S.3.R, while it had bilateral 
treaties with Iraq and Britain. Middle East Mirror. June 16, 
1956, p. 26.
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idea that joining it was tantamount to dividing the Arab 
front. But others did not appreciate Jordan's particular 
position. Majali said:
I say frankly: if I were an Egyptian, Saudi, 
or Syrian, and if the interests of my country dic­
tated such action, I would have refused joining 
the Pact.
But I am a Jordanian who is fully aware of 
my position. . . .  I realize that the capabilities 
of my country differ to a large extent from those 
of Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. . . .  As a loyal 
Jordanian, I realize fully the delicate circum­
stances of Jordan which could not be ignored under 
any conditions. . . . 114
Prime Mnister Majali was succeeded by Ibrahim 
Hashim, whose government lasted for two weeks only. He was 
followed by Samir Al-Rifa'i. In his letter of commission 
to Rifa'i, Husayn directed that the policy of the new gov­
ernment should follow the following lines:
1. The preservation of friendly relations 
with all Arab states, taking into consideration
the interests of Jordan and its number-one question; 
the problem of Palestine.
2. The preservation of friendly relations 
with all friendly and allied states. 115
The policy of the Hifa'i government was submitted
to the Chamber of Deputies on January 26, 1956. Its main
feature was that Jordan's policy would be not to join any
foreign alliances:
^^ "^ Ma.jali, Qissat Muhadathat Templer. p. 1.
Since Jordan's problem was mainly economic, the 
Pact nations promised to give economic assistance for eco­
nomic development plans. Ibid.. p. 22.
^^^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. p. 57.
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There are two currents of opinion in the 
Arab world today: one aims to organize defense on 
the basis of alliances extending beyond the Arab 
sphere, and the other seeks to establish defense 
arrangements within an independent Arab framework. 
And whereas the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was 
committed to the sister Arab states by multilateral 
agreements within the framework of the Arab League 
and the Mutual Cooperation Pact, I have declared 
in a statement delivered upon the formation of this 
Cabinet, which I am honored to head, that it is not 
our policy to join qr be tied in any way to any new 
alliances, and to work for the consolidation of 
Arab solidarity. 116
Rifa'i encountered a warm welcome in Jordan and out
side since he adopted a policy which was anti-Baghdad Pact.
It also necessitated neutrality in the struggle between
Cairo and Baghdad. However, the Egyptian and Syrian presses
continued their attack on Jordan because Egypt wanted Jor-
ll7dan to be on its side. Though a reversal of the Majali 
policy, the Rifa'i statement to steer clear of foreign al­
liances did not imply neutralism since it indicated that
Jordan would persist in respecting its agreements with Bri- 
1 T ft
tain and Iraq.
Opposition to the Government was expressed in the
Jordan, Proceedings of the House of Representa­
tives. January 26, 19^6. p. *44; Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. p. '38.
^^^Majali, Muthakkirati. p. 182.
Egypt and Syria told Rifa'i that the purpose of the 
proposed Arab subsidy was to remove British pressure off 
Jordan. Both countries promised "in the event the British 
subsidy was ended, they would be ready to pay a substitute 
to Jordan." Ibid.. p. 181.
118Jordan, Proceedings of the House of Representa­
tives. Op. cit.. p. 24%.
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streets. Although opposition leaders were arrested, public 
pressure was too strong to he ignored. Thus a major shift 
of policy was the only alternative and the Government was 
put on the defensive even after it renounced the Pact, 
Elizabeth Monroe observed:
The disasterous Templer mission to Jordan 
in December, 1955, exposed the degree to which 
Arab unity and Arab nationalism must now be taken 
into account in any successful Middle Eastern pol­
icy, o , e The Templer incident was proof that the 
force of public opinion in the Middle East, though 
it may be volatile, was henceforth powerful, and 
that its impulses were all against the policy of 
a few sedate politicians who thou^t a pact with 
the West a price worth paying for stability. 119
And the Observer, critical of Britain's policy commented:
There was a brief honeymoon, then Britain 
plunged into the Baghdad Pact Plan which she knew 
in advance was, in our opinion, a threat to our 
vital interests. It was also against the genuine 
desires of the Arabs. Any policy in this area 
must recognize nationalism. . . .  Arabs are not 
now able to accept themselves as a tail to British 
policy, . . .  I believe that by attempting to keep 
this area as a sphere of influence, Britain will 
lose her real interests. 120
The Role of the United States 
in the Baghdad Pact
The Baghdad Pact was inspired by Secretary of State 
Dulles and implemented by Eden. Dulles contemplated a 
flexible series of bilateral assistance treaties with Mid­
dle Eastern States. In his Northern Tier Plan, the stress
^^%lonroe, op. cit.. p. 188.
^^^Ibid.. p. 191; Sunday Times. March 25, 1956; 
The Observer. March 25, 1956.
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121was on American military aid, and the regional forces,
Dulles's conception of the Northern Tier plan assumed the
bypassing of the Arah-Israeli conflict and the disentangling
of the United States from association with British Middle
122East policies, which had faced unpopularity.
By contrast, Eden's Bagdad Pact reintroduced West­
ern power and represented the continuation of the imperial­
ist policy of stationing foreign troops in the Arab coun­
tries. It also aimed at aligning the Arab people in line 
with the West, a policy which intensified inter-Arab rival­
ries, which Dulles hoped to avoid.
Dulles was unwilling to recognize, unreservedly, 
Eden's interpretation of the primacy of Britian's responsi­
bility in the Middle East which constituted the basis for
12%
Britain's central role in the Baghdad alliance. This 
difference in viewpoint represented a lack of Anglo-Ameri­
can coordination on the highest level which proved to be 
calamitous.
The United States had supported the Baghdad Pact 
in its early stages but refrained from joining it as a 
full-fledged m e m b e r , E d e n  was critical of American
121Fitzsimmons, op. cit.. p. 134.
IZ^Ibid.
^^^Ibid.. p. 135.
^^^At the Bermuda Conference on March 24, 1957, 
Eisenhower and Macmillan agreed that the U.S. would be ac-
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abstention and accused the U.S. of venturing on a course
of "uncertain diplomacy" in inspiring the alliance and
then holding back.
Having played a leading part to inspire the 
project, the United States Government held back 
while Britain alone of the Western powers joined 
it. Worse still, they tried to take credit for 
this attitude in capitals like Cairo, which were 
hostile to the Pact. Then, by a series of hesi­
tant steps, they drew nearer the Pact, sending an 
observer and spending money, but still not joining 
it. An ounce of membership would have been worth 
all the wavering and saved a ton of trouble later 
on. 125
While the Americans would not join, they were pre-
126pared to give the alliance "moral support". For a time 
the Pact stimulated diplomatic activity that made it ap­
pear as a successful plan. Efforts were initiated to link 
many Middle East countries in a series of alliances that
might form a defense s y s t e m . T h u s ,  by the end of 1955,
128"the Baghdad Pact was proving a firm stabilizer."
tive in the Military Committee: "Willingness of the United 
States, under the authority of the recent Middle East Joint 
Resolution, to participate actively in the work of the Mil­
itary Committee of the Baghdad Pact." U.S. Policy in the 
Middle East, p. 421; 6. B.. British and Foreign State tapers. 
Vol." 1’63T p . 80. -----------------
^^^Eden, Full Circle, p. 375.
IZGibid.. p. 374.
127PitBsimmons, op. cit., p. 128.
It was announced that the Prime Minister of Pakis­
tan and the President of Turkey had been working on a pro­
ject that might include Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Yaman, and 
Iran. London Times. February 21, 1955.
^^^FitzSimmons, op. pit., p. 128.
A writer in Round Table concluded: "By and large
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The reluctance of the United States was due to 
the Egyptian and the Saudi opposition to the Pact and the 
desire of the U.S. to avoid endangering its interests in 
Saudi Arabia.Moreover, Israel had opposed the alliance 
because it would not be permitted to join it, as a result 
of the Iraqi veto. Israel feared that the West would change 
its attitude toward her, as well as the Palestine question» 
and thus Western aid would become commensurate to its size. 
At the same time, the armies of the Arab States would be 
strengthened and could enter a battle against her.
However, Eden’s speech in the House of Commons 
oa March 30, 1955» allayed the fears of the Zionists:
I take the view that when this agreement 
comes to be studied, it will be seen that from 
the viewpoint of Israel it is likely to be a 
desira&l* development because this is the first 
time an Arab state is looking in another direction 
than simply toward Israel. 130
Moreover, because of the Palestine problem, the U-
nited States decided not to join since American membership
would very likely result in an Israeli request for a treaty
with the U.S.A. , and such an eventuality would inevitably
worsen Western relations with the Arab states. In ad-
the Middle East seems in a better shape for defend­
ing itself in 1944 than at any time since the end 
of the War." Round Table. XLV, 1954, p. 133.
12Q^In an attempt to appease the Saudis, the U.S.A. 
offered to mediate in the British-Saudi dispute over the 
Buraimi Oasis, Hafez, op. cit.. p. 216; Also Perlman, M., 
"The Turkish-Arab Diplomatic tangle," Middle Eastern Affairs. 
Vol. VIII, January, 1955, p. 16.
^^^MonroSy op. oit. p. I84.
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dition, Congress had insisted on making permanent the bor­
ders in Palestine but Dulles refused this request.
Thus the fears of Israel echoed in Washington. The State 
Department was reluctant to put the treaty of the Bagdad 
Pact before Congress because that would have meant the 
initiation of a debate over the whole Middle East policy, 
a debate in which the Zionists and local party politics 
might have played a great role in deciding its outcome.
The Anglo-Egyptian agreement for the evacuation of 
the Suez Canal Zone drastically reduced Britain's presence 
in the Middle East. Her attempt to restore lost influ­
ence through the Baghdad Pact alliance further undermined 
her prestige, since the Arabs opposed it as being a direct 
attack on their unity. Britain's participation in the 
Suez affair of 1956 on the side of Israel, further dimi­
nished its influence in the Arab World. However, the dis­
missal of General Glubb from his powerful position as com­
mander of the Jordan armed forces and sole director of the 
army’s budget, had entirely eliminated British presence and 
prestige in the Arabs countries.
The Dismissal of Glubb and the Arabization 
of the Jordan Army
The inability of the Jordan Government to join 
the Baghdad Pact, lowered its prestige and forced it to
^^^Jamali, op. cit.. p. 115.
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reach an accommodation with the nationalists. During the 
period when Jordan was contemplating joining the Pact,
Cairo was inciting the Jordan people to pressure their 
government to "get rid of the British officers in the army 
. . . .  Get rid of the King who is keeping Jordan as a 
tool of the West»"^^^ Husayn's response was to dismiss 
Glubh, who was regarded by Arab public opinion as the last 
vestige of i m p e r i a l i s m . T h i s  measure was largely aim­
ed at satisfying Jordan's demand to command its own amy,
as well as to keep the armed forces on his side.^^4
The Role of the Army in Jordan 
While Jordan has been an independent state only
^Husayn, Uneasy lies the H e ^ . op. oit.. p. 107.
In the House of Commons, the leader of the opposi­
tion, Gaitskel said," I think that the Baghdad Pact. . . . 
has itself contributed very materially to this development." 
Documents on International Affairs. 1956, p. 15.
Member of ï^ arïiament, ï/egge Bourke added:
"The decision taken by the King of Jordan was 
the lesser of two evils and may be the responsibi­
lity of another state altogether. Can we have an 
assurance that in examining this problem Her Maj­
esty's Government will bear in mind that the real
culprit in this matter may well be Egypt?" (G.B. 
Parliamentary Debates. Vol. 591, Col. 1714-1715.)
^^^The Templer Mission contributed to the erosion 
of British prestige. In his biography. General Glubb wrote 
that Prime Minister Samir Al-Rifa'i had visited Egypt short­
ly before the dismissal, and that he had settled it with 
Egypt to Arabize the Army. Glubb, Soldier With the Arabs. 
op. cit.. p. 427.
Conroe, op. oit.. p. 189; Ray Allan," Jordan:
Rise and Pall of the Squirarchv." Commentary. Vol. 13.
March, 1957.
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since 194-6, its army dates tack to 1921. One could, there- 
fore, argue that the army created the state.
In its earlier history!, the Legion's function was 
mainly a "praetorian guard" to establish the authority of 
Amir Abdullah over a divided and instable s o c i e t y . W i t h  
the expansion of the kingdom and the infusion of new pop­
ulation, the political role of the Legion acquired new di­
mensions; to prevent any successful challenge to the au­
thority of the King and to protect the dynasty, its regime
T ■î?
and establishment from any external or internal threats.
In Jordan, the Palace system of power has survived longer 
than elsewhere in the Arab World, This is due to the loy­
alty of the army, to Western military and economic aid and 
to the role of Israel in the politics of the region. Until 
the end of 1961, Jordan was a garrison state in so far as 
the Palace used force for the maintenance of its rule,^^^
135"In Jordan there is an army which eims the state," 
The Armies of the ^ a b  States in the Context of Their Envi­
ronment, I HetirewJ . Tel-Aviv, I94W, This publication iraa 
intended to acquaint the Zionist soldier with the Arab 
defense forces. Cited in Vatikiotis, op. cit,, p, 5*
^^^Vatikiotie, op. cit,, p, 6,
137ibid,
^^^Ibid,, p, 12.
Although the period 1950-1957 was generally tur­
bulent, as it was dangerous for the monarchy, post- 1967 
war period proved to be the most dangerous in the history 
of the country. This was essentially due to the increasing 
power and activities of the Palestine liberation Organiza­
tions, with whom Ring Husayn made various agreements. How­
ever, due to differences in their policies regarding Pales-
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In Jordan, the army is not only the instrument for 
defense and stability, but a part of everything. To a 
large extent, the Jordan army today continues to be one 
of the most important factors in the country's economy.
Reasons For The Dismissal 
In his biography, King Husayn indicated that dis­
missing General Glubb was the only alternative to appease 
the opposition, and to regain his position following the 
eclipse of the Government as a result of the Baghdad Pact 
controversy. Husayn wrote:
One thing led to another. With Communism 
filtering into the Middle East and Cairo branding 
Jordan as an imperialist power, there was no al­
ternative , Glubb had to go, . . . I would say 
that if Glubb had been in command of the army a n/i 
year longer, it would have been the end of Jordan.
On the other hand, General Glubb suggested the
underlying reasons for Husayn's action. He said:
, . . The King had been enthusiastically 
determined to enter the Baghdad Pact, and he had, 
thereby incurred the hostility of Egypt and of the
tine and peace with the Zionists, confrontation between 
the P.L.O and the Jordan army was inevitable, as was 
the case in September, 1970.
^^%usayn. Uneasy Lies the Head, op.cit., p. 133.
^^^VatikiOtis, op. oit.. p. 12.
In the period 1950-5?, the largest item of Jordan's 
budget was that of the army whose expenditure exceeded the 
combined budgets of departments. Ibid., p. 10.
^^^n denying the accusation that the dismissal 
was the result of emotionalism as it was spontaneous, the 
King answered: '* Let it not be thought that I dismissed
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Jordan extremists. The policy had failed. It was 
pointed out to him that he could regain his popu­
larity with these extremely vooal enemies at one 
stroke. To perform some act of defiance towards 
Britain and to dismiss me would immediately re-es­
tablish his popularity. . . . The King was probably 
influenced partly by the illusion that I had neg­
lected to provide ammunition, partly by a desire 
himself to exercise authority, unfettered by a 
middle-aged and cautious advisor. He also believed 
that to defy Britain would restore his popularity 
and, finally his imagination was fired by the idea 
of being the hero of his country, 142
There are however various interpretations for Glubb's
dismissal; one, Glubb represented Jordan's subservience to
B r i t a i n . J o r d a n  was dependent for its political and
economic existence on British support and subsidy which was
paid directly to an account controlled by G l u b b . T h u s ,
Britain which paid the annual subsidy to Jordan also sup-
plied officers to train its army, and in fact ran it.
an old and trusted friend in a fit of emotional pique."
Ibid.. pp. 43-46.
^^^Giubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, pp. 425-426.
^^■^Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, (Hew York:
Holt, 1963), p. 313.
^'^^Husayn, Uneasy lies the Head, p. 131; Gerald 
Sparrow, Hussein of Jordan, C Lond,on : George G. Harrap &
CO. Ltd.,"Tg6ü)‘; p. 115'.
14.5•^'^ Husayn, Uneasy lies the Head, p. 131.
In 1949, Prime minister Abul-Huda reached an agree­
ment with Britain to replace Glubb with another Chief of 
the General Staff, but Abdullah disagreed saying:
"A face you know is better than one you do 
not know. As long as the C.G.S. would have to be 
a Britisher, Glubb is better than any other Eng- 
li shman,"
Majali, Muthakkirati, p. 94.
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In the political sphere, this meant that Jordan's policies 
could not deviate from established policy lines drawn in 
London.
According to Gluhh, Jordan of all the Arab states 
discovered the secret of success that "the Arabs could not 
progress without European help.
Two, the role of the British officers and Glubb in 
particular regarding the strategy and defense of the coun­
try was viewed as a danger to the army and the homeland. 
Despite his long service in Jordan, Glubb persisted in 
giving allegiance to Britain first and thus placed its in­
terests before those of J o r d a n . I t  appeared that in 
receiving his orders from White Hall, Glubb's strategy was 
based on defensive plans. To Husayn, this was a damaging 
strategy which could cost Jordan dearly and result in
^^^Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs, p. 64. 
147piiigtin. March 4, 1956.
Brigadier Ashton, Glubb's second in command, was 
dismissed from the service for dereliction of duty during 
the Qibya massacre which took place on the night of 14-15 
of October, 1953. Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. pp. 19-20; Vatiki­
otis, op. oit.. p. I2Ô.
The opposition leader, H u ^  Gaitskell, said in the 
British House of Commons that the dismissal of Glubb:
"Increases the danger of a war between the 
Arab states and Israel. . . . The reason why there 
has been such general agreement on this is that we 
know . . . that General Glubb and his fellow offi­
cers have exercised a restraining influence upon 
the Arab Legion and upon the policy of Jordan. I 
can vouch for that because the Foreign Secretary 
of Israel himself told me that three years ago." 
Documents on International Affairs. 1956, p. 15.
^^®Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 135.
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defeat;
To my way of thinking, a piirely defensive 
strategy invited disaster. If the enemy knew we 
would hit them as hard as they hit us where it 
would hurt the most, it would make them think 
twice before attacking. 149
Husayn felt that Jordan should answer force by 
force. However, Glubb's policy which invited border inci­
dents created a gulf between the army and the people.
This was due to the fact that what happened on the Jordan- 
ian-Israeli frontier could affect the political equilibrium 
of the state of Jordan. Often times it led to serious dis­
turbances in Jordan, particularly when Israeli raids in­
flicted extensive damage to life and property. Thus, poli­
tical demonstrations against the regime were directed against 
the inability of the arm^  ^to give adeq.uate protection against 
the Israeli raids which would be attributed to a lax com- 
mand.^^l
I49ibid.
As an example, in March, 1949, when the Zionist 
forces advanced eastward across the Negeb, Glubb withdrew 
the Jordan forces well inside the Jordan frontier thus al­
lowing the Zionists to occupy a substantial area in the 
eastern Negeb as well as the port of Elat. Musa, op. cit., 
p. 529.
150The most devastating exercise by Glubb was in 
exceding his authority on many occasions. In his lecture 
to army officers, he asserted that since Israel was stronger 
than the Arabs it was unwise to fight on the frontier.
"In vain I pointed this out to Glubb. . . .  He ad­
vocated at first a withdrawal in the event of an attack 
and withdrawal would end up on the East Bank. Thus, the 
defensive strategy of Glubb meant losing a lot of territory 
before a battle even started." Husayn, Uneasy Lies the 
Head, pp. 135-138.
^Vatikiotis, op. cit.. p. 16.
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Three, since Jordan depended completely on British 
weapons and in view of Gluhh's theory of defensive strategy 
which did not require large stores of ammunition, the stock 
was inadequate for any prolonged confrontation. Thus, Jor­
dan's security would he endangered and Gluhh's "very pre­
sence in our country was without douht an important factor
152in the trouble. We were in the hands of foreigners."
Bour, the role of the Arah officers in the army was 
one of secondary nature. The British dominated the Jordan 
military affairs while no Arah officers were given impor-
15 T
tant responsibilities. Husayn observed:
^^^Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 137.
Husayn declared:
" . . .  This was not a matter of theory, it 
meant a margin that separates victory from defeat." Husayn, 
Uneasy lies the Head, p. 135.
In his memoirs, Gluhh revealed that although the 
Arah Legion was essentially a part of the British defense 
forces it was not supplied for offensive action. Perhaps 
Britain's plan was to prevent Abdullah from undertaking an 
offensive action and occupying a larger part of Palestine 
thereby endangering the existence of the Zionist state in 
whose creation Britain had played a crucial role. Gluhh 
said that "the British refused to give us ammunition hut 
they agreed to send us barbed wire." Glubb, A Soldier with 
the Arabs, p. 213.
During the war of 1948 complaining about the short­
age of ammunition, Glubb told Abdullah: "We have very lit­
tle ammunition and the depots are empty. I cannot fight 
for more than five hours." Na'ahashibi, on. cit.. p. 151.
Minister of Defense Palah Al-Madaohah gave his view:
"The army secrets were all with Glubb. . . . Trea­
sury secrets were all with Glubb. Political plans were all 
with Glubb. As for us Ministers/, we knew only what he 
wanted us to know." Nashashibi, on. cit.. p. 151.
^^^n an answer to a question whether the dismissal 
of the British officers would create new incidents along 
the Israeli frontier, Eden replied in the House of Commons:
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Around me I saw junior Arab officers who 
would obviously never become leaders. Some of them 
were men lacking in ability and force, men pare pared 
to bow to White Hall's commands transmitted by sen­
ior British officers. Men who had no spark. Men 
without initiative and who could be trusted not to 
cause any problems. These were officer material.154
In his biography Husayn expressed his disagreements
with Glubb in connection with preparing Arab officers to
assume higher commands, but Glubb's "British policy" did
not take into consideration Jordsui's national aspiration
155to Arabize its army. Husayn wrote:
I was determined to build up strong, well- 
balanced armed forces . . . and since this was not 
possible with Glubb, our self-respect demanded 
that we fight our battles alone. 156
To Husayn, Glubb's attitude seemed to reflect the
"As regards the affect of these dismissals 
upon the international situation and upon Israel, 
the House must judge - and can judge as well as her 
Majesty's Government - as to the effect of the pre­
sence or absence of these officers. I would have 
thou^t that many would realize that the effect 
upon the military value of the Legion would be very 
serious indeed." G. B., Parliamentary Debates,
Vol. 549, Col. 1711.
'^Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 131; see Hu­
sayn's speech to the Cabinet on April 9, 1955, in Al- 
Husayn Ibn Talal. p. 62.
In the (jibyah incident the garrison commander, an 
Arab army officer, refused to answer questions of the min­
isterial investigating commission. He said:
"If it were not for Glubb, I would be a shepherd. 
Therefore, I refuse to talk unless my master /Glub^ orders 
me to." Nashashibi, op. cit.. p. 149.
^Husayn was told that Arabization could not be 
accomplished before 1975 and that "the Royal Engineers of 
the Arab Legion would have an Arab commander by 1985." 
Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 132.
ISGlbid.. p. 138.
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British policy to dominate the Jordan army through slow 
change. To his Prime Minister he expressed:
Since I assumed my constitutional powers,
I have been trying to correct these conditions 
in a manner which suits the dignity of Jordan. .
. . However, I have not detected any positive 
results of these attempts. 157
Arabization of the army which meant eliminating 
foreign influence and transforming the Arab legion into 
a genuine national Arab army, ranked h i ^  in Husayn* s 
calculations. At the time he ordered his Prime Minister 
to dismiss Glubb, the army commander, Patrick Coghill, 
chief of intelligence,and Bigadier Hutton, chief of op­
erations, Husayn revealed to the Cabinet that it was time 
to save Jordan from further catastrophe. He said:
. . .  I believe that if matters were left 
to the mood of the Chief of General Staff, it is 
very probable that we would find ourselves face 
to face with a catastrophe similar to that of 1948, 
even worse. Therefore, I decided to end the ser­
vices of the C.G.S. together with other British 
officers who assist him in implementing his policy 
and ambitions. I also decided that this order be 
executed without hesitation or delay, and ordered 
him to leave the country today. 158
Five, another important problem was GlubTb*s interference 
in the politics of the country. By controlling the fi­
nances of the army, Glubb was incapable of divorcing him­
self from politics, particularly, since the security forces 
were under his command. "He operated from a position of
^^^Husayn, Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. op. cit.. p. 83.
1581bid.. p. 85.
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such strength that our political leaders tended to turn 
to him or to the British embassy before making the sligh­
test d e c i s i o n . A l t h o u g h  Jordan became independent in 
1946, virtually all policy decisions had to be cleared 
with the British Ambassador. This was possible since 
the finances and the military in Jordan were at the mercy 
of London. Thus while the political leaders ceased to think 
of Jordan as an independent country, it also became axio­
matic to come to the British embassy for advice.
^^%usayn. Uneasy files the Head, op. cit., p. 139.
In his biograplhy, Uuaayn' revealed that Glubb had 
refused to promote, even dismissed,senior Arab army and 
police officers because they were nationalists or ambi­
tious. Ibid.. p. 140.
^^°Ibid.. p. 152.
Glubh^ 8 interference in political affairs, led to 
differences with Prime Minister Rifa'i. A group of army 
officers, formed on the lines of the Egyptian "Free Qf- 
icers", were reported to have visited the King and handed 
him a British newspaper with the heading, "The Uncrowned 
King of Jordan." They asked him to dismiss Glubb, because, 
by 30 doing, Husayn would compensate for popular uni^st 
caused by the Baghdad Pact episode, and thus would become 
a nationalist hero while ending Glubb's dictatorship.
The King responded:
" I wish iriiat happened in Amman on March 3, 
1956, had taken place ten years earlier. . . . The 
army got rid of its commander before the catastro­
phe took place, and Palestine was lost." Nashashibi, 
op. cit.. p. 139.
Glubb was reported to have described the politics 
of the Middle East in the following terms:
", . .We have given them self-government for 
which they are totally unsuited. They veer natural­
ly toward dictatorship. Democratic institutions 
are promptly twisted into an engine of intrigue 
. . . ." Quoted in Golden Carpet, p. 106, and cited 
in Security and the Middle East.. op. cit.. 51.
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Husayn’3 action must have been contemplated years 
earlier. His statement at a top leadership-military meet­
ing on April 9, 1955, in which the Cabinet and Glubb were 
present revealed his future plans regarding the Arabization 
of the army, the position of Glubb, the sovereignty of Jor­
dan, and the general internal conditions;
It is impossible for any military force today 
to fulfill its duty unless certain conditions are 
met. The army's high command must possess high 
qrialifications to accomplish its goals. . . .  A 
number of senior officers in our army and the Na­
tional Guard in particular have not attained an 
academic level but were promoted according to sen­
iority rather than ability.
. . .  I believe that loyalty to one person is 
a mistake. . . . Loyalty should be to the country 
and to the national interests not to certain per- 
sonalities.
The army machinery in the Le^on is in need 
of change and revision and reorganization. The ap­
paratus which was adequate in the past can not do 
the job today. . . .  To the military man, is a cer­
tain function and to the politician another.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an inde­
pendent sovereign country with a treaty with Bri­
tain. . . .  We must devise a military plan accord­
ing to which there will be no retreat from any posi­
tion. . . . A military plan must mean a counter­
attack.
Our internal position today does not corres­
pond to the reality. Y/e are in a state of war with 
the Jews. Our ammunitions are inadequate. . . .161
The British Response 
From the official Jordan viewpoint, Glubb was a 
civilian employee whose dismissal should not affect Anglo- 
Jordan relations. To convince the British Government of
^^^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. pp. 62 f.
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this policy, Husayn issued a statement in Amman emphasizing
Anglo-Jordan friendship:
Nothing was further from my thoughts than to 
terminate the friendship but it was essential to 
prove our country independent, free to speak its 
mind and free to act without outside influence or 
dictation. 162
From the British viewpoint the dismissal of Glubb 
and other command officers was against the spirit of the 
Anglo-Jordan t r e a t y , H o w e v e r ,  inspite of Jordan's as­
surances, Eden personally cabled Husayn asking him to change 
his mind. The British Ambassador in Jordan also threatened:
You must be aware, Sir, that the step you 
have taken has caused a tremendous uproar in Lon­
don. . . .  I must advise you. Sir, that Her Maj­
esty's Government feels that unless you change 
your decision immediately on this matter, unless 
Glubb Pasha is permitted to continue his work here, 
and we are given a chance to clear this whole mat­
ter up, the consequences. Your Majesty, could be 
very serious as far as you, yourself, the monarchy, 
and the whole future of Jordan is concerned. 164
King Husayn replied:
I believe, Mr. Duke, that what I have done 
is for the good of my country, and I am not going 
to alter my decision regardless of any consequences. 
I would rather lose my life than chsinge my mind.
The monarchy belongs to the people, I belong to 
this country. I know that I am doing this for the 
best, come what may. 165
-1 flO
Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, pp. 138-139.
^^%t meant the end of British as well as Western 
influence in the region. Emphasizing this development.
The Economist commented: "The political life in the Middle 
East has escaped from Western control." March 10, 1956.
^^^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. p. 145.
IGSibid.
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Inapite of this announcement, indignation in Bri­
tain seemed to swell into new hysteria, even Eden's state­
ment in the House of Commons in which he said:
The House will have heard wi.th resentment and 
with regret of the summary dismissal of General 
Glubh and two other senior British officers of the 
Arab Legion. The lifetime of devoted service which 
General Glubb has given to the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan should have received more generous treat­
ment.
It is right to tell the House that the King 
of Jordan and the Jordanian Prime Iflinister have 
told Her Majesty's ambassador that they don't want 
any change to take place in Anglo-Jordan relations, 
and that they stand by the Anglo-Jordan treaty.
Her Majesty's Government have given due 
weight to Jordan's Government statement regarding 
the officers. They feel that in view of the treat­
ment meted out to the British officers who have been 
dismissed it would be wrong for British officers in 
the Arab Legion to be left in an uncertain position. 
In our opinion, officers in the executive commands 
cannot be asked to continue in positions of respon­
sibility without authority. We have therefore 
asked that such officers should be relieved of their 
commands.
It is clear from the treaty that its whole 
spirit is based on the need for consultation to en­
sure mutual defense, and in this sense. General 
Glubb's dismissal is in view of the Government 
against the spirit of the treaty. 166
The British protest did not move the King to rescind
his order. In a joint session of the Jordan Parliament,
on March 3, 1957, Husayn declared that Arabization of the
army was a necessary step to ending subservience to Britain.
Husayn stated:
. . .  We arabized the army. Arabization was 
a reply to a threat which I had received, that our 
very existence and the throne would not survive
^Husayn, Uneasy Ides the Head, op. cit., p. 148.
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longer if I did not follow the policies desired 
by a certain great power. This was the practical 
answer. But the reply which the representative of 
that power received was that this throne is a part 
of this country, as it is its symbol, I am ready 
to leave if it symbolizes anything else. Its value 
equals the power it gives to the sons of Jordan and 
Arabism, , , , But my position was not shaken and I 
have been successful, , , , 167
Conclusion
Jordan's relations with Britain were essentially 
the personal connections of Kings Abdullah and Husayn with 
London, for with her protection, funds and direction they 
became rulers and contenders for Arab leadership. In the 
political sense, both owed their political survival to 
Britain, For this reason, the Hashemites did not see evil 
in the Mandate system nor in their personal association with
Al-Husayn Ibn Talal, op, cit,, p, 153.
The London Times made the following observation 
after Glubb's departure ;
"Amman is still en fete in celebration of 
General Glubb's departure and it must be recorded 
that the pleasure seems both to be universal and 
genuine. Young Arab Legion officers claim to be­
lieve it will take politics out of the army on the 
grounds that General Glubb refused promotions to 
officers not sympathetic to Western policies.
There are a few who even think it will even 
help rather than hinder good relations with Britain 
and many who are convinced that if Britain had vol­
untarily withdrawn her officers long ago, perhaps 
incorporating them in a military mission such an 
unhappy event would never have occured,
, , , The whole trend of Arab policy for 
years has been toward the removal of such symbols 
of Western influence," Cited in Husayn, Uneasy 
Lies the Head, op, cit., p, 149.
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the British. In return they advanced British interests in 
their territories, in spite of Arab nationalist opposition.
In the mid-fifties, Britain's declining influence 
in the region seemed to endanger western economic, politi­
cal and military interests. An alternative was the estab­
lishment of the Baghdad Pact through which western inter­
ests would be protected without western physical presence.
Husayn was personally enthusiastic about joining 
the Pact. His policy was based on sound reasoning, as he 
was confronted with complex situations. The internal set­
ting in Jordan was an explosive one. Husayn was under in­
creasing nationalist pressure to end treaty relations with 
Britain. Simultaneously, he was faced with an external 
pressure. Britain would refuse to revise or end the treaty 
unless Jordan became a member in the defense alliance. 
Secondly, Jordan suffered from instability and Husayn's 
policies appeared to lack consensus of his subjects. This 
situation rendered his regime on the brink of collapse. 
Thirdly, Jordan stood in dire need for economic as well as 
military aid while Husayn needed the political support of 
a great power.
Five main factors Influenced Husayn's decision to 
join the pact. First, the U.S. and Britain had promised 
to equip and expand his army. To Husayn such development 
meant personal fulfillment for he desired to lead a strong 
army. Second, strengthening his army would minimize
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Israeli attacks. Further memhership in the Pact would in 
all probahilities preclude any Israeli attempÿ to invade 
Jordan's territory, thereby insuring the security, inde­
pendence and integrity of the country. Also, Husayn was 
promised the large economic aid sorely needed for develop­
mental projects to alleviate the chronic unemployment 
Such aid could have minimized internal upheavals, since it 
mii^t have kept thousands engaged in other employment than 
politics. Finally. membership in such defense system under 
the protection of two major powers would have enhanced his 
personal stature among the Arab leaders, while it could have 
enabled him to conclude a separate peace with Israel which 
Abdullah strive for, and which Husayn desired.
Viewing this reasoning from Husayn's personal and 
dynastic looking glass, the logic for his enthusiasm is evi­
dent. However, from the popular point of view, such policy 
seemed dangerous and had to be stopped. Since the King was 
suffering from lack of popular base, the only alternative 
was to submit to the popular will: no pacts.
Husayn's venture worsened his status with the na­
tionalist, particularly the army officers. Since the army 
was considered the most loyal institution to the Palace, 
his course had grave consequences. Thus, in order to avoid 
the collapse of his regime, and to restore the confidence 
of the nationalists, he decided on a major act of defiance 
against Britain. Such course appeared to have been the
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most potent weapon in the arsenal of the nationalists. 
Arabization of the ariqy was the goal. Overnight, Husayn's 
image changed into that of a nationalist hero. However, 
Husayn may have been considering such action earlier since 
external as well as internal factors made such action im­
perative.
To enhance his personal stature in the Arab world, 
the King had to command his army, for the presence of the 
British commanders made the army a point of controversy:. 
Another was Glubb*s involvement in politics which the King 
considered unwarranted curtailment of his personal prero­
gatives. As to Jordan's military capability, eversince 
1948, it was a defensive one , simply because General Glubb 
and Loudon wanted it so. This strategy has always enoour* 
aged Israeli aggression. Lack of retaliation by Jordan's 
arey - having been commanded by British officers - had al­
ways aggravated the Arab officers and placed Husayn in un­
comfortable positions which he desired to avoid.
In any case, the Arabization of the army and ending 
treaty relationships with Britian pacified the nationalists 
and preserved the regime for only a few months as Husayn, 
again, embarked on a similar venture: adherence to the Eisen­
hower Doctrine.
CHAPTER XV 
JORDAN-DHITED STATES RELATIONS 
Backfiround
Americari-Jordaii relations went through three stages. 
In the first period, 1946- 1949, relations were not close 
inspite of the fact that Amir Ahdullah had declared war on 
Germany on the side of the Allies. The American attitude 
may have been influenced by many factors, paramount among 
which was the pro-Zionist groups which demanded that Trans­
jordan should be opened for Jewish immigration and coloni­
zation. Thus the United States did not recognize Jordan 
when it became independent in 1946. When informed of its 
independence, a telegraph reply acknowledged that the mes- 
sage had been noted by the United States Government. On
^Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 14, No. 357,
(May 5, 15'4? )7 -----------
Senator P. Myers championed the idea that Jordan 
should be opened to Zionist colonization instead of being 
given statehood. In a letter dated April 23, 1946, Secu­
re tary of State James Byrnes reftited Uyer^s claim that Jor­
dan was a part of Palestine. He said that the Department 
" . . .  has found nothing which would justify 
it in taking the position that the recent steps 
taken by Great Bid tain with regard to Transjordan 
violates any treaties existing between Great Bri­
tain and the United'States including the Convention 
of December 3, 1924, or deprived the United States
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Janiiary 31, 1949, however, the United States extended de
.jure recognition to Jordan, almost three years after her
2
independence.
The second period, 1950-1956, stressed Western in­
terests in Jordan due to its strategic importance "between 
the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Aqaha, its inclusion of 
most of the Holy Places, its long boundary with Israel, and 
its involvement with the Palestinian refugees. The multi­
plicity of Jordan's problems made financial assistance im­
perative to keep the kingdom stable and independent, and 
the West was willing to pay the price. Jordan, during this 
period, was supported by Britain with the United States 
playing a secondary role. However, in April, 1957, the 
United States, in replacing Britain, played the major role 
in supporting Jordan after the abrogation of the Anglo-Jor- 
dan treaty.
A third period, 1957 on, manifested United States
intervention to restore Husayn's position which was eclipsed
by the Nationalists. Friendly U.S. relations were strength-
of any rights or interests which the United States may have 
with respect to Transjordan, the Department of State con­
siders that it would be premature for this government to 
take any decision at the present time with respect to the 
question of recognition of Transjordan as an independent 
state." U.S. Concessional Record, 79th Cong. 2nd Sees., 
1946, XCII, Part^, 8130. See Myers oharges o6 the State 
Department and his attacks against Britain, Ibid, 8128-8132.
2By contrast, the U.S.A. recognized Israel within
a few hours of its establishment on May 15, 1948.
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ened, while British relations normalized and improved con­
siderably after the summer of 1958.
Up to 1957, American policy in the Middle East had 
evolved through two phases, neither satisfactory to U.S. 
interests. Truman's policy of open partiality for Israel 
was followed by Dulles' efforts to punish Nasser for having 
accepted communist arms and for rejecting Western offers 
of protection.^ It may be said that by 1957, the United 
States was entering the history of the Middle East, and by 
1958, in order to contain communism, a policy of even hand­
edness was adopted. The U.S. generally adopted a policy 
of neutrality in Arab disputes.^ The United States had re­
jected unilateral pledges to Israel and promised to defend
15
victims of aggression in the Middle East, including Jordan. 
While this policy guaranteed the protection of Israel, it
%arry Ellis, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict Today,"
The United States and the Middle East, (Englewood Cliffs,
îTT.ÏTHFfi” ênfîâITrTg64')V p. 117”
^George Denczowski (ed). United States Interests 
in the Middle East, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute, 196B)', p. 25.
op. pit.. p. 116.
V/hen the U.S.A. pressed Israel to withdraw from 
Sinai after the Suez war, a delegation of American Zionists 
met with Dulles and protested the U.S. action and argued 
that the U.S.S.R. did not withdraw from Hungary. Dulles 
replied: "Israel has an ambassador who can defend Israel's 
viewpoint. You are U.S. citizens, and I am not going to 
accept your protest." Jamali, op. cit., pp. 135-138.
President Eisenhower said,'*ï assure you that I will 
not bend before Zionist pressure, and the Arabs will not 
be injured by my policies. As to the mistakes of previous 
administrations, I cannot erase." Ibid., p. 11.
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also stressed the maintenance of Jordan's government for 
the overthrow of King Husayn would react immediately on 
the Arah-Israeli dispute.^ For example, Israel's opposition 
to Jordan's engulfment hy the Arah Solidarity Pact in 1956, 
led Ben Gurion to declare that Israel retained freedom of 
action to occupy the West Bank of the Jordan. To this pro­
nouncement, the United States reacted by delivering a wam-
7
ing to Israel against any preventive move into Jordan.
Until 1957, Jordan depended upon Britain for its 
survival. After the Suez crisis, British influence in the 
Arab world, including Jordan, had diminished. To keep Jor­
dan within the West's sphere of influence, the United States 
replaced Britain as the political guardian of Jordan and 
assumed its financial burden. Prior to 1957, American aid 
was largely to head off social unrest and to meet urgent
needs. While military aid was small, the assistance was
8spent for long range economic development.
^Ellis, op. cit.. p. 118.
King Faysal tbn Saud also said that he wished the 
U.S.A. would make greater effort to sustain Husayn. His 
reason was that if internal pressures toppled the moderate 
King Husayn, Saudi Arabia would be the only important 
state friendly to the U.S., and would eventually come under 
pressure to alter that position.
^Ibld.. p. 115.
Q
U.S.A.I.D., U.S. Economie Assistance to Jordan, 
1952-1962. (Amman, ig^ZT
A major example was the"Jordan TVA Project." An­
other was the Jordan East Ghor Canal Project. In 1953, Pre­
sident Eisenhower sent Eric Johnston to negotiate a peace 
plan with the Arab states and Israel. It was based on util-
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American foreign policy in the Middle East stressed 
the maintenence of pro-Western conservative monarchial re­
gimes, Accordingly, the survival of Jordan as a viable 
independent state became of "vital concern" to the U.S.A.
This policy was given official backing by the proclamation 
of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which served as the basis of 
Jordan-American relations since January, 1957.
The Eisenhower Doctrine
Introduction
In 1956, the British and the French Governments 
declared that the issues of the Middle East required forth­
right Western intervention. Dulles, however, did not share 
their use-of-force approach, insisted that the United States 
would not "shoot its way through the Suez Canal," and ad-
izing the Jordan River waters to benefit both sides, and 
to contribute to the resettlement of the Arab redgugees. 
However, due to political reasons, the Plan never material­
ized. The Arabs viewed it as a measure to liquidate the 
Palestine question through economic measures, that it would 
have meant the recognition of Israel through collaboration 
in the common project and rehabilitating the refugees.
Edward Rizk. ]&e River Jordan. (New York: The Arab Inform­
ation Center, p. kv.
Nonetheless, Israel embarked on its water projects 
according to the Johnston plans. These projects were largely 
financedby the United States. Simultaneously, the U.S.A. 
financed a small scale water project in Jordan, the East 
Ghor Canal Project. This was a uni lateral move by Jordan, 
since the Arab States had rejected the Johnston Plan. The 
project had economic significance for Jordan, as it could 
irrigate one third of all potentially cultivable land in 
the country. Joseph Dees,"Jordan’s East Ghor Canal Project," 
Middle East Journal. Vol. 13, No. 4, (Autumn, 1959), p. 370.
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vised the use of moral force instead. While the tripartite 
aggression of 1956 curtailed to a large measure the influ­
ence of France and Britain in the Arab world, the growth 
of the nationalist movement further hindered imperialist 
penetration in the region. From the viewpoint of the Y/est, 
a vacuum was created which had to be filled by the United
Q
States to guarantee the security of Western interests.
Thus the Doctrine was an outcome of the Anglo-French-1sraeli 
fiasco at Suez,^*^
The United States' stand on the Suez issue was in­
terpreted by the Arab nationalists as acceptance by the 
U.S. of their policy, that of neutrality. But they soon 
found that a dialogue with the West could not be fruitful 
since Western policy aimed at hindering Arab unity, inter­
fering in inter-Arab affairs, and isolating Nasser who was
- - - 11 
viewed by the Arab people as a "mystical sort of savior,"
The idea of Pan-Arabism had Soviet support. The 
U.S.S.R. aimed at eliminating the Western position in the 
lÆiddle East, To that end, it found Nasser's neutralism a 
valuable ally. Such alliance was based on superficial 
grounds. In 1964-65, the government of the Soviet Union 
communicated with Israel that:
%'Iishil Kamil, Al-Mu*amarah Al-Amrikiyah fi al- 
Urdunn. (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr, 1957), p. Ï9.
^^Copeland, The Game of Nations, p, 214,
^^Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 107,
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The Soviets and Arabs did not really have 
much in common, but the Arabs as the Soviets had 
discovered a decade earlier, were determined to 
eliminate Western interests and influence in the 
Middle East. On this basis, the Soviets and the 
Arabs could make common cause. But the Israelis 
did not have to worry and should not get excited. 
The Soviets intend to be a moderating influence in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nasser was merely the 
best means for getting the West out of the entire 
region. 12
Nonetheless, Nasser's arms deal secured for the 
Eastern camp a foothold in the region. In an effort to 
dissociate the United States from Nasser without abandoning 
the other Arab states to his leadership, the U.S. embarked 
on a policy of active anti-Communism in the Middle East.^^ 
Preoccupied primarily with the global task of con­
taining the Communist advance by erecting alliances around 
it, the United States policy was neither concerned with 
British interests nor with Hashemite ambitions. To the 
Eisenhower Administration, the difficulty had been that 
the Middle East was becoming exposed to increased danger 
of international Commxmism. In his statement before the
12Draper, op. cit.. p. 34.
^^Paul Hammond, The Cold War Years; American For­
eign Policy Since 1945. lüew York: Harcourt), p. 117.
At the height of the Lebanese crisis in 1958» the 
U.S. ambassador reported to the State Department that: 
"American's prestige in Lebanon was deeply 
involved and . • , the State Department should be 
prepared either to support the current regime in 
resisting subversion or to cut its losses and leam 
to live with a great Arab nation presided over by 
Nasser," Charles Thayer, Diplomat, (New York: 
Harper, 1959), p. 8.
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House üoinmittee on l'’oreign Affairs, Secretary of State 
Dulles said:
I can assure you that the leaders of Inter­
national Communism will take every risk that they 
dare to take in order to win the Middle East, Al­
ready, they have made that clear. 14
He, therefore, was convinced that "basic U.S. policy should
now find expression in joint action hy Congress and the
Executive.
In attempting to counter Communist expansion in the 
Middle East, American policy had tovork with the remains 
of British influence in Iraq, and Jordan. Earlier attempts 
to huild a position of strength for the West, namely the 
Middle East Defense Organization and the Baghdad Pact, foun­
dered on the rocks of local politics and Arah nationalism.^^ 
Accordingly, on January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower pro­
posed a third attempt, the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was
the major American response to the post-Suez growth of So-
17Viet and Communist influence on radical Arah nationalism. 
Eisenhower appealed to anti-Communism as a way to recon-
Policy in the Middle East. 1956-57. p. 38.
15
ary 21, 1957, pp
16
U.S., Department of State Bulletin, 36, Janu-
>.85-87.
John C. Camphell, "From Doctrine to Policy in the 
Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35» No. 3 (April, 1957), 
pp. 2141-2142.
17Lenczowski, The United States Interests in the 
Mddle East, p. 20.
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struct the American position in the Middle East. He de­
clared that :
The Middle East has abruptly reached a new 
and critical stage in its long and important his­
tory. . . . Our country supports without reserva­
tion the full sovereignty and independence of each 
and every nation in the Middle East. 19
However, the United States failed to recognize that Arah 
nationalism and Islam on the one hand, and Communism on 
the other, could mix. It also failed to acknowledge that 
by I960 "Nasser had proved to be a relatively competent na­
tionalist leader who was not at all inclined to become a
20tool of either Soviet or American policies."
To certain Arab leaders, fear of Communist infil­
tration in the Middle East was theory rather than fact. 
However, Western intervention through the Baghdad Pact and 
Eisenhower Doctrine, ostensibly to check Communist expan­
sion, was carried out despite public declarations to the 
contrary, by responsible Arab statesmen, as well as Ameri­
can officials. President Nasser stated:
They /the Americans/ say Nasser is turning 
to the East and wants to put his country under 
Eastern domination, but dealing commercially with 
Russia is not the same thing as turning Communist. 
We aim at equal relations with all nations, to say 
we are encouraging Communism is completely untrue.
18Hammond, op. cit., p. 174? Seale, op. oit.,
p. 285.
^%.S. Policy in the Middle East. 1956-57. p. 15.
20Hammond, op. cit.. p. 175.
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21We have our own philosophy.
In 1958, a leading American authority on the Middle 
East, Harold B. Minor, told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee:
We should avoid the erroneous and easy assump­
tion that there is a deliberate trend in any Middle 
Eastern country toward Comnrunism, There is an ide­
ological gulf between Islamic and other Middle 
Eastern cultures , , . and Communism. 22
When the Soviet Union supported Egypt during the
Suez crisis of 1956, the Kremlin had made an expediential
decision in the hope of gaining "an opportunity of having
a legitimate place in the Arab community," But Egypt,
bluntly warned the Kremlin:
Contrary to what was then given wide cur­
rency, this policy /of expelling Western colonial­
ism from the Arab worl^ was not meant to open the 
doors of the Middle East to Soviet Communism, , ,
, The Middle East and Afro-Asian world will be 
closed to all alien principles, be they Communist 
or otherwise, 24
Furthermore, when ex-Vice-President Richard Nixon 
visited the site of the Aswan Dam in 1963, he observed that 
while Egypt was relying heavily upon Soviet technicians to
21Quoted in Cecil Crabb, ^erican Foreign Policy 
in the Nuclear Age, (2d ed,; New York: liarper, 196^;,
22U.S., Congressional Hearings, Review of Foreign 
Policy. 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, p, 5&5.
^^Egyptian Mail, December 16, 1961,
"Communism and Us," The Scribe (Cairo), Vol. 2, 
May-June, 1961,
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■build it, there was "no possibility of infiltration" of
25
the Egyptian government by Communism because of this fact.
In Syria, the situation was identical to that of
Following a trip behind the Iron Curtain, the Syrian
Minister of State Khalid Al-Azm, publicly declared;
The U.S.S.R. . . . does not want to interfere 
in our affairs nor does it want to interfere with 
our political or social systems. It wants Syria 
to have a strong economy to support Syria's poli­
tical independence. , , . The U.S.S.R. has given 
us political support and supplied us with arms, 
which we were completely unable to obtain from 
countries other than the U.S.S.R. 26
However, despite Nasser's public declarations that 
the Arabs in general and Egypt in particular were not in­
terested in changing V/estem imperialism for an Eastern 
one, he, nevertheless, continued hostilities toward Israel. 
This attitude, rather than association with the Soviet bloc 
led Congress to view him in a negative light, and over Pre­
sident Kennedy's protest, passed an amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1963 which "denied aid to Egypt if she
engaged or prepared for 'aggressive military efforts'
27against other recipients of American aid."
In the House hearings, Dulles described the proposed 
Eisenhower Doctrine as a policy of containment similar to 
the Truman Doctrine, since both aimed at preventing Soviet
^^New York Times, June 4, 1963.
Documents on International Affairs; 1957, (Lon­
don ; Oxford Univers!iy Press, I960;, p. 322.
27Hammond, op. cit., p. 175•
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moves in advance. The objective of the United States, 
therefore, was to warn the Soviet Union "to stay out, and
pO
to build up the vitality of these countries." Dulles in­
sisted that the U.S.A. can promote peace in the area by 
"making clear our position in advance," thus preventing 
"miscalculation by a would-be a g g r e s s o r . D u l l e s  also
(t
insisted that best results could be attained if Congress 
has spoken," for that would make the Soviet rulers more
deterred, while the target people would also feel more
.< 30 secure,''
The Eisenhower Doctrine was the last link in the 
Western-sponsored defense alliances for the containment of 
the Soviet Union's expansion. It was to provide a protect­
ive screen against Russian penetration, behind which the 
U.S.A. could work diligently to strengthen the internal 
security and economic stability of the indigenous states.
28House Hearings. on the Eisenhower Doctrine, p. 4I.
^^U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Af­
fairs, Hearings, of H.J. Resolution 117, 85th Cong., 1st 
Sess., p. 3. Hearafter cited as House, Hearings on the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.
^^U.S, Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Ser­
vices and Foreign Relations, Hearings. on S.J. Res. 19, 
and H.J. Res. 117, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 9-10.
^^The Soviet Union viewed the Doctrine as detri­
mental to both the U.S.S.R. as well as these states. In 
a diplomatic note to the British Government dated September 
3, 1957, the Soviet Government characterized the Doctrine as, 
" . . .  put forward by monopolistic circles 
in the United States, and approved by the British 
Government which aims at United States interference
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On March 9, 1957, the Congress approved the Eisen­
hower Doctrine, which authorized the President to under­
take "military assistance programs with any nation or group
■jp
of nations of that area desiring such assistance." The 
joint resolution further declared that the "United States 
regards as vital to the national interest and to world peace 
the preservation of the independence and integrity of the 
nations of the Middle East."^^ With this, the U.S.A. issued 
a "unilateral warning to the world that the United States 
would defend the whole Middle East against Soviet attack."^4
in the Middle East to bolster up the crumbling 
colonial system and place obstacles in the path 
of the peoples of the region toward independent 
development and deprive them of national independ­
ence." G.B. British and Foreign State Papers,Vol. 
CIXIII, (1957-1958),"pT72:
By contrast, the Soviet policy was characterized 
by non-interference in the internal affairs of the host 
countries. In M s  study of Oomiaunism in the region, 
laquer wrote :
"Soviet and Communist propagandists could 
point to the stark contrast between Moscow’s policy 
of ’hands off’ and Western imperialist attempts to 
’or^uiize’ the area. To draw the various countries 
into all kinds of suspect ’defense* blocs». These 
Western activities tended to fan smoldering anti- 
Western resentment and to antagonize most of the 
Arabs who were psychologically quite unprepared; 
the Soviet danger was in their eyes some mytMcal 
invention or perhaps a clever stratagem of American 
and European 'imperialists’ desirous of perpetuate 
ing their rule in the Middle East. As a result, 
Soviet prestige grew." Laquear, op. cit.. p. 261.
^^U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East. September. 
1956 to June. 19^7. Documents. itîew York; Greenwood Press.
ljfe}',' p. AS.
%^bid.
^^Deconde, op. cit.. p. 755.
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However, when President Eisenhower referred to "any nation 
controlled by International Communism," he probably had 
Egypt in mind.^^
The critics pointed out that the danger was sub­
version not "covert armed aggression." But Dulles replied 
that the United States "could not protect the Middle East 
through defense treaties without becoming involved in local
*5 g
disputes not connected with Communist action," This 
policy did in fact permit the U.S.A. to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the host nations, and beeame the main 
target for attacks by the Soviet Union as well as the 
states which opposed American domination.
By assuming the entire responsibility for Western 
defense of the Middle East, it became apparent that "No 
power- friend, potential eneipy or ’neutralist' Arab State- 
could now assume that the U.S. would not fight for the 
Middle East."^^ By guaranteeing the security of the area, 
the Dootrine had implicitly guaranteed the safety of Israel 
through maintaining the staus quo. This was confirmed by 
President Kennedy in 1963» when he declared that the U.S.A. 
supports the security of Israel and its neighbors, and 
would take necessary action if needed to stop any aggression
^^copeland, op. cit.. p. 216. 
^^Deconde, op. cit.. p. 756. 
3?lbid.
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that might erupt in the Middle East.
Neither S.E.A.T.O, nor the Bagdad Pact has been 
as exclusively directed against International Communism 
as was the Eisenhower Doctrine because it provided for 
economic and military assistance with special provisions 
for prompt implementation of such assistance.
Jordan and the Eisenhower Doctrine
As the Eisenhower Doctrine went into effect on 
March 9, 1957, Jordan became the center of the next Middle 
East crisis. The coming of the pro-Nasser revolutionary 
nationalists to power in Jordan resulted in a split with 
the Palace, since the Government's policies displeased the 
King as they were diametrically opposed to those adopted 
by him. The Nabulsi government had recognized Bed China 
and indicated interest in exchanging diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet U n i o n . A t  the same time, the King was 
denouncing Communism. Supported by the Parliament and 
many army officers, the Nabulsi government succeeded in 
diminishing the Role of the King, who decided that this 
trend had to be s t o p p e d . T h e  only pretext that King
^^liohammad Ghanim, Al-Alagat Al-Dawliyyiah Al-Arab- 
iyiah. (Cairo; Nahdat Misr, 19b^), P» 313*
^^Hammond, op. cit.. p. 117.
^%ajali, Muthakkarati. op. cit., p. 211.
^^Kamil, op. cit.. p. 25; Also Musa, op. oit.. 663.
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Husayn could devise was cautioning of increased Communist
activities inside the c o u n t r y . I n  February of 1957, the
King sent a letter to Prime Minister Nabulsi asking him to
curb Communist infiltration:
. . , During the Cold War between the two camps, 
foreign doctrines began to seep into our land.
Those doctrines contradict our principles and be­
liefs which, unless stopped, will adversely affect 
our nationalism, for we might substitute the high 
principles which elevated our nation for material­
istic doctrines which contradict the basics of our 
nation. Also we might exchange one form of im­
perialism for another from which we would never lib­
erate ourselves if it rooted its foundations. The 
Arab nation has not forgotten that the Eastern camp 
which exports its attractive doctrines was a major 
supporter of our enemy as it assisted it to expro­
priate a precious part of the Arab homeland - Pal­
estine. International Zionism found effective 
assistance with the Eastern camp as well as imper­
ialistic nations of the West.
. . .  At this time we see the danger of Com­
munist infiltration into our homeland. . . .  If we 
permit the Communist doctrine which unites the 
Arab Communists and the Zionist Communists to in­
filtrate our ranks, we will have lost our heritage 
as a nation. . . .  We believe in the rights of this 
homeland. . . .  We want a strong structure based
December 31, 1956, Nabulsi permitted the Com­
munists to issue the weekly, Al-J^^eer. To Husayn, this 
action was in defiance of the established anti-Communist 
law which declared:
"Article 3: A person will be penalized by 
temporary hard labor if he:
1. became a member of a Communistic organiza­
tion for the purpose of propagandizing.
2. became a member of a Communistic organiza­
tion, occupied an office or funtioned as its agent.
3. urged people to become Communists by speech, 
writing, or photography.
4. distributed a Communist document with the 
purpose of propaganda.
5. possessed a Communistic Document."
Musa, op. oit.. pp. 664-665; Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. p. 195.
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on the Arab legacy and a hope in the future insu­
lated from Communist propaganda and the ideas of
Bolshevism, . . .  43
The letter revealed the widening gulf between the
Cabinet and the Palacô,^^ The King's message was broadcast
4.5at the same time it was handed to Nabulsi. With strong 
external support, the Palace decided to challenge the Cab­
inet at the moment when the latter decided to exchange dip­
lomatic representation with the U.S.S.R.^^ The crisis be­
came acute on April 10, when Husayn dismissed Nabulsi.
In making his move, the King was betting on his life and 
the life of Jordan as the weeks following the dismissal
^^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. pp. 177-180; English text 
in Khalil, Vol. Tl,' pp.""9Tr-5l9.
^^ajali, Muthakkirati, p. 212.
45lbid.
^^Ibid.. p. 213.
Majali wrote that C.G.S. Nuwar had met with the 
Russian ambassador at Damascus. Upon his return to Amman 
the Cabinet met and decided to exchange diplomatic relations 
with Soviet Russia. This decision was a clear reply to 
Husayn's message.
Majali added that Nuwar had negotiated with the 
Americans regarding a treaty between the twc countries to 
replace the Anglo-Jordan treaty. Ibid., p. 214.
^^Nabulsl's resignation was submitted with the 
phrase "by order of Your Majesty." Husayn, Uneasy Lies the 
Head, p. 163.
Husayn wrote that on April 10 a telegram from Nas­
ser to Nabulsi was intercepted which read, "Do not give 
in. Remain in your positions." Ibid.. p. 162; Shwadran, 
op. cit.. p. 348.
One year later Rifa'i at the U.N. General Assembly 
stated that Nabulsi was acting under instructions from Egypt 
and was instructed to comply with the King's demand for 
his resignation. U.N.G.A., Official Records. 3rd Emergency 
Special Session, A/PV.735, August 14, 1558, p. 25.
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were filled with uncertainty, turmoil, and suspense,^®
Some sources believe that one main reason for the 
Cabinet~Palace differences was that Husayn was willing to 
accept American aid even if it meant agreeing to the Eisen­
hower Doctrine, Accordingly, he contacted the American
49Embassy and consulted with old politicians.
More significantly, Husayn's fear of the Communists 
coincided with the basis for the Eisenhower Doctrine. His 
letter seemed a direct appeal to the assistance clause of 
the Doctrine, Campbell wrote:
What is significant is that a test of strength 
took place in what was ostensibly a Jordan domestic 
affair, that was also a test of alignments in the 
Middle East and especially of American policy. As 
early as Pebruary, 1957, Ki#g Husayn was publicly 
dencuncing Communism as if to make Jordan eligible 
for American aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
while Nabulsi was preparing tc establish diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union, 51
Thereafter, Husayn's relations with the Cabinet
were dependent upon the attitude in Washington. He also
^ ^ n  Israel it was decided that if the pro-Nasser 
Nationalists win in Jordan then the Israeli forces would 
enter Jordan. Foreign Minister Meir declared: "Israel 
would not stay with hands tied if foreign forces entered 
Jordan." After the dismissal of Nabulsi, however, Israel's 
position changed suddenly and the United Press reported 
that Ben Gurion had declared that "the situation in Jordan 
is no longer dangerous and that he would not take any steps 
to complicate the efforts by Husayn and his Prime Minister 
Khalidi." Cited in Kamil, op. cit.. p. 32,
49c^Shwadran, op. cit.. p. 347, 
^^Tutsch, op. cit,
^^Campbell, op, cit,. p. 128,
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received support from Saud whose visit to Washington sig-
52naled his acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In a
letter on March 31, he assured Husayn of support;
We should cooperate to oppose all destructive 
principles which contradict our religion, our tra­
ditions, and our customs. You will always find me 
by your side in my person, my soldiers, my money, 
my country - working for the victory of Islam and 
the Muslims. 53
In Jordan, popular and governmental attitude toward 
foreign pacts including the Eisenhower Doctrine was nega­
tive. The Speaker of the House, Hikmat Al-Masry, declared
that "the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine are
54twins, one complements the other." The Chamber also re­
jected the Eisenhower Doctrine in the following statement;
1, The United States Government regarded the 
Doctrine as part of a larger scheme aiming at the 
restoration of Western influence in the Middle East. 
The Doctrine was designed to replace the Bagdad 
Pact.
2. The aim of the United States Government 
was to create division among the Arab governments 
and to woo Arab leaders who were opposed to nation­
alism in the hope of isolating Egypt and its 
friends.
^^Saud received $50 million in military aid, and 
renewed the agreement of the Dahran A.P.B. for another 
five years.
^^Royal Institute of International Affairs, Docu­
ments on International Affairs. 1957, p. 1645.
The H'ew York Times reported on April 17 that a 
Saudi plane “brought sufficient gold to Amman as a reward 
to the loyal troops and Bedouin chiefs who supported Husayn 
at the Zarka Affair. Help came from Saud "who placed the 
Saudi Arabian troops then in Jordan under Husayn's personal 
command." Campbell, op. cit.. p. 129.
^^Kamil, op. oit.. p. 21.
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3. Jordan, which was engaged in discussions 
to bring the abrogation of its treaty with Bri­
tain, had no intention of selling itself to a 
higher bidder despite its limited resources. 55
Furthermore, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Ab­
dullah Al-Rimawi affirmed the stand of the Chamber and the 
government's commitment to the policy of positive neutral­
ism and declared that the Arab states were capable of de- 
fending themselves.^ He added;
It is an essential element in Jordan's for­
eign policy that the vacuum theory should be 
utterly rejected, Jordan does not believe that 
the disappearance of British and French influence 
has left a vacuum that somebody else ought to 
fill. . . . Jordanians will not agree to one for­
eign influence directly or indirectly replacing 
another. Defense of the Arabs should solely be 
the responsibility of the Arabs. 57
To enforce the stand of the Government and the Par­
liament, a national congress was convened in Nablus on 
April 22 and adopted a resolution demanding that the Govern­
ment reject the Eisenhower Doctrine and expell the United 
States ambassador and his military attache. These demands 
were presented to the Cabinet with the threat of demonstra­
tions if the Government failed to respond. However, while
Jordan, Proceedings of the House, January 6,
1957, p. 2.
S^ ibid.
'^^ Al-Difa'a, January 3, 1957; this attitude was 
shared by tKe Syrian Government which on January 1, 1957, 
issued a statement rejecting the vacuum theory and denying 
that Communism presented any immediate threat to the Arab 
world, Seale, op. cit., p. 289.
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the Cabinet agreed, the King rejected the demands. Thus,
demonstrations took place and caused the Khalidi Govem-
S8ment to resign.
On April 24, the King asked Ibrahim Hashim to form 
a new Cabinet of old conservatives and those loyal to the 
Palace. He dissolved the Parliament, abolished political 
parties, suspended the constitution, and declared martial 
law.
The United States Responds
Husayn's control of the situation was attributed 
to the loyalty of certain Bedouin army units and the plac­
ing of Saudi troops in Jordan under Husayn's command, but 
most importantly due to the support of the United States 
Government. This fact was confirmed by Dulles in a speech 
before the Senate declaring that; "Husayn had derived from 
the Eisenhower Doctrine the power to face the difficult 
situation in his country.
^®Musa, op. cit.. p. 675; Al-Difa'a. April 23, 1957.
It was reporteà that the United States Ambassador 
in Amman had told Husayn on April 24 that unless he took 
stem measures against nationalist elements in the Khalidi 
Cabinet intervention of Israel would be inevitable and that 
the U.S. would not stop this. Accordingly, Husayn ordered 
the formation of a new Cabinet under Hashim. Cited in 
Kamil, op. cit., p. 43; Musa, op. oit., p. 675.
Supporting this point, Ma jail wrote;
"The reasons for the Zarq.a Affair were to 
prevent /îhwart the attempts/" for installing a Cabinet to 
succeed phe Nabulsi Government. Also, to pressure the King 
to restore the Nabulsi group to office." Majali, Muthak­
kirati . p. 218.
^^Cited in Kamil, op. cit., p. 35.
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Certain army units at the Zarqa army hase were sup­
posed to have been involved in an attempted coup.*^^ During 
the Zarqa affair, the Sixth Fleet was permitted by Lebanon
to stand by in Beirut while Husayn carried out his coup
d*etat in J o r d a n . A s  Cabinet instability became the or­
der of the day, the United States decided to come openly 
to the support of Husayn. Thus, on April 23, Dulles in a 
press conference said:
W'e have great confidence in and regard for
King Husayn because we really believe that he is
striving to maintain the independence of his
^^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal, p. 206; Shwadran, op. cit.. 
p. 349; Musa, op."cit., p. 669.
General Ali Al-Hayari declared that there was no 
plot against Husayn, and that the Palace invented the idea 
of the coup because the army officers refused to strike 
against the people for resisting the formation of a new 
government "willing to cooperate with imperialism and accept 
schemes which forced Jordan out of the Arab liberation 
policy of Egypt and Syria." Shwadran, op. cit.« p. 351; 
see supra footnote 58, p. 433.
^^Kirk, Contempora:^ Arab Politics, p. 121.
At the Bermuda Conference, Jordan was selected as 
a testing ground for the Eisenhower Doctrine. At that 
conference on March 24, 1957, Prime lÆLnister Macmillan 
said:
"The U.S. and Great Britain are in agreement on 
new methods to solve any Middle ]3ast problem if present 
solutions fail, . . . Jordan constitutes the major source 
for war in the Middle East." Cited in Kamil, op. cit., 
pp. 25-26.
The Associated Press commented on Macmillan's state­
ment that "there is an agreement for combined action in 
case of a sudden collapse such as the collapse of the Jor­
dan Government." Cited in Ibid.
The aim of the U.S. Sixih Fleet which was given 
permission for flints over Israeli territory was to 
frighten the nationalists in Jordan as well as other Arab 
states supporting them. It was reported that Nasser and 
Ben Gurion were told that the U.S. would not let Jordan's 
cry for help go unanswered. Newsweek, April 25, 1958.
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co-untry in the face of very great difficulties and 
he does not want to see Jordan fall under the dom­
ination of other countries which have indicated a 
desire to work contrary to what the King considers 
to be the best interests of his country. It is our
desire to hold up the hands of King Husayn in these
matters to the extent that he thinks that we can 
be helpful. He is the judge of that. 62
As the struggle between the Palace and the Nation­
alists persisted, it became evident to the United States 
that Jordan could no longer rely on the Syrian and Egyptian 
subsidy nor could it survive merely with Saudi ^Arabian aid. 
At this point, Husayn won his victory with the support of 
the United States which was willing to extend help as long 
as Husayn was willing to maintain his independence and 
fight Communism. James P. Richards, Eisenhower's special 
assistant for Middle Eastern affairs and former chairman 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, embarked on a visit 
to the Middle East. Husayn, however, faced with national­
ist pressure, decided not to invite him to Jordan. At the
same time, Husayn decided to enjoy the benefits of the Doc­
trine without subscribing to it. Washington, cognizant of 
this fact, expressed its understanding;
. . .  It was realized that for Husayn to em­
brace the Eisenhower Doctrine in the present cir­
cumstances would be equivalent to the kiss of 
death. Mr. Dulles, therefore, deliberately played 
down the Eisenhower Doctrine, but announced that 
the U.S. would give Husayn its full support in
G^u.s. Policy in the Middle East. 1956-1957. p. 69; 
U.S., Department of State Press kelease. 237, April 23, 
1957.
436
whatever he considers to he in the interest of his 
country. 63
On April 24, at Augusta, Georgia, Press Secretary 
James Hagerty said that he had been authorized to say that 
"both the President and the Secretary of State regarded 
the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital, An 
explicit application of the Eisenhower Doctrine to Jordan 
was stated in an announcement by Lincoln V/hite of the News 
Division of the State Department on April 25. He said:
I can only say with respect to Jordan that 
the statement issued in Augusta yesterday after­
noon represented a reminder to the world by the 
President that a finding had been made in the Joint 
Resolution of the Congress on the Middle East that 
the preservation of the independence and integrity 
of the nations of the Middle East was vital to the 
national interest of the United States and to world 
peace. This reminder was appropriate because of 
the threat to the independence and integrity of Jor­
dan by international Communism as King Husayn him­
self stated. 65
On the same day, elements of the Sixth Fleet in­
cluding the carrier Porestal, were dispatched to the East 
Mediterranean to implement the Eisenhower Doctrine. In 
the meantime, martial law was established and hundreds of 
opposition leaders were either sent to jail or fled the 
country.
^^Barraclough, op. cit.. p. 173.
^^Cited in U.S. Policy in the Middle East, 1956-- 
1957. p. 69; Magnus. documents on the Middle East.
(Washington: American Phter^prlse institute, 1965), p. 95.
^^U.S. Policy in the Middle East, p. 69; New York 
Times. Aprii üb, 1957.
^^Musa, OP. cit.. p. 677.
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To the West, Jordan occupied an important military 
and strategic position in the heart of the Middle East* It 
constituted a bridge connecting Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
Israel, and,in a technical sense, Egypt* Commenting on 
Jordan's position in this regard, Ben Gurion said:
Occupation of Jordan territory by Israel 
will not result in geographic division of the Arab 
States only, but will be the beginning of the end 
of the spiritual unity among the Arabs* 67
The justification for supporting Husayn to preserve his 
throne and the sovereignty of Jordan was that it provided 
a convenient buffer between Egypt and Syria on the one hand, 
and Israel on the other, thus minimizing the probability 
of a second round in Palestine*
Eisenhower*s offer of American aid was implicit 
in his statement of April 24, inspite of Husayn's reluc­
tance to invite Ambassador Richards to visit Jordan* 
Marguerite Higgins observed that:
The United States will not, for instance, em­
barrass the King by demanding that he receive the 
Richard's mission as the price of getting financial 
aid. If the King wants that aid. from us, he can 
get it in other ways. W’e are prepared to furnish 
assistance via Saudi Arabia. 69
In a radio speech on April 25, 1957, Husayn justi­
fied the dismissal of the Nabulsi Government as Communist
^'^Kamil, op. cit., p. 40.
Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics, p. 111.
^% e w  York Herald Tribune, April 29, 1957; Shwadran, 
op. cit.. p. 356; Abidi. op. cit.~. p. 165.
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inspired;
. . . You all know that the Communist Party in 
Jordan is illegal, not only because international 
Communism is opposed to our religion and beliefs 
as well as the elements of our nationalism, but 
because the Communists in Jordan were and still are 
in consort with Communists inside Israel from which 
they received directions since the latter is the 
bastion of Communism in the Middle East.
. . . The Communists and their supporters in 
Jordan have shown contempt to our religion by ac­
cusing those who respect the doctrines of Islam 
and protect it of being reactionary elements. They 
aim at disintegrating the unity of the nation and 
to eradicating its progress. . . .
As to the stand of that Cabinet with regard 
to the Eisenhower Doctrine and American financial 
assistance . . .  I want to assure my people that 
it is not our policy to invite the American envoy 
^ichard^/ to visit our country and we deny that 
we will accept the Doctrine. Jordan's policy is 
purely Arab which derives from the decisions of 
the Cairo conference. I would like to add and de­
clare that Jordan under no circumstances will se­
parately consider this Doctrine and will not take 
any step in that re^rd without agreements with the 
Arab states. This /[the dismissal of the Oabinej^ 
is an internal matter unrelated to our foreign 
policy. V/e therefore will not allow outsiders to^g 
interfere in our local and private matters. . . .
Husayn's statement that the internal crisis of
Jordan was "the responsibility of international Communism
71and its followers" acted as the magic phrase which quieted 
the American conscience and loosened the American purse 
strings. The United States shouldered the financial sub­
sidy promised by the Arab states and within two years was
72aiding Jordan to the tune of some $70 million a year,
^Al-Husayn Ibn Talal. pp. 229-234.
^^New York Times. April 25, 1957, p. 13.
79
Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics, p. 111.
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Only Lebanon and Libya formally approved the Eisen­
hower Doctrine.Saud, however, was in full agreement with 
its provisions although he did not formally adhere to it.
When Saud returned from his visit to Washington following 
the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Husayn flew to 
Riad and after consultation on April 29 both kings issued 
a communique emphasizing friendship and cooperation.^^ On 
the following day, Husayn formally requested financial aid 
from the United States State Department which was immedi­
ately approved - perhaps the first time in history such aid 
was sectioned in a few hours. Jordan was granted ;$10 mil­
lion "in recognition of the brave steps taken by his Majesty 
King Hussein and the Government and the people of Jordan
75to maintain the integrity and independence of their nation." 
Furthermore, the American ambassador added that the United 
States would "maintsiin a continuing review of Jordan's pro­
blems with his Majesty's Government to determine what fur-
7^In Lebanon the Eisenhower Doctrine was considered 
as treasonable behaviour of the Government and a distinct 
breach of its National Covenant which recognized Lebanon 
as an Arab state that should hever seek assistance from any 
European power to the detriment of another Arab state. The 
Eisenhower Doctrine implied that the Christians were call­
ing upon the U.S. to replace France as their protector and 
to intervene in Lebanon on their behalf. Cited in Ihid.. 
p. 121; K.S., "The Lebanese Crisis in Perspective.""World 
Today. No. 74 (1958), p. 372; lonides, op. cit.. p. S4Û.
^American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1957,
p. 1024.
^^New York Herald Tribune, April 29, 1957; Shwadran, 
op. cit.. p. 356; London ^imes. ^pril 30, 1957; Department 
of State Bulletin. Vol. 37. No. 945, p. 260,
440
76ther steps can be required.”
Although Husayn had no intention of adhering to the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, "the speed with which the U.S. respond­
ed to M s  needs suggests that there was nevertheless an
77understanding. " This also indicated the extent to wMch
the United States was willing to go in order to break the
pro-Nasser front in Jordan. Since the date, Jordan contin-
7fi
ued more than ever to side with the West. The Manchester
Guardian wrote that, "It is no longer a secret that Husayn
had reached an agreement with the U.S. before changing the
7Qpoli cy of Jordan."
In Jordan, Husayn put down his left-leaning army
opposition in an encounter in April of 1957. Washington
sealed its victory by sending the Sixth Fleet to the East
Mediterranean and adding $30 million in economic assistance 
80to Jordan. In responding to Husayn*s anti-Communist
^American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 1025.
Shwadran, op. cit.. p. 356.
^^Georgiana G. Stevens (ed.), The United States 
and the Middle East. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- 
Hall,-Tg^ 57,-'p."I6'7:
^^Cited in Kamil, op. cit.. p. 35.
80
Hammond, op. cit., p. 118.
Foreign Minister Rifa'i declared that Jordan would 
need about $50 million annually in U.S. aid for the next 
five to ten years to develop her economy and maintain the 
armed forces; Jordan was counting on the U.S. "not to let 
us down." In order to vindicate his country in the eyes 
of the Arab world for accepting American assistance, Rifa'i 
stated that the American aid must be given without strings 
attached. Shwadran, op. cit.. p. 369.
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appeals, 'Washington was able to use the Eisenhower Doctrine
to shift the key political issue in the Middle East from
Western imperialism to Soviet Imperialism, but only at the
Ô1cost of severely limiting U.S. influence in the area. 
Furthermore, Husayn’s policy of suppressing nationalist 
feelings through the use of Bedouin army units and his un­
official adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine resulted in 
worsening of inter-Arab relations and placed Husayn in a
negative light to a degree which the Eisenhower Doctrine
82did not ask for.
Evaluation of the Eisenhower Doctrine 
In putting the Doctrine to the test, the United 
States was rendering aid to the ruling group, while defying 
the will of the population.®^ In the opinion of Senator 
Ralph E. Flanders, to be effective, any American formulation 
of a new foreign policy should take into account the reali­
ties of the conditions and the needs of the people of the 
region. American foreign policy should take into serious 
consideration the aspirations of the people rathei* than the 
unpopular governments. Flanders remarked:
. . . Our whole policy is based on the en­
deavor to form alliances with persons, . . . that 
to trust in rulers and governments is vain compared
G^ Ibld.
8?
Hafez, op. cit., p. 151. 
®^Ibid.
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with trust in people. Grovemments come and Govern­
ments go. . . . The people remain. 84
Sharing this view, a student of the area politics, John
Campbell, commented:
Yet the American diplomatic victory had some 
angles worthy of future thought. Its permanence 
was open to question. . . . Hussein had no guaran­
tee of a long and quiet reign. The United States 
had taken sides in what was basically an inter- 
Arab struggle. . . .  It had supported its friends 
but also raised cries against 'gunboat diplomacy' 
and in doing so it had placed itself in a position 
hardly distinguishable from that which the British 
had just been forced to relinquish.
Henceforth, Jordan was to be kept alive by 
American instead of British guarantees, by dollars 
instead of pounds. Would America be any more suc­
cessful over the long run in combatting Arab nation­
alism by these methods than the British? 8 5.
Various positions were taken on the subject. While 
Elizabeth Monroe described the situation as "a former 
British protege had changed protectors," the New York 
Times held that the American move to aid "embattled Jordan" 
was a "landmark in American foreign policy," and insisted 
that the United States had acted "as a great power in de­
fense of our vital interest. Cki the other hand, the 
Soviet Union accused the United States of manipulating the
^^Senator Ralph E, Flanders, "We Are off the Sum­
mit- Let Us Strengthen the Foundation," 0ongressional 
Record. (Senate), 85th Congress, 2nd Session, ctV, part 
I3, August 6, 1 9 5 8, p. 16324.
Campbell, op. cit., p. 131.
®%onroe, op. oit.. p. 208.
^^New York Times, April 28, 1957.
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Government of Jordan as the country was brought into the 
American sphere of influence. The New Times of Moscow 
wrote appealing to Arab patriotism:
Today it is no longer Glubb Pasha but Ambas­
sador Mallory who directs the reprisals against 
Jordanian patriots and forms the Governments of 
Jordan. It is no longer Britain but the United 
States which subsidized the Arab army from which 
the patriotic officers were expelled, 88
The American move involved military protection,
political support and financial assistance. Commenting
on Jordan's con^lete dependence on the United States,
particularly from the subsidy point of view, the New Yark
Herald (Cribune wrote that the American assistance to Husayn
would be disasterous:
One of the main dangers which threaten Husayn 
was his adoption by the United States Government 
because this adoption is the kind which will in­
evitably lead in the end to death by strangulation,89
Bochkaryov, "The Jordan Events," The New Times, 
(Moscow), May 9, 1957, p, 12,
®^Cited in Kamil, op. cit,, p, 49.
This prediction was fulfilied following the 1967 
war, when the Johnson Administration suspended the budget­
ary assistance which had sustained Jordan's economy ever- 
since 1957.
It is ironic that Jordan's survival has depended 
upon the policies of other nations. King Husayn's bio­
grapher, Sparrow, revealed that Jordan could be a rich 
state in its mineral wealth were developed. He wrote:
", . . 1  was handed in Britain a document 
dealing with the secret mineral wealth of Jordan 
unexplotted in the days of the Mandate, The doc­
ument was never published, but was compiled by 
experts in their field. The allegation is made 
that the British oil interests, as a matter of 
policy, were opposed to the development of Jordan 
oil. Very detailed and convincing figures are
444
The United States took these steps once King Husayn 
charged that the army attempted a coup to dethrone him and 
to federate Jordan with Egypt and "to make Jordan a vassal 
state of Soviet R u s s i a . B u t  most importantly, because 
Husayn played the American game of charging that the inter­
nal crisis in Jordan "was the responsibility of Internation­
al
al Communism.
The Doctrine did serve a more immediate purpose.
As it abandoned Nasser and constructed a pro-American, anti­
given in this document still in my possession, of the lo­
cation of oil and mineral wealth in Jordan, with estimates 
of the amount and quality of each locality." Sparrow, op. 
cit.. p. 124.
^^Husayn, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 183.
^^ e w  York Times. April 25, 1957, p. 13.
General Ali Abu-Nuwar, C.G.S., was accused of engin­
eering the so-called coup, but permitted to leave Jordan.
He went to Damascus. Nuwar was succeeded by General Ali 
Al-Hayari, who requested the King to head an investigating 
commission of the Zarqa Affair and the coup. This was de­
nied. Hayari then went to Syria and telephoned his resig­
nation on April 20. In a press conference he declared;
"I proclaim to the Arab and international 
public opinion that there was no plot for a coup 
against King Husayn. The whole thing is an imper­
ialistic plot aimed at certain objectives - parti­
cularly that of forcing Jordan out of the Arab liber­
ation policy of Egypt and Syria." New York Times. 
April 24, 1957.
Al-Ahram reported that Radio Damascus accused the 
American Embassy of creating the convulsion in Jordan 
through direct interference in her affairs. Al-Ahram,
April 21, 1957,
Stevens also commented:
"Indeed, at least one Western authority (and 
many Arabs) believed the alleged plot was fiction 
and the April crisis was an American contrivance
from start to finish." Stevens, op. cit., p. 167.
For an account of the plot see Husam I bn Talal. p. 206f;
Majali, Mutheikkirati. pp. 213f; Abldi. op. cit., p. 164.
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Nasser, anti-Communist TdIo c , forcing the Middle East states 
to choose between the Moscow-Cairo axis on the one hand
QO
and Washington on the other.
Although the Eisenhower Doctrine was manifestly 
anti-Communist in scope, its application verified the fact 
that it aimed at involvement in inter-Arab affairs, speci­
fically in Lebanon and Jordan. The Doctrine did not allow 
for inter-Arab disputes while ignoring Arab unity covenants. 
It appeared to have the goal of isolating certain Arab 
states according to the axiom, "divide and rule." How­
ever, this policy found adverse reaction inside the Arab 
world for it pushed the nationalists and the Communists 
toward each other. Patrick Seale observed:
This alliance between Nationalists and Com­
munists was cemented by the West's failure clearly 
to distinguish between them. Faced with the Sa'ath- 
Communist front in Syria, and with evidence of Ab­
dul Nasser's growing dependence on the Soviet Union, 
Western diplomats tended to overlook the fierce 
anti-Communist record of the Ba'ath Party and Nas­
ser's treatment of his local Communists. The truth 
is that Communists and Nationalists were exceeding­
ly wary of each other and were united only in op­
posing Western pressures: it had been a gross tac­
tical error to push them into each others arms. 94
Although Jordan offered the first case of the
^^Hammond, op. oit.. p. 118.
^^lonides, op. oit.. p. 240.
The Arab nationalists in Lebanon - mostly Muslims - 
saw Chamoun's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine as "the 
Americans ganging up with the Christian Chamoun against 
the Arab nationalists of Syria." Ibid.
^^Seale, op. oit.. p. 287; lonides, op. cit.. p.
243.
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application of the Eisenhower Doctrine and accepted Ameri­
can aid and protection, it never could officially adhere 
to the American Doctrine. In this situation, the Eisen­
hower Doctrine was interpreted to have worked for the pre­
servation of Husayn's throne as he reverted from anti-West- 
e m  Arahism to cooperation with the United States. The 
crux of the matter was that there had not been a single 
Arab leader who could lead his country into an alliance 
with the West without eventually running into a head-on col­
lision with the nationalists: a collision that might threat-
Q g
en this throne or his office. Thus, when the United 
States sought open support for the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
its new policy encountered the same difficulties that be­
set the Baghdad Pact:
Mass opinion still tends to becbme very easily 
anti-West because colonial memories are so recent.
To build alliances with the ex-colonial powers can 
easily be twisted to look like falling once again 
under their imperial control. This twist, it need 
hardly be said, is stable Gommunist propaganda.
The real government in Iraq, fell in part because 
of its readiness to work with the West and Middle 
East military alliances. 97
Although the Eisenhower Doctrine was resisted by
^^Fitzsimmons, op. cit.. p. 198.
^^The case of Lebanese President Chamoun is a good 
example. By inviting American intervention, he, in fact, 
split the country. See Kirk. Contemporary Arab Politics, 
pp. 120-134.
^^Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Na- 
ti ons. (New York: V/. W. or ton and Co., Inc., I96È), p. l28.
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the host countries, it, nevertheless, persisted to he the 
hackhone for American involvement in the region. In his 
progress report to Congress in I960, President Eisenhower 
stated:
The Middle East Resolution remains as a 
safeguard in reserve available to any country of 
the region desiring outside assistance against 
a possible threat to its independence and stability 
from external forces of International Communism.98
the Husayn-American understanding was of a recipro­
cal nature. In return for placing Jordan under the Ameri­
can umbrella, the King reaffirmed his anti-Communist pol­
icy. Accordingly, he accused Nasser of making possible 
Communist infiltration in the region. By contrast, he 
characterized Jordan as a "model state" representing true 
Arab nationalism, which could never coexist with a foreign 
ideology such as C o m m u n i I n  a Washington speech at 
the Press Club, he declared that his anti-Communist stand 
"brought us not only the enmity of the Communist camp but 
also created serious misunderstanding with some Arab states," 
Pursuing his pro-Westem, anti-Communist stand, the
101
^^Richard Stebbins, (ed.), Documents on ^erican 
Foreign Relations. (New York: Harper, 1961), p. 401.
^^Seeking to consolidate his unofficial alliance 
with the West, the King, accompanied with Prime Minister 
Rifa'i visited Formosa, South Korea and the United States 
in March, 1959. Husayn's tour signified his affirmation 
of his pro-Westem position in return for American commit­
ment to preserve Jordan's independence.
100Husayn, Uneasy lies the Head, op. cit., p. 234.
103-New York Times. March 29, 1959.
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King further declared, "There is no life or future for
Arahism if it departs from the camp of the free world and
102emhraoes Communism." Husayn's anti-Communist campaign
which was either tailored by him to please the United States 
or programmed by the West for pronouncement by an Arab, 
Muslim leader, was not restricted to the Arab world, but 
took an international scope. At the United Nations General 
Assembly, on September 4, I960, he said;
. , . The nations of the world are being of­
fered a choice. . . .  It lies between becoming a 
part of the Soviet Empire, subservient ultimately 
to the dictates of the Supreme Council of the Soviet 
Union or standing as a free nation with sole ex­
ternal allegiance to the United Nations itself.
That is the choice. . . . May I say at once and 
with all the strength and conviction at my com­
mand that Jordan has made its choice. We have 
given our answer in our actions and I am here to 
reaffirm our stand to the nations of the world.
We reject Communism. The Arab people will never 
bow to Communism. Communism will never survive 
in the Arab world because if it ever did, it would 
have replaced Arab nationalism. There would cease 
to be an Arab nation and an Arab world. . . .
. . . It is my firm belief that all nations 
which believe in God should meet in counter attack 
against the common challenge to their very exist­
ence represented by Communism. . . . Not until 
those who honestly believe in God and KLs dictates 
of love , equality and social justice unite to 
translate their ideal into action, will Communism 
be defeated and peace restored to earth. In the 
great struggle between Communism and freedom there 
can be no neutrality, 103
To the American and British publics, the West was 
defending freedom and democracy against Communist aggression.
TO 2Husayn, Al-Qawmiviah Al-Arabiyyiah. (Amman:
Bureau of Information, 1960;.
103Khalil, op. cit.. Vol. II, pp. 982-987.
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However, since the Arab nationalists were neither commu­
nists nor even communistic, the more the West pursued its 
policy of using the reactionary rulers to perpetuate its 
neo-colonial position, the ijiore material they gave to 
Nasser and the Russian to swing Arab popular opinion against 
the West.^°^
For Husayn identification with the West has been 
a "matter of personal c o n v i c t i o n . I n  the councils of 
Arab leaders, he, dauntlessly, would declare, "We were, 
we are and we will be friends of the United States. We 
have faith in the United S t a t e s . T h u s  Husayn's accept­
ance of American policies secured for Jordan an annual 
subsidy of fifty million d o l l a r s . H e  also was assured 
by President Eisenhower that "Jordan was not alone," In 
expressing his appreciation for American "adoption," Husayn
rejected the idea of neutralism, and pledged to fight on
loâ
the side of the West in the event of a major war.
The King's insistence on receiving equipment from
the West was another way by which he maintained his in-
1.09dependence from Egypt and Syria. Furthermore, Aainte-
^^tlonides, op. cit.. p. 243.
^^^New York Times. September 24, 1968, p. 2. 
^^ '^ Ibld. i March 23, 1959. 
^®®Ibid. April 17, 1959.
^^ b l d . . September 24, 1968, p. 22.
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nance of Jordan's ties with the West was considered a way 
hy which Arah-Israeli conflict could be prevented from be­
coming an East-West question.^^^ Israel wanted an East- 
Weast polarization because that would effectively ensure 
American ties with her. The Russians, too, wanted suoh 
polarization to take place because that would render the 
Arabs completely dependent on the Soviet Union.
The United States has been interested in maintaining 
Husayn's regime because it was more kindly disposed toward
her and relatively less hostile toward Israel than the rest
112of the Arab states. "This has beennthe reason w%y the 
United States has been providing most amounts of military 
assistance to Jordan since 1957."^^^
The Jordan army, until the 1967 war, was viewed 
by the American officials as a stabilizing force in Jordan. 
By partly satisfying the appetite of the army for modem 
weapons, the United States had hoped to strengthen the 
military support of the Government of King Husayn.
The impact of American economic assistance on
^^ I^bid.
^^ •^ Ibid.
^^^ e w  York Times. February 28, 1965, p. 3.
^^ I^bid.
^^^Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara said that 
arms were given as gift to friendly nations such as Is­
rael, Jordan and Iran. London Times. January 31, 1961.
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Jordan since the inception of the U.S. Aid Program in 1952,
U Scan hardly he exaggerated, Without such assistance, 
Jordan, in all probability, would have perished in the 
cross fire of politics in the turbulent Arab world. Thus, 
before 1957, the United States felt that Jordan's collapse 
would very likely set in motion a chain of events which 
could all but destroy prospects of peace in the region.
Added to that was the probability of resumption of the
To qualify for such grants, a Middle Eastern coun­
try must assent to the goals of the Mutual Security Act - 
the security of the U.S. and the free world implicitly 
against the Soviet Union, Security and the Middle East.
A report submitted to the President, April 1954, P# n3,
^^^Expenditures from the inception of the program 
in February, 1951, to September 30, 1968, totaled $569,939, 
104 for economic assistance. Military assistance totaled 
an additional $68 million.
The United States began to provide budget support 
assistance to the Government of Jordan in 1957, following 
the termination of the Anglo- Jordanian treaty. Until 
then, Britain contributed substantially to the budget 
through support of the army. The level of the United States 
assistance has been decreasing continuously from a high 
of almost $46 million to $32 million in 19661 The total 
amount of budget support payments from March, 1957 to 
September 30, I960 was $373,900,317. These funds were given 
to Jordan to make up j ts annual budget deficit and to pro­
vide the foreign exchange.
Although the economic assistance given to Jordan 
after 1967 was viewed by the United States as necessary 
"to help King Husayn maintain political control," the war 
of June, 1967 required adjustments in the U,S, economic 
assistance program. The U.S. budget support payments liave 
been stopped, "We decided to suspend direct budgetary pay­
ments, the largest increment of our pre- 1967 aid program, 
when Jordan began to receive the Khartoum subsidies," (From 
a letter to the author from the Jordan Desk Officer, U,S. 
Department of State, dated December 2, 1969,)
The preceding figures were derived from U,8,A.I,D., 
United States Assistance to Jordan, published on December 
24, Also New York Times. June 12, 1967.
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Arab-Israeli hostilities and intensification of East-West 
conflict. Thus, in view of the United States foreign pol­
icy, the preservation of Jordan was important to the sec­
urity of the West.
. . .  We have national interests of the high­
est importance in the Arab World. • . to encourage 
and strengthen the moderate Arab states in order 
to weaken the radical potential and to avoid a 
polarization of power relationships in which the 
United States would have no friends in the Middle 
East except Israel, while the Soviet Union would 
gain uncontested influence and possibly control 
throu^out the vast and populous Arab World. 116
The United States policy for the Middle East fol­
lowing the 1967 war was announced by President Johnson on 
June 19, 1967. Paramount among his five principles for 
peace was the "respect for political independence and ter­
ritorial integrity of all states in the a r e a . T h i s  was 
a reiteration of his statement of May 23, 1967:
To the leaders of all the nations of the Near 
East, I wish to say what American Presidents had said 
before me- that the United States is firmly committed 
to the support of the political independence and 
territorial integrity of all nations of that area.
The United States strongly opposes aggression by 
anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clan­
destine. . . . 118
However, this policy is viewed by Jordan as mere
^^^Letter from Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,to 
Chairman Mendel Rivers of the House Armed Services Committee. 
Quoted in the New York Times. August 18, 1967, p. 7.
117Magnus, op. cit., p. 205.
Tift
Lenczowski, United States Interests in the Lliddle 
East, op. oit.. p. 30.
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empty promise, Taecause its territorial integrity was vio­
lated while the U.S. has heen either reluctant or unable 
to implement its policy.Accordingly, after the 1967
war, Husayn* s talks with Johnson were unproductive since
120Washington's dictates were not always obeyed in Israel.
However, while the U.S. resumed arms sales to Jordan after
the conflict, the Johnson Administration attempted to "pur-
suade Husayn to settle with Israel on a piece-meal basis
without following the other Arab states into a blind 
121alley." But Husayn*s refusal to attempt a separate
^^^Dismemberment of the Jordan territory by con­
tinuous Israeli occupation poses a threat that the kingdom 
may disintegrate. The collapse of Jordan is viewed as ad­
verse to the U.S. policy in the region since the latter has 
been trying to uphold the independence and territorial in­
tegrity of that country since the proclamation of the Eisen- 
hov/er Doctrine. This was because the country was considered 
an element of stability in the region, as a state friendly 
to the West, and because it resisted Communist infiltration 
by rejecting Soviet offers of aid, Lenczowski, op. cit., 
p. 11.
120For example, Johnson's message to Eshkol regard­
ing the status of Jerusalem was not given any attention as 
Israel decided to annex the Old City. Financial Times. 
November 21, 1967.
Expressions by prominent Americans had been usually 
deferential to Israel in her dispute with the Arab states. 
Shortly before his inauguration. President elect John P. 
Kennedy, for instance, told Ben Gurion: "I was elected by 
the Jews of New York, and I would like to do something for 
the Jewish people." (C.L. Sulzberger, New York Times, July 
31, 1968; Ben Gurion was quoted as commenting, "I was 
shocked, Y/hy should he say such a thing to a foreigner?" 
Cited in Lenczowski, United States Interest in the I/hddle 
East, p. 31.)
In their television debate on June 1, 1968, Sena­
tors Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy - then presidential 
aspirants - both spoke of American "commitment" to Israel, 
as an exception to their general views. Ibid., p. 31.
121
Hodes, op. cit., p. 160.
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peace treaty - which to him was a political impossibility -
resulted in U.S. retaliation v/hen it informed Jordan not
to expect any more budgetary assistance. The United States
Government also threatened that it would not sink more
money into Jordan's war-shattered economy "unless the King
122took a more realistic position." vYhile this decision 
was ostensibly based on Jordan's acceptance of Arab sub­
sidy, many observers believe that Husayn "was being pun­
ished for declaring war on Israel and for refusing to ac­
cept the realities of defeat.
Although the United States has no public treaties 
with Israel, nevertheless, unofficial commitments for its 
defense and economic development have been a substitute. 
Consequently, Israel has been enjoying almost unlimited 
American political support particularly at the United Na­
tions. Furthermore, Israel has been the recipient of
125large amounts of military equipment as well as Foreign Aid.
122ibid., p. 161.
^^^Daily Telegraph. January 9, 1968; George Lenczow­
ski, "Arab Sloe Realignments," Current History. (December, 
1967), p. 346.
^^^On June 7, 1967, C.L. Salzburger of the New York 
Times refuted the idea that the U.S. policy in the Arab- 
Israeli dispute was even-handed. He, instead, character­
ized it by saying "Washington is about as neutral on Pales­
tine as Peking on Vietnam."
The New York Times on June 29, 1967, reported that 
the U.S.A. had ^ven "diplomatic support" to Israel throu^- 
out the 1967 crisis.
125In answer to a question, Lban said that the U.
S. "should strengthen Israel to the maximal degree. There
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Until June of 1967, Husayn's relations with the 
United States were friendly and cooperative. However, a 
drastic change took place as the U.S. policy toward the 
Arabs became hardened regarding a peace settlement. This 
placed Husayn in a precarious position. He explained:
Due to the indifferent attitude of the United 
States and her one-sided policy up to now in terras 
of support to Israel, the constant question I am 
asked by the leaders of the Arab world is, "As a 
friend of the United States, what has the U.S. done 
for you in Jordan in your present crisis?" and I 
find it exceedingly difficult to answer that, un­
fortunately. 126
Conclusion
Essentially American-Jordanian relations assumed 
significance with the implementation of the Eisenhower Doc-
is progress in that." Issues y d  Answers on A.B.C. Tele­
vision Network, October 4, 197Ô.
In December, 1970, the U.S. Congress approved a 
.$500 million aid bill to Israel. By contrast, on December 
10, following King Husayn's visit to President Nixon, Jor­
dan was given a .$30 million in military aid.
Husayn, interview on A.B.C.'s "Issues and Answer", 
May 3, 1970.
The Arabs charge that Israel's preemptive strike 
in 1967 was with knowledge and approval of the U.S.A.
Haykal added that "the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediter­
ranean is a military and a strategic reserve for Israel if 
matters became critical." M.H. Haykal, "This is the Real 
Crisis," Al-A]p^. June 19, 1970.
In a television conversation with reporters from 
the three networks on July 1, 1970, President Nixon re­
vealed the true pro-Zionist, anti-Arab U.S. policy as he 
said: " . . .  The other Arab countries do want to drive Is­
rael into the Sea. . . . We will do what is necessary to 
maintain Israel's strength vis a vis its neighbors,. . . . "
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trine. Although Husayn had failed to officially adhere 
to the American plan, Jordan reaped the political, military 
and economic "benefits provided by the Doctrine.
ICing Husayn was perhaps more determined to recog­
nize the Eisenhower Doctrine than the Baghdad Pact, since 
American aid and protection became more urgent than during 
his confrontation with the nationalists in 1954. The crys- 
talization of the nationalists’ opposition to the Palace 
posed significant danger to the regime, particularly when 
the Cabinet under pro-Nasser Prime Minister Nabulsi and a 
few high ranking officers including the C.G.S., Gener­
al Ali Abu Nuwar, himself a Jordanian, adopted an all Arab 
policy and recommended establishing diplomatic relations 
with the Communist bloc.
Realizing that the first was aimed at placing him 
in an inferior position to Nasser, and the second would 
have isolated Jordan from the West, Husayn concluded that 
his salvation lay in Western protection through adhering 
to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Since the American policy 
aimed at crushing the pro-Nasser nationalists as well as 
halting Communist subversion in the region, the objectives 
of Husayn and the Eisenhower Doctrine appeared to coincide. 
By recognizing the Doctrine, Husayn would receive American 
political support to quell the tide of nationalist danger 
thus preserving his throne, and the independence of Jordan. 
Furthermore, he would secure a more dependable financial
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aid to replace the Arab subsidy. Husayn'a pro-Western at­
titude was a matter of personal conviction, While depend­
ence on the Arab subsidy might eventually result in ending 
Jordan’s political independence, the American aid would 
perform the opposite. Thus, to Husayn, association with 
the West became more valuable than Arab cooperation.
Aside from Husayn's personal desires, the external 
setting also dictated his positive response, for failure 
to do so, could have been even more devastating to Jordan. 
Jordan was faced with the threat of a military attack from 
Israel which the country's military capability could not 
possibly prevent. The American Ambassador warned that un­
less Husayn took stern measures to eliminate the national­
ist elements from the Cabinet, the Parliament and the Army, 
intervention by Israel to prevent the pro-Nasser group from 
taking over would be inevitable and that the United States 
would not stop it. Realizing that the United States was 
using Israel's military to enforce its policy in the Arab 
world, Husayn had no alternative. Thus the Zarqa incident 
was staged to provide the Palace with a pretext for the 
dismissal of the nationalist army officers and the quelling 
of public clamor for restoring the pro-Nasser Cabinet led 
by Prime Minister Nabulsi. Thus Husayn carried his revolu­
tion under the protective shadow of the Sixth Fleet and the 
threat of an Israeli invasion, appointed General Habis 
Majali a loyal conservative as C.G.S., and restored to the
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Palace the powers which the Nahiilsl group had monopolized, 
Por a decade, Jordan was placed under the United 
States protective umbrella because King Husayn played the 
American game of curtailing the Arab revolutionary progress 
as well as minimizing Communist influence in the region.
It appeared that Jordan was chosen as the testing grounds 
for Western policies, as all requirements were present. 
While the King benefited significantly, the United States' 
gains were greater. The success of Western strategy sec­
ured American influence in the region for a decade.
The United States policy in the Arab World has, 
ostensibly been aimed at stopping the Soviets. However, 
behind this facade was the policy of protecting the oil.
This policy aimed at preventing the control of Arab oil by
the revolutionary regimes which might nationalize it, or 
by the Soviet Union per se. Thus Nasser's victory in the 
Yaman war was interpreted as a prototype for revolutionary 
trend aiming at eliminating the conservative regimes. Elab­
orating on this point, the New York Times wrote on April 
17, 1967Î
The glittering prize on the horizon is the 
oil of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf 
. . . .  A part of the prize could be command of 
the Middle East. . , •
The United States policy has emphasized non-direct
involvement in the Middle East, Its instrument has been
Israel which has been the receiver of the eternal American
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economic and military aids. The New York Times of June 
11, 1967 reported:
The United States. « . must rely on a local 
power, the deterrent of a friendly power as a first 
line to stave off American direct involvement. Is­
rael feels that she fits this definition. . .
But if the American policy aimed at humiliating 
Nasser, thereby stemming the tide the Arab revolution while 
keeping the Arab oil out of Nasser's grip, why a "friend" 
as Husayn was made to suffer immensely as a result of the 
1967 war? A logical explanation may be found in the fact 
that the West considered Jordan as having served its pur­
pose, and that friendship with Israel was considered more 
valuable as well as more permanent.
CHAPTER XVI 
CONCLUSION
The foreign policy of Jordan has been the product 
of the dynamics of the interaction between its internal 
setting and the geopolitical environment. Several factors 
have influenced the substance and the process of foreign 
policy. They include (1) geography, (2) the monarchy, (3) 
the economy, (4) the role of Israel, and (5) the role of 
the Arab states.
Though small in population and productivity, Jordan 
had held a pivotal position in the game of nations, both 
locally and internationally. Jordan's geographical circum­
stances have shaped its foreign policy. Its geographic 
location has endowed it with strategic importance rendering 
it a pawn both in the inter-Arab and the international 
struggle to dominate the Middle East. This situation may 
have been based on the assumption that whoever controls 
Jordan controls the Arab East and in turn whoever controls 
the Arab East controls the Middle East. On the local level, 
Jordan has been the object of control by Egypt and Iraq, 
because of its central position in the Arab world, as was
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the case with the U.A.R. and the Arab Union in 1958, It 
links Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria on the one hand, and 
on the other it links the Arab East with Egypt, Eurthermore, 
control of Jordan's territory is strategically curcial to 
the containment of Israeli expansion. In this regard, Ben 
Gurion declared that without Jordan, there would not be an 
Arab unity, and that Israel's occupation of Jordan would 
also end Arab spiritual unity. On the international level, 
however, Jordan has been and will continue to be coveted 
by both camps.
Throughout its history, the palace in Jordan had a 
virtual monopoly of all powers in the state. Thus, in spite 
of the efforts of the Cabinet and Parliament, particularly 
in 1956, the making of the foreign policy rested almost ex­
clusively in the hands of the ICing, whose character and per­
sonality were of crucial significance in determining the 
foreign policy of Jordan,
The characteristics of the political culture during 
Abdullah's reign were a decisive factor in his monopoly 
over the conduct of Jordan's foreign relations. His auto­
cratic outlook and patriarchial rule precluded political 
opposition and.rendered democracy and parliamentary insti­
tutions a mere facade. Held by coercive cohesion, the pop­
ulation were for the most part precluded from political 
participation. The King tolerated no opposition as he sup­
pressed all ideological groups at both ends of the spectrum.
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He only approved of traditional, pro-monarchial, Transjor­
dan parties which accepted his autocratic rule.
The union with Palestine, however, brought with it 
the problems of integrating the socially, culturally, eco­
nomically, and politically different populations. The sit­
uation developed into a Palestinian-Transjordanian, Muslim- 
Ghristian problem. The Transjordan population represented 
a factor of stability; the Palestinian a force of instabil­
ity. While the Kuslim majority looked for union with other 
Arab states and desired an end to all connections with Bri­
tain and the West, the Christian minority, on the other 
hand, preferred the continuation of British influence in 
Jordan through which they secured better government posi­
tions as well as protection. Consequently, adaptation and 
assimilation of the different groups caused friction which 
inevitably became a significant factor influencing the con­
duct of Jordan's foreign relations.
The introduction of the politically involved Pales­
tinians into the Jordan polity brought untold problems to 
the monarchy. The articulate Palestinians attacked Abdul­
lah for his autocratic rule, for suppressing political op­
position and for his alliance and subservience to Britain. 
They demanded liberalization and clamored for republican­
ism. Having become Jordanian subjects, they demanded re­
presentation in a truly representative government. They 
placed the monarchy under fire, for hitherto the country's
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politics had been oligarchic in nature since the Cabinet 
was the King's personal instrument and the Legislature was 
pov/erless, Abdullah, however, fought these manifestations 
with vigor and determination.
Until annexation, Abdullah, who believed in and 
practiced patriarchal rule, was not concerned with such 
problems as constitutional reforms, fundamental rights, 
and parliamentary sovereignty which the Palestinians began 
to question. He was determined not to sacrifice his royal 
prerogatives to appease the new articulate opposition. In­
stead, he considered their attacks as subversive, aimed 
not only at the monarchy but at the separate existence of 
the state. He declared their action to be open treason 
and treated it accordingly. In the meantime, Abdullah took 
advantage of the division among the Palestinian leadership. 
Most appointments of Palestinians to senior posts were based 
more on consideration of loyalty to him than to merit.
The Jordan polity was tranquil until the annexation. 
The Palestine issue brought fresh challenges to Abdullah as 
instability v/as caused by factors of agitation. These were 
his relations with Britain, his attitude toward Israel, and 
the economic situation.
Despite the fact that an assault on the Jordanian 
monarchy was made by Abdullah's assassination, his regime 
faced insignificant problems compared to Husayn's. In the 
main, Abdullah's encounter with Arab nationalists centered
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on the fact that Jordan politics were greatly influenced 
by the country's relations with Britain, hven independence, 
when granted in 1946, was largely theoretical since the 
country lacked the economic, military, and political requi­
sites for statehood. As these manifestations gained momen- 
tujn and became explosive issues, Husayn was confronted with 
more violent attacks, which compelled him to Arabize the 
army in 1956 and to end the treaty relationship with Bri­
tain. British influence v/as the bone of contention between 
the nationalists and the Hashemites, and persisted to be a 
significant factor in the uncertainty of political life in 
Jordan.
The dissatisfaction of the Palestinians centered 
on the discrepancy between the provisions of the constitu­
tion and the practices of the state. V/hereas Abdullah was 
autocratic by nature, his son, Prince Talal ( the father of 
Husayn) had the making of a democratic king. Annexation 
and the assassination of King Abdullah, as well as the de­
sire of King Talal to end the autocratic rule, required the 
revision of the constitution. This took place in January, 
1952, thus partially satisfying the demands of the opposi­
tion. Although the new instrument stressed Cabinet respon­
sibility to the Parliament instead of the Palace, the pow­
ers of the King were not reduced. They remained substan­
tially strong. The King continued to appoint the Prime 
Minister and the House of Notables, to dissolve the Parlia-
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ment and to veto legislation.
During King Abdullah's reign, the Palace bore the 
Arabic-1slamio impact, which emphasized unquestioned alle­
giance to the King thus facilitating his autocratic pater­
nalistic rule. By contrast, Husayn's British training in­
stilled in him the Western ideas of democracy: political 
parties and parliamentary sovereignty. However, despite 
the difference in orientation, Husayn followed in Abdul­
lah's footsteps. He relied on the elder statesment who 
were trained in Abdullah's service to implement his poli­
cies. Ruling the country riddled with crisis, Husayn ap­
plied all his powers, and until 1967, when the P.L.O, 
challenged his authority, he was a strong ruler.
JAiring the last two decades, the Palestinian major­
ity wanted to dominate the politics of Jordan, They were, 
for the most part, not loyal to the Hashemites whom they 
considered selfish and an obstacle to Arab unity, a unity 
which they favored to Jordanian parochial nationalism.
To appease the opposition, the 1953 lav/ permitted 
the establishment of political parties. In theory, any 
party could be allowed to operate but in reality only the 
conservative, moderate parties were in fact licensed.
In his encounter with the nationalists, Husayn 
sensed that opposition to Abdullah was of a different na- 
ture. After the rise of Nasser to Arab leadership, popular 
allegiance to the Hashemites was determined by one factor
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alone: Jordan's relationship with Egypt. King Husayn en­
joyed full support of both the array and the subjects as long 
as he maintained cooperative relations with Nasser. He re­
alized that sixty-five percent of the population were at­
tracted to Pan-Arabisra represented in Nasser's leadership. 
Since this popular force appeared potentially dangerous 
to the security of the state, his solution was to integrate 
politically the leaders of the opposition into the elites 
of the state. Although he limited their influence by re­
fusing to appoint them in the major organs of the state - 
which remained exclusively for thé Transjordanians - his 
liberalization and integration policy may have been his 
greatest achievement, since it narrowed the gap between 
the pro-raonarchial Transjordanian leadership and the emerg­
ing West Bank leadership. However, this policy almost cost 
him his throne, as the pro-Nasser nationalists controlled 
the Cabinet and the Parliament and tried to alter the di­
rection of Jordan's foreign policy to a purely Arab one.
Suppressing the opposition, regardless of the method, 
gained for Jordan the description of a garrison state, for 
coercion, rather than consensus for political action and 
for ruling, appeared to dominate. This attitude was made 
possible as both kings were supported by the army, the 
backbone of the monarchy. Having exercised ^  facto con­
trol of the state, the army became the final arbiter of 
political power in the country. Subsidized and patronized
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by the kings, it became the ally of the Palace and the 
guardian of the throne. In particular, the kings have de­
pended upon the Bedouin elements who believed that since 
the Hashemites were the direct descendants of the Prophet, 
disloyalty was a sinful act. With such unswerving loyalty, 
the kings ruled fairly autocratically, as they felt safe 
against revolutionary thinking in the military establish­
ment.
Before annexation, the army was not involved in 
politics. With the infusion of new population and by of­
fering all groups the opportunity to serve, the army's 
political role acquired a new dimension. The Palestine 
question brought instability to Transjordan in the form of 
two related factors; Israeli aggression and the dissatis­
faction of the Palestinians. Border incidents had their 
immediate effects inside the country, as the population 
blamed the government for its inability to defend its cit­
izens. This inevitably caused the loyalty of the officers 
to waver. Consequently, solidarity was diluted as the army 
officers and personnel came to hold divergent political 
views ranging from the support of the monarchy to advocacy 
of republicanism.
King Abdullah was a "statesman" in the sense that 
he was a leader who thought of the future generations. His 
vision was to head a large Arab state. Although he was a 
competent strategist, he was also a poor tactician. However,
468
he seemed unav/are of the realistic political and power as­
pects of the situation. His autocratic mentality ignored 
Arab nationalism and the force of public opinion as both 
factors rejected autocratic rule and preferred representa­
tive democracy and republioanism. Nonetheless, his person­
ality and political drive were factors to reckon with, as 
General Glubb related;
When King Abdullah was alive, Syria and Saudi 
Arabia lived in fear of Jordan, and Hgypt, with 
fourteen times her population, viewed her with 
anxiety as a rival. So immense can be the power 
and influence of one man. 1
Abdullah's motives to create a Great Syria revolved 
around his personal ambition to rule an Arab kingdom as pro­
mised by Britain. Such a kingdom would provide sufficient 
economic and manpower capabilities to enable him to secure 
freedom from British dictation. At the same time, he would 
be able to compete effectively with the other Arab rulers. 
His dream may have been a reflection of the idea of a Mus­
lim Middle East bloc which would place him in a respectable 
role in both Arab and Islamic worlds. Thus his eagerness 
to annex eastern Palestine may have been due to his view 
that this would be a first step to the realization of his 
political aspirations.
"Unrealism" appeared to be an important factor which 
Abdullah did not take into consideration. Although Jordan's
^Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 438.
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economic and military capabilities were exceedingly inade­
quate in supporting his political aspirations, he persisted 
in his efforts to realize a Hashemite domination over Great 
Syria. I'urthermore, the external environment opposed, 
rather than eased, his program. Thus, while it was practi­
cal to annex Arab Palestine which had no actual state or 
effective leadership, it was impossible to sway the Syrians 
to his program. It must be recalled that the major obstacle 
had been his insistence on monarchial and dynastic inter­
ests. Abdullah never won the initiative in Syria for split­
ting the Hashemites had contributed to their ineffective­
ness. His continued claim to Syria had done the Arabs grave 
injury. While his policy revived enmities, it divided the 
Arabs where it sought to unite them.
Safeguarding the security of the state is a para­
mount foreign policy goal. A foreign policy is never 
totally divorced from security considerations. The forma­
tion of the U.A.R. in 1958 heralded a new dawn for Arab 
unity. The Egyptian extension in North Arabia, the irre- 
sistable tide of Arab nationalism, and the clamor of the 
majority of the Jordan population to join the U.A.R. pre­
sented Husayn with a problem of significant consequences. 
Joining the U.A.R. meant sacrificing the Hashemite claim
to leadership as well as his throne. In order to preserve
the Jordan entity, the Hashemite kings, in response to the 
U.A.R. and their dynastic interests, established their own
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union. One might surmize that the collapse of the United 
Arah Republic might have been caused by the absence of Jordan.
Neither Abdullah nor Husayn was ever at ease with 
the other Arab leaders. Having espoused Jordanian parochial 
nationalism, both suppressed opposition which appeared to 
be a potential threat to their regimes and their monarchy.
This sheds light on Abdullah's disagreements with the Arab 
League which he considered an instrument to block his per­
sonal plans. Husayn, too, has never been at ease with the 
Arab revolutionary regimes which he believes to have con­
stituted the major threat to Jordan's conservative monarchy. 
This state of affairs inevitably resulted in the Arab cold 
war which was tantamount to a contest for Arab leadership 
between the conservative and progressive regimes.
Both Kings Abdullah and Husayn have claimed Arab 
leadership as heirs of the Arab revolt of World V/ar I and 
have considered Jordan the nucleus for a comprehensive Arab 
unity. Accordingly, they would agree to such a unity if 
they were to lead it. Contrariwise, they insisted on the 
preservation of the independence of monarchial Jordan against 
outside attempts at Arab unity, such as the U.A.R.
King Abdullah had developed his own brand of Arab 
nationalism, namely Jordanian or Hashemite nationalism.
Just as Abdullah, Husayn considered Jordanian nationalism 
as true Arab nationalism and declared that Jordan would be 
the "model Arab state." Thus Husayn differed with Nasser on
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the iüsue of Arab nationalism, lîasser equated comprehensive 
Arab unity with Arab nationalism. To avoid sacrificing Jor­
dan to an Arab unity in which the Hashemite monarchy would 
disappear, Husayn stressed local nationalism and on many 
occasions requested foreign intervention to achieve this 
goal. In this regard, he accused Nasser of using Arab unity 
as a pretext for Hgyptian imperialsm. To Husayn acquies- 
ence to Nasser's policies meant capitulation which he re- 
si sted.
Another aspect of Jordan's foreign policy under 
Husayn has been flexibility which enabled him to exhibit 
cordiality when it was in Jordan's interest. While Abdul­
lah's policy was to trust no one except Iraq, it became 
a landmark in Husayn's foreign policy to associate with one 
state or a bloc, Arab or Western, when such action provided 
him with security of the monarchy. Husayn would associate 
with the Arab revolutionary regimes to gain support against 
external threats such as Israel as was the case on tlay 30,
1967. On the other hand, he would associate with the con­
servative monarchial Saudi Arabia and Yaman against the 
progressive regimes as was the case in the Yamani war.
One of Jordan's chronic problems has been that of 
the economy. Since the state has been unviable economi­
cally, its dependence on external assistance has to a large 
degree influenced the direction of its foreign relations.
The subservience of kings Abdullah and Husayn to Britain
472
was in the main occasioned "by Jordan's dependence on Bri­
tish subsidy which had been the basic factor in the survival 
of the state.
Abdullah's peace negotiations with Israel had be­
gun even before hostilities erupted in 1948, and continued 
during and after the war. liis rationale was that Jordan's 
military and economic capabilities could not sustain pro­
longed hostilities. Jordan's economy depended on peace 
with Israel, for hostilities meant economic blockade of 
land-locked Jordan. Traditionally, Jordan's trade was re­
ceived at ports on the Mediterranean. In the absence of 
peace, Jordan was left with two alternatives: to pay tran­
sit duties to Lebanon and Syria or to use its southern port 
of Aqaba through the Suez Canal. In both cases, Jordan's 
economy would suffer. Thus peace talks with Israel became 
an urgent matter. Abdullah's peace proposals included 
giving Jordan port privileges on the Mediterranean and the 
concluding of a non-aggression pact, furthermore, Abdullah 
had other motives. By finalizing peace, Israel would recog­
nize his control of Eastern Palestine. Once this goal was 
accomplished, Jordan would be recognized by foreign powers 
and would be admitted into the U.N. Thus economic assis­
tance would be forthcoming, particularly from the U.S. and 
through the U.K.
When Britain decided to restore its political influ­
ence in the Arab world through the Baghdad Pact, Husayn
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became determined to join the alliance through which large 
amounts of economic assistance,sorely needed for develop­
mental projects,were promised. However, the violent op­
position, Arab nationalism, and anti-British feeling forced 
Husayn to abandon the idea.
The te r m in a t io n  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  s u b s id y  i n  1957 l e f t  
Jordan a t  th e  mercy o f  th e  Arab s t a t e s .  Husayn dreaded de­
pendence on th e m ,fo r  such  dependence would i n e v i t a b l y  put  
the monarchy and th e  c o u n t r y ' s  d e s t i n y  i n  th e  hands o f  th e  
A rabs. H is f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  would have to  be i n  l i n e  w ith  
th e  c o n t r i b u t i n g  s t a t e s .  A c c o r d in g ly ,  he p r e fe r r e d  depen­
dence on B r i t a i n  i n s t e a d .  He m ight have been o f  th e  o p in ­
io n  t h a t  w h i le  B r i t a i n  would sh a re  h i s  i n t e r e s t  i n  p r e s e r v ­
in g  th e  in d ep en d en ce  o f  th e  H ashem ite d y n a s ty ,  th e  Arabs -  
Saudi A ra b ia , E gyp t, and S y r ia  - t r a d i t i o n a l  r i v a l s  o f  th e  
H ashem ites -  m ight w e l l  b r in g  an end t o  Jordan a s  a s t a t e .
To free himself from this critical situation,
Husayn played the American game by declaring that the 
Nabulsi Cabinet and Parliament, as well as the army had 
been infiltrated by Communists and that Communism was the 
major cause for instability in Jordan. Under the protec­
tive eye of the U.S.A., Husayn executed his coup against 
the nationalists and the army, thus bringing Jordan within 
the American sphere of influence. Although Husayn encoun­
tered the same opposition when he planned to adhere to the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, he nonetheless, became the recipient
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of an i'lmericari oubsidy replacing' the Arab aid. At the 
same time, the independence and territorial integrity of 
Jordan were preserved, but at the cost of perpetual inter­
nal instability for the Arab nationalists interpreted such 
an association as the return of Western colonialism in 
other forms aiming at dividing the Arabs when they needed 
unity most.
The future of Jordan remains uncertain. Its inde­
pendence is being permanently threatened by external as 
well as internal pressures: the threat of an Israeli in­
vasion, and Arab nationalism, both aiming at destroying 
Jordan's sovereignty. Significantly, the major Arab pro­
tagonists, on the one hand, and Israel on the other, are 
not convinced that Jordan, as a buffer state, has outlived 
its usefulness. The Palestine Pedayeen Movement has devel­
oped into a significant political and military force chal­
lenging Kusayn's regime, and has become his main concern 
and worry. Ironically, while the Arab nationalists and 
Husayn consider Israel the main threat to the Arab world, 
the existence of Jordan as an independent state has been 
contigent upon the continued survival of the state of Israel. 
Fearing that a change in Jordan's political identity would 
increase the threat to its security, Israel often threat­
ened to intervene.
Despite the varied negative factors governing its 
survival, Jordan continues to exist. This may be attributed
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to the personality, courage, determination and political 
finesse of Kings Abdullah and Husayn. However, the course 
of events in Jordan will be determined by the general con­
ditions in the Middle East and the world situation. So 
long as Israel continues to hold the military and the poli­
tical balance in the region, and the Arabs remain disunited, 
Jordan's political status is not likely to change.
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